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Summary 
 
The worsening scarcity of fresh water resources has led to an increasing number of 
people without sustainable access to safe water across the globe. Water privatisation 
has been presented as the panacea to addressing the global water crisis. 
Privatisation of water has heightened the impetus for the explicit recognition of water 
as a human right. This dissertation seeks to establish the legal status of the right to 
water under international human rights law. The dissertation further attempts to 
ascertain the scope and normative content of such a right. In order to answer these 
questions, this dissertation carries out a detailed analysis of the possible legal basis, 
scope and normative content of the right to water under international human rights 
law. The principal question that arises is how a State can ensure compliance with its 
human rights obligations in the event of involvement of non-State actors such as 
private corporations in the management and distribution of water services. This 
dissertation‘s main hypothesis is that although privatisation of water services does 
not relieve the State of its legal responsibility under international human rights law, 
such privatisation imposes certain obligations on private actors consistent with the 
right to water. The dissertation goes beyond articulating normative considerations 
and looks at implementation at the national level by highlighting good practices on 
the practical implementation of the right to water consistent with the normative 
standards imposed by the right. The dissertation‘s key contribution is its development 
of an accountability model to ensure that States and private actors involved in the 
provision of water services have clearly designated roles and responsibilities 
consistent with the human right to water. If properly implemented, the model has the 
potential to give greater specification to the normative commitments imposed by the 
right to water in privatisation scenarios. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iv 
 
Opsomming 
Die verergerende skaarste van vars water bronne het aanleiding gegee tot die 
toename in die hoeveelheid mense sonder volhoubare toegang tot veilige water oor 
die hele aarde. Dit word aangevoer dat die privatisering van water die wondermiddel 
is om die globale water krisis aan te spreek. Die privatisering van water het 
aanleiding gegee tot ‗n verskerpte aandrang om water uitdruklik te erken as ‗n 
mensereg. Hierdie proefskrif poog om die regsstatus van die reg tot water te vestig 
binne die raamwerk van internasionale menseregte. Die proefskrif probeer verder om 
vas te stel wat die omvang en normatiewe inhoud van so ‗n reg sal wees. Vervolgens 
voltrek hierdie proefskrif ‗n uitvoerige analise van die moontlike regsbasis, omvang 
en normatiewe inhoud van die reg tot water binne die raamwerk van internasionale 
menseregte. Die vernaamste vraag wat opduik is hoe ‗n Staat kan verseker dat sy 
menseregte verpligtinge nagekom word waar nie-Regeringsrolspelers soos 
korporasies betrokke is by die bestuur en distribusie van waterdienste. Die kern 
hipotese van hierdie proefskrif is dat alhoewel die privatisering van waterdienste nie 
die Staat verlig van sy regsverpligtinge in terme van internasionale menseregte nie, 
sodanige privatisering sekere verpligtinge aan privaatrolspelers voorskryf wat in lyn is 
met die reg op water. Hierdie proefskrif gaan verder as die artikulering van 
normatiewe oorwegings en kyk ook na die implementering op nasionale vlak deur 
goeie praktyke uit te lig met betrekking tot die prakiese implementering van die reg 
tot water wat konsekwent is met die normatiewe standaarde wat die reg voorskryf. 
Die kern bydrae van hierdie proefskrif is die ontwikkeling van ‗n 
aanspreeklikheismodel wat versker dat Regerings en privaat rolspelers wat betrokke 
is by die voorsiening van waterdienste duidelik aangewysde funksies en 
verantwoordelikhede het wat in lyn is met die reg tot water. Indien hierdie model 
behoorlik implementeer word, het dit die potensiaal om grooter spesifikasie te gee 
aan die normatiewe verpligtinge wat deur die reg tot water voorgeskryf word in 
privatiserings scenarios. 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
1 1  Background to the study 
Access to safe water is essential to sustain human life and indispensable to ensure a 
healthy and dignified life.1 A significant portion of the world‘s population lacks basic 
access to safe water which leads to a substantial global burden of disease and death 
from water-related diseases. Lack of access to safe water has been tied to sixty per 
cent of the world‘s illnesses.2 Furthermore, lack of access to safe water has been 
considered as one of the greatest obstacles to development.3 The latest official 
figures published by the World Health Organisation (hereinafter referred to as 
―WHO‖) and the United Nations Children‘s Fund (hereinafter referred to as ―UNICEF‖) 
indicate that 894 million people lack access to safe water for domestic use.4 The 
WHO and UNICEF report further estimates that globally, 88 per cent of diarrhoeal 
deaths are due to inadequate availability of water for hygienic purposes.5   
Water related diseases are some of the leading causes of death in developing 
countries. Water-borne diseases such as cholera, typhoid and diarrhoea are 
associated with lack of access to safe water. For instance, the largest ever recorded 
cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe in mid-August 2008 left a staggering 98 592 cases 
including 4 288 deaths by the 30th July 2009.6 According to the United Nations 
                                                     
1
 T Kiefer & V Roaf ―The Human Right to Water and Sanitation-Benefits and Limitations‖ in M 
Mancisidor (ed) The Human Right to Water – Current Situation and Future Challenges (2005) 1 4; EB 
Bluemel ―Implications of Formulating Human Right to Water‖ 2004 (31) Ecology Law Quarterly 957 
957; M Williams ―Privatisation and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century‖ (2006-
2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 469 469-470. As noted by the Harvard Law Review, 
―the impact of water‘s increasing scarcity has grown more pronounced in recent decades, and so too 
has its importance in the public consciousness.‖ See Harvard Law Review ―What Price for the 
Priceless?: Implementing the Justiciability of the Right to Water‖ (2007) 20 Harvard Law Review 1067 
1068. Screiber also notes that ―water is a fundamental aspect of human development, dignity and 
health. See W Screiber ―Realising the Right to Water in International Investment Law: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to BIT Obligations‖ 2008 (48) National Resources Journal 431 431. 
2
 V Petrova ―At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatisation and the Human Right to 
Water‖ 2006 (31) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 557 580. 
3
 Harvard Law Review ―What Price for the Priceless?: Implementing the Justiciability of the Right to 
Water‖ (2007) 20 Harvard Law Review 1067 1071. 
4
 See World Health Organisation & United Nations Children‘s Fund Progress on Sanitation and 
Drinking Water (2010) 7. 
5
 7. The UN General Assembly, in a watershed resolution adopted in 2010 on the right to water and 
sanitation, graphically illustrates the dire magnitude of the global water crisis. See preamble to the UN 
General Assembly The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (2010) A/64/L.63/Rev.1 and Add.1 para 
4. 
6
 See World Health Organisation Cholera Country Profile: Zimbabwe (2009) 6. 
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(hereinafter referred to as ―UN‖) Human Rights Council, approximately 1.5 million 
children under 5 years of age die as a result of water-related diseases.7  
Lack of access to water also has an enormous impact on human 
development. Water is a multi-purpose resource that is used not only for personal, 
domestic as well as for industrial and agricultural use,8 but it is also essential for food 
security, economic development, and for securing livelihoods.9 In addition to the 
more apparent consequences that result from lack of access to an adequate supply 
of safe water highlighted above, there are secondary, less apparent effects. These 
include reduced school attendance, as well as the negative impact on the ability of 
communities or individuals to earn a living through subsistence farming or other 
water-dependent livelihoods.10 Lack of access to safe water in the vicinity of the 
home has particular impact on women and children. Many children, especially girls, 
spend their days carrying water from distant sources rather than going to school, 
which has a negative impact on their enjoyment of the right to an education. The UN 
has estimated that 443 million school days are lost every year as a result of water-
related diseases.11  
It is further important to note that the linkage between poverty and water 
shortage is well established. Those who do not have access to sufficient water are 
geographically located in the poorer regions of the developing world.12 Rural women, 
especially in developing countries, lack time for income-generating activities as they 
have to walk long distances to access water sources as well as attending to those 
suffering from water related diseases.13 The UN‘s 2009 World Water Report points 
out that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage of people living in absolute poverty is 
                                                     
7
 See preamble to the UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water 
and Sanitation (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/L.14 para 6. 
8
 IT Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water 
Allocation (2012) 1. See also LK Nkonya ―Realising the Human Right to Water in Tanzania‖ (2010) 17 
Human Rights Brief 25 25. 
9
 2. 
10
 A Hardberger ―Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the 
Duties and Obligations it Creates‖ (2005) 4 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 311 
312. 
11
 See preamble to the UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water 
and Sanitation (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/L.14 para 6. 
12
 SMA Salman & S McInerny-Lankford The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions 
(2004) vii. 
13
 Williams 2006-2007 Michigan Journal of International Law 471. 
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essentially the same as it was 25 years ago. The report further states that 340 million 
Africans lack access to safe drinking water.14  
The above figures could be higher as the indicator used for these figures is 
access to an improved water source yet criteria such as safety and affordability of the 
water service are not considered.15 Marginalised and poor communities may not 
afford the water service; water services may be inaccessible with communities 
spending inordinately long time waiting to access a water source. Affordability of 
water services has an enormous impact on the quantities of water consumed, 
alongside other factors such as physical accessibility and water quality. Even 
improved water sources such as wells and boreholes may not supply water services 
regularly or the water may be contaminated.  
The global water crisis has become a topical issue, generating complex and 
extensive debates within the UN and other international foras.16 The need for a global 
consensus to combat the water crisis is addressed in the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (hereinafter referred to as ―MDGs‖) adopted by world leaders at 
the turn of the century.17 One of the set targets is to reduce by half the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe water by 2015.18 Even the ambitiously 
worded MDGs call for a reduction of only 50 per cent in the number of people without 
sustainable access to water.19 Access to safe water is also important for the 
realisation of related socio-economic rights such as health, education and poverty 
eradication.20  
The global water crisis highlighted above has resulted in calls for the treatment 
of water as an economic good.21 The notion of regarding water as an economic good 
implies that all water services are based on the principle of full cost recovery.22 The 
principle of full cost recovery seeks the recovery of all costs related to the provision 
                                                     
14
 World Water Assessment Programme/UNESCO The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 3: Water in a Changing World (2009) xii <http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/> 
(accessed 23.09.2010). 
15
 Winkler The Human Right to Water 2. 
16
 Salman & McInerny-Lankford The Human Right to Water vii. 
17
 Target 10 of goal 7 is to ―halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water‖ UN Millennium Development Goals (2000) <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (accessed 
12.03.2010). 
18
 See Target 10 of goal 7 of the MDGs. 
19
 K Bakker Privatising Water: Governance Failure and the World‘s Urban Water Crisis (2010) 9. 
20
 Winkler The Human Right to Water 6. 
21
 See K Moyo ―Privatisation of the Commons: Water as a Right; Water as a Commodity‖ (2011) 22 
Stellenbosch Law Review 804 804. 
22
 See Bluemel 2004 Ecology Law Quarterly 964. 
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of water, primarily operationalised through the pricing of water.23 It is significant that 
the conceptualisation of water as an economic good, and full cost recovery as its 
corollary, opened up the water sector to privatisation.24 The global water scarcity is 
depicted as justifying the privatisation of water and the adoption of cost-reflective 
pricing.25 This is predicated on the argument that water is a scarce resource which 
must be priced at full economic cost. This will enable further investments in water 
services to facilitate access to the unserved and underserved individuals and 
communities.26  
The world water crisis saw the International Financial Institutions (hereinafter 
referred to as ―IFIs‖), in collaboration with donor agencies and regional development 
banks, vigorously pushing for privatisation of water supply services.27 The World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as the ―IMF‖) and 
regional development banks, particularly in the mid-1990s, started to push for 
privatisation of water supply services. These institutions promoted the involvement of 
multinational water corporations in particular as the panacea to the global water 
crisis.28 The private sector was viewed as bringing much-needed financing, 
efficiency, management skills and technology to the water services sector.29 Water 
privatisation therefore became the centrepiece of the IFIs, so-called water think tanks 
and donor agencies‘ policies in the water sector.30 The insistence on water 
privatisation was based on perceived State inefficiency.31 For instance, in 1997, the 
                                                     
23
 964. 
24
 See section 3 2, chapter 3 for further discussion on privatisation. 
25
 See K Bakker ―The ‗Commons‘ versus the ‗Commodity‘: Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and 
the Human Right to Water in the Global South‖ (2007) 39 Antipode 431 435. 
26
 World Bank The State in a Changing World: World Development Report (1997) 64. 
27
 See P Bond ―Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives: Pricing, Policy Debates  
from Johannesburg to Kyoto to Cancun and back‖ 2004 (15) Capitalism Nature Socialism 7 8. 
28
 See Petrova 2006 Brooklyn Journal International Law 578-580; K Bakker "The ‗Commons‘ versus 
the ‗Commodity‘: Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global 
South" 2007 (39) Antipode 430 431; Williams 2006-2007 Michigan Journal of International Law 46. 
Petrova points out that water services privatisation has been consolidated within the stewardship of a 
few water multinational companies, particularly from France and UK, and lately Germany. See Petrova 
2006 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 578. 
29
 See L Lundqvist ―Privatisation: Towards a Concept for Comparative Policy Analysis‖ 1988 (8) 
Journal of Public Policy 1 7. See also P Parker ―The New Right, State Ownership and Privatisation: A 
Critique‖ (1995) 8 Economic and Industrial Democracy 349-378 who argues that arguments about 
privatisation improving service performance and public finances remain uncorroborated as 
privatisation may run counter to what its proponents claim. The author cites the privatisation of the 
British Council housing as well as the privatisation of the public transport in Britain as a case in point. 
30
 S Grusky & M Fiil-Flynn Will World Bank Back Down? (2004)1.  
31
 The World Bank pointed to what it perceived as flawed management by the State and structural 
defects in public sector management of water as being responsible for the poor quality and low 
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IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank demanded the 
privatisation of Bolivia‘s water utility, the Servicio Municipal del Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado (hereinafter referred to as ―SEMAPA‖) as a condition for debt 
renegotiation and forgiveness.32 Bolivia complied with these structural adjustment 
conditionalities by forging ahead with the privatisation of SEMAPA.33 In Tanzania, the 
country obtained funding of US$140m from the World Bank, African Development 
Bank and European Investment Bank for a comprehensive programme to repair and 
extend Dar es Salaam‘s water and sewerage infrastructure. The funding was 
conditional on having a private operator replacing the public water provider.34 It is 
against this backdrop that proponents of water privatisation look to private sector 
involvement in water service supply as a way to improve access to safe water 
especially in cash-strapped developing countries.35 The above and other related 
water privatisation cases are discussed and analysed in chapter 3.36 
The conception of water as an economic good also stimulated the lobby for 
the explicit recognition of water as a human right. Human rights practitioners argued 
that water is a basic need, a human right and a public good hence its 
commodification37 would lead to lack of access, especially by poor and vulnerable 
members of society.38 Additionally, a human right to water would guarantee access to 
safe and affordable water in sufficient quantities without discrimination and would 
                                                                                                                                                                     
penetration of water supply systems. See World Bank The State in a Changing World: World 
Development Report (1997) 64. 
32
 T Cruise & C Ramos ―Water and Privatisation: Doubtful Benefits, Concrete Threats‖ Social Watch 
Report: The Poor and the Market (2003) 98 <http://www.philadelphia.edu.jo/Books> (accessed on 
17.06.2011). 
33
 EP Beltrán Water, Privatisation and Conflict: Women from the Cochabamba Valley (2004) iv 
<http://www.boell.org> (accessed 16.06.2011). In 1997, the World Bank provided Bolivia with US$20 
million in technical assistance for regulatory reform and privatisation, including preparation of laws and 
regulations for the financial, infrastructure and business sectors. Some of this funding was earmarked 
for the ―Major Cities Water and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project‖ which aimed to provide full coverage 
to Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and La Paz. One of the bank‘s conditions for the extension of the loan 
was the privatisation of the La Paz and Cochabamba water and sewerage utilities. 
34
 See a discussion paper by J Perez ―Sleeping Lions: International Investment Treaties, State-
Investor Disputes and Access to Food, Land and Water‖ Oxfam Discussion Paper (2011) 19-20 
<http://www.oxfam.org> (accessed 08.06.2011).  
35
 Petrova 2006 Brooklyn Journal International Law 581-582. 
36
 See 3 5, chapter 3 for a discussion of the impact of privatisation on water services focusing on four 
case studies. 
37
 Commodification is the process of converting a good or service formerly subject to many non-
market social rules into one that is primarily subject to market rules. See R Giullianotti ―Supporters, 
Followers, Fans and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football‖ (2002) 26 Journal of 
Sport and Social Issues 25 26. 
38
 Shiva Privatisation, Pollution and Profit ix. 
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enjoin the State to act to ensure access.39 A human rights based approach, it was 
argued, would transform the basic need for water into a right that gives rise to 
corresponding obligations.  
 
1 2  Research problem 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to 
as ―CESCR‖) declared the existence of the right to water in the ground-breaking 
General Comment 15 adopted in 2002.40 A watershed development occurred in 2010 
when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the right to water and 
sanitation.41 This was affirmed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2010 when it 
stated that the right to safe drinking water is derived from the right to an adequate 
standard of living, the right to health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.42 
Although the CESCR attempted to elaborate the legal basis, scope and 
content of the right to water in General Comment 15, the legal status of the right to 
water under international human rights law remains the subject of intense debate as 
the right is not explicitly provided for under international human rights law. The 
resolutions and general comments adopted by UN institutions are a very significant 
political step towards the recognition of the right to water. However, from a legal 
perspective many questions remain as to the legal status of the human right to water 
under international human rights law.43  
The two major international human rights treaties, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―ICCPR‖)44 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred 
                                                     
39
 See CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 2. 
40
 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 15, Right to 
Water (2002) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11. It is noteworthy that although General Comment 15 is not itself 
legally binding, it is an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR, which is legally 
binding on States that have ratified or acceded to it. General comments are used by the Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) to elaborate on the normative content and nature of the 
obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
See M Craven ―The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights‖ in A Eide et al (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, (2001) 455-457 for a discussion of the legal status 
of General Comments. 
41
 UN General Assembly The Human Right to Water and Sanitation UN Doc A/Res/64/292. 
42
 UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2010) 
UN Doc A/HRC/res/15/9 para 1. 
43
 IT Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance Legal Status and Implications for Water 
Allocation (2012) 11. 
44
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (hereafter ―ICCPR‖). 
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to as ―ICESCR‖)45 do not explicitly refer to a right to water.46 As a human right to 
water has an important role to play in addressing the global water crisis described 
above, the absence of a formal recognition of the right remains a cause for concern. 
Privatisation processes covering human rights sensitive areas such as water 
inevitably involve a private operator in actions that impact on human rights. The 
privatisation movement in the water sector has generated immense debate, linked to 
the status of water as a human right on one hand, and the characterisation of water 
as an economic good on the other.47 Weaker accountability mechanisms for human 
rights protection, particularly where non-State actors are involved in the provision of 
water services, raises human rights concerns.48 In addition, accountability is further 
eroded by the paucity of direct international human rights obligations on non-State 
actors.  
One of the fundamental issues engendered by privatisation49 is the prevalence 
of non-State actor involvement in the provision of basic social goods such as water. 
The increase in privatisation entails that access to basic services such as water, 
health and education are increasingly dependent on the actions and policies of 
private service providers.50 The traditional approach maintains that the protection of 
human rights remains exclusively the responsibility of States regardless of private 
involvement in human rights sensitive goods and services.51  
Recent experiences have demonstrated that private actors can, and often do, 
abuse human rights of groups and individuals.52 Feminist and children‘s rights 
scholars have highlighted the limitations of the State-centric approach to human 
rights, arguing that women and children‘s rights are particularly susceptible to 
                                                     
45
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (hereafter 
―ICESCR‖). 
46
 See A Cahill ―The Human Right to Water – A Right of Unique Status: The Legal Status and 
Normative Content of the Right to Water‖ (2005) 9 The International Journal of Human Rights 389 
390. See also A Kok ―Privatisation and the Right of Access to Water‖ in K De Feyter & FG Gomez 
(eds) Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (2005) 259 260; M Williams 
―Privatisation and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century‖ (2006-2007) 28 
Michigan Journal of International Law 467 473. 
47
 JW de Visser & C Mbazira Comparing Water Delivery in South Africa and the Netherlands (2006) 1. 
48
 See section 3 5, chapter 3 where I discuss four select examples of water privatisation from 
Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa. 
49
 See chapter 3 below. 
50
 See P Bond, D McDonald & G Ruiters ―Water Privatisation in Southern Africa: The State of the 
Debate‖ (2003) 4 Economic and Social Rights Review 1 10. 
51
 DM Chirwa ―The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential means of holding Private Actors 
Accountable for Human Rights‖ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 3. 
52
 See Chirwa 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 3. 
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infringement by non-State actors in private relations.53 Where host States may be 
weak or otherwise unable or unwilling to regulate private providers, it is important that 
the human rights regime should impose certain human rights duties on non-State 
actors. Thus, the challenge that this dissertation seeks to address is twofold as both 
the human right to water and human rights responsibilities of non-State actors such 
as corporations are relatively nascent and still contested notions which need further 
elaboration. 
 
1 3 Research questions and hypotheses 
In this dissertation, I analyse water privatisation from a human rights perspective, in 
particular the right to water as provided for under international human rights 
instruments and elaborated by treaty bodies and domestic legal systems. The key 
research question this dissertation attempts to answer is how a State can ensure 
compliance with its human rights obligations in the event of involvement of non-State 
actors in the management and distribution of water services. The dissertation‘s main 
hypothesis is that although privatisation of water services does not relieve the State 
of its legal responsibility under international human rights law, such privatisation 
imposes certain obligations on non-State actors consistent with the right to water. 
This will necessitate an analysis of the nature and scope of obligations which the 
right to water imposes on States and non-State actors. 
 The aim of Chapter 2 is to trace the possible legal basis of the right to water 
under international human rights law. The research questions explored in this chapter 
is how can a right to water be derived under international human rights law, and what 
is the content and scope of such a right? In order to answer these questions, the 
dissertation carries out a detailed analysis of the possible legal basis, scope and 
normative content of the right to water under international human rights law. The 
hypothesis is that an independent human right to water has evolved under 
international human rights law.  
 The question that chapter 3 seeks to address is to ascertain what impact 
privatisation of water services has on access and enjoyment of the human right to 
                                                     
53
 See for instance C Romany ―State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in Human Rights Law‖ in R Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National 
and International Perspectives (1994) 85 95. See also Chirwa 2004 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 2. 
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water. The key hypothesis is that privatisation of water services may negatively 
impact on the realisation of the human right to water if not carried out in accordance 
with the standards imposed by the right to water. The aim of chapter 3 is to analyse 
water privatisation from a human rights perspective, in particular the right to water as 
provided for under international human rights instruments and elaborated by treaty 
bodies and domestic legal systems.  
 The aim of chapter 4 is to analyse the nature and scope of States‘ duties to 
realise the right to water under international human rights law. The question this 
chapter attempts to address is: what obligations do States bear in the context of 
private sector participation in the provision of water services? The point of departure 
of this chapter is that States are bound by their domestic and international human 
rights obligations, both substantive and procedural, when they privatise basic 
services such as water supply.  
 Privatisation of human rights-sensitive services such as water brings with it a 
fundamental shift in the method for delivering positive human rights outcomes given 
the involvement of non-State actors.54 A question explored in chapter 5 is whether a 
human right to water under international human rights law impose duties on non-
State actors participating in the provision of water services and, if so, what is the 
nature and scope of such duties? The hypothesis of this chapter is that international 
human rights law imposes certain human rights responsibilities on non-State actors 
involved in the provision of water services. Chapter 5 aims to identify and discuss 
any normative standards applicable to non-State actors to ascertain their applicability 
within the context of water privatisation for holding water corporations to account. 
The second aim of chapter 5 is to analyse the normative standards imposed by the 
right to water and identify the duties, if any, applicable to non-State actors. 
Delineating non-State actors‘ duties imposed by the right to water will provide 
normative guidance to both State and non-State actors contemplating or involved in 
privatisation initiatives in respect of water services. 
                                                     
54
 The activities of MNCs often have a positive effect on economic, social and cultural rights. They 
provide much needed employment thus facilitating the right to work itself instrumental in the realisation 
of related socio-economic goods. Their innovation and the associated skills transfer can lead to the 
creation of new products, such as new medicines which facilitate the enjoyment of socio-economic 
rights such as the rights to health or an adequate standard of living. However, corporate ownership or 
control of goods for human welfare such as water or patents in life-saving drugs may drive the price of 
such goods out of reach of poor people if not properly regulated.  
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 Chapter 6 aims to develop an accountability model incorporating good 
practices from different jurisdictions for holding State and non-State actors involved 
in the provision of water services accountable for the right to water. It grapples with 
the question as to what model of accountability consistent with the right to water can 
be used to guide State and non-State actors involved in the provision of water 
services. The hypothesis of this chapter is that it is possible to devise an 
accountability model which incorporates mechanisms to safeguard access to safe 
water which would enable State and non-State actors to comply with the standards 
imposed by the human right to water. This chapter seeks to develop an argument as 
to why such an accountability mechanism is necessary to give concrete effect to the 
normative obligations imposed by water as a human right and to facilitate monitoring 
and accountability.  
 
1 4 Methodology 
To address the above research questions and hypotheses, the dissertation will use 
traditional methods in the discipline of law and legal theory in the study of relevant 
international instruments and jurisprudence. However, different approaches will be 
used given the complexity of this subject. A historical analysis of primary legal 
sources such as international treaties and jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies and 
regional tribunals will be conducted. Secondary literature pertaining to the 
emergence of the right to water under international law and debates concerning State 
and non-State actor human rights responsibility will be analysed. This project will 
further examine empirical literature and secondary sources in relation to four case 
studies involving privatisation of water initiatives discussed in chapter 3 with a view to 
analysing their impact and implications for the beneficiaries of the right to water. The 
project will further use primary sources from across the world such as legislation, 
case law, regulations and complaints mechanisms as examples of good practices 
and accountability mechanisms on the implementation of the right to water. 
 
1 5 Significance of the research 
This dissertation aims to develop an accountability model which can serve as a guide 
to both State and non-State actors involved in the provision of water services to 
ensure compliance with the standards imposed by the human right to water. The 
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accountability model is closely tied to the normative content and obligations imposed 
by the right to water which I analyse in chapters 255 and 4.56 The accountability model 
will thus serve to illustrate the implications of the normative standards imposed by 
water as a human right in water privatisation contexts. This dissertation proposes that 
both State and non-State actors‘ accountability for the right to water may help 
address some of the accountability issues raised by water privatisation without 
dispending with privatisation per se. Rather than perceiving the human right to water 
and water privatisation as mutually exclusive, this dissertation will attempt to 
demonstrate the potential complementarity between the human right to water and 
privatisation of water services if the latter is carried out in accordance with the 
normative standards imposed by the right to water. 
 
1 6 Scope of the dissertation 
Apart from personal and domestic uses, water is required for a range of different 
purposes. This includes water for agriculture, sanitation, health and for securing 
livelihoods and the enjoying of certain cultural practices.57 This dissertation focuses 
only on the right to water for personal and domestic use. This includes water for 
consumption, hygiene, cleaning, cooking, and subsistence agriculture. This is 
consistent with the UN CESCR‘s approach that the ―[t]he human right to water 
entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable 
water for personal and domestic uses.‖58 Winkler‘s doctoral dissertation addresses 
the issue of prioritisation and the right to water.59 This dissertation does not address 
the question of water resource allocation as its main focus is on access to water for 
personal and domestic use.  
 Furthermore, although there is a tendency in some literature to lump the right 
to water as enshrining sanitation, this dissertation adopts the view that the two are 
distinct and should be treated separately. The CESCR took the position that there 
was not sufficient support under international law at the time for the right to sanitation 
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 See section 2 6, chapter 2 for further discussion on the normative content of the right to water. 
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 See section 4 2 1 - 4 2 4 for a discussion on the obligations imposed by the right to water. 
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 UN CESCR General Comment 15 para 6. 
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in the same manner as the right to water.60 The Special Rapporteur submitted her 
report to the UN Human Rights Council on the subject of sanitation in 2009.61 The 
Special Rapporteur‘s conclusion was to acknowledge that ―there is an ongoing 
discussion about sanitation as a distinct right‖ and ―a trend towards recognition of 
such a distinct right.‖62 The Special Rapporteur has emphasised that sanitation is a 
―distinct right‖ on account of its specific dignity dimensions.63 Additionally, sanitation 
does not necessarily have to imply water-borne sanitation as dry sanitation practices 
are moving away from reliance on water for sanitation purposes thus severing the 
specific linkage with water. 
 Lumping of water and sanitation together may also lead to the former being 
overshadowed by the latter ―buttressing the practice of treating sanitation as the poor 
sister of water, whether in political commitments, funding or implementation.‖64 For 
the above reasons, this dissertation takes the view that the right to water is distinct 
from and does not include the right to sanitation and will treat it as such in the 
ensuing discussion. 
 
1 7 Overview of chapters 
Chapter two will evaluate evidence for the emergence of the right to water as a 
human right under international human rights law and the nature and scope of this 
right. Particular attention will be paid to international human rights instruments in 
which the right to water is located or from which it has been derived as well as 
discussing and analysing other international treaties outside the realm of human 
rights, but broadly supportive of a right to water. Chapter 2 will also attempt to show 
that the right to water is emerging as a rule of customary international law. In support 
hereof the chapter will illustrate how the right to water is being increasingly 
recognised in both binding and non-binding international instruments. Furthermore, 
this chapter will discuss the increasing recognition of the right to water at the 
                                                     
60
 M Langford, J Bartram & V Roaf ―Revisiting Dignity: The Human Right to Sanitation‖ in M Langford 
& A Russell (eds) The Right to Water: Theory, Practice and Prospects (2011) 10. 
61
 See United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/24 (hereinafter referred to as ―Special Rapporteur Sanitation Report).‖ 
62
 Para 59. 
63
 The Special Rapporteur stated that ―[one might argue that, because dignity pervades the issue of 
sanitation and sanitation cannot be entirely subsumed into any other existing human right, it should be 
considered a distinct human right.‖ See Special Rapporteur Sanitation Report para 58. 
64
 Langford et al ―The Human Right to Sanitation‖ in The Right to Water 10. 
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municipal level, highlighting the national constitutions and domestic laws in which the 
right has been recognised.  
Chapter 3 will attempt to define privatisation initiatives in the context of water 
services, and thereby delineate the key features of the privatisation process this 
study intends to focus on. Particular attention will be paid to the increased 
participation by non-State actors in the water services sector. Access to adequate, 
safe and affordable water, rights of participation, access to information, monitoring 
and regulation and access to remedies for breach are some of the issues to be 
confronted whenever a private entity takes over responsibility for the provision of 
water services. Chapter 3 will attempt to illustrate the potential impact of privatisation 
on the human right to water through examining concrete issues which arise in the 
context of water privatisation with the aid of four select examples of water 
privatisation from Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa.  
Chapter 4 discusses the origins and development of typologies of State duties 
as well as their significance for understanding State obligations in respect of the right 
to water. An approach has emerged in terms of which State obligations under 
international human rights treaties are analysed as entailing four types or levels of 
obligations, the obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in 
question.65 Although the main focus of this chapter is on the obligations imposed on 
States under international human rights law, the chapter will also analyse 
comparative national jurisprudence from select national jurisdictions to understand to 
what extent, if any, national courts have applied the four-fold typology of respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill in their interpretation of respective national constitutions 
and legislation providing for the right to water. Chapter 4 seeks to provide a detailed 
analysis of the obligations that the right to water imposes on States. It outlines and 
evaluates the approach of treaty monitoring bodies, customary international law, 
reports of the Special Rapporteur on the right to water and the jurisprudence of 
regional and national judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in elucidating the scope of the 
                                                     
65
 See A Eide ―Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights‖ in A Eide, C Krause & A 
Rosas Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) 23-24. See also Craven who points out that not 
only does such an approach provides a detailed analytical framework in which a clearer understanding 
of State obligations in respect of human rights may be achieved, but also serves to counteract some of 
the traditional assumptions that tended to distinguish economic, social and cultural rights from civil and 
political rights. This is because the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill can be identified in respect 
of every human right thereby counteracting the notion that economic, social and cultural rights are 
solely ‗positive rights‘ any more than civil and political rights being solely ―negative rights‖. See Craven 
The International Covenant 109. 
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obligations imposed by socio-economic rights in general and the right to water in 
particular. Identifying obligations imposed by the right to water is fundamental to the 
accountability model developed in this dissertation. Significantly, States need to know 
what they are obliged to do when contemplating and implementing a privatisation 
project in respect of water services in order to comply with the obligations imposed 
by the right to water.66 
Chapter 5 will illustrate how the State-centric focus of the human rights 
approach is increasingly being challenged given the emergence of powerful non-
State actors capable of abusing human rights. Chapter 5 will further demonstrate 
how the necessity to ensure that non-State actors comply with human rights 
standards has seen the emergence of initiatives attempting to impose human rights 
responsibilities on non-State actors. This includes such voluntary initiatives as 
corporate codes of conduct, domestic legislation and other multi-stakeholder 
initiatives. This dissertation will attempt to show how a combination of hard law 
initiatives such as domestic legislation and voluntary initiatives have the potential for 
holding corporations responsible for the right to water in privatised contexts. This 
dissertation will further discuss and analyse some hard-law responsibilities imposed 
by human rights on non-State actors such as the duties to respect and the duty to 
provide remedies.67  
Involving non-State actors in the provision of water services requires clearly 
defining the scope of the functions delegated to such entities. To ensure 
accountability, chapter 6 will demonstrate how States and non-State actors involved 
in the provision of water services can have clearly designated roles and 
responsibilities derived from the normative commitments of water as a human right. 
The accountability model developed in this chapter seeks to establish regulatory 
standards to enable compliance by both State and non-State actors to be more 
effectively monitored.68 Although this dissertation is mainly concerned with the right 
to water under international law and the implications of privatisation thereof, the 
implementation of the right to water takes place at the municipal level. The chapter 
thus goes beyond articulating normative considerations and looks at implementation 
at the national level by highlighting good practices on the practical implementation of 
                                                     
66
 MM Sepulveda Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2003) 4. 
67
 See section 5 3, chapter 5. 
68
 See Special Rapporteur Report para 16. 
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the right to water and draws from national experiences such as model legislation, 
case law, regulations, and complaints mechanisms. In the process, it also highlights 
practices or legislative provisions which have negative implications for the right to 
water and should be avoided. 
Chapter 7 will provide a summary of the conclusions reached throughout the 
study. It will also seek to articulate the theoretical contribution of the study for 
scholarship in this field as well as the key legal and policy implications for States, 
international and regional bodies such as the World Bank, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) as well as MNCs. I anticipate that the proposed 
accountability model will also be useful to civil society organisations working in the 
field of socio-economic rights in general and the right to water in particular. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
 
Chapter 2 
The nature and scope of right to water under international law 
2 1 Introduction 
The 2010 United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the ―UN‖) General Assembly1 
and the UN Human Rights Council2 resolutions recognising a human right to water 
provide acknowledgement of a problem that affects one-third of humanity – close to 
one billion people without access to safe water and 2.6 billion without access to 
improved sanitation services. Although the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―CESCR‖) attempted to elaborate the 
legal basis, scope and content of the right to water way back in 2002, the legal basis 
of the right to water under international law remains the subject of intense debate. 
The resolutions and general comments adopted by UN institutions are a very 
significant political step towards the recognition of the right to water. However, from a 
legal perspective many questions remain as to the legal status of the human right to 
water under international human rights law.3 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―UDHR‖) does not expressly mention a human right 
to water. The two major international human rights treaties, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―ICCPR‖)4 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred 
to as ―ICESCR‖)5 do not explicitly refer to a right to water.6 This raises a plethora of 
questions. What is the legal status of the right to water under international human 
rights law? What is the scope and normative content of such a right? In order to 
answer these questions, a detailed analysis of the possible legal basis, scope and 
content of the right to water under international human rights law is required. This 
                                                     
1
 See UN General Assembly The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (2010) A/64/L.63/Rev.Add.1 
para 4. 
2
 See UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation 
(2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/L.14 para 6. 
3
 IT Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance Legal Status and Implications for Water 
Allocation (2012) 11. 
4
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (hereafter ―ICCPR‖). 
5
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (hereafter 
―ICESCR‖). 
6
 See A Cahill ―The Human Right to Water – A Right of Unique Status: The Legal Status and 
Normative Content of the Right to Water‖ (2005) 9 The International Journal of Human Rights 389 
390. See also A Kok ―Privatisation and the Right of Access to Water‖ in K De Feyter & FG Gomez 
(eds) Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (2005) 259 260; M Williams 
―Privatisation and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century‖ (2006-2007) 28 
Michigan Journal of International Law 467 473. 
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chapter will consider and evaluate the legal status of the right to water from a legal 
perspective. The chapter will also explore the content, scope and nature of such a 
right if it is found to exist.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will trace the genesis of 
the right to water under international law. This will entail a discussion of the various 
international conferences and declarations from the early 1970s in order to show how 
these laid the basis for the emergence of the push for recognition of the human right 
to water. The focus will be on the various debates that spurred the rise of the right to 
water such as the conceptualisation of water as either a human right or an economic 
good. The second part will discuss and analyse the legal basis for the right to water 
under international human rights law. Particular attention will be paid to international 
human rights instruments in which the right to water is located or from which it has 
been derived. This will be followed by a discussion and analysis of other international 
treaties outside the realm of human rights, but broadly supportive of a right to water. 
Universal and regional treaties, customary international law and other soft law 
declarations will be considered. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
explicitly provides that the ordinary meaning, context and the object and purpose of 
provisions of these treaties must be taken into account in their interpretation.7  
In addition to treaty provisions, the question as to whether the right to water 
has metamorphosed into customary international law will also be examined. In that 
regard, a number of States‘ declarations, resolutions, statements, national 
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the right to water will be relevant.   
In this chapter, I will argue that a right to water is emerging as a rule of customary 
international law. In support hereof this section will illustrate how the right to water is 
being increasingly recognised in both binding and non-binding international 
instruments. Furthermore, this section will also discuss the increasing recognition of 
the right to water at the municipal level, highlighting the national constitutions and 
laws in which the right has been recognised. The final part of this chapter will focus 
on the normative content of the right to water. This will be followed by a discussion 
and analyses of some objections that have been raised against the recognition of a 
right to water under international human rights law and responses thereto. The 
concluding section will seek to synthesise and evaluate the evidence for the 
                                                     
7
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) UN Treaty Series 1155 331. 
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emergence of the right to water as a human right under international law and the 
nature and scope of this right. 
 
2 2 Emergence of the right to water under international law 
The emergence of the discussion on the right to water is traceable to the 1970s but it 
is only recently, particularly the 1990s that the debate gained in momentum.8 Several 
reasons have been cited for the current prominence of the right to water debate in 
international human rights and development discourse. These include normative 
developments in international human rights law, the cumulative effect of a significant 
number of international conferences focusing on the environment and water. The 
current global water crisis highlighted in chapter 1 and the consequent inclusion of 
water in the development agenda has spurred the call for a right to water.9 The 
debates surrounding the conception of water in a binary fashion as either a 
commodity to be traded on the market or a public and social good to which 
everybody has a right of access may also have given more impetus to this debate.10 
The latter is particularly noted by Bluemel who asserts that: 
 
―Calls for recognition of a human right to water have largely resulted from mistrust 
and fear of treating water as an economic good…many scholars fear that if water is 
                                                     
8
 SMA Salman & S McInerny-Lankford The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions 
(2004) 7-16. The authors trace the emergence of the campaigns towards recognition of the right to 
water from the 1970s through various international conferences and declarations, culminating in the 
adoption of General Comment 15 on The Right to Water by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in 2002 (hereafter ―General Comment No 15 (2002)‖) by the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
9
 P Parmar Revisiting the Right to Water (Unpublished LLM thesis) University of British Columbia 
(2006) 9. Salman & McInerney-Lankford for example who point that:  
[i]t took the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights about 13 years between the 
time it issued the first General Comment in 1989, and General Comment No 15 recognising a 
human right to water in 2002. During those years, the world community had given increased 
attention to water resources management due to the vast array of problems faced in this 
sector. A large number of conferences and forums have been held, and resolutions and 
declarations have been adopted by those forums. Similarly, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted a number of resolutions on issues related to water resources. See 
Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 6. 
10
 See W Vandenhole & T Wielders ―Water as a Human Right-Water as an Essential Service: Does it 
Matter?‖ (2008) 26 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 391-424. Bluemel has further explained 
that: 
the international community first proposed treating water as an economic good in an attempt 
to ensure water resources for all by minimising inefficiencies through the pricing system. The 
strategy was simple: higher prices will encourage only those uses which are most valuable 
and will minimise waste thereby increasing the total amount of water resources for use by 
households. See E Bluemel ―Implications of Formulating Human Right to Water‖ (2004) 
Ecology Law Quarterly 957 962. 
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perceived solely as an economic good, then access may be determined based purely 
upon market forces, without regard to equity or need.‖11 
 
The genesis of the debate on the right to water is traceable to the Stockholm 
Declaration adopted at the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment which 
identified water as one of the natural resources that needed to be safeguarded.12  In 
1977, the UN held the Mar Del Plata Water Conference in Argentina which was 
devoted exclusively to discussing the emerging global water resources problems.13 A 
significant outcome of the conference was the adoption of a UN General Assembly 
resolution in 1980, proclaiming the period 1981 to 1990 as the ―International Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation Decade.‖14 Salman and McInerney-Lankford emphasise 
that the debate on the right to water is traceable to this conference, particularly 
Resolution II on ―Community Water Supply.‖15 The resolution declared for the first 
time that:  
 
―All peoples, whatever their stage of development and their social and economic 
conditions have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a 
quality equal to their basic needs.‖16  
                                                     
11
 Bluemel 2004 Ecology Law Quarterly 963. 
12
 Principle 2 of the 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, identified 
water as one of the natural resources that needed to be safeguarded.  It specifically provided that ―the 
natural resources of the earth including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially 
representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safeguarded for the benefit of the present and 
future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate.‖ See Salman & 
McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 7. See also SC McCaffrey ―A Human Right to Water: 
Domestic and International Implications‖ (1992) 5 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 1-24; P Gleick ―The Human Right to Water‖ (1998) 1 Water Policy 487-503; Bluemel 2004 
Ecology Law Quarterly 957-1006. 
13
 The UN held the Mar del Plata Water Conference in Argentina in 1977. The Conference‘s main 
focus was to discuss the emerging water resources challenges. The conference subsequently issued 
the Mar del Plata Action Plan, which sought to tackle these water resources challenges. See UN Mar 
del Plata Water Conference Report UN Doc No E/Conf.70.29 (1977).   
14
 The UN General Assembly in Resolution 35/18, adopted on November 10, 1980, after referring to 
the Mar del Plata Action Plan, proclaimed ―the period 1981–1990 as the International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade, during which Member States will assumed a commitment to bring 
about a substantial improvement in the standards and levels of services in drinking water supply and 
sanitation by the year 1990.‖ See UN General Assembly Res 35/18 UN Doc A/RES/40/171. The UN 
General Assembly followed up on the matter and issued Resolution 40/171 on December 17, 1985 as 
a middle-of-the-decade reminder to States  in which it implored them to work extremely hard to meet 
the commitments made under the International Drinking and Water Supply Decade as ―significant 
progress towards meeting the objectives of the Decade by 1990 will require a much greater sense of 
urgency and priority on the part of Governments and the continued support of the international 
community.‖ See UN Doc A/RES/40/171 (1985). 
15
 McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 8. 
16
 The resolution went on to state that the universal recognition of water and, to a significant extent, 
the disposal of waste water are essential to both life and the full development of man as an individual 
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The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development‘s Agenda 21 on 
―Programme of Action for Sustainable Development‖ included a separate chapter on 
freshwater resources.17 The overall objective laid down for freshwater resources was 
to satisfy the fresh water needs of all countries for their sustainable development.18 
Other notable developments include the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Non Navigational Uses of International Water Courses in 1997.19 This 
instrument, as will be discussed in more detail below, enjoins member States to pay 
special attention to providing sufficient water for vital human needs.20 
The UN General Assembly also adopted a resolution proclaiming the year 
2003 as the ―International Year of Freshwater.‖21 A further UN General Assembly 
resolution declared the period 2005-2015 the ―International Decade for Action, ‗Water 
for Life.‘‖ The UN further declared March 22 as the World Water Day since 1993, 
highlighting the significance of the water situation.22 A UN General Assembly 
resolution on the Right to Development in 2000 recognised the right to clean water as 
a fundamental human right.23   
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its 
General Comment 15 on the Right to Water (hereafter ―General Comment 15‖) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and as an integral part of society. See further discussion by McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to 
Water 8. 
17
 See Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992) para 3.8(p) (hereinafter ―the Rio Summit‖). Agenda 21 of the Rio 
Summit on Programme of Action for Sustainable Development in its Chapter 18 on ―Water Resources‖ 
proclaimed that ―the overall objective laid down for freshwater resources is to satisfy the freshwater 
needs of all countries for their sustainable development.‖ On the issue of the needs and the right to 
water, Chapter 18 further stated that ―water resources have to be protected…in order to satisfy and 
reconcile needs for water in human activities. In developing and using water resources, priority has to 
be given to the satisfaction of basic needs.‖ 
18
 Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 8. 
19
 UN Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (1997) UN 
Doc A/51/49. 
20
 See article 10(2). It is agreed that the ―vital human needs‖ provision refers to water required to 
sustain human life, including both drinking water and water for food production to avoid starvation. See 
PH Gleick The World‘s Water: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources (1998) 215. 
21
 See UN General Assembly International Year of Freshwater Declaration (2003) GA/Res 55/196. 
22
 The UN General Assembly decided on December 22, 1992 to declare the 22
nd
 March of each year 
World Day For Water, to be observed starting in 1993. See UN General Assembly World Day for 
Water (1992) GA/Res/47/193. 
23
 The UN General Assembly adopted on 15 February 2000, states that the ―rights to food and clean 
water are fundamental human rights, and their promotion constitutes a moral imperative both for 
national Governments and for the international community‖. The resolution further affirmed the right to 
development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development, as universal and 
inalienable, and re-emphasised that its promotion, protection, and realisation are an integral part of the 
promotion and protection of all human rights. See UN Doc A/RES/54/175 (2000) para 12(a). 
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recognised the existence of an independent right to water under international law.24 It 
derived the right to water under articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―ICESCR‖).25 In 
2008, the UN established a special procedure on the right to water and sanitation. 
The mandate of the Independent Expert on the human right to safe drinking water 
and sanitation was initially established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 
2008.26 The UN Human Rights Council, in March 2011 extended and changed its title 
to Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation 
(―hereinafter referred to as Special Rapporteur‖).27 The Special Rapporteur‘s overall 
mandate entails undertaking a study and further clarification of the content of human 
rights obligations, including non-discrimination obligations, in relation to access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur‘s mandate 
includes studying the normative content of human rights obligations in relation to 
access to water and sanitation as well as to study responsibilities of the private 
sector in the context of private provision of safe drinking water and sanitation among 
others.28 The Special Rapporteur has a number of thematic reports on the human 
rights obligations relating to obligations of States and responsibilities of non-State 
actors in the context of non-State provision of water services. The Special 
Rapporteur has recently issued reports on the MDGs relating to water and 
                                                     
24
 See CESCR General Comment No 15 (2002). Although not legally binding, general comments are 
used by the CESCR to elaborate on the normative content and nature of the obligations imposed by 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). See M Craven ―The 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights‖ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, (2001) 455-457 for a discussion of the legal status of General 
Comments. See also C Blake ―Normative Instruments in International Human Rights Law: Locating the 
General Comment‖ (2008) 12 Centre for Human Rights & Global Justice Working Paper No 17 
<http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/blake.pdf> (accessed 16.06.2010); See also S Tully ―A 
Human Right to Access Water? A Critique of General Comment No. 15‖ (2008) 26 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 35  37-38 who notes that the CESCR derived the right to water from 
articles 11(1) and 12(1) of the ICESCR. 
25
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316.  
26
 UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2008) 
Resolution 7/22. See paras 2(a)-(f) for an over view of the Special Rapporteur‘s mandate. Catarina de 
Albuquerque took up the mandate in November 2008 and her mandate enjoins her to carry out 
thematic research, undertake country missions, collect good practices, and work with development 
practitioners on the implementation of the rights to water and sanitation. 
27
 UN Human Rights Council The Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2011) 
A/HRC/RES/16/2. 
28
 For the Special Rapporteur‘s mandate see <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WaterAndSanitation> 
(accessed 07.05.2012). 
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recommendations from a human rights perspective,29 on national and local planning 
for the implementation of the right to water.30 In one of her recent reports, The 
Special Rapporteur has addressed the issue of stigma as it impacts the realisation of 
the right to water.31 The Special Rapporteur has also issued a compendium of good 
practices, highlighting how the right to water can be implemented.32 One of the major 
impetuses towards the emergence of the right to water was the conception of water 
within two different normative and analytical frameworks: water as a human right, on 
one hand and water as a commodity on the other.33 This will be fully discussed 
below. 
 
2 3 Moving from water as an economic good to water as a human right 
The notion of regarding water as an economic good implies that all water services 
are based on the principle of full cost-recovery. The principle of full cost-recovery 
seeks the recovery of all costs related to the provision of water, primarily 
operationalised through the pricing of water. The 1992 International Conference on 
Water and the Environment adopted what became known as the ―Dublin Statement 
and Principles on Water‖ (hereinafter referred to as ―Dublin Statement.‖34 Although 
not legally binding, it became an extremely important tool in the conceptualisation of 
water as an economic good. Principle 4 in particular provides that: 
 
                                                     
29
 See UN Human Rights Council Millennium Development Goals and the Right to Water and 
Sanitation: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation (2010) A/HRC/65/254. 
30
 See UN Human Rights Council National Plans of Action for the Realisation of the Rights to Water 
and Sanitation: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation (2011) A/HRC/18/33. 
31
 See UN Human Rights Council Stigma and the Realisation of the Human Rights to Water and 
Sanitation: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation (2012) A/HRC/21/42. 
32
 See UN Human Rights Council Compilation of Good Practices: Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2011) A/HRC/18/33/Add.1. 
33
 See Vandenhole & Wilders 2008 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 391-424. 
34
 In 1992, the World Meteorological Organisation held an International Conference on Water and 
Environment in Dublin and the result was the Dublin Statement articulating various principles on water 
resources management which was commended to the world leaders participating at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. See Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development (1992) <http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html> (accessed 
03.04.2010) (hereafter the ―Dublin Principles.‖) 
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―Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as 
an economic good...Managing water as an economic good is an important way of 
achieving efficient and equitable use.‖35 
 
It must be noted that the accompanying language, often not cited by protagonists on 
both sides of the water debate, is quite illuminating. Principle 4 of the Dublin 
Statement affirmed ―the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean 
water...affordable.‖36 The Dublin Statement‘s assertion of water at an affordable price 
perhaps is recognition that if treated solely as an economic good, the supply of safe 
and adequate water may be imperilled. The poor and other marginalised members of 
society may not be able to afford the cost of accessing water were it to be treated as 
a purely economic good. 
The World Bank adopted the economic good model of the Dublin Statement 
as its guiding principle. It introduced the principle of full cost-recovery - a corollary of 
applying the economic good model - as conditionality for loans in the water sector, 
especially in the developing world. The principle of full cost-recovery meant that the 
State or non-State supplier of water services should be able to recover the full costs 
of supplying water to all users.37 The proposal to treat water as an economic good 
was predicated on the belief that treating it as such would, firstly, ensure access to 
water resources for all. Secondly, it would minimise inefficiencies through pricing 
techniques. The reasoning is explained in the following terms by Bluemel who states 
that cost-reflective pricing ―will encourage only those uses which are most valuable 
and will minimise waste, thereby increasing the total amount of water resources for 
use by households.‖38 This entailed introducing the cost recovery principle within the 
tariff system and opening up the water sector for private sector involvement and 
foreign investment.39  
                                                     
35
 See Dublin Principle 4. 
36
 Principle 4. 
37
 Bluemel 2004 Ecology Law Quarterly 964. 
38
 962. 
39
 See P Bond ―Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives: Pricing, Policy Debates 
from Johannesburg to Kyoto to Cancun and Back‖ (2004) 15 Capitalism Nature Socialism 7 8. For 
further discussion on the principle of cost recovery within the water delivery and management sector, 
see also V Petrova ―At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatisation and the Human 
Right to Water‖ (2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal International Law 557 578-580;  K Bakker "The 
`Commons' versus the `Commodity': Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and the Human Right to 
Water in the Global South" (2007) 39 Antipode 430 431; Williams 2006-2007 Michigan Journal of 
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Scholars and human rights activists reacted differently to this proposition of 
treating water as an economic good and the consequent privatisation of water 
services. Vandenhole and Wielders argued that what makes water an economic 
good is that drinking water is a good with limited supply and unlimited demand.40 The 
two authors however proposed categorising water as a quasi-commodity.41 They 
argue that water cannot fulfill all the conditions to be a real commodity in the 
capitalist sense of the word. They pointed out that the cost of water is high as it is 
expensive to produce, and not always available as potable water.42  Some scholars 
suggest that to consider water as an economic good without addressing issues like 
higher tariffs and disconnections conflicts with treating water as a human right.43 This 
is because full cost recovery may lead to the removal of State subsidies and to the 
implementation of full cost recovery measures. Such measures may affect the poor 
and vulnerable disproportionately, and result in increased disconnections of water 
due to non-payment, and a decrease in the quality of service.44 Bluemel, for instance, 
pointed out that the principle of full cost-recovery was likely to price water out of the 
reach of poor and marginalised communities thereby curtailing their access to an 
adequate supply of safe water necessary to meet their basic needs.45 
An alternative argument, represented by scholars like Vandenhole and 
Wielders is to argue that considering water as an economic good is not necessarily in 
conflict with the human right to water. They point out that: 
―The qualification as an economic good does not mean that water should be sold at 
the highest price or that water services should be liberalised and privatised, but in 
principle simply indicates that it is scarce. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that once 
a good has been qualified economic, it may be subject to trade liberalisation policies 
and subjected to market mechanisms. If this happens without any regulation, the 
outcome risks being more often than not in violation of human rights law.‖46 
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The economic good versus human right conception of access to water thus 
intensified the campaign by human rights practitioners for the formal recognition of 
the human right to water. The debate also forms part of the wider political and 
jurisprudential debate surrounding privatisation of water services and its implications 
for the realisation of the right to water. The latter is fully discussed and analysed in 
chapter 3.  
 
2 4 Conclusion 
The above discussion provided an overview of the various initiatives, starting with the 
1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in which water was recognised as a 
basic need. What became clear was the growing call for the recognition of the human 
right to water. Developing concurrently with the above was the push for the 
recognition of water as a commodity susceptible to be traded on the market. This 
approach is more forcefully reflected in the Dublin Statement highlighted above. This 
was marketed as the panacea to the global water crisis, and serving as a precursor 
to widespread privatisation of water services. 
The conception of water as an economic good also stimulated the lobby for 
the explicit recognition of water as a human right. Human rights practitioners argued 
that water is a basic need, a human right and a public good hence its 
commodification would lead to lack of access, especially by the poor and vulnerable 
members of society. The above debates thus gave the impetus toward vociferous 
calls from human rights practitioners for recognition of the right to water under 
international human rights law. As will be shown below, the UN took the initiative by 
construing a human right to water from the existing international human rights 
instruments. What is quite conspicuous is the shift toward water as an independent 
human right. The following section will examine the legal basis for a right to water 
under international human rights law. The relevant provisions contained in the 
various international human rights instruments will be examined and evaluated. 
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2 5 Legal basis for the right to water under international law 
2 5 1  Introduction 
Peter Gleick, writing more than a decade ago, asserted that one of the fundamental 
failures of development in the 20th century was a lack of universal access to water.47 
Gleick further posed the following question:  
―Is water so fundamental a resource, like air, that it was thought unnecessary to 
explicitly include reference to it at the time these agreements were forged? Or could 
the framers of these agreements have actually intended to exclude access to water 
as a right, while including access to food and other necessities?‖48 
 
The UDHR does not expressly mention a human right to water.49 The two 
major international human rights treaties - the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights50 and the ICESCR (which is the core international legal instrument on 
economic, social and cultural rights) – do not explicitly refer to a right to water. It must 
therefore be analysed whether a human right to water is implicitly recognised in the 
provisions of these universal treaties. The only explicit references to a right to water 
are contained in the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (hereafter referred to as ―CEDAW‖),51 the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (hereafter referred to as ―CRC‖),52 and the International Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Dignity and Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(hereafter referred to as the ―Disability Convention‖).53 It must be noted though that 
these latter instruments are limited ratione personae as will be fully considered 
below. 
A study carried out by McCaffrey in 1992 concluded that there was a right at 
least to sufficient water to sustain life and that a State has the due diligence 
obligation to safeguard this right as a priority.54 Gleick expanded upon McCaffrey‘s 
study and concluded that international law and evidence from the practice of States 
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strongly support the human right to a basic water supply.55 Equally, Bluemel noted 
that the absence of an explicit reference of a right to water under any universal 
human rights instrument should not be a bar to the recognition of a right to water. 
Bluemel argued that under the current international framework, a right to water may 
be characterised as subordinate and necessary to achieve the primary human rights 
recognised directly by international human rights treaties.56  
The following section begins with an examination of the doctrine of the 
interdependence of all human rights as potentially the most promising theoretical 
basis for supporting the derivation of the right to water under international human 
rights law. For the latter, I will adopt the framework developed by Craig Scott on the 
related interdependence of all human rights to fully explain the raison d'etre for the 
derivation of the right to water from related rights. This is followed with a discussion 
of one of the watershed developments in standard setting with regard to the right to 
water, the CESCR‘s General Comment 15. The section will further review the legal 
bases for deriving a right to water under international law as developed in the 
academic literature and the jurisprudence and general comments of UN bodies. The 
main focus will be on international human rights law, focusing particularly on relevant 
provisions of the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CRC and the Disability 
Convention. This will be followed by a discussion of other legally binding universal 
instruments such as humanitarian and international criminal law treaties.  
2 5 2 International human rights treaties and declarations 
McCaffrey, writing nearly two decades ago argued that the human right to water is 
implicit in the provisions of the International Bill of Rights (the UDHR, ICESCR and 
the ICCPR)57 as a derivative right.58 These include the rights to an adequate 
standard of living, food, health and life. McCaffrey and other scholars‘ argument is 
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that the fulfillment of these rights is impossible without water.59 Gleick argued that 
access to water can be derived from the explicit rights to health and an adequate 
standard of living contained in the ICESCR.60 This is because the provision of safe 
and adequate water is necessary for the full realisation of such rights.61 This section 
will examine whether indeed a universal human right to water can be derived from 
international human rights law. The analysis will focus on the provisions of 
international human rights treaties. These will include the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, 
CEDAW, CRC and the Disability Convention. 
 
2 5 2 1 The interdependence of human rights 
The UN has emphasised the interrelatedness, indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights through a number of resolutions and declarations. One of the distinctive 
aspects of the UDHR is that it emphasised the interdependence and interrelatedness 
of all human rights by placing all human rights; civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural rights at the same level.62 The views of the drafters of the UDHR in this 
respect are illuminating on the importance they placed in looking at human rights in 
an integrated and interrelated fashion. Renè Cassin for example regarded the 
inclusion of economic and social rights parallel to civil and political rights in the 
UDHR as one of the major pillars in asserting the interrelatedness of all human 
rights.63 John Humprey argued that without economic, social and cultural rights, civil 
and political rights would hardly have any meaning for most people.64 It must 
however be noted that the deep ideological division of the world of the fifties led to 
the categorisation of human rights thereby undermining the holistic vision of human 
rights propounded by the UDHR. This is reflected in the adoption of two separate 
human rights conventions in 1966, the ICESCR encapsulating economic, social and 
cultural rights, and the ICCPR enshrining civil and political rights.65 
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The 1968 UN World Conference on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
the ―Teheran Conference‖) marked the first systematic reaction to the fragmentation 
of human rights reflected above. The Teheran Conference forcefully asserted the 
interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights.66 This was a remarkable victory 
given a world that was divided by the bipolar characterisation of the cold war. In the 
words of Trindade, it marked a ―rescuing of the basic philosophy laid by the UDHR in 
this regard which for years had been undermined by the ideological struggle of the 
cold war.‖67 Additionally, the 1993 UN Declaration and Programme of Action of 
Vienna, adopted at the Second World Conference on Human Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Vienna Conference‖) reasserted the interdependence and 
indivisibility of all human rights.68 
The UN General Assembly noted the interrelated nature of all human rights in 
the first resolution on the issue in 1977, declaring that all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent. The UN General Assembly 
further noted that the promotion and protection of one category of rights can never 
exempt or excuse States from protecting other rights.69 The UN General Assembly 
followed up with a similar resolution in 1987 in which it stated that freedom from fear 
and want can only be eradicated when all people enjoy economic, social and cultural 
rights, as well as their civil and political rights.70 The UN‘s position on the 
                                                     
66
 See generally United Nations Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights UN Doc 
A/CONF.32/41 (1968). 
67
 Trindade 2002 International Social Science Journal 514. 
68
 See UN Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
(1993) UN Doc A/Conf.157/24 para 5. 
69
 UN General Assembly Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1977) 
A/RES/32/130. Some of the UN General Assembly resolutions addressing the issue of the indivisibility 
and interrelatedness of both economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights include 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/40/114(1985) which states in its preamble that ―all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent and that the promotion and protection of 
one category of rights can never exempt or excuse States from the promotion and protection of the 
other rights…the full realisation of civil and political rights is inseparably linked with the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights.‖ Another UN General Assembly resolution emphasised that 
―[e]qual attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and 
protection of both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights.‖ See preamble to 
UN General Assembly Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and 
Political Rights (1986) A/RES/41/117. Another UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 1988 
noted that ― the realisation of the right to development may help to promote the enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms [and that] equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil and political 
rights.‖ See UN General Assembly Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, 
Civil and Political Rights (1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/113. 
70
 See UN General Assembly Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil 
and Political Rights (1987) UN GA A/RES/42/102. Similarly, the Vienna Declaration affirms that ―All 
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of all human rights is an 
endorsement of the position that each category of rights is indispensable to the 
realisation of the other, and no hierarchical categorisation should be made between 
them. Interdependence of human rights means that the realisation of one right (or 
group of rights) may require the enjoyment of others despite their distinctiveness as 
particular rights.71 Understanding interdependence of human rights is important as it 
helps elaborate the extent to which distinct rights are mutually dependent on each 
other thereby making rights effective.  
Craig Scott has argued that the interdependence of human rights may be 
understood in two senses: ―organic interdependence‖ and ―related 
interdependence.‖72  Organic interdependence means that ―one right forms part of 
another right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right.‖73 According to 
Scott, the organic rights perspective means that ―interdependent rights are 
inseparable or indissoluble in the sense that one right (core right) justifies the other 
(derivative right).‖74 Scott explains that ―related interdependence‖ refers to a situation 
where rights are treated as complementary yet separate, ―for instance to protect right 
x will directly protect right y.‖75 The significance of the organic framework to the 
understanding of the interdependence of human rights is that protecting a core right 
will mean directly protecting a derivative right as ―[t]he goal is to render rights 
meaningful and non-illusory.‖76 Interdependence in the ―related rights‖ sense means 
that the rights in question are ―mutually reinforcing or mutually dependent but 
distinct.‖77 According to the related interdependence perspective, rights are treated 
as equally important yet separate hence ―to protect right x will indirectly protect right 
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y.‖78 The significance of the related interdependent framework in the understanding 
of the interdependence of human rights is that protecting one right indirectly results in 
the protection of another right. There is a profound and multilayered connection 
within economic, social and cultural rights and between economic, social and cultural 
rights and civil and political rights. As a consequence, neither set of rights has a full 
meaning without the other and ―attempting to find a priority between them is a 
fruitless endeavor.‖79 
Applying this analysis, it becomes clear that the right of access to water is a 
human right as it is intrinsically connected and is a part of other human rights. It is 
indispensable to the realisation of those other rights. All the major rights explicitly 
enshrined in the ICESCR and other human rights instruments, such as the right to life 
would be impossible to realise in the absence of safe water.80 The absence of an 
explicit reference to a right to water in the ICESCR is therefore not a sufficient 
argument to deny access to water the status of an independent human right.81 
Salman and McInerney-Lankford persuasively argue that: 
―Human rights are protected differently in different contexts and times, and their 
effective protection can in no way be viewed as static or unchanging, but rather as 
constantly evolving. This flux is further compounded by the fact that different human 
rights are deeply interwoven and are rarely realised in a singular or isolated manner, 
but rather exist in complex interdependency. Thus, the argument of the Comment that 
many human rights are interwoven around water, and cannot possibly be realised 
without a right to water, rests on a considerably solid basis.‖82 
The doctrine of interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights is thus 
aptly illustrated in the case of access to water for domestic and personal use. Even 
without the word ―water‖ being directly referred to, very few would question the 
existence of a right to water in principle. The CESCR in General Comment 15 
emphasised that the human right to water is indispensable and a necessary 
requirement for the realisation of other human rights.83  
                                                     
78
 783. 
79
 Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 28. 
80
  8. 
81
 EH Riedel ―The Human Right to Water and General Comment Number 15‖ in EH Riedel & P Rothen 
(eds) The Human Right to Water (2004) 19 24. 
82
 Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 60. 
83
 See CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 6. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32 
 
It is also important to note that none of the human rights, be it civil and political 
or economic, social and cultural rights are fully elaborated in human rights 
instruments. There is an imperative need for interpretative guidance, either from 
national or international courts or quasi-judicial tribunals such as UN human rights 
treaty bodies. It is within this light that the CESCR‘s derivation of the rights to water 
from the international Bill of Human Rights should be understood. 
The importance of water as a human right has also been recognised in other 
international treaties outside the area of human rights. These include humanitarian 
law, international criminal law and international water law. Key components of the 
right to water such as the obligation to refrain from measures that impede access to 
water by civilians in war time and to ensure quality of water sources are effectively 
protected under humanitarian law. The following section discusses and analyses the 
extent to which access to water is protected under these international instruments. 
The inclusion of the need to ensure basic access to water in other universal 
instruments outside international human rights law is indicative of an evolving global 
acceptance of the critical importance of access to water. 
2 5 2 2 Significance of General Comment No 15 
The CESCR‘s adoption of General Comment 15 in 2002 marked a watershed 
development towards the emergence of the right to water as it triggered sustained 
discussion on the right, and its further recognition within the UN system. Although 
General Comment 15 is not itself legally binding, it is nevertheless an authoritative 
interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR. The latter is legally binding on States 
that have ratified or acceded to it.84 Although the General Comments issued by UN 
treaty bodies do not and cannot create new obligations for States, they often clarify 
and elaborate on States‘ existing obligations under the various UN treaties. Salman 
and McInerny-Lankford have pointed that the involvement by States in the reporting 
process invests such General Comments with the necessary legitimacy.85 It is also 
noteworthy that the General Comments adopted by the treaty bodies are included in 
the CESCR‘s annual report to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the 
UN, which is brought to the attention of the General Assembly. This gives the 
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General Comments of UN treaty bodies some heightened form of legitimacy and 
legal weight due to this involvement of State parties to the treaties. The CESCR is 
the only UN entity officially authorised to interpret the ICESCR hence its General 
Comments carry significant legal authority. This is underlined by the fact that the 
CESCR‘s general comments are widely accepted in practice by States Parties to the 
ICESCR.86 In that regard it should be noted that General Comment 15 does not in 
any way create new obligations for State parties to the ICESCR. It simply elaborates 
on the ICESCR‘s explicit provisions and expounds on the obligations these entail. It 
makes explicit the right of access to safe water as it is embodied in the provisions of 
the ICESCR and related human rights treaties.  
Matthew Craven has underlined the importance of General Comments of the 
CESCR by stressing that although such interpretations of the ICESCR by the 
CESCR are not binding, they do have legal weight.87 This is because in the absence 
of an authoritative procedure for settling different opinions in the interpretation of the 
ICESCR, the CESCR helps fill that void by issuing such General Comments.88 Such 
a position was also echoed by Theodor Meron who also pointed out that although not 
legally binding, General Comments influence the States‘ reporting obligations and 
their internal and external behaviour.89 On that basis General Comment 15 carries 
significant legal and political weight. This dissertation will therefore consult General 
Comment 15 for the interpretation of the different aspects relating to the right to 
water.90  
2 5 2 3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the UDHR do not explicitly 
include a right to water.  The UDHR however, does contain provisions that provide 
some measure of justification for the derivation of a right to water. As a General 
Assembly resolution, the UDHR is not binding per se.91 However, its most 
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fundamental provisions are generally thought either to have crystallised into 
customary international law or to constitute an authoritative interpretation of the UN 
Charter obligations.92 Significantly, the broad human rights provisions contained in 
the UDHR have since been incorporated in legally binding form in many international 
human rights instruments.93 Article 22 of the UDHR states that:  
 
―Everyone, as a member of society. . . is entitled to realisation, through national effort 
and international cooperation and in accordance with the organisation and resources 
of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development of his personality.‖94  
 
Article 25(1) further provides that ―[e]veryone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.‖95 
McCaffrey has argued that such a standard of living could not exist without an 
adequate supply of water suitable for drinking.96 Gleick also points out that the 
relevant notes from the original debates show that provisions relating to food, 
clothing and housing were not meant to be all inclusive.97 Rather, they were inserted 
as representative of the component elements of an adequate standard of living.98 
Accordingly, the drafters of the UDHR did not explicitly exclude water as they 
considered water to be too obvious to include as one of the component elements.99 
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It is therefore logical to conclude that the drafters of the UDHR did not 
recognise water in explicit terms as they considered water ―too obvious to include as 
one of the component elements‖ to an adequate standard of living.100 This is because 
water is a necessary and indispensable element to the realisation of the other rights 
explicitly recognised in the UDHR. Gleick further argues that the drafters of the 
UDHR may have considered water to be as fundamental as air. He elaborates the 
―derivative right‖ argument as follows: 
―[S]atisfying the standards of [a]rticle 25 cannot be done without water of a sufficient 
quantity and quality to maintain human health and well-being. Meeting a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of individuals requires the availability of 
a minimum amount of clean water. Some basic amount of clean water is necessary to 
prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related diseases, and to 
provide for basic cooking and hygienic requirements.‖101 
 
The UDHR also includes rights that might be considered less fundamental than a 
right to water. These include the rights to work, to protection against unemployment, 
to form and join trade unions as well as rest and leisure.102 This further supports the 
conclusion that article 25 of UDHR was intended to implicitly support the right to a 
basic water requirement for personal and domestic uses.103 
 
2 5 2 4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
2 5 2 4 1 Water as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living 
A significant question is whether a right to water is implicitly included in the rights 
explicitly provided for under the ICESCR. The rights to an adequate standard of 
living, health, housing and food will be explored in the following sections. The 
ICESCR provides for the right to an adequate standard of living that consists of 
several components. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR states that:  
―The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.‖ 
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The CESCR set forth in General Comment 15 its criteria for deriving the right 
to water from other related rights by stating that:  
 
―Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies a number of rights emanating 
from, and indispensable for, the realisation of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, including adequate food, clothing and housing. ...The right to water clearly falls 
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of 
living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival.‖104 
 
It may be questioned why the drafters of the ICESCR did not explicitly mention 
access to water in article 11(1) while arguably less fundamental elements of an 
adequate standard of living such as adequate clothing and housing are explicitly 
referred to. The inference of the right to water from article 11(1) has provoked 
criticism from some scholars.105 Stephen Tully, for instance, has argued that article 
11(1) offered no interpretive space for the reading of new rights given the seemingly 
endless list of other rights that could be added.106  
It must be noted that the overwhelming literature is supportive of such a 
stance of deriving the right to water from article 11 of the ICESCR.107 The main 
explanation for the omission seem to be that freshwater was not the scarce and 
competed-for resource it is today at the time the ICESCR was drafted.108 This 
position is supported by Malcolm Langford in his ensuing debate with Tully.109 The 
use of the word ―including‖ makes clear that the enumeration of adequate food, 
clothing and housing was not intended to be exhaustive, but rather serves as an 
illustration of constituent elements of an adequate standard of living. The drafters of 
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the ICESCR were reluctant to define the term ―adequate standard of living‖ in explicit 
terms. It was argued that the implications of the concept were generally well 
understood that it had a general and broad meaning.110   
The difficult issue though is to ascertain what other components are 
encapsulated by the right to an adequate standard of living. It appears there is no 
generally accepted definition in human rights scholarship or jurisprudence.111 It can 
be argued that an adequate standard of living is realised when individuals live under 
conditions that enable them to participate in social life in a dignified manner. Access 
to safe and sufficient water is a key component to an adequate standard of living. 
Water is necessary for human health, personal and household hygiene.  Access to 
water is also crucial to enable individuals and groups to carry out a range of activities 
such as work, education and cultural activities. Enjoyment of the preceding rights is 
important for active participation in social life and the realisation of other human 
rights.112 It may also be important to draw parallels to the rights explicitly guaranteed 
in order to ascertain the components of the right to an adequate standard of living. 
Similar to the rights to housing and food, access to safe and sufficient water is 
absolutely necessary not only for an adequate standard of living but to sustain life 
itself as well as to live in dignity.113 This dissertation therefore adopts the position that 
the right to safe and sufficient water is included in an adequate standard of living and 
has the same status as the rights to food and housing that are explicitly mentioned. 
There is no doubt that access to a basic supply of safe and adequate water is 
a conditio sine qua non for the sustenance of human life itself. Keifer and Brolmann, 
for instance, argue that water is a fundamental precondition for the realisation of an 
adequate standard of living.114 The two authors put the issue succinctly by stating 
that: 
―[I]t seems logically unsound to recognise the right to an adequate standard of living 
without concluding that this norm must encompass a right to access essential 
freshwater supplies. In our view, any interpretation to the contrary is impossible to 
reconcile with the object and purpose of article 11(1) ICESCR. It thus seems we may 
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correctly infer an implied right to basic water supplies from the right to an adequate 
standard of living as enshrined in article 11(1) ICESCR.‖115 
2 5 2 4 2 Water as a component of the right to health 
Article 12(1) of the ICESCR provides for the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. The CESCR also derives a 
right to water from the above provision, stating that the right to water is also 
inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of health.116 The 
above position has been further articulated by the CESCR in General Comment 14 in 
its interpretation of the right to the highest attainable standard of health in article 12 
of the ICESCR.117 According to that authoritative interpretation by the CESCR, the 
right to health is not limited to a right to health care services only.118 The CESCR has 
further noted that the drafting history and the express wording of article 12(2) of 
ICESCR acknowledge that the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-
economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life.119 
This extends to the underlying determinants of health such as access to safe and 
potable water.120 This interpretation by the CESCR is persuasive in the light of the 
strong causal link between inadequate freshwater supplies and ill-health or even 
death, highlighted in chapter 1.  
The interpretative strategy of deriving the right of access to water from the 
right to health has also been followed by other international human rights treaty 
bodies.  The Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as the 
―CRC Committee‖), the treaty body charged with monitoring State compliance with 
the CRC has adopted the same interpretative stance. The CRC Committee stated 
that the obligation in article 24 of the CRC to ensure that children have access to the 
highest attainable standard of health meant that States have a duty to ensure access 
to safe water as such access is essential for children‘s health.121 The former Special 
Rapporteur of the then UN Commission on Human Rights on the right of everyone to 
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the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health122  
also emphasised that the right to health extended to the underlying determinants of 
health, such as access to safe and potable water.123 
A purposive and teleological interpretation of article 12(1) of the ICESCR (as 
conducted by the CESCR) endorses the argument that the right to health extends to 
the right of access to water. Access to safe water is perhaps the most fundamental 
underlying determinant of health. It therefore seems clear that a right to access to 
essential quantities of safe water can also be derived from the right to health as 
envisaged in article 12(1) of ICESCR as articulated by the CESCR.  
2 5 2 4 3 Water as a component of the right to housing 
The CESCR in General Comment 15 further articulated the right to water as 
inextricably related to the right to adequate housing contained in article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR. The CESCR had earlier on adopted the same interpretative stance in its 
General Comment 4124 adopted in 1991. In interpreting the right to housing enshrined 
in article 11(1) of the ICESCR, the CESCR in General Comment 4 on the right to 
adequate housing emphasised that beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing 
should have access to safe and adequate water.125   
The former Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living (hereafter referred to as the ―Special 
Rapporteur on housing‖)126 had similarly emphasised that water is a fundamental 
component of the right to adequate housing. The Special Rapporteur on housing 
pointed that ―[n]o dwelling should be deprived of water because such deprivation 
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would render it uninhabitable.‖127 There is no doubt that access to safe and sufficient 
water is an essential component of adequate housing. According to the Special 
Rapporteur on housing, ―water is not only an essential human need, but its place in 
human rights lies at the confluence of human rights and housing, health and food.‖128 
2 5 2 4 4 Water as a component of the right to food 
The ICESCR provides in article 11(1) and (2) for the right of everyone to adequate 
food, including the fundamental right to be free from hunger.129 The CESCR has 
interpreted this provision by implying a right to water as a component of the right to 
food, noting that the right to water is inextricably related to the right to adequate 
food.130 The UN Commission on Human Rights requested the former Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food (hereinafter  referred to as Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food‖) to pay particular attention to the issue of drinking water given its 
interdependence with the right to food.131 The Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food, in a subsequent report, asserted that the right to food includes not only the right 
to solid food, but also the right to liquid nourishment and drinking water.132 Water is 
an integral part of the right to food, both as a requirement for food production and as 
food in itself.133 Of particular concern is the right to water within agrarian societies, 
indigenous peoples and traditional societies. It is significant to recognise the 
significant role of water for traditional livelihoods, indigenous peoples and pastoralist 
communities where livestock is of great importance.134 Such an approach is in 
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accordance with the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights discussed 
above. 
2 5 2 5 Deriving the right to water from the CRC, CEDAW and the Disability 
Convention 
It was pointed earlier that the only explicit references to the right to water under the 
contemporary universal human rights instruments are in the CEDAW, CRC, and the 
Disability Convention. These instruments are limited ratione personae since they 
target specific groups in society, namely, women, children and the disabled persons 
respectively.135 The above treaties address the situation of a particular part of the 
population, conferring specific protections and ensuring non-discrimination. As will be 
discussed below, the significance of these instruments lies in the fact that they 
explicitly provide for a right to water.136 Additionally, it is possible to derive more 
extensive conclusions from the above instruments regarding the recognition of the 
right to water for everyone under a State‘s jurisdiction.137  
The CEDAW sets out an agenda to end discrimination against women, and 
explicitly refers to the right to water for rural women. It obliges State parties to cater 
for the specific needs of rural women and to ensure them the ―the right to enjoy 
adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to...water supply.‖138 CEDAW does 
not create new rights but aims to proscribe discrimination against women in areas 
that are already protected pre-existing human rights treaties such as the international 
Bill of Rights. The fact that access to water is mentioned under article 14(2)(h) 
signifies that water is regarded as a component of one the rights already guaranteed 
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– the right to an adequate standard of living.139 These rights, including the right to 
water, are already guaranteed to all individuals as discussed above. The 
consideration of water supply addressing the situation of rural women is an indication 
that the problem of access to safe water is likely to be more pronounced for rural 
women than other urban women. Discrimination against rural women in access to 
safe water thus deserves special protection as reflected in article 14(2)(h) of 
CEDAW. It can be assumed that protecting water supply especially for rural women 
implies that the right of access to safe water is already extant in the human rights 
framework.140 
The CRC is the mostly widely ratified universal human rights treaty and 
accords special protection to children.141 The CRC explicitly provides for the right to 
drinking water for children. It states in article 24(2)(c) that ―State Parties recognise 
the right of every child ...to clean drinking water.‖142 Furthermore, article 27(1) 
recognises the right of every child to an adequate standard of living. The latter 
provision has been consistently interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child to include access to clean drinking water.143 Additionally, article 28 of the 
Disability Convention enjoins States to ensure disabled people and their families an 
adequate standard of living, similar to article 25 of the UDHR and article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR. As discussed above, the right to water has been derived from these 
provisions. Additionally, the Disability Convention explicitly provides for the right of 
equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water.144 Article 28(2)(a) obliges 
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States to ―ensure equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water services, 
and to ensure access to appropriate and affordable services.‖ 
What is of great significance with regard to these instruments is the lack of 
State reservations in regard to the particular provisions relating to the right to water. 
The lack of reservations in these human rights treaties in relation to the right to water 
clearly shows States‘ willingness to accept that there is a human right to water which 
must be protected and ensured.145 CEDAW and CRC have to date received almost 
universal ratification by States: 187 States are parties to CEDAW while 193 States 
are parties to the CRC.146 
2 5 2 6 Deriving right to water from right to life 
The right to water has also been inferred from the right to life enshrined in article 6 of 
the ICCPR which recognises every human being‘s inherent right to life.147 That raises 
the question whether the above provision can be considered to imply a right of 
access to life-sustaining supplies of adequate and safe water the realisation of which 
State parties are obliged to respect, protect and fulfil.148 The basis of such an 
inference is that it is impossible to sustain life without water.149 In his commentary on 
the ICCPR, Manfred Novak described the right to life as the ―supreme human 
right.‖150 Some scholars have even argued that article 6 has become part of 
customary law, while others even declared that it has become a norm of jus 
cogens.151 Novak asserts that the special status of article 6 of the ICCPR is 
underlined by both its formulation in the treaty. He points out that the right to life is 
the first substantive right to be listed in the ICCPR; secondly, it is the only right in the 
ICCPR that is qualified by the adjective ―inherent‖; and thirdly, it is one of only three 
rights in which the declaratory present tense ―has‖ rather than ―shall have‖ was 
used.152  Additionally, article 4(2) of ICCPR lists the right to life as one of the rights 
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from which no derogation is permitted, even in times of public emergency that 
threatens the life of a nation.153 
It must be pointed that such a broad conception of the right to life has been 
questioned. Dinstein advocates for a restrictive interpretation of article 6 of ICCPR. 
While he concedes that ―human beings need certain essentials - particularly food, 
clothing, housing and medical care in order to remain alive,‖ he argues that these are 
ingredients of the social right to an adequate standard of living recognised under the 
ICESCR.154  Dinstein argued that the human right to life under the ICCPR is a civil 
right only and does not guarantee anyone against death from famine or cold or lack 
of medical attention.155 The argument is that article 6 does not require a State to take 
positive steps to provide people access to life-sustaining resources such as potable 
water. Rather, the scope of the right is limited to the State obligation to refrain from 
arbitrary deprivation of life.156 If one is to agree with Dinstein‘s interpretation of article 
6, a positive right to access water for personal and domestic uses could hardly be 
derived from that provision.157 
The contemporary approach from international lawyers and human rights 
scholars is to expand the right of life under article 6 of ICCPR. Understanding the 
right to life in this sense entails, not only protection against any arbitrary deprivation 
of life. It also means States are also under an obligation to pursue policies that are 
designed to ensure access to the means of survival for all people within their 
territories. Such an expansive view of the right to life finds favour with a number of 
notable scholars. Gleick for instance points that the right to life implies the right to 
fundamental conditions necessary to support life.158 McCaffrey points to the 
contemporary trend towards an expansive interpretation of article 6 of ICCPR. 
McCaffrey cites as an example the UN Human Rights Committee‘s assertion that the 
right to life as the most fundamental right and may not be understood in a restrictive 
                                                     
153
 Kiefer & Brolmann Non-State Actors and International Law 186. 
154
 See Y Dinstein ―The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty‖ in L Henkin (ed) The International 
Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (1981) 114 115. 
155
 137. 
156
 114-137. 
157
 AAC Trindade ―The Contribution of International Human Rights Law to Environmental Protection, 
with Special Reference to Global Environmental Change‖ in EB Weiss (ed) Environmental Change 
and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (1992) 244 272. 
158
 Gleick 1998  Water Policy 493. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 45 
 
sense.159 In its General Comment 6 on the right to life, the Human Rights Committee 
stated that: 
 
―[T]he right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression ‗inherent 
right to life‘ cannot be properly understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection 
of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this connection, the 
Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties to take all possible 
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in 
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.‖160 
 
McCaffrey has argued that protection of the right to life requires States to adopt 
positive measures to protect life. This encompasses access to safe water for 
personal and domestic uses to prevent hunger, dehydration and water-related 
diseases.161  
State practice also reflects this contemporary understanding of the right to life. 
The jurisprudence from the Indian courts provides a good example. The Indian 
constitution does not provide for an explicit right of access to water. The Indian 
Supreme Court has however interpreted the right to life under article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution to encompass the right of access to water.162 Liebenberg has illustrated 
how the Indian Supreme Court has drawn on from the non-justiciable Directive 
Principles in part IV of the Indian Constitution to infuse the right to life with 
substantive content. This has resulted in the court interpreting the right to life to 
encapsulate basic survival needs such as adequate nutrition, clothing, right to 
livelihood, shelter, healthcare and the right to education.163 The Indian Supreme 
Court stated in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan that ―[w]ater is the basic need 
for the survival of human beings and is part of the right to life and human rights as 
enshrined in [a]rticle 21 of the Constitution of India.‖164 Values and interests 
underlying socio-economic rights, such as the right of access to water, has led to 
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their protection through civil and political rights, particularly in those jurisdictions 
where there are no express socio-economic rights provisions.165 
This dissertation will thus adopt this expansive understanding of the right to 
life as incorporating the right to water. The above interpretation of the right to life as 
encompassing the right to water is consistent with Scott‘s understanding of the 
interdependent and interrelated nature of human rights. There is an interrelated 
interdependence between the right to water and the right to life as life cannot be 
guaranteed in the absence of access to safe water. This interrelatedness of human 
rights means that the protection of human rights can only be conceived of and acted 
upon in an integrated fashion.166  
2 5 2 7 Conclusion 
The CESCR in General Comment 15 used three methods of deriving the right to 
access to water from contemporary international law. Firstly, General Comment 15 
recognised the right to water through derivation and inferences from articles 11 and 
12 in the ICESCR as pointed above. Secondly, it derived the right to water through 
an analysis of the centrality and necessity of water to other rights under the ICESCR 
and the other instruments under the International Bill of Rights. A pertinent example, 
is the derivation of water as an essential component of the right to life enshrined in 
the ICCPR. Thirdly, the CESCR in General Comment 15 also recognised the right to 
water as a right that already exists and recognised under various other international 
legal instruments. Through these three analytical models, the CESCR provided a 
solid legal basis for recognising a human right to water under international human 
rights law.167 Jurisprudence from regional and national courts as well as legal 
scholars have thrown their weight behind the CESCR‘s derivation of the right to water 
from international human rights instruments using the above analytic device as 
legally permissible and non-revisionist.  
The discussion above clearly illustrates the practical application of the concept 
of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all human rights. There is little doubt 
                                                     
165
 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 121-122. 
166
 AAC Trindade ―The Interdependence of all Human Rights-Obstacles and Challenges to their 
Implementation‖ (2002) 50 International Social Science Journal 513 515. As Nickel points out that 
―[s]ystem-wide indivisibility might be defended on the grounds that if all human rights are derived from 
a single value, such as human dignity, the result will be that all the families of human rights will have a 
strong form of unity akin to indivisibility.‖
166
 
167
 55-60. 
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that the right to water is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the human person 
and is indispensable for the realisation of other human rights. By following such an 
approach, the CESCR in General Comment 15 has emphasised the importance of 
access to water as an integral component of the rights to health, adequate standard 
of living, food and life.  
The above approach of deriving the right to water from related rights such as 
the right to life is in harmony with the purposes and values underlying human rights. 
Human rights constitute a mechanism to protect and advance certain values. Human 
rights are thus not just abstract concepts but social practises to realise those 
values.168 The most important value underlying human rights is human dignity.169 
Jack Donelly conceives of human rights as a ―road map and set of practices for 
constructing a life of dignity.‖170 Asborn Eide emphasised the significance of human 
dignity as an animating value underpinning the push for the recognition, protection 
and promotion of all human rights.171 The full realisation of all human rights, including 
the right to water, requires an understanding of the symbiotic relationship between all 
human rights. This is because human rights are deeply interconnected and cannot be 
realised in an isolated manner. Conceiving of human rights in an interdependent 
manner works as a bulwark against a fragmented conception of human rights.  
Access to safe water is essential for the realisation of other human rights 
protected under the ICESCR and the ICCPR. Water is an underlying determinant of 
the rights to housing, health, life, food and an adequate standard of living. 
Significantly, as shown in this section, access to water has also been guaranteed in 
other human rights instruments such as CEDAW, CRC and the Disabilities 
Convention although the personal scope of these treaties is limited. Some of these 
treaties such as the CRC, CEDAW and the Disabilities Convention have been ratified 
by a significant number of States. The ICESCR and the ICCPR have also been 
widely ratified, and taken collectively, the right to water should be considered an 
independent human right. The following section explores the recognition of the right 
to water under other international treaties outside the realm of human rights. 
                                                     
168
 J Donelly Human Rights and Dignity. Paper Commissioned by and prepared for the Geneva 
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the framework of the Swiss Initiative 
to commemorate the 60
th
 Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2009) 
<www.udhr60.ch> (accessed on 09.02.2011)13. 
169
 13. 
170
 13. 
171
 A Eide ―Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights‖ in A Eide & A Rosas (eds) 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2001) 9 and 12. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 48 
 
2 5 3 Recognition of the importance of access to water in other international treaties 
International humanitarian law encapsulated in the Geneva Conventions stipulates 
obligations that relate to access to water.172 Although reference to water under the 
Geneva Conventions is not necessarily tantamount to its recognition as a human 
right, the guarantees regarding access to water underline its importance to sustain 
human life and dignity.  The Geneva Conventions set out obligations to respect and 
ensure access to water for specified groups such as prisoners of war and interned 
persons.173 They also contain similar provisions with regard to the protection of 
civilian persons.174 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions also 
prohibit warring parties from attacking or destroying objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population including drinking water supplies.175  
The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (hereinafter referred to as the ―Watercourses 
Convention‖) enjoins States to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States although it does not directly address the issue of a human right to 
                                                     
172
 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) 75 UNTS 135. 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) 75 UNTS 287; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) 75 UNTS 85 & Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949) 75 UNTS 31. 
173
 Article 20 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides that: 
The detaining Power shall supply the prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient 
food and portable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention (emphasis 
added). 
 Article 85 provides, in relevant part: 
Internees...shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal toilet and 
for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities necessary for this purpose shall 
be granted to them. Showers or baths shall also be available. The necessary time shall be set 
aside for washing and for cleaning. 
Article 89 states that: 
Internees shall also be given the means by which they can prepare for themselves any 
additional food in their possession. Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees. 
Article 127 states that: 
The Detaining Power shall supply internees during transfer with drinking water and food 
sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to maintain them in good health, and also with the 
necessary clothing, adequate shelter and the necessary medical attention. 
174
 See Articles 27, 88 and 89 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (1949). See also article 54(2) of Protocol. Article 54(2) states that:  
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock and drinking water installations. 
175
 Protocol II in article 5(1)(b) enjoins State parties  to ensure that interned, detained, wounded and 
sick persons are ―to the same extent as the local civilian population, be provided with food and 
drinking water.‖ Article 14 has a similar provision as in the Protocol 1 cited above and proscribes the 
deliberate destruction of ―objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as 
…drinking water installations and supplies.‖ 
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water.176  The Watercourses Convention enjoins States to pay special regard to the 
requirements of vital human needs in the event of conflict on the uses of an 
international watercourse. The Statement of Understanding issued by States 
negotiating the Watercourses Convention explained that:  
 
―In determining ‗vital human needs‘, special attention is to be paid to providing 
sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water and water 
required for production of food in order to prevent starvation.‖177 
 
The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, for example, 
requires States to take all appropriate measures to ensure adequate supplies of 
potable water for everyone.178 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―Rome Statute‖) defines war crimes as the intentional 
use of ―starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects 
indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided 
for under the Geneva Conventions.‖179 This would encompass such acts as the 
deprivation of water supply to civilians as a means of warfare. The inclusion of water 
as an object indispensable to the survival of the civilian population under the Geneva 
Conventions and the Rome Statute emphasises the importance of water for which 
access should be protected even in war situations.  
The human right to water is increasingly being recognised in regional 
agreements. Specific human rights treaties in Africa, Europe and the Americas 
explicitly or implicitly provide for the right to water. The following section examines 
the extent to which the right to water has been recognised in regional instruments. 
                                                     
176
 See United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (1997) UN Doc A/51/869. See Article 7 on Obligation not to cause significant harm 
provides that ―Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, 
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.‖ 
177
 See Report of the Sixth Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole (1997) UN Doc 
A/51/869 para 8. 
178
 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (1999) EUR/ICP/EHCO 020205/8Fin articles 4(2)(a) & 6(1)(a). 
179
 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 2187 UNTS 90. Article 8 (2)(xxv) 
defines ―war crimes‖ as ―intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving  
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided 
for under the Geneva Conventions.‖ 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
 
2 5 4 Recognition of the right to water under regional instruments 
2 5 4 1 Africa 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (hereafter referred to as the 
―African Charter‖)180 is distinctive in its attempt to append an ―African fingerprint‖ on 
the human rights discourse.181 It is the only regional human rights instrument that 
recognises economic and social rights on the same footing as civil and political rights 
in the same text. The preamble to the African Charter endorses the indivisibility and 
interrelatedness of all human rights by declaring that ―civil and political rights cannot 
be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as 
their universality.‖182 The African Charter contains an enforcement mechanism for all 
human rights recognised in its text and the African Commission, as will be shown 
below, has adopted an approach to interpreting the African Charter in a way that 
endorses the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.183  
The African Charter explicitly recognises a number of socio-economic rights. 
These include the right to property,184 the right to work,185 the right to health186 and 
the right to education.187 The African Charter recognises the right of every individual 
to the best attainable state of physical and mental health,188 and guarantees all 
peoples the right to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development.189 
The right to life is also protected in the African Charter. This is also an important 
provision with regard to the protection of the right to water as a derivative of the right 
to life.190  
                                                     
180
 See African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (1981) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/rev.5. 
181
 See M Mutua ―The Banjul Charter and the African Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties‖ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339 339. For an analysis of the African human 
rights system and the latest jurisprudence on economic and social rights see DM Chirwa ―African 
Regional Human Rights System: The Promise of Recent Jurisprudence on Social Rights‖ in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 323  324. 
182
 See para 8 of the preamble to the African Charter. 
183
Chirwa ―African Regional Human Rights System‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 324. 
184
 Article 14 of the African Charter. 
185
 Article 15. 
186
 Article 16(1). 
187
 Article 17(1). 
188
 Article 16. 
189
 Article 18. 
190
 Article 4 of the African Charter provides that ―[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being 
shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right.‖ 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 51 
 
The African Commission has derived from the African Charter some socio-
economic rights not specifically provided for in that instrument. These include the 
rights to social security, adequate housing, adequate standard of living, adequate 
food and social security. Commentators have argued that the right to water can thus 
be inferred from the above provisions as such guarantees are unattainable without 
access to water.191  
The Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as ―Guidelines‖) note that although the African Charter does not explicitly 
refer to a right to water, the right to water is implied in a number of provisions.192 
These include the protections of the right to life, the right to dignity, the right to work, 
the right to health, the right to economic, social and cultural development and the 
right to a satisfactory environment contained in the African Charter.193 A discussion of 
the jurisprudence of the African Commission below will reveal how the African 
Commission has underscored the interrelatedness and indivisibility of all rights 
thereby engendering a holistic development of the African Charter.194 
In Africa, most States are party to the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.195 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is 
one of the regional human rights instruments that include explicit provisions 
concerning the right to water.  Article 14(2)(c) guarantees to every child the right to 
enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental health safe drinking water.196 
                                                     
191
 See Petrova 2006 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 557.  
192
 See section III(I) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (2011) adopted by the African 
Commission on Human and People‘s Rights on 24
th
 October 2011 (hereinafter the ―Guidelines‖) 
<http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/ecosoc_gview/> (accessed 20.04.2010). The Guidelines were developed 
by the African Commission Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [check name] 
created in 2004. The mandate of the working group was to develop principles and guidelines on 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs), elaborate guidelines pertaining to ESCRs for State 
reporting as well as undertake studies and research on specific ESCRs. The Guidelines are intended 
to provide detailed guidance to States on their drafting of development policies and human rights 
reports regarding the implementation of ESCRs. They are further intended to give national, regional 
and international civil society, as well as monitoring bodies benchmarks against which to assess 
national policies. 
193
 See section III(I). 
194
Chirwa ―African Regional Human Rights System‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 324. 
195
 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
196
 Article 14(2)(c) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child states that: 
Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and 
spiritual health...State Parties...undertake to pursue the full implementation of this right 
and...shall take measures...to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking 
water. 
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The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (hereafter ―Protocol on African Women‖) has also been 
cited to support the existence of a right to water in international law as it provides for 
women‘s right of access to water.197 Article 15 of the Protocol on African Women 
enjoins States to ensure women access to clean drinking water. This constitutes an 
endorsement of the importance of the right of access to water as it is enshrined in a 
legally binding instrument.198 The Protocol on African Women further enjoins States 
to provide budgetary support for the actualisation of the rights guaranteed in the 
treaty. Of great importance for the realisation of the right to access to water by 
women in Africa is article 26 which provides that must implement the treaty at 
national level, and indicate the legislative and other measures undertaken for the full 
realisation of the  protected right. Article 26 further enjoins States to provide 
budgetary and other resources for the full and effective implementation of the 
guaranteed rights.  
The above provisions oblige States to take positive steps to advance the 
realisation of the rights contained in the Protocol on African Women, including the 
right to water. States are also enjoined to adopt measures to assist individuals and 
communities to access the various rights provided for in the Protocol on African 
Women, including the right to access water. It is important to note that the Protocol 
on African Women has a sound monitoring mechanisms in the form of the African 
Commission on Human and People‘s Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―African 
Commission‖), the African Court on Human and People‘s Rights,199 pending the 
                                                     
197
 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(2000) CAB/LEG/66.6 (hereinafter ―Protocol on African Women).‖ Article 15 provides that ―States 
Parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. In this regard, they 
shall take appropriate measures to ensure...women with access to clean drinking water.‖ 
198
 The Protocol on African Women was adopted in July 2003. One observer commented that ―the 
speed with which the Protocol on African Women was ratified broke all records for the ratification of 
continental human rights in Africa.‖ See I Houghton ―Reviewing the Protocol on the Rights of Women 
in Africa‖ Pambazuka News  (26 May 2006) <http://www.newsafrica.org/new> (accessed 24.06.2010). 
199
 The African Court on Human and People‘s Rights (ACHPR) was established in 1998 through the 
Protocol to the Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(1998) OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III). The Protocol establishing the ACHPR entered 
into force on January 1, 2004 upon its ratification by fifteen member States to the African Charter. The 
ACHPR has the competence to take final and binding decisions on human rights violations 
perpetrated by African Union member States. The court has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes 
submitted to it regarding the interpretation and application of the African Charter, the Protocol to the 
Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and any other 
relevant human rights instrument ratified by States that are party to a case. The African Court of 
Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights were merged by virtue of the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in 2008 to form a single court, the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights. Adopted on the 1 July 2008, the Protocol on the Statute of the 
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coming into effect of the protocol that creates the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights in Africa (hereinafter referred to as the ―African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights.‖)200 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights will have within its 
mandate the enforcement of the human right to water. This is because the African 
Court of Justice will have jurisdiction over the interpretation and the application of the 
African Charter, the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol on 
African Women among others.201  
The above discussion clearly shows that the right of access to water is a 
fundamental value within the African human rights system given that it is one of the 
rights that would be subject to monitoring by a fully-fledged judicial mechanism. The 
African Commission has adopted an approach to interpreting the African Charter in a 
way that reinforces the concept of interdependence of human rights. Chirwa has 
pointed out that when considering communications brought before it, the African 
Commission considers the facts in the light of all relevant rights applicable.202 In the 
case of The Social and Economic Rights Centre & the Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria,203 for instance, the communication alleged that a consortium 
comprising the State-owned Nigerian Petroleum Company and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company had committed a range of human rights violations. It was 
alleged that the consortium had exploited oil resources in Ogoniland, Nigeria, without 
due regard for the health or environment of the local communities. This resulted in 
water, soil and air pollution causing serious health problems for the local 
communities. The African Commission found Nigeria to be in violation of a range of 
civil, economic, social and political rights. These included the right not to be 
discriminated against, the rights to life, property, health, family protection, satisfactory 
                                                                                                                                                                     
African Court of Justice and Human Rights merges the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
and the Court of Justice of the African Union into one single court. The Protocol on the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights, thus, replaces the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted in 
1998) and the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (adopted in 2003). The Protocol on 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, currently not yet into force, will enter into force upon 
ratification by fifteen member States to the African Union. As of 14 August 2012 the Protocol on the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights had a total of 5 ratifications. For a list of ratifications see 
<http://au.int/en/treaties> (accessed 23.11.2012). 
200
 See Protocol on African Women, article 32 which provides that:  
Pending the establishment of the African Court [of Justice and Human Rights in Africa] the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights shall be seized with matters of 
interpretation arising from the application and implementation of this Protocol. 
201
 See Article 28 of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
202
Chirwa ―African Regional Human Rights System‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 324. 
203
 The Social and Economic Rights Centre & the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96, Ref.ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (27 May 2002). 
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environment and the right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth.204 The 
significance of the African Commission‘s finding is that it derived the rights to food 
and housing from a range of other rights in the African Charter thus explicitly 
endorsing the organic and related interdependence of all human rights. This supports 
the interdependence of human rights approach to derive the right to water from 
related rights such as health, food, water and housing. 
In the case of Free Legal Assistance Group and others v Zaire,205 the 
petitioners made numerous allegations of human rights violations against the State. 
These ranged from arbitrary arrests, detention, torture and religious persecution, to 
the shortage of medicines and the failure of the government to provide basic services 
such as safe drinking water. The African Commission ruled that article 16 of the 
African Charter which provides for every individual‘s right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health had been violated. The African Commission 
further ruled that the failure by the State to provide basic services such as safe 
drinking water was also a violation of article 16.206 
In its recent decision in the case of Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE) v Sudan, the African Commission found Sudan to have violated a number 
of rights provided in the African Charter, including the right to water.207  The African 
Commission ruled that the poisoning of water sources was a violation of the right to 
water implicit in article 16 of the African Charter as it exposed the victims to serious 
health risks.208 The African Commission‘s derivation of the right of access to safe 
drinking water from the right to health is an endorsement of the interrelated and 
interdependent nature of human rights. It further endorses the argument advanced 
above that the right to water is a cardinal component of the right to health. 
Other instruments adopted under the African system such as the revised 
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, although 
not yet in force, explicitly provides for the member States to guarantee a continuous 
supply of suitable water.209 The 2002 Senegal River Water Charter, a treaty 
                                                     
204
 See an analysis of the decision in Chirwa ―African Regional Human Rights System‖ in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence (2008) 324-326. 
205
 Free Legal Assistance Group and others v Zaire Communications 25/89, decision made at the 18th 
Ordinary Session (October 1995). 
206
 See para 47. 
207
 See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan Communication 296/2005. 
208
 Para 212. 
209
 See The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised 
Version (2003). Article 7(2) provides that: 
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concluded between Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, also aims to ensure (amongst 
other objectives), access to ―the fundamental right to healthy water‖ for the 
populations of the riparian States.210  
2 5 4 2 Americas 
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights has a number of 
human rights instruments. The significant ones include the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (hereafter referred to as ―the American Declaration‖)211 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as ―the 
American Convention‖),212 the Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights on the Abolition of the Death Penalty and213 the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture.214 Others such as the Inter-American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons,215 the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women,216 and the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter referred to as the ―Protocol of San 
Salvador‖) are equally important.217 
The American Declaration provides a full spectrum of socio-economic rights 
as well as civil and political rights. The socio-economic rights include the right to 
protection for maternity and childhood,218 the right to health,219 the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
The Parties shall establish and implement policies for the planning, conservation, 
management, utilisation and development of underground and surface water, as well as the 
harvesting and use of rain water, and shall endeavour to guarantee for their populations a 
sufficient and continuous supply of suitable water. 
210
 Senegal River Water Charter (2002) concluded between Mali, Mauritania and Senegal in May 
2002. French original version <http://www.lexana.org/traites/omvs_200205.pdf> (accessed 
11.10.2010). Article 4(3) provides that: 
The guiding principles governing every distribution of the water of the River [Senegal] aim to 
ensure the full use of the resource for the populations of the riparian States, while respecting 
the safety of people and works, as well as the fundamental human right to healthy water, in 
the perspective of sustainable development. 
211
 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) OAS Res XXX. 
212
 American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 1144 UNTS 123. 
213
 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1990) 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1. 
214
 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc 6 rev.1. 
215
 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994) 33 ILM1429. 
216
 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against 
Women (1994) 33 ILM 1534. 
217
 The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1988) 33 ILM 1429. 
218
 American Declaration, article 7. 
219
 Article 11. 
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education,220 the right to culture,221 the right to employment and fair remuneration,222 
the right to rest and leisure.223 The other protected rights include the right to 
housing,224 the right to property,225 the right to special protection for mothers, children 
and the family,226 and the right to social security.227  
The American Convention recognises an extensive catalogue of civil and 
political rights but does not explicitly provide for economic, social and cultural rights. 
These include the rights to adequate food, housing, health, social security, education, 
unionisation, employment, just labour conditions and to social security.228 Melish has 
however noted that the American Convention‘s provisions provide the Inter-American 
Court with the necessary arsenal for the judicial protection of socio-economic 
rights.229 The Inter-American Court of Human and People‘s Rights (hereafter referred 
to as ―the Inter American Court‖) has affirmed that socio-economic rights are the 
same in substance as civil and political rights as they all derive from the dignity of the 
person.230 The Inter-American Court has relied on the rights enshrined in chapter II of 
the American Convention to protect socio-economic rights such as health, education 
and social security.231 The American Convention also protects the rights to life, 
personal integrity, legal personality, special protection for children and the family as 
well as inviolability of the home.232 These latter provisions are important, particularly 
with regard to the protection of economic and social rights including the right to 
water. The Inter-American Court, as will be shown below, has addressed essential 
aspects of the right to water, health, education, food, recreation, sanitation and 
adequate housing all of which are important for a dignified life under the rights to life 
and personal integrity.233 
                                                     
220
 Article 12. 
221
 Article 13. 
222
 Article 14. 
223
 Article 15. 
224
 Articles 9 and 11. 
225
 Article 23. 
226
 Articles 6 and 7. 
227
 Article 16.  
228
 These rights are guaranteed under article 26 of the American Convention. 
229
 See TJ Melish ―The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity‖ in M Langford 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 372 
374. 
230
 See Inter-American Court on Human Rights Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (1986) OEA/Ser.LIII.15 para 14. 
231
 See Melish ―The Inter-American Court of Human Rights‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 375. 
232
 See American Convention, articles 4 and 5. 
233
 See Melish ―The Inter-American Court of Human Rights‖ Social Rights Jurisprudence 374. 
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The protocol of San Salvador incorporates a catalogue of detailed and well-
defined socio-economic rights. These include the rights to health and a healthy 
environment, food, education, work, just and equitable conditions of work, social 
security, benefits of culture and special protection of family, children, the elderly and 
persons with disabilities.234 The Protocol of San Salvador entitles everyone to the 
right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services.235 
This provision has been interpreted to encompass a right to water.236 The right of 
access to water is a vital component of a healthy environment. Lack of access to safe 
water, as illustrated in chapter 1, is one of the major causes of ill health and mortality. 
The right to a healthy environment necessarily incorporates the right to access safe 
water. 
The Inter-American Court has also affirmed the interdependence of all human 
rights discussed above. The court asserted that economic, social and cultural rights 
are the same in substance as civil and political rights.237 The Inter-American Court 
explained that all categories of rights derive from the essential dignity of human 
beings.238 In the Case of Children‘s Rehabilitation v Paraguay (hereinafter referred to 
as ―Street Children‖) the Inter-American Court interpreted the right to life in the 
American Convention as including the right not to be prevented from having access 
to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.239 In Legal Status and Human 
Rights of the Child case, the Inter-American Court also expansively interpreted the 
right to life in the American Convention as including, for children, the obligations to 
provide the measures required for life to develop under conditions of dignity. 240  
The Inter-American Court has particularly highlighted healthcare for children 
as one of the key pillars to ensure the enjoyment of a decent life by children.241  In 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay,242 the Inter-American Court held that 
the State had failed to take positive measures with respect to conditions that limited 
the community members‘ possibilities of living a dignified life. The State was, 
therefore, held to have violated the right to life in the American Convention. Citing the 
                                                     
234
 See Protocol of San Salvador, articles 6-18. 
235
 Article 11. 
236
 COHRE Manual on Right to Water and Sanitation (2008) <http://www.cohre.org> (accessed 26-02-
2010). 
237
 See Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1986) 44-45 para 14. 
238
 Para 14. 
239
 Case of Children‘s Rehabilitation v Paraguay 2004 (Ser.C) No 112 para 144. 
240
 Legal Status and Human Rights of the Child 2002 OC-17/02/Ser.A No 17 para 80. 
241
 Para 86. 
242
 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay 2005 Ser/C No 125 para 82. 
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CESCR‘s General Comments Numbers 12, 14 and 15 (on the rights to food, health 
and water, respectively), the Inter-American Court emphasised the very close nexus 
between access by indigenous people to their ancestral lands and enjoyment of their 
rights to clean water, food, health, education and cultural identity.243 The Inter-
American Court further asserted that the State‘s obligation to protect the right to life 
necessitates it to ensure the minimum conditions of life compatible with human 
dignity. This requires the State to adopt positive concrete measures oriented to 
upholding the right to a dignified life.244 The court particularly underscored the State‘s 
obligations to guarantee the rights to adequate food, access to clean water and 
health.245 
The interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights implies that, under 
the Inter-American human rights system, the right to access water can be enforced 
through a number of provisions. These include the express provisions relating to the 
rights to adequate health, food and housing. Some of the cases highlighted above, 
for instance the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay case, clearly illustrate 
and reflect a broad understanding of the right to health. This right does not just 
encompass access to medical care in the narrow sense, but also access to the 
underlying determinants of health such as access to clean water. The same can be 
said of the rights to adequate food and housing. 
The Inter-American Court has also expanded the right to life as a right to a 
dignified life or to a life project. This approach, as illustrated in the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court, is ―illimitable in scope, capable of subsuming into their 
protective embrace all nationally and internationally recognised human rights.‖246 The 
right to life encapsulated in the American Convention has thus been interpreted to 
encompass a diverse array of socio-economic rights including access to safe and 
potable water, housing, decent healthcare and adequate food as illustrated above.247    
                                                     
243
 Paras 72-73. 
244
 Para 68. 
245
 Para 78. 
246
 Melish ―The Inter-American Court of Human Rights‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 407. 
247
 407. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 59 
 
2 5 4 3  Europe 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereafter referred to as the ―ECHR‖),248 is the pre-eminent human rights instrument 
under the Council of Europe, focuses almost entirely on the traditional canon of civil 
and political rights.249 The ECHR contains no unqualified provisions obliging member 
States to provide core socio-economic rights such as the right to adequate health, 
social security or water. It provides protection for respect of one‘s private and family 
life, home and correspondence but does not contain an obligation to ensure or 
provide housing.250 The First Protocol to the ECHR provides for explicit socio-
economic rights through its protection of the rights to property and education 
respectively.251  
It is noteworthy that as long ago as 1979 in Airey v Ireland (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Airey case‖),252 the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter 
referred to as the ―ECtHR‖) recognised an overlap in the ECHR between civil and 
political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other, a view that 
is now immanent in its jurisprudence.253 The ECtHR specifically stated that: 
 
―[T]he mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere 
of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an 
interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from the field 
covered by the Convention.‖ 
 
The ECtHR has built a body of socio-economic rights jurisprudence through an 
incremental interpretation of the traditional civil and political rights in articles 2, 3 and 
8 and articles 6 and 14 of the ECHR.254 Since the Airey case, the ECtHR has 
                                                     
248
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5/213 
UNTS 222 (hereinafter ―ECHR‖). 
249
 See generally E Palmer ―Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights‖ (2009) 2 Erasmus 
Law Review 397-425. 
250
 See article 8(1) of the ECHR. 
251
 Articles 1 and 2 of the First Protocol concern, respectively, the right to property and the right to 
education. 
252
 See Airey v Ireland A.32 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 para 26. 
253
 Stec v United Kingdom Admissibility decision (2005) 41 EHRR SE 18 para 52. 
254
 ECHR article 2 provides for respect of the right to life, article 3 is a prohibition against torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, article 8 provides for respect for private and family 
life, home and correspondence and article 6 enshrines the right to a fair public hearing. For a 
comprehensive discussion on the development of positive obligations under the ECHR, see generally 
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engaged in expansive interpretations of the substantive elements of article 8 (private 
and family life, home and correspondence) to support the development of a wide 
range of socio-economic benefits in a wide range of cases. Such a mechanism is 
used in cases characterised by severe socio-economic deprivation for which 
responsibility cannot be directly or indirectly imposed on the State. In such scenarios, 
the approach of the ECtHR has been to interpret the ECHR in such a way that it 
compels the State to provide socio-economic assistance by virtue of the positive 
obligation contained in article 1255 of the ECHR read with articles 3 and 8. In Dulas v 
Turkey, for instance, the ECtHR held that the destruction of the applicants‘ homes 
and property constituted particularly grave and unjustified interferences with the 
applicants‘ respect for their private and family lives and homes under article 8 and 
the right to property under article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. The ECtHR therefore 
imposed a positive duty on the State to provide housing to the applicants.256 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has in some cases indicated its readiness to impose 
positive obligations on State parties in cases involving the protection of the 
environment, child protection and public health and welfare systems.257  
The ECtHR has to date not explicitly derived the right to water from the 
provisions of the ECHR. However, there is little doubt that the right to water can be 
derived from an expansive and principled interpretation of the various provisions of 
the ECHR. It is virtually impossible to enjoy the right to life, to be free from inhuman 
and degrading conditions without access to safe water. The indivisibility and 
interdependence of all human rights entails a rejection of the overly simplistic 
taxonomy of catagorising rights as either social and economic or civil and political.258  
In Europe, several States are party to the European Social Charter which 
implicitly recognises the right to water.259 The revised European Social Charter also 
                                                                                                                                                                     
A Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004). 
255
 Article 1 of the ECHR provides for the State parties to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms contained in that instrument. 
256
 Dulas v Turkey (2001) Application no 25801/94. 
257
 For an illuminating discussion the ECtHR‘s approach to the development of positive obligations 
encompassing the protection of economic and social rights under the rubric of the ECHR, see E 
Palmer ―Protecting Socio-Economic Rights‖ (2009) Erasmus Law Review 397-425. 
258
 See L Clements & A Simmons ―European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic Unease‖ in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law 
(2008) 409 409. 
259
  European Social Charter (1965) ETS No 35. Article 11 enjoins member States to: 
take appropriate measures...to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health...to provide 
advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the encouragement of 
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recognises the right to housing, whereby States are enjoined to promote access to 
housing of an adequate standard.260 The European Committee on Social Rights, a 
treaty body charged to monitor State compliance with the European Social Charter 
held in the case of Defence for Children International v The Netherlands that the right 
to clean water is a component of the right to adequate housing.261 Such an 
interpretation is consonant with the discussion above on deriving the right to water as 
a component of the right to housing. Furthermore, it constitutes an endorsement of 
the related interdependence of rights articulated as a framework to derive the right to 
water from related rights.  
The UN Commission in Europe (hereinafter referred to as ―UNECE‖) adopted 
the London Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (hereinafter 
referred to as ―UNECE London Protocol‖). The UNECE London Protocol is the first 
regional international agreement of its kind adopted specifically to ensure an 
adequate supply of water for everyone and to protect water in a sustainable way. It 
specifically enjoins member States to ensure equitable access to water of acceptable 
quality and quantity to the entire population.262 It also emphasises special regard to 
the disadvantaged and socially excluded groups in the supply of water.263 
Additionally, under the European System (hereinafter referred to as the ―EU‖), the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
individual responsibility in matters of health...[and] to prevent as far as possible epidemic, 
endemic and other diseases. 
260
 See article 31 of the Revised European Social Charter (1966) ETS No 163. 
261
 See Defence for Children International v The Netherlands Complaint no 47/2008.  
262
 Article 4. 
263
 See Protocol on Water and Health to the Watercourses Convention. A number of provisions are 
supportive of the emergence of the right to water. These are:  
Article 4 – General Provisions 
1. The Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce water-related 
disease within a framework of integrated water-management systems aimed at sustainable 
use of water resources, ambient water quality which does not endanger human health, and 
protection of water ecosystems. 
2.  The Parties shall, in particular, take all appropriate measures for the purpose of ensuring: 
(a) Adequate supplies of wholesome drinking water which is free from any micro-organisms, 
parasites and substances which, owing to their numbers or concentration, constitute a 
potential danger to human health. This shall include the protection of water resources which 
are used as sources of drinking water, treatment of water and the establishment, improvement 
and maintenance of collective systems. 
Article 5(1) provides that ―[e]quitable access to water, adequate in terms both of quantity and of 
quality, should be provided for all members of the population, especially those who suffer a 
disadvantage or social exclusion‖. Article 6 provides that ―[i]n order to achieve the objective of this 
Protocol, the Parties shall pursue the aims of access to drinking water for everyone.‖ 
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European Parliament adopted a watershed resolution in 2003.264 In that resolution, 
the EU affirmed that access to drinking water of a sufficient quality and quantity is a 
basic human right and enjoined national governments to fulfill this obligation.265 The 
EU resolution on water further provides that distribution of water services should be 
looked upon as a public service. In that regard, public-private partnerships systems 
should be viewed as one of several ways of improving access to water rather than 
the panacea.266   
2 5 4 4  Asia 
The Asia-Pacific Message from Bepu Declaration, although not legally binding, was 
endorsed unanimously by heads of States and governments from the Asia-Pacific 
region.267 It explicitly provides for people‘s right to safe drinking water by 
―[r]ecognis[ing] the people‘s right to safe drinking water...as a basic human right and 
a fundamental aspect of human security.‖268 The signatory States further undertook 
to substantially increase resource allocations towards water.269 This clearly shows 
that access to water is an important social value regarded as fundamental in a world 
of diverse value systems hence the high degree of international consensus on the 
need for it to be accessible. 
2 5 4 5  Conclusion 
The above section analysed the legal bases for the right to water under international 
law. The discussion has focused mainly on the primary instruments under the 
                                                     
264
 See European Parliament resolution on the Commission communication on water management in 
developing countries and priorities for EU development cooperation COM (2002) — 2002/2179(COS) 
(hereinafter referred to as ―European Parliament resolution on water‖). 
265
 See European Parliament resolution on water. The European Union Water Fund has also affirmed 
the right to water for all without discrimination, thereby giving impetus to the emergence and 
significance of the right to water. See European Union Water Fund <http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_2262_en.htm> (accessed on 11.10.2010). Article 23 specifically states that 
―access to water for all without discrimination is a right, and therefore [the EU] takes the view that 
appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that insolvent people are not deprived of such access.‖ 
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 The European Union Water Fund further provides in para C that ―access to water is essential for 
life, health, food, well-being and development and water cannot therefore be regarded as a mere 
commodity.‖ Paragraph D(1) ―reaffirms that access to drinking water in a sufficient quantity and of 
adequate quality is a basic human right and considers that national governments have a duty to fulfill 
this obligation.‖ 
267
 See Report of The Proceedings of the First Asia-Pacific Water Summit (2007) 
<http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Programs/Right_to_Water/Pdf_doct/Message_from_
Beppu_071204.pdf> (accessed 06.10.2010). 
268
 First Asia-Pacific Water Summit (2007). 
269
 First Asia-Pacific Water Summit (2007). 
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international human rights regime. The above section demonstrated that a human 
right to water is implicit in the provisions of the UDHR, ICESCR and the ICCPR. This 
is because water is necessary to meet the explicit rights to health, food, housing and 
an adequate standard of living contained in the these instruments. Significantly, this 
section demonstrated that a human right to water can also be inferred from the right 
to life. This is because a contemporary understanding of the right to water is not to 
conceive of such right only in a negative sense. The protection of the right to life 
requires States to adopt positive measures to protect life. This encompasses access 
to safe water for personal and domestic uses to prevent hunger, dehydration and 
water-related diseases.  
The right to water is however explicitly enshrined under CEDAW, CRC, and 
the Disability Convention. This clearly shows that claims for the existence of a 
universal human right to access water are predicated on a sound legal base. A 
noteworthy development, highlighted above, is that the human right to water is now 
extant, not only under universal human rights instruments but also under regional 
treaties.  
What comes out clearly from the above discussion is the practical application 
of the concept of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all human rights. This 
section demonstrated that the right to water is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity 
of the human person and is indispensable for the realisation of other human rights. 
General Comment 15 on the right to water, the UN‘s standard-setting instrument in 
the elaboration on the right to water, also emphasised the importance of access to 
safe and adequate water as an integral component of the rights to health, adequate 
standard of living, housing, food and life. 
Some scholars have also pointed that the right of access to water is emerging 
as a norm of customary international law. This view has been endorsed by scholars 
like Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins.270 They point to the increasing recognition of the 
right to water at both the international and domestic levels as reflecting State practice 
pointing towards its emergence as a customary norm. In the following section I 
discuss and analyse this issue with a view to ascertaining whether the right to water 
can be said to be emerging as a rule of customary international law. 
                                                     
270
 McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins 2003-2004 Fordham International Law Journal 1728. 
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2 5 5 Customary International law 
The question as to whether the right to water is part of customary international law is 
of great significance.271 States that have not ratified human rights treaties in which 
the right to water is guaranteed could nevertheless be bound by a human right to 
water.272 Customary international law is one of the primary forms of international law 
as provided in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.273 
The International Court of Justice is thus obliged to apply ―[i]nternational custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.‖274 Goldsmith & Posner defined 
customary law as ―the collection of international behavioural regularities that nations 
over time come to view as binding as a matter of law.‖275 The International Law 
Association has defined a rule of customary international law as one that is ―created 
and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States in circumstances that 
give rise to the legitimate expectation of similar conduct in future.‖276  It is a practice 
that States follow ―not in blind pursuit of political approbation, but rather, because 
they believe they have a legal obligation to do so.‖277  
The basic elements for the formation of customary law were judicially 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v the United 
States of America.278 Firstly, there must be a widespread and uniform State 
practice.279 Evidence of State practice may be gathered from statements made by 
government spokespersons to parliament, at international conferences and at 
meetings of international organisations.280 State practice may also be reflected 
through State constitutions, legislation, judicial decisions and regulations.281 The 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (hereinafter referred 
to as the ―Restatement‖) for instance, asserts that the practice of States that builds 
customary law takes many forms and includes what States do in or through 
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 Winkler The Human Right to Water 65. 
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 65. 
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 See article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> (accessed 23.03.2010).   
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 JL Goldsmith & EA Posner ―A Theory of International Law‖ (1999) 66 The University of Chicago 
Law Review 1113-1116. 
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See International Law Association <http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_1206/> (accessed 
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 See International Law Association. 
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 Nicaragua v USA (Merits) ICJ Reports 1986 ICJ Reports 97. 
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 MW Janis An Introduction to International Law (2003) 44. 
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 I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (2003) 6. 
281
 P Malanczuk Akehurst‘s Modern Introduction to International Law (2005) 39. 
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international organisations.282 In particular, the Restatement refers to resolutions and 
other documents of the UN as reflective of State practice.283   
It is worth emphasising that for a practice to be considered customary 
international law, it does not necessarily have to muster universal following. 
However, it must nevertheless command widespread acceptance. States must 
engage in the practice out of a sense of legal obligation. This requirement, referred to 
as opinion juris, is an important element in the formation of customary international 
law.284 Although in certain circumstances it may be difficult to determine whether 
States act out of a sense of legal obligation or habit, such a sense of responsibility 
may therefore be implied from a State‘s conduct at the international and domestic 
spheres. 
Malanczuk notes that a rule of customary international law is generally 
considered to be binding on all States in the international community.285 The 
exception is where a State can show that it is a persistent objector to the emergence 
of the customary international law rule in question.286  The International Court of 
Justice held in the Asylum and Fisheries cases that the doctrine of persistent objector 
is only applicable to a State that has persistently and openly objected to the 
emergence of an embryonic rule of customary international law.287 The following 
section examines the conduct of States at both the municipal and the international 
levels with a view to determining whether there is sufficient and consistent practice 
supporting the emergence of a human right to water as a customary norm. 
2 5 5 1 National constitutions 
Many national constitutions in various regions of the world specifically impose 
obligations upon the States to ensure availability, quality, accessibility or affordability 
of water for the population at large. A number of such provisions include explicit 
references to the right to water. Similarly, the constitutions of over a hundred 
countries recognise the right to a healthy environment. The CESCR in its General 
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 See Restatement of the Law, Third, the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) §102(2). 
283
 §102(2). 
284
 Malanczuk International Law 39-41. 
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 48. 
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 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication 103. 
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Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) 1951 ICJ Reports 116-278.  
See also Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru 1950 ICJ Reports 266 – 331.  It must however be noted that 
some aspects of customary international law have assumed the status of jus cogens from which no 
derogation is permitted. Such jus cogens norms include genocide, slavery and torture. See article 53 
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Comment 14 has interpreted the right to health in the ICESCR as incorporating a 
right of access to water.288 This growing evidence of States enshrining the right to 
water in their national constitutions provides further evidence to support the 
emergence of a right to water under customary international law.  
South Africa‘s 1996 Constitution for instance explicitly provides for a right to 
water. It provides in section 27(1)(b) the right of everyone to access sufficient 
water.289 In one of its leading cases on socio-economic rights, the South African 
Constitutional Court in the case of Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others290 was called upon to interpret the import of the above provision. The 
applicants had alleged violation of the right to have access to sufficient water under 
Section 27 of the South African Constitution. The case is fully discussed in chapter 4 
below.291 The Mazibuko case was very significant in that it was the first South African 
case in the Constitutional Court in which litigants explicitly sought enforcement of 
their constitutional right of access to sufficient water in terms of section 27(1)(b) of 
the South African Constitution. Legislation has further been enacted in South Africa 
to implement this right in the form of the Water Services Act292 and the National 
Water Act.293 Furthermore, Kenya‘s new constitution adopted in August 2010 
guarantees every person a right to clean and safe water in adequate quantities.294  
Article 20(1) of Bolivia‘s 2009 constitution provides for everyone‘s right to universal 
and equitable access to basic water. The Bolivian constitution further provides for the 
criteria that must be met by service providers in the provision of basic services such 
as water. It provides that the provision of water services must meet the criteria of 
universality, accountability, accessibility, continuity, quality, efficiency, effectiveness, 
fair and necessary coverage rates, with participation and social control.295 The 
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 See CESCR General Comment  No 14 (2000) paras  8, 11, 12 and 36. 
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 Constitution of South Africa (1996). The 1996 South African Constitution binds all three spheres of 
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 67 
 
Constitution of Uruguay recognises water as a natural resource essential for life 
hence ―[a]ccess to drinking water and access to sanitation constitute fundamental 
human rights.‖296 Different formulations of the right to water are recognised in a 
significant number of constitutions across the world.297 
A significant number of national laws and policies contain specific entitlements 
in respect of the right to water for personal and domestic uses. A comprehensive 
study conducted by the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions on water laws298 
reveal that a substantial number of laws and policies dealing with access to water 
were enacted after the adoption of General Comment 15 by the CESCR in 2002. A 
2012 publication by three organisations, WASH United, Freshwater Action Network 
and WaterLex contains a comprehensive overview of laws, policies and regulations 
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 See article 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay (1967). 
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 See also, Constitution of Ecuador (1998) which provides in article 23 for the State to recognise and 
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decision in the case of Unni Krishnan v State of AP and Others 1993 SCR (1) 594.  Such constitutions 
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Constitution of Eritrea (1997), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia (1994), The Constitution 
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(2005), Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
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guaranteeing the human right to water at the international, regional and national 
levels.299 What is noteworthy is that these laws and policies address access to water 
for personal and domestic use from a human rights perspective.300 Such a trend is 
replicated in all geographical regions of the world and across all legal cultures.  
Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins point that most States have engaged in a 
consistent practice of adopting measures to ensure water provision for their 
citizens.301 This supports the requirement that an emerging norm of customary 
international law be evidenced by the general practice of States.302 It could be argued 
that States are increasingly motivated by the belief that they have a legal obligation 
to ensure access to water for their inhabitants. This is evidenced by the binding 
treaties highlighted above in which the right to water has been inferred or expressly 
stated such as the ICESCR, CRC, CEDAW, ICCPR and regional instruments. There 
could be evidence suggesting that a universal rule of customary international law is in 
the process of emerging. The following section discusses the increasing recognition 
of the right of access to water under international soft law instruments. 
2 5 5 2 Soft law instruments 
Soft law has been defined differently by legal scholars. Guzman has defined soft law 
instruments as those non-binding rules or instruments that interpret or inform our 
understanding of binding legal rules.303 To put it differently, they are non-binding 
interpretations and elaborations of binging legal instruments.304 Liebenberg defined 
                                                     
299
 See WASH United The Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation in Law and Policy – A 
Sourcebook (2012) 5. 
300
 Many States have adopted laws and policies dealing with access to water. Some of the notable 
ones are: Algeria‘s Water Law No 05-12 of 4 August 2005; Angola‘s Water Act of 21 June 2002; 
Argentina‘s Law 17711 of 1968; Water Code of the Province of Cordoba, Law 5589/73, as amended 
by Law 8928/01 (Argentina); Water Code of the Province of Buenos Aires, Law 12.257 of 9 December 
1998 (Argentina); Azerbaijan‘s 1997 Water Code of the Azerbaijan Republic; Bangladesh‘s National 
Water Policy of 1999; Belarus ‗s Law on Drinking Water Supply, Law No 271-Z of 24 June 1999; 
Burkina Faso‘s Framework Law on Water Management, Law No 002-2001; Cameroon‘s Water Code, 
Law No 98-005 of 14 April 1998; Quebec Water Policy, 2002 (Canada); Cape Verde‘s Water Code, 
Law No 41/II/84; Chile‘s Water Code, DFL No 1122 of 1981; Costa Rica‘s Water Law 276 of 27 
August 1942. Other countries  that have enacted water laws include Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Israel, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Paraguay, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
301
 McFarland Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins 2003-2004 Fordham International Law Journal 1728. 
302
 1728. 
303
 AT Guzman International Soft Law (2009) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No 1353444 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1353444 (Accessed on 14.09.2010)> 6. 
304
 6. 
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soft law instruments as standards which have not yet crystallised into treaty 
provisions or norms of customary international law.305 Such norms and standards 
include resolutions adopted at international conferences organised under the 
auspices of the UN or regional bodies such as the African Union. It also includes 
guidelines and reports adopted by international organisations, by special rapporteurs, 
working groups and other non-treaty based international mechanisms.306 This 
dissertation adopts the latter definition.  
Soft law instruments are thus statements of policy that do not possess formal 
legal enforceability. This follows from the doctrinal axiom of international law, 
endorsed by the International Court of Justice in the celebrated Lotus case,307 that 
States cannot be bound without their consent. In this respect, they should be 
distinguished from treaties that are subject to signature and ratification, and that, 
once in force, are legally binding on the States that have ratified them. Soft law 
instruments such as resolutions and declarations are not subject to signing and 
ratification and as such, do not create binding effects. It is important though to note 
that soft law instruments may later create the impetus for latter binding instruments 
and further the definition of policy and principle in a given area.308  
The importance of soft law instruments in the elaboration of States‘ obligations 
as provided by binding instruments has been endorsed by notable scholars. Rosalyn 
Higgins for instance, noted in 1995 that: 
―In international law, the passing of binding decisions [by an international body] is not 
the only way in which law development occurs. Legal consequences can also flow 
from acts which are not in the formal sense ‗binding‘ [for example evidence of 
crystallising rule of customary international law.‖309   
It is particularly noteworthy that soft law instruments like General Comments of UN 
treaty bodies are elaborations of States parties‘ obligations as provided for under 
binding treaties. The importance of further elaboration of binding instruments through 
the development of soft law standards is particularly significant. Most legal rules are 
                                                     
305
 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 102. 
306
 102-103. 
307
 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (Series A) No 10, the court stated that ―the rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will.‖  
308
 Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 12. 
309
 R Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1995) 25. 
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phrased at some level of generality. It follows that whether any specific act or 
omission violates the rule will require detailing further what the rule requires.310  
The section below discusses some of the major soft law instruments in which 
the right to access to water has been recognised. They range from declarations, 
action plans, resolutions and declarations of UN organs and declarations of 
intergovernmental organisations at both the international and regional levels. These 
instruments, although not in themselves legally binding, are a reflection of the 
currency that the human right to water has generated at the international level. They 
support the earlier assertion that there are clear signs of the emergence of the right 
to water as a rule of customary international law. 
 
2 5 5 2 1  Stockholm Declaration 
The 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment identified water as one of 
the natural resources that needed to be safeguarded.311  Principle 2 of the Stockholm 
Declaration is of particular significance for the discussion of the right to water. This 
provision specifically provided that the earth‘s natural resources, including water, 
must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful 
planning and management.312 Most scholars on the right to water are unanimous that 
the contemporary debate on the right to water is traceable to the Stockholm 
Declaration.313 
2 5 5 2 2  Mar Del Plata Conference 
The ground-breaking 1977 UN Water Conference held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
(―hereinafter referred to as the Mar del Plata Conference‖) expressly recognised that 
all peoples have the right to have access to drinking water to meet their basic needs. 
The Mar del Plata Conference was devoted to exclusively discussing the emerging 
global water resources problems.314 The conference subsequently issued the Mar del 
Plata Action Plan, which sought to tackle these water resources challenges. A 
                                                     
310
 35. 
311
 UN Conference on Human Environment Declaration UN Doc A/Conf. 48/8 (1972). 
312
 See UN Conference on Human Environment: Stockholm Declaration (1972)  UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/8 
(1972) principle 2. 
313
 See Salman & McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water 7. See also McCaffrey 1992 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1-24; Gleick 1998 Water Policy 487-503 & 
Bluemel 2004 Ecology Law Quarterly 957-1006. 
314
 See UN Mar del Plata Water Conference Report (1977) UN Doc No E/Conf.70.29. 
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significant outcome of the conference was to proclaim, through a UN General 
Assembly resolution adopted in 1980, the period 1981 to 1990 as the ―International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade.‖315 Salman and McInerney-Lankford 
emphasise that the action plan contributed immensely and gave the impetus towards 
the movement for the recognition of the right to water.  The two authors particularly 
emphasise the importance of Resolution II on ―Community Water Supply.‖316 The 
resolution declared for the first time that:  
―All peoples, whatever their stage of development and their social and economic 
conditions have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a 
quality equal to their basic needs.‖317 
The resolution further emphasised that the universal recognition of a right to water is 
essential to both life and the full development of man as an individual and as an 
integral member of society.318   
2 5 5 2 3  Agenda 21 of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development 
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development‘s Agenda 21 on 
―Programme of Action for Sustainable Development‖ included a separate chapter on 
freshwater resources.319 In its Chapter 18 on ―Water Resources‖, Agenda 21 
proclaimed that ―the overall objective laid down for freshwater resources is to satisfy 
the freshwater needs of all countries for their sustainable development.‖ On the issue 
of the need and right to water, Chapter 18 further stated that: 
 
                                                     
315
 The UN declared the period 1981–1990 as the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade, during which Member States assumed a commitment to bring about a substantial 
improvement in the standards and levels of services in drinking water supply and sanitation by the 
year 1990. The UN General Assembly followed up on the matter and issued Resolution 40/171 on 
December 17, 1985 as a middle-of-the-decade reminder to the States in which it implored States to 
work extremely hard to meet the commitments made under the International Drinking and Water 
Supply Decade. See UN Doc A/RES/40/171 (1985). 
316
 McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water (2004) 8. 
317
 8. 
318
 8. 
319
 See UN Conference on Environment and Development: Agenda 21 of the Rio Summit on 
Programme on Action for Sustainable Development Rio Summit Report (1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992) para 3.8(p). 
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―[W]ater resources have to be protected…in order to satisfy and reconcile [the] needs 
for water in human activities. In developing and using water resources, priority has to 
be given to the satisfaction of basic needs.‖320 
 
The overall objective laid down for freshwater resources was to satisfy the fresh 
water needs of all countries for their sustainable development.321 
2 5 5 2 4  UN Declaration on the Right to Development 
The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (hereinafter referred to as the 
―Declaration‖),322 adopted by the UN General Assembly, includes a commitment by 
States to ensure equality of opportunity in accessing basic resources. In article 8 of 
the Declaration,323 the UN General Assembly includes water as a basic resource 
necessary for the realisation of the right to development. The UN has elaborated on 
article 8 of the Declaration, noting that the persistent conditions of underdevelopment 
in which millions of people are ―denied access to such essentials as food, water, 
clothing, housing and medicine in adequate measure‖ represent a violation of human 
rights.324 
2 5 5 2 5  Cairo Declaration of the UN International Conference on Population 
and Development 
The Programme of Action adopted by consensus of all 177 participating States at the 
1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, also 
endorsed the right to water. It stated in Principle 2 that people within a State‘s 
jurisdiction have the right to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their 
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 McInerney-Lankford The Human Right to Water (2004) 8. 
321
 8. 
322
 See UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) UN Doc A/41/53 (1986). 
323
 Para 8 of the Declaration on the Right to Development provides that: 
1. States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realisation of the 
right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access 
to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair 
distribution of income. Effective measures should be undertaken to ensure that women have 
an active role in the development process. Appropriate economic and social reforms should 
be carried out with a view to eradicating all social injustices.  
2. States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor in 
development and in the full realisation of all human rights. See UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development para 8. 
324
 See P Gleick The World‘s Water 2000-2001: The Biennial Report on Fresh Water Resources 
(2000) 9. 
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families, including adequate food, clothing, housing, water and sanitation.325 This 
constitutes the endorsement of water as a social value of fundamental importance 
and human right and a constituent element to an adequate standard of living 
discussed above. 
2 5 5 2 6  UN bodies‘ resolutions on right to water 
The 2010 UN General Assembly resolution326 on the right to water and sanitation is 
by far the most recent endorsement of the right to water by the UN. This is evidenced 
by the overwhelming support accorded to the resolution by States.327 This UN 
General Assembly resolution explicitly recognises the right to water, noting that the 
right to safe and clean drinking water is a human right essential for the full enjoyment 
of life and all human rights.328 The resolution constitutes a global endorsement of the 
right to water given its overwhelming backing in the UN General Assembly. The 
                                                     
325
 UN International Conference on Population and Development: Programme of Action (1994) UN 
Doc A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 principle 2 para 15. 
326
 UN The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (2010) A/RES/64/292.  
327
 Of the 192 member General Assembly, 122 States voted in favour and zero votes against the 
resolution, while 41 countries abstained from voting. 
328
 See para 1 of the resolution. The operative part of GA resolution A/RES/64/292 provides:  
1. Recognises the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that 
is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights; 
2. Calls upon States and international organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-
building and technology transfer, through international assistance and cooperation, in 
particular to developing countries, in order to scale up efforts to provide safe, clean, 
accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all; 
3. Welcomes the decision by the Human Rights Council to request that the independent 
expert on human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
submit an annual report to the General Assembly, and encourages her to continue working on 
all aspects of her mandate and, in consultation with all relevant United Nations agencies, 
funds and programmes, to include in her report to the Assembly...the principal challenges 
related to the realisation of the human right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation 
and their impact on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
The International Law Association (hereinafter referred to as ―ILA‖)  has also recognised a right to 
water under international law. The ILA is a membership organisation whose membership ranges from 
lawyers in private practice, academia, government and the judiciary, to non-lawyer experts from 
commercial, industrial and financial spheres, and representatives of bodies such as shipping and 
arbitration organisations and chambers of commerce. According to its constitution, the ILA is 
dedicated to the study, clarification and development of international law, both public and private, and 
the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law. Article 17 of the ILA‘s 
Berlin Rules on Water Resources (Berlin Rules) adopted at the ILA‘s Berlin conference in 2004 
provide that ―[e]very individual has a right of access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically 
accessible, and affordable water to meet that individual‘s vital human needs.‖ See International Law 
Association, Berlin Conference, Water Resources Law:  Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004) 
article 17(1) (2004) <http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Water%20Resources/FinalReport%202004.pdf> 
(accessed on 06.10.2010). It is also noteworthy that the first UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners approved by 
ECOSOC provides that ―Prisoners shall be…provided with water…necessary for health and 
cleanliness.‖ See UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment Offenders, Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1956) UN Doc A/Conf/6/1 para 15.  
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statements accompanying the votes are equally illuminating in their endorsement of 
the existence of the right to water under international law. Most of the statements 
pointed to the existence of the right to water either as a necessary component of 
other human rights recognised under international human rights law, or as an 
independent human right.329 
The UN Human Rights Council (hereafter ―Human Rights Council‖) has added 
further impetus in endorsing the existence of the right to water from the pre-existing 
international human rights instruments. In a recent watershed resolution, it explicitly 
stated that: 
―The human right to safe drinking water … is derived from the right to an adequate 
standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human 
dignity.‖330 
                                                     
329
 See UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognising Access To Clean Water and Sanitation 
GA/10967 (2010) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga.doc.htm> (accessed 05.10.2010). 
The statements made by State representatives during the adoption of the resolution are quite 
illuminating in their endorsement of the right to water. Spain‘s representative argued that water was a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a position also endorsed by the Hungarian representative. The 
representative of Brazil, for instance, asserted that the right to water and sanitation was intrinsically 
connected to the rights to life, health, food and adequate housing. This is also an endorsement of the 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights discussed above. The representative of 
Argentina, speaking in explanation of his country‘s position after the vote, stated that the main human 
rights treaties were pillars of his country‘s legal order. He further stressed that the importance of 
drinking water had been recognised by many international instruments supported by Argentina, 
arguing that States had the main responsibility to ensure that people had access to safe drinking 
water. The representative of Australia also pointed out that access to water was linked to a range of 
civil rights. As argued above, the right to life - the pre-eminent civil right - is impossible of attainment 
without access to safe water. The representative of Costa Rica, in support of the resolution, argued 
that access to water was an inalienable right. She further pointed out that every State has the primary 
responsibility to provide its citizens with access to water. The representative of Mexico argued that the 
right of access to clean water is already extant in international instruments. The representative of 
Ethiopia pointed out that although his country had abstained from the voting process, access to clean 
water was a natural right. The representative of Liechtenstein argued that the explicit rights recognised 
in international human rights law implied many others, and that was true of water. This is an 
endorsement of the derivation of the right to water from related rights discussed above. The 
representative of Liechtenstein noted that his country understood that the resolution did not create a 
new right and that its aims fell under existing international human rights law. The representative of 
Yemen, as a co-sponsor of the resolution, stressed the importance of water for life, which led to its 
being a natural right. The representatives of Cuba and Nicaragua endorsed the resolution as a 
milestone after 25 years of discussion at the global level. The representative of Venezuela argued that 
water was a necessity for life and his country rejects its transformation as a commodity. The Observer 
for Palestine also argued that the right of access to clean water is a universal human right that should 
be enjoyed by all people, including those living under occupation. Germany, Togo, Norway, France, 
Egypt and Belgium expressly endorsed the resolution. The United States noted that safe water 
furthered the realisation of certain human rights but noted that adopting the resolution might 
undermine the work of the Human Rights Council‘s Special Rapporteur on human rights obligations 
relating to drinking water and sanitation. 
330
 See para 3. The resolution further explicitly states in its preamble that:  
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Prior to adoption of the above resolution, the UN Human Rights Council 
appointed a Special Rapporteur (formerly Independent Expert) in 2008 on the issue 
of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water discussed 
above.331 The Special Rapporteur‘s mandate also involves clarification of the content 
of human rights obligations, including non-discrimination obligations, in relation to 
access to water.332 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted a report 
in 2007 elaborating on the scope and content of the relevant obligations related to 
equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation under international human 
rights instruments. The Report of the High Commissioner explicitly pointed that ―it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
international human rights law instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities entail obligations for States parties in relation to access to safe 
drinking water. 
See UN Human Rights Council The Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation (2010) 
A/HRC/15/L.14. See also preamble to the UN Human Rights Council Human Rights and Access to 
Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Resolution 7/22 (2008) on human rights and access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation which explicitly states that: 
[I]nternational human rights law instruments, including the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities entail obligations for States parties in relation to 
access to safe drinking water. 
Other international soft law instruments supportive of the emergence of a right to water under 
international law include the UN Principles for Older Persons (1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/91 (1991) 
which states that ―older persons should have access to adequate food, water, shelter, clothing and 
health care through the provision of income, family and community support and self-help‖. The UN 
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990) A/RES/45/113 provides under 
article 37 that: 
Every detention facility shall ensure that every juvenile receives food that is suitably 
prepared and presented at normal meal times and of a quality and quantity to satisfy the 
standards of dietetics, hygiene and health and, as far as possible, religious and cultural 
requirements. Clean drinking water should be available to every juvenile at any time. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General (1998) 1997/39 UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 
provide in Principle 18(1)&(2)(a)that : 
All internally displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living...[a]t the 
minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities 
shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to...[e]ssential food and 
potable water. 
Also note worthy is the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 (2002). In article 25, the world leaders agreed to: 
Launch a programme of actions, with financial and technical assistance, to achieve the 
Millennium development goal on safe drinking water. In this respect, we agree to halve, by the 
year 2015, the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water, 
as outlined in the Millennium Declaration. 
331
 See section 2 2 above. 
332
 See section 2 2 above on the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. 
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now time to consider access to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human 
right.‖333 
The UN Guidelines for the realisation of the right to drinking water supply and 
sanitation prepared by the former Special Rapporteur on Water emphasised the right 
of everyone to sufficient quantity of clean water for personal and domestic uses.334 
The right to water has further been recognised in a significant number of declarations 
and final documents of UN and other intergovernmental conferences. This 
constitutes an endorsement of the emergence of the right to water as an independent 
right under international law.335 The above clearly shows the recognition and 
                                                     
333
 See UN Human Rights Council Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Scope 
and Content of the Relevant Human Rights Obligations related to Equitable Access to Drinking Water 
and Sanitation under International Human Rights Instruments (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/3 para 66. 
334
 See UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Realisation of the Right to Drinking Water and 
Sanitation (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25 para 6. 
335
 The 1996 Habitat Agenda adopted by consensus of all 171 participating States at the Second UN 
Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), Istanbul, Turkey, recognised in paragraph 11 that: 
Everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, 
including adequate food, clothing, housing, water and sanitation, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.  
See UN Conference on Human Settlements (1996) UN Doc A/CONF.165/14 para 11. In the Abuja 
Declaration adopted at the First Africa-South America Summit (ASA) in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 
November 2006, 53 African and 12 South American States committed to promoting the right of access 
to clean and safe water for their citizens. The Declaration provided under paragraph VI on Water 
Resources that: 
18. We recognise the importance of water as a natural resource... [and an]essential element 
for life with socio-economic and environmental functions. We shall promote the right of our 
citizens to have access to clean and safe water and sanitation within our respective 
jurisdictions. 
See First Africa-South America Summit (2006) ASA/Summit/doc.01(I). At the 1st Asia-Pacific Water 
Summit, held in Beppu, Japan, 3-4 December 2007, 49 countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
unanimously adopted the ―Message from Beppu‖  Declaration which recognised the people‘s right to 
water as a basic human right and a fundamental aspect of human security. It stated that: 
We, the leaders of the Asia-Pacific, coming from all sectors of our societies and countries, 
meeting at the historic inaugural Asia-Pacific Water Summit, in the beautiful city of Beppu, in 
the hospitable Oita Prefecture of Japan, do hereby agree to...[r]ecognise the people‘s right to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation as a basic human right and a fundamental aspect of 
human security. 
See Report of The Proceedings of the First Asia-Pacific Water Summit (2007). 
<http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Programs/Right_to_Water/Pdf_doct/Message_from_
Beppu_071204.pdf> (accessed 06.10.2010). The Final Summit Document of the 14
th
 Summit 
Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba (2006) 
emphasised the importance of access to water and implicitly endorsed General Comment No15 
(2002) on the right to water. It stated in para 226 that : 
The Heads of State or Government recalled what was agreed by the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in November 2002, recognise the importance of water 
as a vital and finite natural resource, which has an economic, social and environmental 
function, and acknowledged the right to water for all. See Non-Aligned Movement Declaration 
(2006) Doc1/Rev.3 < http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments_2006> (accessed 06.10.2010).  
An identical provision was included in the Final Document of the 15th Ministerial Conference of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, Teheran (2008) and in the Final Document of the 14
th
 Summit of Heads of 
States of the Non-Aligned Movement Egypt (2009) <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/> 
(accessed 06.20.2010).  Recommendation (2001) 14 of the Committee of  Ministers to member States 
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importance of access to safe water hence its endorsement as a human right by UN 
bodies. 
2 5 6 Conclusion 
The above section demonstrated the increasing recognition of the right to water at 
the national level through national constitutions and domestic legislation, regulations 
and policies. A particularly significant and noteworthy development is also taking 
place at the international level. This is reflected by a considerable number of non-
binding but persuasive soft law instruments, adopted both at the universal and 
regional levels, in which a right to water has been recognised and endorsed. What is 
particularly significant is the absence of serious objections, apart perhaps from some 
sporadic protests from countries like Canada and the United States.  
It is however important to note that such protests are not premised on an 
outright rejection of the concept of the right to water under international law. They are 
predicated rather on the need for further elaboration on the scope and content of the 
right. As outlined above, a combination of both elements, State practice and opinion 
iuris have to be considered in the evolution of customary international law. It is still 
premature to speak of a general and consistent practice regarding the recognition of 
the right to water at the international level. Still, it must be observed that issues 
relating to access to water are increasingly being perceived from the human rights 
perspective as reflected in the above analysis of relevant instruments. This has 
implications for the evolution of the human rights to water as a norm of customary 
international law. Such a customary law norm would apply to all States regardless of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
on the European Charter on Water Resources noted that international human rights instruments 
recognise the fundamental right of all human beings to be free from hunger and to an adequate 
standard of living and the right to water is included. It states in para 5 that:   
―Everyone has the right to a sufficient quantity of water for his or her basic 
needs...International human rights instruments recognise the fundamental right of all human 
beings to be free from hunger and to an adequate standard of living for themselves and their 
families.
  
It is quite clear that these two requirements include the right to a minimum quantity of 
water of satisfactory quality from the point of view of health and hygiene.
 
Social measures 
should be put in place to prevent the supply of water to destitute persons from being cut off.‖ 
See Recommendation (2001) 14 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the 
European Charter on Water Resources, representing each of the then 43 members of the 
Council of Europe at the time adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 October 2001 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=231615&Site=COE> (accessed on 06.10.2010).  
The 2008 Third South Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN III) held in India issued the Delhi 
Declaration. Paragraph 1 of the Delhi Declaration provides that ―access to sanitation and safe drinking 
water is a basic right, and according national priority to sanitation is imperative.‖  See The Third South 
Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN III) ―Sanitation for Dignity and Health‖ (2008) 
<http://www.wsscc.org/fileadmin/files/p_Declaration_SACOSAN_III.pdf> (accessed on 06.10.2010).            
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whether or not they are parties to the treaties recognising the right to water unless 
they consistently object to the concretisation of access to water as a customary 
norm. The above section therefore demonstrated the emergence of the right to water 
as a norm of customary international law as reflected by State practice, both at the 
municipal and international level. 
 
2 6  Normative content of the right to water 
2 6 1 Introduction 
The mere recognition of a human right to water in an instrument is not enough to 
ameliorate the plight of those without access to water. Writing within the South 
African context, Liebenberg argued that: 
 
―The Constitutional Court has a special responsibility to develop the meaning of all 
the rights in the Bill of Rights, no less so socio-economic rights such as the right of 
everyone to have access to sufficient water.‖336 
 
Liebenberg‘s comment was a reaction to the Mazibuko case highlighted 
above. In that case, the South African Constitutional Court dismissed the arguments 
by residents of an informal settlement that their current free basic water supply of 25 
litres per person per day was insufficient. This was despite the fact that section 
27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution, as noted, explicitly provides for a 
justiciable and  independent human right to water. That provision is operationalised 
by section 1 of the Water Services Act. The latter defines a basic water supply as: 
 
―The prescribed minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable 
supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water of households, including informal 
households, to support life and personal hygiene.‖337 
 
The Mazibuko case clearly illustrates the difficulty, and indeed the imperative 
necessity of defining the normative content of the right to water with certainty and 
clarity. Failure to do so with the necessary rigour will entail that such right will have 
no meaningful impact in the lives of ordinary people. The same can be said of the 
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right to water under international human rights law. Elaborating the normative content 
of the right to water helps to ascertain the State‘s obligations with regard to that right. 
What follows is a discussion of the normative content of the right to water under 
international law as elaborated by General Comment 15. This section will however 
not deal with the detailed obligations imposed by the right to water as these are fully 
discussed in chapter 4.  
The normative content of the right to water as set out in General Comment 15 
encompasses both substantive and procedural components. The CESCR highlighted 
the fact that different conditions and circumstances may affect the contextual 
definition of the right to water. It is however pertinent to note that the substantive 
components of the right to water that apply in all circumstances comprise availability, 
accessibility and quality of water services.338 The guiding principle is that the 
available water must be adequate for human dignity, life and health.339 General 
Comment 15 explicitly states that the ―right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses.‖340   
The CESCR further elucidated the procedural requirements of the right to 
water as entailing the right to information concerning water issues, the right to 
participation and the right to effective remedies.341 General Comment 15 
acknowledges the importance of water for a range of different purposes to realise 
many other rights. This includes the importance of ensuring sustainable access to 
water resources for agriculture to realise the right to adequate food. The above 
statement should however be subject to qualification. The CESCR unequivocally 
asserted that priority in the allocation of water must be given to the right to water for 
personal and domestic uses.342 
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2 6 2  Adequacy   
General Comment 15 provides that an adequate amount of safe water is necessary 
for human dignity, life and health.343 This is to prevent death from dehydration, to 
reduce the risk of water-related diseases and to provide for consumption, cooking, 
personal and domestic hygienic requirements. Within the detailed provisions of 
paragraph 12 of General Comment 15, the three principles of availability, quality and 
accessibility contain the substantive standards regarding the content of the right to 
water. They set out the normative standards which must be satisfied by States in 
determining the quantum of water needed in various contexts to guarantee life, 
health, hygiene and dignity.  They further set standards for safety and cleanliness of 
water and ensuring equal access, both physical and economic.344  
 The General Comment 15 thus provides that the quantity of water available for 
each person should correspond to the WHO guidelines.345 The WHO Guidelines 
indicate that 50-100 litres of water per person per day are sufficient to cover all basic 
human needs. The WHO Guidelines consider 20 litres per person per day as the 
absolute minimum at which basic health can be maintained in most circumstances.346 
Gleick suggested that the international community adopt a figure of 50 litres per 
capita per day as a basic water requirement for domestic water supply.347 The 
Sphere project348 suggested 15 litres of water per capita per day as suitable for 
meeting minimum standards for disaster relief.349 The UK‘s Department for 
International Development suggested that a minimum supply should be 20 litres per 
capita per day, whilst noting the importance of reducing distance and encouraging 
household connections.350 Any rigid, context-blind reliance on the above standards 
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should be avoided. The quantity required by each person varies to a certain extent 
based on circumstances such as sex, age, climate and temperature conditions.351 
2 6 3  Quality 
There is no doubt that sufficient water alone is not enough to ensure a human right to 
water. The safety component means that water for personal and domestic use must 
be safe and free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiological 
hazards.352 This is in recognition of the fact that even though many people may 
receive this basic water requirement or more, in some cases the water delivered may 
not be of adequate quality. Additionally, General Comment 15 stipulates that water 
for personal and domestic use must be of an acceptable colour, odour and taste.353 
2 6 4  Accessibility 
The third principle that the CESCR articulated as a constituent element of the 
normative content of the right to water is accessibility. Water facilities and services 
must be accessible to everyone without discrimination.354 General Comment 15 
elaborates four dimensions to accessibility, namely physical accessibility, economic 
accessibility, non-discrimination and information accessibility.355 
In terms of physical accessibility, water services should be within safe physical 
reach for all sections of the population.356 Economic accessibility means that water 
must be affordable for all. Although water services can be provided at a price, it is 
important that direct and indirect costs associated with securing water must be 
affordable to all, particularly for vulnerable and marginalised sections of society.357 
Information accessibility covers the right to receive and distribute information 
concerning water issues.358 The right to information in relation to water issues, 
together with principle of non-discrimination in water provision are the most 
significant aspects of the right to water. This is because they entail the right of people 
to participate in decision-making processes on water policies, programmes and 
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actions. Non-discrimination means that water must be accessible to everyone, 
including the most vulnerable and marginalised communities.359  
2 6 5 Critique of the normative content of the right to water 
It must however be noted that some scholars have critiqued the normative content of 
the right to water as elaborated by General Comment 15. Cahill for instance argues 
that the General Comment 15 did not define the content of the right to water with 
much specificity. Cahill argues that it was crucial for the CESCR to define the content 
of the right to water with specificity so as to appropriately establish the normative 
content for the effective implementation of the right.360 Cahill‘s concerns are that the 
scope and content of the right to water are ill-defined hence clarification is needed in 
order to strengthen the right through defining a clear scope and content of the right. 
Cahill further argues that since there is a close relationship between the right 
to water and other related rights,361 the relationship between that right and related 
rights is equivocal and needs to be investigated further. This is imperative so the 
contours of each right can be established in order to appropriately determine the right 
to water.362 Cahill believes such clarity will enable effective implementation of the 
right. Cahill further asserts that:  
 
―In order to determine the scope and core of the right, it is imperative that these 
relationships between the right to water and related rights such as health, food, 
housing and the right to life are clarified. Until this is done, the right to water is always 
in danger of being deemed a derivative right and not a right of independent status.‖363 
 
Others like Dinara Ziganshina also bemoan that General Comment 15 does not 
articulate the normative content of the right to water with much clarity and specificity. 
Dinara Zigashina criticises the omission by the CESCR of the water requirements for 
food production within the scope of the right to water.364  
                                                     
359
 Para 12(c)(iii). 
360
 Cahill 2005 The International Journal of Human Rights 393. 
361
 Cahill points out that the right to water is a derivative right and she defines a derivative right as a 
right deriving from other related or dependent rights. For the purposes of the right to water, these will 
include the rights to health, housing, food and life. See Cahill 2005 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 391. 
362
 394. 
363
 405. 
364
 D Ziganshina ―Rethinking the Right to Water‖ (2008) 1 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 113 
118. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
 
The General Comment 15 does in fact elaborate sufficiently on the normative 
content and scope of the right to water. Firstly, General Comment 15 makes it crystal 
clear in paragraph 2 that the human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic uses. Such access is ―necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to 
reduce the risk of water related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, 
personal and domestic hygiene requirements.‖365 Furthermore, the CESCR 
emphasised that although water is necessary for food production, securing 
livelihoods and enjoying certain cultural practices, priority in the allocation of water 
must be given to the right to water for personal and domestic uses.366 Water 
resources to prevent starvation and disease should also be given the necessary 
priority.367  
In paragraph 37, General Comment 15 reiterates the above. At the very least, 
the right to water requires: firstly, access to the minimum essential amount of water 
that is sufficient and safe for domestic uses to prevent disease. Secondly, the 
normative content of the right to water enjoins non discrimination in access to water, 
especially for vulnerable or marginalised sections of society. Thirdly, General 
Comment 15 enjoins physical access to water facilities and services that provide 
sufficient and safe water with a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid prohibitive 
waiting times. Such water facilities must be at a reasonable distance from the 
household. Finally, personal security in accessing water is of cardinal importance.368 
It is also pertinent to note that the normative content of the right to water also 
encapsulates procedural rights of people to information concerning the State‘s 
activities regarding water, to participate in decision-making concerning water, and to 
an effective remedy in cases where the right is violated.369  
In light of the observations above, it is clear that the CESCR appropriately 
defined the normative content of the right to water with sufficient specificity. It lays a 
sound legal basis for determining the obligations on State and non-State actors 
involved in the provision of water services, discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
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It must however be noted that the realities in the real world are that not all 
States are able to ensure the full realisation of the right to water in the short term. 
The State is however obliged to take steps "with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realisation of the rights recognised"370 in the ICESCR, including the right to 
water. The concept of progressive realisation constitutes an acknowledgement that 
full realisation of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to 
be achieved in a short period of time.371 A State‘s inability to ensure the full 
realisation of the right to access water in the short term does not absolve it from the 
obligation to take immediate steps to provide relief to those in urgent need to protect 
them from suffering irreparable harm.372 The CESCR has elaborated in General 
Comment 3 that: 
 
―[T]he fact that realisation over time...is foreseen under the Covenant should not be 
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the one 
hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the 
difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the raison d'ˆtre, of the Covenant which is to establish clear 
obligations for States parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in 
question.‖373  
Some scholars have disputed the existence of a universal human right to 
water, though these are in a minority. The section below discusses and analyses 
some of the objections that have been raised by those opposed to the recognition of 
a universal human right to water. This will be followed by the conclusion to the 
chapter. 
 
2 7 Objections to the existence of a right to water 
The existence of a right to water under international law has been disputed by some 
scholars. The derivation of the right to water from the right to life enshrined in the 
ICCPR has been questioned. Dinstein for instance has argued that the human right 
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to life is per se a civil right and does not guarantee any person against death from 
famine, cold or lack of medication.374 
Two American lawyers, Dennis and Stewart, have also accused the CESCR of 
rewriting the provisions of the ICESCR as ―the derivation of a separate right to water 
is without precedent.‖375 They see the CESCR‘s inference of a right to water from the 
provisions of the ICESCR as part of a larger revisionist programme. Dennis and 
Stewart argue that the CESCR has unduly rewritten the provisions of the ICESCR 
and expanded the liability of State parties in a way neither borne out by the text of the 
covenant, nor by the history of its negotiations.376 They further accused the CESCR 
of unilaterally altering the substantive content of the ICESCR as well as the States‘ 
obligations by deconstructing the right to an adequate standard of living in article 11 
into at least four separate and distinct rights to adequate food, water, clothing and 
housing.377 The two authors question the legal basis upon which the CESCR 
identified and elaborated a distinct right to water under article 11 of the ICESCR as 
there is no mention of water in the negotiating history of the ICESCR.378 
In his critique of General Comment 15, Stephen Tully also advances some 
arguments in order to delegitimise the CESCR‘s derivation of a right to water from 
article 11 of the ICESCR.379 Tully argues against the derivation of a right to water 
from article 11 of the ICESCR. In his view, that provision offers no interpretative 
space for new rights as doing so undermines the principle of legal security. According 
to Tully: 
 
―[The term] ‗including‘ is a self-evidently imprecise term leading one to speculate on 
the number and nature of other characteristics essential to an adequate standard of 
living but not explicitly guaranteed by the Covenant. Does General Comment No. 15 
herald rights to access electricity, the internet or other essential civic duties such as 
postal delivery?‖380  
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Tully thus advocates for a restrictive interpretation of the word, ―including‖ and 
in order to avoid the possibility of a plethora of new rights. He further argues that an 
amendment to the ICESCR is legally required in order to incorporate the right to 
water in the treaty.381 Additionally, Tully argues that deference must be given to the 
States‘ omission of water in the drafting of the ICESCR. 
In response to the above critiques, Malcolm Langford notes that the 
interpretative methods of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are the subject of long 
philosophical debates.382 Langford argues that the method a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body chooses in interpreting legal instruments becomes particularly relevant ―when 
the phraseology of legal instruments is ambiguous, or it has become so due to 
societal changes or the revelation of new or unforeseen facts.‖383  
―This debate is epistemological, ranging from literalist arguments, that the meaning of 
legal texts is self evident in the context of some jurisdictionally defined legal method, 
through to more relativist responses. It is also more normative, with some advocating 
more backward looking or historical approaches, (discerning the intentions of the 
drafters or relying on earlier precedents) while others call for purposive or teleological 
interpretations that may be more relevant to contemporary circumstances.‖384 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth the 
general rules for interpretation of treaties.  That provision states that a treaty shall be 
interpreted ―in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖385 The 
object of a treaty, purpose and context are teleological elements which militate 
against a narrow literal interpretation of treaty texts. In the context of international 
law, the interpretative criteria highlighted above lean in favour of a purposive 
approach that takes account of the evolution of international law.386 
In adopting General Comments to the ICESCR, the CESCR was in effect 
tasked by States to interpret and elaborate the provisions of a treaty drafted more 
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than 50 years ago in the context of today‘s circumstances.387 It must be further noted 
that the UN‘s Economic and Social Council (hereinafter referred to as ―ECOSOC‖) 
encouraged the CESCR to use the mechanism of adopting General Comments to 
develop a fuller appreciation of the obligations of States parties under the ICESCR. 
As indicated above, the primary function of General Comments, as the above 
ECOSOC resolution makes clear, is to guide States on the implementation of the 
provisions of the ICESCR.388 In any case, there is no doubt that a right to water is so 
fundamental as to require immediate minimum essential levels of water for personal 
and domestic uses. Such an approach is consistent with the obligation of good faith 
compliance with treaties. Tully‘s contention for a restrictive interpretation of the word 
―including‖ in article 11 of ICESCR to curtail a flood of new rights avoids mention of 
the CESCR‘s key reasoning in the adoption of a general comment on the right to 
water.389 The CESCR explicitly emphasised that the fundamental human need for 
water unquestionably furnishes it with a special status: 
 
―The right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for 
securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most 
fundamental conditions for survival.‖390 
 
The discussion above clearly illustrated various provisions at the international, 
regional and domestic level in which the right to water has either been explicitly or 
implicitly recognised as an independent right. The CESCR was therefore able to 
conclude that water is clearly in the class of food, housing and access to health 
services.391 
Tully, Dennis and Stewart‘s argument that the CESCR was engaged in 
revisionism by inferring a right to water from the ICESCR has also been countered by 
scholars. Langford for instance asserts that the right to water was never rejected by 
the drafters as the records indicate that the issue was never discussed by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights or the Third Committee.392 Langford provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the various debates surrounding the adoption of article 11 
of the ICESCR. He concludes that the travaux preparatoures provides little guidance 
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as to the interpretation of the currently worded article 11 of ICESCR, and only 
indicates the difficulties some delegates experienced with trying to delimit the broad 
wording of the right to an adequate standard of living.393 
The scepticism by some scholars and States regarding the right to water 
stems from the larger jurisprudential and political debates regarding the alleged 
differences between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and 
social rights on the other.394 The traditional understanding of civil and political rights 
is to conceive them as negative rights, requiring the State merely to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of such rights. The classical understanding of 
economic and social rights is to conceive of them as requiring positive State action 
and significant budgetary demands on State resources. 
  The above dichotomy has been challenged as being out of date reflective of 
the Cold War era ideology.395 In any case, a closer examination reveals that civil and 
political rights are not absolutely dissimilar from social and economic rights in many 
respects. Civil and political rights also impose affirmative duties in the same way as 
socio-economic rights. For instance States are enjoined by some human rights 
instruments to organise governmental institutions that would ensure the realisation of 
civil and political rights, something which requires spending resources.396 Amartya 
Sen has also forcefully critiqued the privileging of ―negative liberties‖ over economic 
needs as being rooted in an unduly narrow conception of freedom and justice.397 
Writing in 1984, Phillip Alston argued that ―recognition of the essential 
dynamism of the notion of human rights inevitably requires a willingness to consider 
the need to proclaim additional rights.‖398 Alston‘s view is that it is important to adopt 
such a dynamic approach that fully reflects changing needs and responds to the 
emergence of new threats to human dignity and well-being.399 Alston proceeds to 
suggest criteria for the recognition of new human rights, chief among them being that 
any right should reflect a social value of fundamental importance.400 According to 
Alston‘s criteria, any proposed new human right should reflect a fundamentally 
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important social value and be relevant throughout a world of divergent value 
systems.401 Additionally, any proposed human right must be eligible for recognition 
on the grounds that it is an interpretation of UN Charter obligations, a reflection of 
customary law rules or a formulation that is declaratory of general principles of law.402 
Alston further proposed that any new right must be consistent with the existing body 
of international human rights law and be capable of achieving a very high degree of 
international consensus.403 Lastly, any proposed right must be compatible with the 
general practice of States and be sufficiently precise as to give rise to identifiable 
entitlements and obligations.404 
The human rights status of water cannot be questioned.  Access to water for 
domestic and personal uses is ―something which all men everywhere, at all times 
ought to have, something of which no one may be deprived.‖405 The need for water is 
a: 
―[C]ondition of living, without which, in any given historical stage of society, men 
cannot give the best of themselves as active members of the community because 
they are deprived of the means to fulfill themselves as human beings.‖406  
 
This chapter drew from Craig Scott‘s interdependence of human rights 
framework to argue for the existence of the human right to water under international 
human rights law, and to elaborate on its substantive content. This is because there 
is organic interdependence between human rights as the right to water forms part 
and is incorporated into other rights such as the right to health, life and food.407 The 
significance of such a framework lies in its bid to define a coherent scope of a right to 
water that takes account of its relationship to directly protected rights. Such an 
exercise is important for clarifying its status as a fully autonomous right.  
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2 8 Conclusion 
Water is of fundamental importance for a life in dignity as a basic need and a human 
right. Yet the current statistics are sobering. This has catastrophic implications for 
health, education, personal security as well as the realisation of other human rights.  
This chapter demonstrated that the most significant development has been the 
rise of a human rights oriented approach to ameliorating the global water crisis. The 
rise of a human rights based approach to addressing the global water crisis has been 
substantially aided by watershed normative developments in international human 
rights law. The consequent inclusion of water in the development agenda has 
precipitated the call for a right to water.  
Another noticeable development, promoted by multilateral lending and donor 
institutions, was the conception of water as an economic good susceptible to 
commodification and marketisation.  It has been shown that the ideological, political 
and philosophical debates surrounding this conception of water as an economic good 
emboldened the lobby for the explicit recognition of water as a human right. The 
latter argument was predicated on the ground that water is a basic need, a human 
right and a public good. Its commodification, it was argued, will lead to lack of 
access, especially by the poor and vulnerable members of society. 
The right to water is also explicitly provided in some international human rights 
instruments as the CEDAW, CRC and the Disability Convention. It is also implicitly 
provided in the provisions of the UDHR, ICESCR and the ICCPR. It was also shown 
that the right of access to water for personal and domestic uses is an indispensable 
component to an adequate standard of living. There is no doubt that access to basic 
supplies of safe and adequate water is a conditio sine qua non for the sustenance of 
human life itself. The realisation of the right to health and a healthy environment 
require access to an adequate supply of safe and potable water, rendering water as 
a core component of the right to health. Similarly, safe and clean water is a 
fundamental component of the right to adequate housing. Denial of a safe and clean 
water supply would render a dwelling inhabitable. Water is indispensable for the 
preparation of food, and in any case, drinking water, as shown above, is regarded as 
liquid food. 
This chapter also demonstrated how the UN CESCR took the initiative by 
construing a human right to water from the existing international human rights 
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instruments through the ground-breaking General Comment 15. This standard-
setting instrument marked the shift toward elaborating the legal basis and normative 
content and obligations engendered by a human right to water. General Comment 15 
marked the UN‘s explicit affirmation of the existence of an independent human right 
to water. It also provided the impetus for the explicit and implicit recognition of the 
right to water in a substantial number of national constitutions from all over the world 
and across legal cultures. 
It is also important to understand the right to water within the realm of the 
interrelatedness and interdependent nature of all human rights. There is organic and 
related interdependence of all human rights. This is because there is a profound and 
multilayered connection between all human rights. This chapter demonstrated that 
the right of access to water is intrinsically connected and is a part of other human 
rights. It is indispensable to the realisation of other human rights. The above is aptly 
illustrated in General Comment 15. It was shown that the General Comment 15 
recognised the right to water through derivation and inference from articles 11 and 12 
in the ICESCR. The CESCR further derived the right to water through an analysis of 
the centrality and necessity of water to other rights under the ICESCR and the other 
instruments under the International Bill of Rights. It emphasised the interrelated and 
integrated nature of the right to water to other human rights. 
This chapter further demonstrated the emergence of the right of access to 
water as a norm of customary international law. There is widespread recognition of 
the right to water at the national level through national constitutions and domestic 
legislation, regulations and policies. A particularly significant and noteworthy 
development is also taking place at the international level. It is however too early to 
positively assert that a human right to water is now extant under customary 
international law. 
As indicated, some scholars have disputed the existence of a right to water 
under international law. The main thrust of their objection is the derivation of the right 
to water from related rights. To such scholars, this amount to rewriting the provisions 
of the treaties, and part of a larger revisionist program. It was shown that such 
arguments cannot be sustained. A proper interpretation of the International Bill of 
Human Rights means that it is perfectly legitimate and permissible to derive a human 
right to water from related rights. Any legal instrument must be interpreted in 
accordance with its object, purpose and context. The object of a treaty, purpose and 
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context are teleological elements which militate against a narrow literal interpretation 
of treaty texts. In the context of international law the interpretative criteria highlighted 
enjoin a purposive approach that takes account of the evolution of international law. 
The human rights status of water cannot be questioned. Access to water is 
intrinsically related to all human rights.  
The following chapter will discuss privatisation and the divergent meanings of 
the concept. Particular focus will be given of increased participation by non-State 
actors in the water services sector and an analysis of the impact of privatisation on 
the human right to water. 
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Chapter 3 
Privatisation and the right to water 
3 1 Introduction 
The last thirty years has witnessed a dramatic decrease in the role of the State in 
economic activities.1 The monolithic State generated by the twentieth century 
concern for welfare has come to be regarded as wasteful and inefficient at delivering 
resources.2 The result has been the promotion of privatisation,3 particularly by 
international financial institutions and donor agencies, as the panacea to rolling back 
the frontiers of a bulky and parasitic State.4 
Privatisation has seen a shift from service provision by the State in some key 
sectors such as health, education, water provision to increased reliance on private 
actors and the deployment of market mechanisms to pursue social goals.5 
Consequently, across a whole range of different sectors, there has been a transfer of 
responsibility from the public sector to the private sector.6 This has resulted in 
services hitherto provided by the public sector such as water provision in the hands 
of private corporations. The State is increasingly arrogated only the responsibility for 
setting down the framework within which non-State actors operate.7 Such a 
framework departs radically from what before was a focus on and significant State 
control in the production, management and supply of water services.8 
Privatisation processes covering human rights sensitive areas such as water 
inevitably involve a private operator in actions that impact on human rights. Weaker 
accountability mechanisms for human rights protection particularly where non-State 
                                                     
1
 DM Newbery ―Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities‖ (1997) 41 European Economic 
Review 357 357. 
2
 See C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 147. 
3
 Privatisation is understood here in a broad sense, including the change from public to private 
ownership and introduction of market principles in governance structures. The privatisation concept is 
fully explained in the following section.  
4
 HB Feigenbaum & JR Henig ―The Political Underpinnings of Privatisation: A Typology‖ (1994) 46 
World Politics 185. 
5
 188. 
6
 G Teubner ―After Privatisation? The Many Autonomies of Private Law‖ (1998) 51 Current Legal 
Problems 393 393. 
7
 K De Feyter & FG Isa ―Privatisation and Human Rights: An Overview‖ in F De Feyter & FG Isa (eds) 
Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (2005) 1. 
8
 Bakker for instance points out that governments owned and operated most water supply systems in 
industrialised countries, with water supplied often at a subsidised rate ostensibly to ensure universal 
access and to safeguard public health. See K Bakker Privatising Water: Government Failure and the 
World‘s Urban Water Crisis (2010) 33. See also part 3 2 5 below on the rise of privatisation, 
particularly from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
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actors are involved in the provision of water services is a cause of concern.9 In 
addition, accountability is further eroded by the paucity of direct international human 
rights obligations on non-State actors. 
In this chapter, I analyse water privatisation from a human rights perspective, 
in particular the right to water as provided for under international human rights 
instruments and elaborated by treaty bodies and domestic legal systems. The 
principal question that arises is how a State can ensure compliance with its human 
rights obligations in the event of involvement of non-State actors in the management 
and distribution of water services. Rights of participation, access to information and 
access to remedies are some of the issues to be confronted whenever a private 
entity takes over responsibility for service delivery, particularly water provision.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, I start by defining 
privatisation and the divergent meanings of the concept. The rise of privatisation as a 
political-economic concept and increased private sector participation in sectors 
hitherto dominated by the State and its agencies will be described. This section will 
focus on global trends towards the privatisation of water services. The second part of 
the chapter will discuss the various manifestations of water privatisation across the 
world. This will be followed by a discussion of the arguments that have been 
deployed to support or oppose water services privatisation. This section will also 
discuss another alternative approach to the contestation which argues for the 
recognition of water as both an economic good and a basic human right. The third 
part of the chapter will discuss four select examples of water privatisation from 
Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa. This discussion does not purport 
to constitute comprehensive case studies given the limited scope of this dissertation. 
Rather, this part aims to illustrate the potential impact of privatisation on the human 
right to water through examining concrete issues which arise in the context of water 
privatisation in different jurisdictions. The final part of the chapter will focus on a 
human rights analysis of water privatisation and its potential consequences identified 
from the aforementioned case studies, followed by the conclusion. 
 
                                                     
9
 This is fully discussed in section 3 5 below where I discuss four select examples of water 
privatisation from Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa. 
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3 2 The concept of privatisation 
3 2 1 Introduction 
Privatisation as a term is mired in definitional uncertainty.10 Bakker, writing within the 
context of water privatisation noted the difficulties attendant on defining the term.11 
To Bakker, terminology is rarely neutral as it signals allegiances.12 The definitional 
conundrum thus ―reflects the slippery analytical terrain of …privatisation debates and 
the inadequacy of conventional terminology to convey [its] complexities.‖13 Donnison 
argues that the meaning of privatisation is uncertain and often tendentious since it is 
―a word invented by politicians and disseminated by political journalists.‖14 Narsiah 
echoes the above sentiments, noting that privatisation is a nebulous term.15 
Privatisation is not a neutral phenomenon as it carries inherent political and 
ideological implications.16 Much of the privatisation trends often reflect a desire to 
limit the State's role in the provision of public goods. Such trends are often tied to 
particular ideological proclivities regarding substantive visions of State policies.17 
Khan, in particular, asserts that privatisation‘s roots are deeply entrenched in the 
ideological foundations of the neo-liberal right.18 This group regards the market as 
wholly benign and finds the private sector inherently superior to the public sector in 
the production and provision of goods and services. This approach is convinced of 
the superiority of the ―free market form of social organisation over the forms of social 
organisations of the Keynesian welfare [S]tate.‖19 The free market is perceived as an 
advance on welfare State social democracy and a provider of economic efficiency.20 
The last two decades have thus seen concerted reform efforts principally designed to 
                                                     
10
 See L Lundqvist ―Privatisation: Towards a Concept for Comparative Policy Analysis‖ 1988 (8) 
Journal of Public Policy 1. 
11
 K Bakker Privatising Water: Governance Failure and the World‘s Urban Water Crisis (2010) xv.  
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 xv.  
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 xv.  
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 D Donnison ―The Progressive Potential of Privatisation‖ in J Le Grand & R Robinson (eds) 
Privatisation and the Welfare State (1984) 41 45. 
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 Privatisation is thus, according to Narsiah, ―the very incarnation of the liberal project.‖ See S Narsiah 
―Discourses of Privatisation: The Case of South Africa‘s Water Sector‖ (2008) 25 Development 
Southern Africa 21 22. 
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 E Metzger ―Privatisation as Delegation‖ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1367 1378. 
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 Metzger 2003 Columbia Law Review 1377-1378. 
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 I Khan Public vs. Private Sector: An Examination of Neo-Liberal Ideology (2006). Unpublished paper 
<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13443/1> (accessed 26.08.2010). 
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reduce the role of the State and expand the role of the market in the production and 
provision of goods and services.21  
Privatisation, as will be shown below, can take a variety of forms. In some 
instances, privatisation represents State withdrawal from a field of activity or from 
responsibility for providing services, as for example when a public entity sells off a 
State-owned entity to a private entity.22 The other, more common model of 
privatisation is when the State engages private entities to provide services to the 
public on the State‘s behalf. This form of privatisation is normally characterised by 
government agencies giving private entities significant control over, and responsibility 
for, the provision of basic services ordinarily provided by the State. The result is that 
private entities end up having significant control over the public‘s access to basic 
goods and services ordinarily provided by the State.23 In this context, privatisation 
often effectively serves to delegate government power to private entities.24  
Metzger further notes the definitional difficulties posed by the broad array of 
public-private relationships encompassed under privatisation arrangements.25  John 
Donahue alludes to the same difficulty in defining the concept of privatisation.26 He 
notes that the word privatisation encompasses two concepts. The first concept 
involves removing certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from the public realm. 
The second conception of privatisation involves the State retaining collective 
financing but delegating delivery of public goods to the private sector.27 
3 2 2 Narrow definition of privatisation 
Various definitions of the term privatisation have been proposed. Proponents of 
privatisation often use a relatively constrained definition, reserving the term 
privatisation for the outright sale of State assets to the private sector. A number of 
scholars have advocated for a constrained understanding of privatisation. Hanke 
conceptualises privatisation as the transfer of public assets, infrastructure, and 
                                                     
21
 Khan Public vs. Private Sector 1. 
22
 In this form of privatisation, encountered in England and Wales, publicly operated monopolies are 
transferred as a whole to a private enterprise-oriented provider. In England and Wales ten water 
service companies were created in this manner and their shares were sold on the stock exchange. 
23
 Metzger 2003 Columbia Law Review 1367 1370-1371. 
24
 1376-1377. 
25
 1378. 
26
 1378. 
27
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service functions to the private sector.28 Abramowitz takes a similar view and defines 
privatisation as the placing of public assets into private hands.29 Savas defines 
privatisation as the increasing the role of the private sector in the ownership of assets 
and concomitantly reducing the role of the State.30 The above definitions of 
privatisation constitute a narrow sense of the understanding of privatisation.  
According to the understanding of privatisation delineated above, the concept 
is delimited to a complete change or a transfer from the public to the private sector. It 
follows that any changes or transfers that do not follow this direction would thus have 
to be excised from the rubric of privatisation.31 In this traditional sense, privatisation 
refers to decreased State involvement in collective consumption and the transfer of 
ownership of State assets to the private sector.32 This form of privatisation is rare in 
the water sector. The privatisation of England and Wales' water utilities in 1989 is the 
most prominent case of full privatisation. 
3 2 2 Expanded definition of privatisation 
Opponents of the participation of private entities in the provision of public goods often 
use the word privatisation as an umbrella term. It is thus used to denote the entire 
gamut of activities involving the participation of private entities in the provision of 
public goods, either on behalf of, or in cooperation with the State or its agencies. This 
may take the form of concessions, management and service contracts, consulting 
services, and public-private partnerships with State agencies.33 These are discussed 
in section 3 3 below. 
A number of authors have adopted a broad definition of privatisation. Heald 
conceives of privatisation as equal to the introduction of market principles in the 
                                                     
28
 SA Hanke ―Privatisation: Theory, Evidence and Implementation‖ (1985) 35 Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science 101 101. 
29
 See M Abramowitz ―The Privatisation of the Welfare State: A Review‖ (1986) 4 Social Work 257 
257. 
30
 ES Savas Privatisation: The Key to Better Government (1987) 3. 
31
 4. 
32
 S Narsiah ―The Neoliberalisation of the Local State in Durban, South Africa‖ (2010) 42 Antipode 374 
381. Some commentators such as Narsiah however reject this traditional understanding of 
privatisation as being under-inclusive. Nasiah notes that in the modern sense, privatisation is also 
used to encompass a shift in the production of goods and services from the public sphere to the 
private sphere. This can manifest itself through adoption of commercial principles; the substitution of 
private goods for public goods; sub-contracting; and corporatisation. See Narsiah 2010 Antipode 374 
381. See also Narsiah in another publication where he notes the conventional view in which 
privatisation is restricted to entail a change in ownership from the public sector to the private sector. 
See Narsiah 2008 Development Southern Africa 22-23. 
33
 Bakker Privatisation xv. 
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provision of welfare. In that sense, privatisation is seen as a diverse set of policies 
geared towards strengthening the market at the expense of the State.34 Shackelton 
views privatisation as not limited to the transfer of public functions, duties and assets 
from the public sphere to the private sphere. It also involves a range of other means 
by which the public sector is exposed to market principles.35  Eisinger equates 
privatisation as a conscious government policy of enlisting private capital, managerial 
techniques and personnel to perform functions that are deemed to fall within the 
domain of the public sector responsibility.36  
Martin, for instance, suggests that privatisation entailed a change in the role 
and responsibilities of the State rather than simply a change of ownership.37 Such a 
definition will not just encompass a transfer of hitherto publicly-owned assets from 
State ownership to private ownership. It encompasses an understanding of 
privatisation in which the State remains the primary service provider and producer. 
Furthermore, it incorporates a more entrepreneurial approach, including market-
stimulating decision-making techniques.38 This may be through the adoption of 
market principles such as full-cost recovery.39 This broad understanding is consistent 
with viewing such concepts as ―corporatisation‖ of public enterprises and the so-
called Public-Private Partnerships (hereinafter referred to as ―PPPs‖) as forms of 
privatisation. This study will adopt this expansive understanding of privatisation. As 
noted by Chirwa, corporatised entities often engage in outsourcing of some of their 
services to private actors.40 In some cases, corporatisation can be a stepping-stone 
towards full privatisation of the service in question.41 Significantly, most of the human 
rights concerns raised by other forms of privatisation are similar to those that arise in 
the context of corporatisation of a service.42 
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 D Heald ―Privatisation and Public Money‖ in D Steel & D Heald (eds) Privatising Public Enterprises: 
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3 2 3 Privatisation, liberalisation and corporatisation  
The relationship between privatisation and the concept of corporatisation also 
warrants discussion. Chirwa defines corporatisation as the integration of corporate 
principles in operation and management of public entities involved in service 
provision.43 This relationship is highly relevant as will be shown by the discussion of 
privatisation in South Africa below. Corporatisation, together with privatisation, is 
increasingly being employed in the delivery of basic services.44 The main reason for 
corporatising a public service is to infuse market principles in its operations. It must 
be noted that a corporatised entity is also bound by similar market principles 
applicable to privatised entities.45 The analysis of privatisation and its impacts in this 
chapter are relevant, and have implications for corporatised entities.46 
It is important to differentiate between privatisation and liberalisation although 
the principle of liberalisation is also closely linked to privatisation. The former entails 
measures aimed at opening up the market to ensure entry of other actors in an 
industry to ensure competition.47 Privatisation and liberalisation are closely linked, but 
not always in the same way. Liberalisation is a broader concept than privatisation. 
Liberalisation thus may entail trade liberalisation in the form of lifting of tariff and non-
tariff barriers against foreign trade. Liberalisation may also entail the removal of 
regulations on prices and removal of subsidies and lifting of monopolies in the 
process opening the market for private sector participation in the production of goods 
and services.48 In this chapter, focus is on privatisation though reference will be 
made to liberalisation as it affects privatisation. The following section will discuss the 
extent of privatisation of public enterprises in general, particularly in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, as well as a discussion of the underlying reasons for such a 
privatisation spur. 
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3 2 4 The magnitude of privatisation 
Bortolotti, Fantini & Siniscalco point out that between the period 1977-1997, more 
than 1850 large-scale privatisations were carried out across the world. These 
involved more than 100 countries, and all the sectors in which State-owned 
enterprises traditionally operate such as power, electricity, railways and water 
provision.49 Covadonga Meseguer likened privatisation to a ―wave‖ and ―major 
phenomenon‖ as it became established policy in both developed and developing 
counties with different political systems.50 Another World Bank publication remarked 
in 1999 that privatisation moved from novelty to global orthodoxy in the space of two 
decades,51 noting that: 
―Privatisation appears to have swept the field and won the day. More than 100 
countries, on every continent, have privatised some or most of their SOEs in every 
conceivable sector of infrastructure, manufacturing and services.‖52  
Privatisation of public enterprises from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s was, to 
Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny like a ―tsunami wave‖ with thousands of State-owned firms 
from across the world being privatised.53 Brune et al give an even higher figure, 
noting that the privatisation of public enterprises has been a defining characteristic of 
the global economy in the last two decades of the twentieth century. They point out 
that more than 8000 acts of privatisation were completed between 1985 and 1999.54 
An authoritative 1996 World Bank publication, studying the privatisation statistics in 
the developing world from 1970 to 1995 alluded to the privatisation trend as a 
―revolution.‖55 It is pointed out that between 1988 and 1994, developing States 
privatised over 3000 entities, noting that between 1988 and 1994, the number of 
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developing countries privatising public enterprises dramatically rose from a paltry 
fourteen to a staggering sixty.56 
3 2 4 1 Reasons for the privatisation spur 
During the past two decades, privatisation has been deemed as the solution to State 
failure to provide basic services as the private sector was deemed more efficient and 
cost effective.57 Peter Drucker famously argued nearly half a century ago that 
government should spend more time governing and less time providing. Instead, the 
State should simply stop producing and purchase services from the private sector.58  
Khan explains that two major philosophical underpinnings inform the debate 
on private provision versus public sector provision debate. He points to the public 
interest school that perceives society as having common interests whom the State is 
competent to identify and serve.59 On the other hand, the private interest school 
regards a person ―as a rational economic actor who will instinctively maximise 
his/[her] personal utility.‖60 Underpinning this philosophical discourse are concepts of 
public choice, property rights and principal-agent relationships.61 
Linked to the cold war and the failure of communist States in Eastern Europe, 
the 1980s witnessed a rise in economic theories emphasising the potential threat of 
centralised planning on individual freedom and liberal values. Proponents of 
privatisation subscribe to certain assumptions about the production and consumption 
of goods and services. Private sector provision is regarded as the most efficient 
distributor of goods and services to the public. Some of the touted benefits of 
privatisation include improving efficiency, reducing the financial burden on the State, 
developing a market economy and attracting capital and international foreign direct 
investment in the privatised sectors.62  
Narsiah argues that such a thesis (of putting faith in the market) is the product 
of a paradigm shift, engendered by the collapse of the Keynesian welfare State 
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interventionist approaches of the post-Second World War period.63  Protagonists of 
privatisation emphasised the pre-eminence of the free market propagated earlier on 
by Friedrich von Hayek, and later on by his student, Milton Friedman.  The economic 
scholarship of Hayek and Friedman opposed the Keynesian welfare State and its 
―search for social equity as inefficient, partly dishonest and demoralising for high 
achievers.‖64 In 1944, Von Hayek famously argued that:  
 
―If ‗capitalism‘ means here a competitive system based on free disposal over private 
property, it is far more important to realise that only within this system is democracy 
possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will 
inevitably destroy itself.‖65 
 
Milton Friedman echoed him 16 years later, arguing that: 
 
―Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political 
freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that 
has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used 
something comparable to a free market to organise the bulk of economic activity.‖66 
 
A new trend thus emerged of questioning the State‘s dominant role in the 
provision of goods and services. This new approach manifested itself through the 
privatisation of goods and services previously distributed under State provisioning. 
Privatisation also operated in tandem with liberalisation. This entailed the opening up 
of previously protected industries to competition as well as the relaxation of curbs on 
the activities of private entities.  
Weizsäcker et al point out that in an endeavour to promote this emerging neo-
liberal paradigm, the most widely used term was ―economic efficiency.‖67  It is also 
noteworthy that the efficiency argument, coincidentally the same argument that was 
used earlier in the century to buttress nationalisation arguments, was successfully 
deployed to delegitimise State provisioning of goods and services as inefficient. The 
private sector is viewed as more economically efficient than the public sector. 
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Additional to the efficiency argument is the robust push for small government and the 
promotion of private property.68  
The apostles of neo-liberalism69 argued that Keynesian deficit spending had 
led to deepening stagflation, which manifested itself through soaring inflation rates 
and high unemployment emblematic of the 1970s. Proponents of privatisation further 
argued against wholesale State involvement in the provision of goods and services. 
They advocated for a small and efficient State. The argument was that doing so 
would open up avenues for the private sector to take care of economic growth, 
technological progress, and the provisioning of goods and services.70 
3 2 4 2 Early privatisation experiences 
Bortolotti et al note that in modern times, the first privatisations were undertaken by 
the Konrad Adenauer government in the Federal Republic of Germany when the 
German government sold a majority stake in Volkswagen in 1961. Similar 
privatisation experiments were embarked upon in Chile and Ireland at the beginning 
of the 1970s.71 Marko Ruh notes that under the dictatorial military regime of Augusto 
Pinochet, the Chilean government privatised all enterprises that were under State 
control in the Allende period. A team of privatisation technocrats in Chile, christened 
the Chicago Boys, were entrusted with overseeing the privatisation programme. The 
Chicago Boys privatised 202 of more than 500 nationalised entities in the first two 
years of the Pinochet dictatorship.72   
In Ireland, one of the forerunners to the privatisation movement, the first act of 
privatisation was the disposal of the Dairy Disposal Company in 1974.73 By far the 
greatest story in the history of privatisation played out from 1979, in the United 
Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as ―the UK‖) under the Conservative government of 
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Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher‘s government accomplished the largest-scale 
privatisation programme in the western world.74 Perhaps it was due to the 
pervasiveness, sheer scale and all-encompassing nature of privatisation in the UK 
that some scholars mistakenly labelled Margaret Thatcher as the pioneer of the 
privatisation movement.75 It is however the privatisation movement of the Thatcher 
government, particularly after 1983 that gave the impetus and inspired the global 
privatisation movement, starting in the 1980s. 
Privatisation emerged as a major issue for policy discussion in the second half 
of the 1970s due to a convergence of a number of factors. The election of 
governments in a number of developed countries, most notably the UK and the 
United States (hereinafter referred to as ―the US‖), that were ideologically committed 
to greater use of the market in securing economic objectives undoubtedly 
accelerated the drive towards privatisation. The rise of conservative governments 
resulted in a more general shift in favour of neo-liberal perspectives at the expense of 
the Keynesian welfarism and State-led provision.76 The faith in market provision as 
superior to any form of political or administrative co-ordination was fundamental to 
the thinking of the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher in UK and 
Ronald Reagan in the US. It also provided an ideological underpinning for 
privatisation, a position followed by other governments across the world, often 
coerced by the international financial institutions (hereinafter referred to as ―IFIs‖). 
In their dismissal of the Keynesian model, proponents of privatisation argued 
that State intervention in the market does not work. They further argued that all 
alternatives to markets are deeply flawed since government failure is more prevalent 
than market failure and, most significantly, State involvement in commerce is likely to 
result in the violation of individual rights.77 In the following discussion, I highlight 
some factors which drove the privatisation agenda. 
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3 2 4 3 Factors driving the privatisation agenda  
Some of the factors cited as driving the privatisation agenda included the role of IFIs, 
particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred 
to as ―the IMF‖) through the so-called Washington Consensus.78 Since the early 
1980s, sentiments in the IFIs and donor agencies changed in favour of privatisation. 
This was motivated by a change of development paradigms and the alleged 
mounting evidence of poor performance of public enterprises, resulting in huge 
deficits on government budgets.79 As a vital ingredient of the Washington 
Consensus, privatisation was also pushed as a condition of aid, new loans and debt 
relief provided by the World Bank and IMF, regional development banks and donor 
agencies.  
Failure to comply with privatisation of some State owned enterprises would 
result in the withholding of the much needed funds. For instance, the World Bank 
made it clear in its Private Sector Development Strategy in 2002 that privatisation 
should include a special emphasis on sectors such as water, energy, healthcare and 
education.80 This spawned concerted and widespread attempts to curtail the 
economic role of the State through privatisation of State owned entities. It is therefore 
not surprising that privatisation in the 1980s was an integral element of the 
Washington Consensus. This model of development stressed market rules, 
deregulation, trade, financial liberalisation, a smaller role for the State and macro-
economic stability, among others.81  
Some of the factors deemed to have contributed to the privatisation impetus 
include the advent of stagflation82 in the 1970s which paved the way for a return to 
economic austerity. Significantly, the widespread collapse of economies as a result of 
Debt Crisis of the early 1980s provided the justification for reigning in socialism and 
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extending market fundamentalism to developing countries.83  This thinking is crisply 
captured by Bakker, where she notes that: 
 
―By the final quarter of the 20th century, the experience with public management had 
given rise to a counter-critique of State failure. The notion of an invariably inefficient 
public sector, together with the fiscal crisis of a State unable or unwilling to finance 
expenditure, provided a justification of private ownership of infrastructure. The 
perceived need to improve productive efficiency stimulated the introduction of new 
management practices that prioritised efficiency gains over other goals such as social 
equity that had been the focus in earlier periods. This strategy was part of a more 
generalised trend: the progressive…[privatisation] of a broad range of State functions 
and welfare services.‖84 
 
The provision of water services has been traditionally regarded as the domain 
of the State.85 The past two decades have however witnessed alternatives being 
sought to ameliorate the perceived short-comings of State provision. Water 
privatisation as an alternative to public-sector provision has been put into practice, 
both in the developed and developing world. The following section will discuss the 
rise in water privatisation and the various forms in which water privatisation has been 
operationalised.  
3 2 5 State management of water supply systems 
It is significant to note that States owned and operated most water supply systems, 
particularly in industrialised countries and urban areas in much of the twentieth 
century.86 During the 1970s and 1980s, privatised water systems were very rare. 
Much of the international funding in the water sector was directed primarily to public 
entities up to about 1990.87  
State management and provision of water services emerged after a period of 
provision by both public and private entities in the nineteenth century. In fact, in some 
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major cities, the first water supply networks were built and operated first by private 
corporations.88 Private corporations operated in cities like Boston, New York, London, 
Paris, Buenos Aires and Seville though such entities predominantly supplied water to 
wealthier neighbourhoods with the poor left to rely on public faucets, wells and 
rivers.89   
3 2 5 1 State justification of ownership 
Throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, governments assumed responsibility 
for an ever-expanding range of societal functions. Later during the 19th century and 
beginning of the 20th centuries, governments also played a crucial role in supplying 
and maintaining large infrastructure facilities such as transport, communications, 
health, water supply and sanitation facilities. Some of the early infrastructure projects 
such as railways and telecommunications had been initially built and owned by 
private entities and later nationalised.90  
Nationalisation was one of the key programmatic ideas of communism from 
the days of the Russian revolution onward, though it took place in many non-
communist Western European and Latin American countries. Although ideology may 
have played a part (since nationalisations in Western Europe often occurred under 
socialist governments), pragmatic considerations may have played a part as well. It 
was easier for capital, so went the argument, to be raised cheaply and readily by the 
State for infrastructure projects. The argument was that public services would be 
delivered in a more efficient way, if managed in the public interest rather than left to 
private companies who would inevitably put their individual commercial interests 
first.91 It is ironic that arguments used by States in the late 19th and 20th centuries for 
nationalisation of utilities such as access to capital, the need for efficient provisioning 
of services, and universal access are the same arguments used to justify 
privatisation of the same services in the late 20th century.92 
3 2 5 2 Municipal hydraulic model 
Hukka and Katko have pointed out that although the first modern water systems were 
first built and managed by private corporations in North America and many European 
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countries, in the majority of cases municipalities soon took over the operation and 
management of such water and sewerage systems.93 For example, by the early 20th 
century, 93 percent of water systems in most German urban centres had been taken 
over by municipalities. The entire water systems in Sweden and Finland were also 
being publicly managed by municipalities.94 
Publicly owned water works in the whole of the US was only 6.3 percent in 
1800, but rose to a staggering 53 percent by 1896. Major US cities such as New York 
and Chicago started providing water services with the help of private corporations. In 
New York, for instance, the Manhattan Water Company was awarded a contract to 
provide water services for the city at the end of the 18th century.95 The cities however 
took over the water system as the private corporations were unable to extend their 
networks to meet the water needs of the growing urban population or serve the peri-
urban areas due to limited financial resources. There was also concern about the 
public health implications of the private corporations‘ inability or unwillingness to 
provide adequate water for other public uses such as street cleaning, fire fighting, 
and pollution prevention.96  
Keating notes that in the US, by 1896, about 200 municipalities had taken over 
the operations of water systems from private enterprises, whereas only 20 municipal 
water systems had been privatised. In the UK, the private enterprises started 
operating water systems at the beginning of the 19th century.97 In England, the first 
water systems were privately owned.98 It is however pertinent to note that by the end 
of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, water operations were largely 
run by local governments.99 
Keating pointed to two main justifications for the trend towards public 
ownership of water supply systems. One of the justifications was grounded on the 
private sector‘s inability or unwillingness to invest sufficiently to allow for network 
extension thereby improving access. The second reason was predicated on private 
enterprises‘ unwillingness to provide the poor and marginalised members of society 
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basic access to water services which were considered essential for societal well-
being.100 
Bakker notes that for much of the 20th century, the conventional approach for 
managing water supply systems, in most counties around the world was what she 
calls ―the municipal hydraulic‖ paradigm of water management.101 This approach 
emphasised the deployment of hydraulic technologies to meet the inevitable growth 
in water demands engendered by modernisation. A commitment to social equity and 
universal provision necessitated significant government regulation, government 
ownership and/or strict regulation of water resources development and water supply 
provision. This was in line with the prevailing arguments in favour of State provision 
of a broad range of public services, predicated on the recognised advantages of 
government provision, both political and technical.102  
The private sector‘s inability to finance universal provision of water services 
led to State take-over of water supply infrastructure. In countries such as Spain, 
France and England, where private entities continued to provide water services 
(albeit to a limited extent), they operated under tight regulations. Private water 
corporations in the UK, for example, had their dividends capped and, most 
significantly, were required to reinvest any remainder in the water supply business.103 
The involvement of the State in the provision of water services was further justified as 
water is expensive to transport relative to value per unit per volume. This is because 
water requires large scale capital investments in infrastructure networks (or large 
sunk costs) hence duplication of the network leads of inefficiency.104 For example, 
the Manhattan Company formed to supply water to New York failed to improve 
access to water for the majority of New Yorkers, often forcing them to rely on 
unhealthy water from ponds and wells.105 Snitow and Kaufam have pointed out that 
this particular company was one of the ―most corrupt, incompetent and disastrous 
experiments in water privatisation on record.‖106 Poor monitoring and regulation of 
this private water supplier is also regarded as having contributed to a series of 
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disasters in New York, including the cholera epidemics of 1832 and 1835.107 These 
disasters precipitated the formation of a Board of Commissioners mandated to raise 
infrastructure capital in order to supply water for the city.108 In London, for instance, 
the nine main water companies that supplied the city were hardly regulated. Prasad 
has pointed out that the private sector was reluctant to supply water to the poor.109 
As a result, the rich had their own supplies whereas the poor were getting water from 
rivers and wells. It was only in the aftermath of a major cholera outbreak in 1840 that 
some form of regulation was imposed.110 Part of the regulation required the private 
water companies to ensure a continuous supply of filtered piped water to 
residences.111 
The result was that States, particularly in the 20th century, created and 
managed public utilities and, in a number of cases, provided utilities such as water on 
a subsidised basis. This was carried out with the aim of providing universal access 
and strengthening public health. In recognition of its public good status, water was 
regarded as a public service, often run at the municipal level, and was frequently not 
metered.112   
The municipal hydraulic model of network water supply provision was, to a 
certain extent, a response to experiences with private provision of water supply in the 
nineteenth century.113 The justification for State control and management of water 
supply systems thus rested on both economic and ethical arguments.114 Firstly, in 
economic terms, the high capital costs of water supply development projects and 
secondly, the need to enhance equitable access to water justified State involvement. 
Strong ethical claims were also made in favour of government involvement in the 
management and distribution of water services. Justifications for such included the 
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symbolic and cultural importance of water as a non-substitutable resource, essential 
for life as well as its strategic political and territorial importance.115 It was also argued 
that sufficient supplies of water enabled a basic, dignified living standard and 
facilitated social inclusion hence access to sufficient amounts of clean water came to 
be viewed as a precondition to participation in public life.116  
3 2 5 3 Challenges to the municipal hydraulic approach 
The municipal hydraulic approach had, by the 20th century, come under severe 
criticism from interest groups, citing a triad of ecological, cultural and socio-economic 
arguments. This included the alleged deleterious effects, especially of large dams, on 
the destruction of species, displacement of communities, flooding of cultural sites and 
contamination of water sources.117 Bakker argues that such capital-intensive 
hydraulic works were particularly susceptible to ―pork-barrel politics,‖118 leading to 
overdesigned ―white elephant‖ projects. Such entities would require heavy subsidies 
from the State for both capital and ongoing operational costs.119  
It is noteworthy that the same reasons used to justify State takeover of the 
water supply and management in the early 20th century were the same reasons used 
to justify privatisation of water services later in the century. These included the 
alleged failure by State-owned enterprises to extend universal access to water and 
the failure to invest adequately in water supply infrastructure. This, according to 
proponents of water privatisation, resulted in the so-called State failure.120 This 
manifested itself through low coverage rates, low rates of cost recovery, uneconomic 
tariffs, underinvestment, deteriorating infrastructure, overstaffing, inefficient 
management and lack of appropriate response to the needs of the poor.121  
3 2 6 Water as an economic good 
Water has been regarded as the last frontier of privatisation across the world.122 The 
world water crisis highlighted in the previous chapter saw the IFIs, in collaboration 
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with donor agencies and regional development banks, vigorously pushing for 
privatisation of water supply services.123 They promoted the involvement of 
multinational water corporations in particular as the panacea to the global water 
crisis.124 The private sector was viewed as bringing the much needed financing, 
efficiency, management skills and technology to the water services sector.125 Water 
privatisation therefore became the centrepiece of the IFIs, so-called water think tanks 
and donor agencies‘ policies in the water sector.126 This insistence on water 
privatisation was based on perceived State inefficiency.127  
The premises underlying the privatisation drive in water services is the 
expansion of tradable goods to include water. This has resulted in the 
reconceptualisation of the utility sector as a profitable business rather than a provider 
of public goods which may require subsidies.128 The global water scarcity is depicted 
as justifying the privatisation of water and adoption of cost-reflective pricing.129 What 
these IFI-inspired neo-liberal water sector reforms sought to do was place greater 
reliance on pricing and thereby full cost recovery of water services even for those 
least able to pay. This was part of stripping the State of its primacy in the provision of 
water services. The conceptualisation of water as an economic good, and full cost 
recovery as its corollary, opened up the water sector to privatisation, lately referred to 
as PPPs.  
The notion of regarding water as an economic good implies that all water 
services are based on the principle of full-cost recovery.130 The principle of full-cost 
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recovery seeks the recovery of all costs related to the provision of water, primarily 
operationalised through the pricing of water. This also entails the removal of 
subsidies as all costs are maintained in order to calculate fixed and variable costs.131 
The strategy is used to determine the costs of production and to effect full cost 
recovery. Such costs need to be calculated so that performance and profit may be 
scientifically determined. Such a process is collectively referred to as ring-fencing.132 
The 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment adopted 
what became known as the ―Dublin Statement.‖133 Although not legally binding, it 
became an extremely important tool in the conceptualisation of water as an economic 
good. Principle 4 in particular provides that: 
 
 ―Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as 
an economic good...Managing water as an economic good is an important way of 
achieving efficient and equitable use.‖134 
 
The World Bank adopted the economic good model of the Dublin Statement 
as its guiding principle. It introduced the principle of full cost recovery - a corollary of 
applying the economic good model – as part of its conditionalities for loans in the 
water sector, especially in the developing world. The principle of full cost recovery 
meant that the State or non-State supplier of water services should be able to 
recover the full costs of supplying water to all users.135 The proposal to treat water as 
an economic good is predicated on the belief that treating it as such would, firstly, 
ensure access to water resources for all.136 Secondly, it would minimise inefficiencies 
through pricing techniques. The reasoning is that apart from minimising waste, higher 
prices will encourage only those uses which are most valuable, thereby increasing 
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the total amount of water resources for use by households.137 This entailed 
introducing the cost recovery principle within the tariff system and opening up the 
water sector for private sector involvement and foreign investment.138  
Scholars and human rights activists reacted differently to this proposition of 
treating water as an economic good as discussed in chapter 2.139 Perry et al argued 
that the question should not be whether water is an economic good or not as there is 
no doubt about the status of water as an economic good.140 The three authors argue 
that the germane question to be asked is whether water is a purely private good that 
can be left to free market forces, or ―a public good that requires some amount of 
extra-market management to serve social objectives.‖141 Proponents of water as an 
economic good argue that water is just like any other good. They argue that its 
production and allocation should be determined by the overriding value of 
consumer‘s sovereignty, ―that is by the amount that people are ready, willing, and 
able to pay for it.‖142 The criterion of consumer‘s sovereignty is unacceptable as it 
ignores inequitable income distribution in society.143 The result is that the poor and 
marginalised in society who are unable to pay as much for a unit of water as the rich 
end up quantities below their basic water needs. 
Bluemel points out that the principle of full-cost recovery is likely to price water 
out of the reach of some poor and marginalised communities.144 This may curtail their 
access to an adequate supply of safe water necessary to meet their basic needs.145 
Some scholars have pointed out what they perceive as an inherent contradiction in 
regarding water as both an economic good and a human right.146 This is because full 
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cost recovery may lead to the removal of State subsidies and to the implementation 
of full cost recovery measures. Such measures may affect the poor and vulnerable 
disproportionately, and result in increased disconnections of water due to non-
payment, and a decrease in the quality of service.147 This would constitute a breach 
of the right of access to water.148 An alternative argument, to be fully canvassed 
below in the human rights analysis of privatisation, is represented by scholars like 
Vandenhole and Wilders. They argue that considering water as an economic good is 
not necessarily in conflict with the human right to water.149 Williams supports this 
approach by pointing out that there is no formal contradiction between the human 
right to water and water privatisation of water services.150 International human rights 
treaties from which the right to water has been derived do not specify the 
mechanisms for the delivery of water services. 
What is of significance is that the conceptualisation of water as an economic 
good, and full cost recovery as its corollary, opened up the water sector to 
privatisation, of late characterised as PPPs.151 This created the justification and 
impetus for the privatisation of water supply services to local and multinational water 
enterprises through various contractual arrangements such as leases, joint ventures 
and management contracts.152 These major forms of privatisation are discussed in 
section 3 3 below. The following section provides a global overview of the extent of 
water privatisation across the world. 
3 2 6 1 Extent of water privatisation 
The degree of water privatisation across the world is significant. Grusky and Fiil-
Flynn have noted that from 1990-1997 over one hundred World Bank-inspired water 
projects with private participation were undertaken, with a total investment of US$ 25 
billion.153 The water and sanitation sector constituted 18 per cent of all private 
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infrastructure projects, ranking third behind the telecommunications and power 
sectors.154   
A global review study carried out on the privatisation initiatives in the water 
sector between 2000 and 2004 clearly shows the pervasive nature of the water 
privatisation agenda. The World Bank lent over US$ 1,26 billion to water and waste 
water service delivery in Asia.155 Ninety-five percent of these loans were conditioned 
on increased cost recovery and 88 per cent promoted increased private sector 
involvement.156 During the same period, the World Bank lent a total of US $ 1 billion 
to 14 African countries in respect of which 80 per cent promoted full-cost recovery 
and 100 percent championed increased private sector involvement.157 In Latin 
America, loans targeted towards the water and sanitation sectors to the tune of US $ 
5, 73 billion were granted to a total of eight countries accompanied with the same 
explicit conditions promoting full-cost recovery and privatisation.158  
Some of the more notable privatisation initiatives in the water sector included 
the privatisation of the Jakarta water supply and management to a French water 
multinational entity, the privatisation of the provision of water and sewerage services 
in Cochabamba (Bolivia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Manila (The Philippines). 
These are discussed further in section 3 5 below.  The introduction of water markets 
in Chile, the sale of publicly owned water companies to private entities in England 
and Wales and the introduction of so-called PPPs in South Africa are some of the 
other major privatisation initiatives.159 
It has been noted above that water privatisation has been preceded by the 
treatment of water as an economic good. The Dublin statement, in particular principle 
4, was pivotal in this regard. The corollary of conceiving water as an economic good 
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is the application of market principles and the concept of full cost recovery in water 
provision. This opens the way for corporatisation and privatisation of water services. 
The key policy challenge lies in ensuring that cost recovery objectives do not 
constitute a barrier for the poor to access services. This issue will be fully canvassed 
in section 3 4 below where I discuss the arguments for and against the privatisation 
of water services. The following section will discuss the role of IFIs such as the World 
Bank in pushing for water privatisation followed by the conclusion.  
3 2 6 2 The Role of the World Bank in water privatisation 
The World Bank began granting loans in the water sector from mid-1960s, albeit at a 
slower pace than would follow in the ensuing decades.160  Throughout this period the 
focus was on funding urban water supply projects. Urban water supply projects were 
selected based on their presumed ability to recover costs through charging for 
services.161 The World Bank‘s shift and its embrace of privatisation in the 1990s 
created the necessary impetus for wide-spread water privatisation. It is significant to 
note that earlier on, the World Bank‘s activities were almost exclusively focused on 
financial support for public enterprises. The 1980s witnessed a pendulum shift, with 
the bank pushing for privatisation of public enterprises, an approach triggered by its 
so-called private sector development strategy.162 
The World Bank‘s shift towards intensification in the funding of water 
infrastructure is observable, and of particular note is the World Bank‘s 1971 
agreement with the World Health Organisation (hereinafter referred to as ―WHO‖) on 
water supply and sewage disposal.163 The creation of the United Nations 
Development Programme-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme in 1977 (an 
offshoot of the Mar Del Plata UN Water Conference discussed in chapter 2)164 is an 
example of this paradigm shift.165 The focus was on water projects in rural areas in 
the 1980s, particularly with the World Bank‘s so-called poverty lending. Further 
impetus was created by the need to complement efforts towards the goals set during 
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the UN Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade.166 Bakker notes that by 1988, the 
World Bank‘s water projects represented 10 percent of total projects.167  
The resulting shift in World Bank policy towards water privatisation was 
captured in the bank‘s new strategy paper released in 1993.168 Specifically, the new 
strategy signalled the World Bank‘s move away from support for public enterprises. 
The new emphasis was on liberalisation and privatisation as the key elements of its 
reform agenda.169 Particularly ominous was the bank‘s adoption of the Dublin 
Principles with its assertion that water should be recognised as an economic good. 
This was consistent with the World Bank‘s new approach, advocating for privatisation 
and the resort to market mechanisms for the management and distribution of water 
resources.170   
The World Bank‘s involvement in the water sector through the advancement of 
loans towards water sector projects surged dramatically in the 1990s. The municipal 
hydraulic approach discussed above was replaced by a new approach focusing on, 
inter alia, privatisation, treatment of water as an economic good, full-cost recovery, 
elimination of cross subsidies, and the introduction of water rights.171 The role of the 
State shifted from that of operator to regulator, whose key role was standard setting, 
as opposed to the direct provider of water services. This new approach in the water 
supply and management architecture necessitated reforms in water related 
legislation. In addition, the World Bank advocated for the adoption of business 
models for water supply utilities, and the introduction of cost-related tariffs for 
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irrigation and drinking water.172 In a number of these cases, for instance in Indonesia, 
Tanzania, Bolivia and The Philippines, structural adjustment loans were predicated 
on water privatisation.173  
3 2 7 Conclusion 
Privatisation as a political and economic concept, is inherently ideological and not 
merely a term descriptive of a purely technical process. The preceding sections 
discussed the concept of privatisation and the definitional problems associated with 
the concept. I discussed the spur in privatisation efforts, particularly from the mid-
1970s and gaining momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the most significant 
and controversial global trends in the water sector in the past two decades has been 
the accelerating transfer of distribution and management of water services from 
public enterprises to private enterprises, particularly represented by multinational 
water corporations.   
Private investment in utilities such as water is not something new. As shown 
above, some of the earlier waterworks were built and operated by private companies. 
States assumed ownership and management of water facilities throughout much of 
the 20th century. This was mainly predicated on the private corporations‘ inability to 
extend water coverage to the unserved and the underserved.174 These private 
operators were insufficiently regulated. As a result, ―[p]rivate management implied 
leaky water pipes, pollution and disease.‖175  
The preceding sections also discussed the rise of water privatisation and the 
significant role played by IFIs such as the World Bank, IMF, donor agencies and so-
called water think tanks in vigorously pushing the case for water privatisation across 
the world. Privatisation and corporatisation of water services, if not properly 
implemented, is clearly not the panacea to the water crisis. This is demonstrated by 
some of the public health implications engendered by high tariffs as a result of 
pursuing full cost recovery mechanisms and the installation of pre-paid water metres. 
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The cholera outbreak in Kwa-Zulu Natal in August 2000 was directly linked to the 
installation of prepaid water meters.176 The installation of prepaid water metres led to 
a rash of disconnections of thousands of people from their previously free water 
supply. This impeded the less privileged communities‘ access to clean and safe 
water. The cholera outbreak resulted in the infection of 120 000 and left 300 people 
dead.177 In addition, issues of equity, particularly access to water by the marginalised 
and poor members of society come into play. The various forms of water privatisation 
that have been implemented across the world will be discussed in the next section. 
This will be followed by a discussion of arguments that have been deployed to 
advance or in opposition to water privatisation. 
 
3 3 Forms of water privatisation 
Water privatisation is effected through various mechanisms. The privatisation of 
water services typically exhibits a continuum of possible institutional arrangements, 
with full State control and management at the one extreme of the continuum, and 
private ownership at the other end, while in between are various shades of so-called 
PPPs.178 Privatisation thus should not be understood in a binary fashion as either the 
State owns and runs a service or the private sector does. Rather, water privatisation 
must be understood as a continuum of public and private mixes with varying degrees 
of involvement by the two sectors.179  
There are two main models of privatisation in the water sector, the French 
model and the British model. Divestiture, euphemistically referred to as the British 
model, was a privatisation model adopted in the UK under the Conservative 
government of Margaret Thatcher in the late 1980s. The British model involves the 
outright sale of assets to a private sector operator. McDonald and Ruiters point out 
that monitoring and regulatory oversight in this model of privatisation remains the 
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responsibility of the State despite the disposal of the facilities.180 The importance of 
monitoring and regulating water services providers is discussed in chapters 6.181 
Most privatisation arrangements nowadays do not involve any transfer of State 
assets to the private sector. Rather, the arrangements focus instead on the transfer 
of operational and managerial functions to the private sector.182 The water 
infrastructure and equipment typically remain in public hands, or are transferred back 
to public ownership after a contractually agreed period.183 Alternatively, there may be 
joint responsibilities between the State and the private entity in managing operations 
and functions, in the form of a joint venture. Most water privatisation agreements 
involve different mixes of PPPs, often tailored to suit the specific needs of the State 
and the private operators.184 This privatisation arrangement is euphemistically 
referred to as the French model.The French model, the most common around the 
world, takes a variety of forms of private sector participation. These include 
management contracts, leases and/or subcontracting specific activities to private 
actors. The other, less popular privatisation model is the Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT). The different types of privatisation arrangements are elaborated on more fully 
below. 
The degree of private sector participation varies from one form of privatisation 
to the other.185 Within the African context, there has been experimentation with the 
service contract in Burkina Faso; management contracts in Uganda, Kenya, South 
Africa and Zambia; the lease contract in Tanzania; and concession contract in Mali. 
What is noteworthy about the contractual arrangements is that these privatisation 
agreements involve different mixes of PPPs, often tailored to suit the specific needs 
of the State and the private operators.186 In the following section, I discuss these 
major forms of privatisation. 
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3 3 1 The Service Contract 
In a service contract, the public sector still retains ownership, control and 
responsibility for capital. The public sector also bears the commercial risk.187 The 
public sector further retains overall responsibility for the operation and maintenance 
of the system, but contracts out to the private sector administrative tasks such as 
meter reading, billing and payment collection.188 The fees in a service contract are 
normally fixed per unit of work and are usually agreed upon in advance. Due to their 
low requirement for capital investment by the private entity, these privatisation 
arrangements normally range from a period of one to two years.189 Service contracts 
by their nature ordinarily allocate the least responsibility to the private entity in 
comparison to other contractual arrangements since the private entity is responsible 
for specific tasks.190  
3 3 2 The Management Contract 
Although similar to the service contract, the private entity, under a management 
contract, takes over the operations and management of the entire water system.191 
Capital investment and expansion of the system remains the responsibility of the 
public sector. Although the private entity is free to make any management decisions 
it deems fit in respect of water supply, it remains immune from any attendant 
commercial risks, with the State bearing the brunt.192 The payment for a 
management contract can be fixed or performance related, for instance, the private 
entity can be paid per volume of water sold or per number of new connections to the 
water supply network. Management contracts are mainly used in cities and countries 
that private water companies consider too risky for long term investment.193 
Management contracts may be initiated as a way of testing the investment 
environment and later upgraded into concession arrangements.194 The duration of a 
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management contract typically would last three to five years.195 An example of this 
contract was the arrangement between the French water giant Suez and the City of 
Johannesburg, South Africa for the management of Johannesburg‘s water supply. 
The management agreement was not renewed after its expiry in 2006.196  
3 3 3 The Lease Contract 
Under this form of privatisation arrangement, the public sector leases out the water 
utility to a private operator and the latter assumes the legal responsibility for the 
operation, maintenance and management of the water delivery system.197 However, 
with a lease contract, the public sector retains ownership of the assets and is 
responsible for capital investment. The compensation payable to the private operator 
is determined by the private operator.198 It is noteworthy, however, that water users 
become direct clients of the private entity. The latter collects the tariffs, pays the 
lease fees to the public sector and retains the balance.  In this kind of privatisation 
arrangement, the private operator bears a significantly greater portion of the 
commercial risks than in the management contract.199 A lease contract is ordinarily 
longer in duration and may last eight to fifteen years.200  
3 3 4 The Concession Contract 
In a concession contract, the private contractor has overall responsibility for the 
utility, including expansion and rehabilitation of the network as well as normal 
maintenance.201 The duration of the contract normally ranges from twenty to thirty 
years. Ownership remains with the public sector which assumes possession at the 
end of the contract period.202 This long contract period is to enable the private 
operator enough time to recoup its capital investment as well as make a profit. In the 
case of a concession contract, the private entity operates the water system at its own 
commercial risk.203 In practice, private operators always seek to ameliorate the 
potential risks associated with operating a water utility by negotiations and in 
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contractual agreements with the public sector.204 In this type of privatisation 
arrangement, the State only assumes the role of regulation and monitoring during the 
duration of the contract period. An example of a concession contract can be found in 
the Philippines capital, Manila discussed in section 3 5 3 below. 
3 3 5 Build-Operate-Transfer 
The Build-Operate-Transfer (hereinafter referred to as ―BOT‖) contractual 
arrangement involves the private entity designing, building, financing and operating a 
project from scratch.205 The BOT involves transfer from the private sector to the 
public sector after a contractually specified period of time.206 The private operator has 
to operate and maintain the infrastructure for a concession period during which it is 
expected to recoup its investments before handing over the facility to the State. In the 
water sector, BOT arrangements are normally employed for water and sewage 
treatment plants rather than for building water distribution networks.207   
3 3 6 Joint venture 
In the case of a joint venture, the State or municipality and the private entity jointly 
form and co-own a water operator in the form of a private company.208 This can be 
an acceptable solution in a situation where full-scale privatisation faces resistance. 
The joint company thereafter may directly undertake provision of water services as a 
private entity and the two shareholders share the responsibilities and benefits.209 
Monitoring and regulation of joint ventures is typically performed by a parastatal 
regulatory body. 
3 3 7 Divestiture (the English–Welsh model) 
The divestiture model of privatisation has been implemented in only a few cases. 
Divestiture is the extreme form of privatisation as it involves the outright sale of 
assets to a private company that takes over the operations and maintenance on a 
permanent basis.210 With this form of privatisation, which is to be found in England 
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and Wales, publicly operated monopolies are transferred as a whole to a private 
provider.211 The utility is operated on business principles. In the case of a divestiture, 
the State is only left with the regulatory and monitoring roles, while the private sector 
takes over ownership, control and capital responsibilities. This model has been 
implemented in England and Wales with the privatisation of all ten of the large 
publicly owned water utilities in 1989.212  
In African countries, the bulk of water privatisation contracts have been in the 
form of management and lease contracts. It appears the main reason for this 
preference is because private operators are disinclined to invest in more demanding 
options such as concessions and BOT contracts. This is due to the perceived high 
risks associated with investing in developing countries.213  
Water privatisation has engendered fierce controversy between proponents of 
privatisation who assert that privatisation of water services will lead to better 
performance. On the other hand, are opponents of privatisation who oppose private 
ownership and management of water services. They argue that State-run water 
supply systems when properly resourced are more effective and equitable. The 
following section will discuss the arguments that have been advanced in favour of 
and against privatisation of water services. 
 
3 4 Arguments for and against water privatisation 
3 4 1 Introduction 
Privatisation in the provision of water services has triggered vigorous debates, 
criticism, and intense scrutiny of the participation of the private sector in water 
provision. Privatisation debates have become more protracted and heated, in part 
because of the dramatic increase in privatisation of water supply services. The 
privatisation conditionality and other pro-market reforms embedded within these 
structural adjustment programmes opened the way for some of the world‘s largest 
water multinationals corporations (hereinafter referred to as ―MNCs‖) to expand their 
operations and ownership of water supply systems in the developing world.214 
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On one side of the debate, it is argued that water is a public good and a 
unique resource essential for life and health and thus should not be privatised. 
Rather, it should remain in the public domain. The other side to the contestation 
argues that the private sector can contribute to the necessary investments in the 
sector, and thus extend coverage to currently unserved or under-served areas. 
Additionally, it is argued that the private sector has the necessary capacity to 
increase service quality and efficiency, contribute technologies and skills to the 
sector, and provide services at lower prices.215 The following section will highlight the 
debates that have been generated, particularly as a consequence of the privatisation 
of water services. Three streams of arguments generally identifiable from the 
literature are highlighted below. 
3 4 2 Objections to water privatisation 
The World Bank, donor agencies and development banks‘ promotion of water 
privatisation, as noted above, has contributed to a growing anti-privatisation social 
movement.216 This movement vehemently opposes the privatisation of water. It 
argues that water is a human right, a public good, and part of the global commons 
and not a commodity that can be bought and sold for profit.217 It is argued that the 
involvement of private entities introduces the pernicious logic of the market into water 
management which is incompatible with guaranteeing the right to water.218 
Opponents of the water privatisation tend to point out that the focus on privatisation 
and cost recovery ignores the need to protect the poor and enhance universal access 
to water.219 To buttress their arguments, they cite examples from Argentina, Bolivia, 
The Philippines, Ecuador, Atlanta and South Africa to show that water privatisation 
initiatives can have disastrous consequences. They cite unaffordable water rates, 
public health crises and social turmoil.220 
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3 4 2 1 Market failure 
The main argument in favour of State provision of water services is predicated on the 
economic concept of market failure. The market failure concept posits that markets 
alone are unable to efficiently allocate goods and services.221 Market failure is said to 
arise in circumstances that fail to correspond with standard assumptions, resulting in 
effects that are unaccounted for by economic actors.222 It is therefore argued that 
water requires heavy infrastructure networks and is heavy to transport.223 This 
constitutes an effective barrier to market entry thereby ruling out any competition. 
The corollary is that water supply becomes susceptible to monopolistic control. It 
therefore, follows that privatisation of water services, unlike other utility services, is 
fraught with difficulties, not least the tendency by private actors to abuse the 
monopolistic nature of water supply which might manifest itself in overpricing.224  
 The argument is that access to water has important implications for hygiene 
and public health. This becomes particularly significant in light of the tendency of 
private actors, due to profit considerations, to cherry-pick profitable neighbourhoods, 
resulting in the overlooking of poor neighbourhoods. This trend has also been 
addressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to water and sanitation in her 
2010 report in which she pointed out that private service providers often select 
attractive areas within regions, countries, cities and neighbourhoods where a high 
rate of return can be expected.225 As indicated in the discussions above, this was one 
of the main arguments which justified public control of water supply and sanitation 
systems from the private sector during the 19th century.226  
3 4 2 2 The accountability argument 
The anti-water privatisation lobby also employs the accountability argument in 
opposition to water privatisation. The accountability lacuna in respect of non-State 
actors means that such entities are only accountable to their shareholders and not to 
the water users. This will become relevant in the section below where this work 
discusses some instances of water privatisation and the lack of accountability 
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experienced as a consequence of arbitration clauses often contained in privatisation 
contracts. 
It is contended that privatisation of public services such as water results in a 
democratic deficit due to its foreclosure of accountability to citizens.227 Non-State 
actors involved in the provision of water services are most likely to be accountable to 
their shareholders. The former may not be sensitive to social equity concerns such 
as access to water services by the poor and vulnerable members of society. The 
contention is that managers in the private sector are only accountable to their 
shareholders and that such accountability is largely in terms of profits. Consequently, 
the desire to make profits motivates private enterprises to invest in areas that are 
likely to bring substantial returns on their investments. Private enterprises are unlikely 
to invest in water services where profit margins are likely to be minimal. The above 
was reflected by Biwater‘s withdrawal from the water privatisation project in 
Zimbabwe, citing lack of financial viability of the proposed project.228 
In many developing countries the bulk of the population is poor and live below 
the poverty datum line. It is virtually impossible for private corporations to meet 
shareholders‘ profit expectations and at the same time implement universal coverage 
with acceptable quality and affordable water. The private sector has few incentives to 
improve access to water when large swathes of the population are very poor. This is 
so given that investment costs in water are too high to expand access and the future 
revenue flows will be low.229 The anti-water privatisation group thus opposes the 
commodification of water. It endorses the human right status of water, claiming that 
water is a res publica, a ―patrimonial good vital to all humanity...and therefore an 
inalienable individual and collective right.‖230 
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3 4 2 3 Lack of adequate regulation  
Water provision normally enjoys monopoly status because of the high costs involved 
in transporting bulky water products.231 In other utilities such as telecommunications 
and electricity, monopoly power is gradually being eroded by technological innovation 
and the development of competitive substitutes.232 Such a development is unlikely to 
occur to any significant extent in the water sector in the foreseeable future hence 
monopoly in the water services sector is likely to remain a long-term feature.233 It is 
significant to point that the difficulties involved in protecting the public from private 
monopoly power abuses was one of the significant historical factors which led to the 
development of public water utilities in many countries.234 This clearly calls for 
regulation of these private enterprises involved in the provision and management of 
water services. Opponents of privatisation have also pointed out the often weak 
regulatory institutions associated with privatisation. This is because private 
corporations often prefer regulatory discretion to be minimised and for the contract to 
be the major regulatory mechanism.235  
Privatisation by States of their traditional domestic functions such as water 
provision has in some cases weakened regulation at national level, because of 
investor pressure and new international free trade rules and bilateral investment 
treaties.236  This is further compounded by the sheer size and scale of some non-
State actors involved in the human rights sensitive services such as the provision of 
water. Dinah Shelton notes that globalisation has led to the emergence of powerful 
non-State actors who have resources greater than those of many States.237 
Consequently, most of the private entities have outgrown the ability of individual 
States to regulate them effectively.238 The sheer size and influence of some 
corporations is such that they are capable of determining national policies and 
priorities.239 In some cases, weak States, especially in the developing world, are 
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unable or unwilling to control their activities. Opponents of water privatisation 
particularly emphasise that the nature of multinational corporations in today‘s global 
economy also makes it more difficult for individual governments, especially those 
from developing countries, to regulate and hold them to account. For instance, a 
recent study revealed that in the water sector, the largest MNCs in the water sector 
are Suez (111,479,116 customers), Veolia Environment (130,924,000 customers), 
RWE AG (38,235,000 customers), Aguas de Barcelona (29,511,718 customers), 
Saur (12,999,000 customers), Acea (14,305,000 customers), Biwater PLC/Cascal 
(8,834,000 customers) and United Utilities (24,028,000 customers).240 
Those opposed to water privatisation therefore argue that such a development 
poses challenges to the international human rights movement, because for the most 
part, that law was designed to restrain abuses by States and State agents. The law 
has not adequately developed to regulate the conduct of non-State actors.241 The 
accountability of non-State actors, including MNCs for the right to water is discussed 
in detail in chapters 5242 and 6.243 
Of particular note is the lack of independence and expertise of regulatory 
bodies. This was buttressed by Nils Roseman‘s study of the Manila water 
privatisation in The Philippines. Roseman‘s study concluded that it was mainly the 
erroneous design of the privatisation process and the lack of political will to create a 
powerful regulatory agency that led to the partial failure of that privatisation 
scheme.244 In South Africa, as noted in section 3 5 2 7 below, the local authority in 
Nelspruit did not have the capacity to effectively regulate the water concession 
contract hence its failure.245 McDonald and Ruiters further pointed out that in the 
Lukhanji, Amahlati and Nkonkobe municipalities in the Eastern Cape Province of 
South Africa, most of the councillors mandated to monitor and regulate the 
privatisation contracts lacked the requisite expertise to do so.246 
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3 4 2 4 Ethical, moral and political arguments  
Bakker notes that water, essential for life and a non-substitutable good, fulfils multiple 
functions and is imbued with many meanings.247 This is because water is a human 
right, has a religious symbol and a cornerstone of public health.248 The opponents of 
water privatisation particularly argue that it is unethical to make a profit supplying 
people with a resource such as water, a resource essential for life and human 
dignity.249 The basis of the argumentation is to emphasise that the main motivation 
for private actor involvement in the water sector is to make profits.  
Some regard water privatisation as capitalism‘s last frontier.250 David Harvey, 
for instance, has argued that water privatisation constitutes what he calls 
―accumulation by dispossession‖- the appropriation, for profit, by the private sector of 
public goods.251 Rhodante Ahlers has argued that this ―accumulation by 
dispossession‖, besides ―invoking scenarios of disaster‖ employs the language of 
―efficiency and rationality‖ to sanitise and make the process natural.252 Ahlers argues 
that water privatisation policies are not geared towards addressing social or 
economic inequities with regard to resource management despite the poverty 
rhetoric. Rather than focusing on incorporating the unserved and underserviced, 
water privatisation implies that fresh water is individualised and given private property 
characteristics. Consequently, public goods are being redistributed from public to 
private property with the help of the market.253 
3 4 2 5 State efficiency argument 
Opponents of water privatisation further argue that State managed water supply 
utilities can and do just as well as the privately run and managed water systems if 
properly resourced. They further point out that public entities are more likely to have 
access to cheaper forms of finance than their private sector counterparts as well as 
greater democratic control and citizen accountability.254 This approach questions the 
efficiency argument deployed by the pro-market water provision protagonists.  
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Vickers and Young argue that efficiency as a concept is poorly understood. 
The empirical evidence on economic efficiency does not conclusively show the 
superiority of either public or private provision of goods and services.255 Gayle and 
Goodrich, for instance, have argued that privatisation in Britain, the former West 
Germany, Chile and Honduras in the 1980s did not result in any recognisable 
superior performance by private enterprises.256 In any case, assessing efficiency 
based on profitability when public institutions do not solely operate on that basis is 
unhelpful.257  
3 4 2 6 Equity arguments 
The implementation of cost recovery measures and the removal of subsidies, which 
go with privatisation, may constitute a denial of access to socio-economic rights, 
especially those of the poor. Intervention in the form of subsidies and kindred 
measures by the State is critical in enabling access by the marginalised and poor 
communities to life sustaining socio-economic and other human rights.258 
One of the key arguments of the anti-privatisation group is to reject the 
premise that water services must necessarily be self-financing, thereby requiring full-
cost recovery. This is predicated on the reasoning that water supply systems are 
extremely capital-intensive, hence affordability concerns, particularly for the poor and 
marginalised, inevitably arise. There is a need for a system of cross-subsidisation 
which, the group argues, has been embarked on even in developed countries.259 
Reference is made to the historical development of water network systems in 
developed countries. States were heavily involved in attempting to ensure universal 
provision through heavily financing water supply systems and the implementation of 
cross-subsidies.260   
As a result, the anti-privatisation movement not only rejects the conceptual 
bases on which water privatisation is predicated, but also vigorously opposes the 
notion that water should be priced at its full cost, for the reasons discussed above.261  
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This group rejects the claim that private management, on a for-profit basis, will 
improve performance. The group equally rejects the claim that accountability to 
customers and shareholders is more direct and effective than the attenuated political 
accountability exercised by citizens via political representatives.262 The question of 
accountability, transparency, participation and information accessibility before and 
during privatisation processes are discussed in section 3 6 below where I carry out a 
human rights analysis of water privatisation. The following section discusses some of 
the main arguments that have been put forward to support water privatisation by its 
proponents.  
3 4 3 Arguments in favour of water privatisation 
3 4 3 1 State failure 
Proponents of private sector participation in the provision of water services advance 
both fiscal and efficiency arguments to buttress their claims. Those who advocate for 
water privatisation argue that water is an economic good and a price should be 
charged for the service of treating and supplying it.263 The private sector is 
considered to constitute an obvious alternative for the delivery of water services in 
the face of State failure to ensure universal access to safe water.264 This approach 
posits that the world is facing increasing fresh water scarcity. Privatisation 
proponents argue that State management and allocation of water services has 
proven inadequate. They vociferously advocate for introduction of market principles 
and mechanisms in water management.265  
The main argument against State provision of water services is predicated on 
what economists refer to as the concept of State failure. The theory of State failure 
posits that governments are less productive, efficient, and effective than markets. 
Bakker notes that in the water sector, the State failure argument comes into play to 
support claims that the State is a poor manager, that this is evidenced by its failure or 
inability to supply water to the poor and marginalised as highlighted in chapter 1 
above.266  
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Proponents of water privatisation further argue that water is increasingly a 
scarce resource which must be priced at full economic cost to facilitate access to 
water services to communities and individuals who currently lack access and prevent 
wasteful use.267 The public sector is deemed to have limited capital to enable 
universal access. It is often pointed out that the State‘s investment policies are 
particularly undermined by short-term political expediency, leading to crass 
inefficiency.268 To support their contention they point to the failure by governments to 
achieve the goal of universal water supply during the International Water and 
Sanitation Decade (1981-1990). The World Bank has also argued that through 
increased efficiency, private companies will be able to improve performance and 
increase cost recovery thereby improving access to water services by a large number 
of people.269 
The rationale for shifting water resources management from public to private 
stewardship is predicated on the argument that the public sector actually hinders the 
efficient distribution of resources. State management, so the argument goes, results 
in waste and mismanagement as resources are not allocated according to their 
highest market value.270 The pro-privatisation group therefore contends that treating 
water as a commodity and locating water supply systems in the private sector will 
translate into less waste, more efficiency and the productive reallocation of the 
resource. These benefits would flow from the fact that competition for the resource 
would ultimately determine its corresponding economic value.271  
3 4 3 2 Accountability and efficiency arguments 
The pro-privatisation lobby further argues that public management and provision of 
water services is immunised from accountability. The thrust of the argument is that 
public sector managers, particularly in ―corrupt‖ developing countries, are virtually 
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unaccountable. As a result, they pursue their own personal goals instead of 
advancing the public interest.272  
Susan Spronk notes that public water utilities have, in some cases, been used 
as political booty by politicians and that justifies the reform of the water sector.273 
According to Spronk, politicians are likely, in the absence of the requisite constraints, 
to abuse their powers.274 Public managers are more inclined to ―handing out jobs to 
their allies based upon their political orientation rather than their competence.‖275  
Spronk argues that this practice will not only distribute resources to political elites, 
but also represents a significant drain on public finances as it leads to administrations 
with a bloated, but ill-qualified staff component.276 Such an assertion is a reflection of 
neoliberal economic theory which considers any political involvement in the 
regulation of political outcomes as the pursuit of self-interest by the political elites. 
This makes it necessary to divorce economic decision-making from political decision-
making.277  
The argument of the pro-privatisation group is to assert that the profit-motive 
acts as the most effective constraint on individual behaviour. This group asserts that 
the private sector demands more efficient and professional management than the 
public sector. The reasoning is that the private sector has to respond to economic 
considerations instead of political demands.278 It is argued that the detachment from 
political control of managers in the private sector means that such managers are 
better placed to adopt cost effective and efficient means of providing services.279  
Proponents of privatisation further assert that private companies will perform 
better in the management and provision of water services. It is presumed that they 
will be more efficient, provide adequate finance, and attract the requisite technical 
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expertise of higher standards than State-owned entities.280  These assertions are 
premised on the argument that State-run water supplies are beset by a plethora of 
problems. These include lack of adequate investment in the water infrastructure, 
uneconomically low tariffs, low rates of cost recovery and bloated personnel.281 
3 4 3 3 An alternative approach: Privatisation not incompatible with the right to 
water 
Another position in the contestation argues for the recognition of water‘s economic 
good status as well as recognising its status as a human right. It advocates for the 
guarantee of universal access to safe water despite the involvement of non-State 
actors.282 This group envisages private sector participation with the State having 
regulatory oversight in order to protect the water‘s public nature.283 
This group points out that human rights do not envisage the State as the sole 
provider of basic services.284  It is permissible within a human rights framework for 
private actors to be involved in the provision of human rights sensitive services such 
as water.285 Reference is made to the pronouncements by treaty bodies on this 
issue. In General Comment No 3, the CESCR has asserted that human rights law 
does not require a particular political or economic system within which human rights 
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can best be realised.286 Consequently, it is argued that private sector involvement in 
the provision of basic goods and services is not in conflict with human rights.287  
Privatisation of human rights sensitive areas does not absolve the State of its 
human rights obligations in respect of the privatised services. This implies that, by 
privatising the provision of basic services and goods, the State remains responsible 
for ensuring the enjoyment by all people the rights relevant to the privatised 
service.288 Agreements with private service providers must therefore be structured by 
the relevant human rights norms.289 The State has a duty to regulate and monitor the 
activities of the private actors during the duration of the privatisation arrangement so 
that human rights are not imperilled.290 The State‘s duty to protect is of utmost 
significance in the context of privatisation.291 The CESCR, for instance, has 
elaborated this obligation to include the duty to prevent rights violations by private 
actors as well as the duty to control and regulate them.  In respect of the right to 
water, for example, the CESCR has stated that the State has an obligation to prevent 
third parties from ―compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, 
safe and acceptable water.‖292  
It appears that both proponents and opponents of water privatisation agree on 
the importance of monitoring and regulation in the event of privatisation.293 It is 
argued that the State‘s obligation to protect and fulfill the right to water survives the 
privatisation arrangement. Consequently, a duty is imposed on the State to monitor 
and regulate the activities of the private enterprises involved in the management and 
distribution of water services.294 
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3 4 3 4 Efficiency Argument 
One of the main criticisms against State-run or private sector managed water 
facilities is the question of performance. The issue of relative performance of the 
public and private sectors has been pivotal to the privatisation debate and remains 
unsettled.295 The analysis of the requisite comparative performance is often 
permeated by ideological inclinations.296 Chirwa has argued that evidence of the 
positive impact of privatisation on economic growth and efficiency is inadequate and 
inconclusive.297  
Khan has carried out a review of the empirical literature on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the debate on the superiority of the public or private sector 
provision.298 This included a review of empirical evidence that included literature on 
macroeconomic, microeconomic and welfare impacts of privatisation.299 Khan‘s 
finding was that despite a plethora of studies and on-going contestations, the 
discourse on the superiority or inferiority of public or private provision of goods and 
services is inconclusive and is likely to remain so in the future. Khan argued that the 
debate is more ideological than empirical as it is impossible to determine the 
superiority of one over the other through case studies, which can only be selective in 
nature.300  
It is predictable that proponents and opponents of privatisation rarely agree on 
research strategies, resulting in competing and divergent evaluations of the same 
contracts.301 Critiques also point to the self-selecting nature of the privatisation 
process, with the tendency to privatise the best performing entities.302 Goals differ 
under public and private management and distribution of water services. Private 
service providers, more often than not, are likely to prioritise profitability over and 
above efficiency and a healthy return on investments. The public sector provider is 
more likely to focus on universal access, equity and security of supply. Such realities 
undermine attempts to analyse changes in performance solely on the basis of 
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efficiency.303 Bakker also confirms the lack of clarity on the actual effects of public 
versus private management of water services on specific performance variables, 
such as efficiency. She however doubts the truism of the assertion that public and 
private operators are no different from one another.304 
The following section will discuss four select examples of water privatisation: 
the Dar es Salaam water privatisation in Tanzania; the Manila water privatisation in 
The Philippines; water privatisation/corporatisation in select municipalities in South 
Africa; and the privatisation of the Cochabamba water supply system in Bolivia. The 
purpose of this discussion will be to attempt to identify broad trends and general 
impacts of these water privatisation projects in terms of factors such as the access, 
equity, quality, public consultation and participation, transparency and accountability 
in water services provision. The above principles embody key elements of a rights 
based approach to the delivery of water services.305 
 
3 5 The impact of privatisation on water services: Select cases 
3 5 1 Tanzania: Dar es Salaam water privatisation 
3 5 1 1 Background  
Water and sanitation services in Tanzania were publicly provided and free of charge 
for the majority of Tanzanians in keeping with the government‘s policy of socialism.306 
This policy of provision of free water was in place until 1991. Prior to 1991, the power 
to regulate and supply water in urban areas was formally granted to the National 
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Urban Water Authority (hereinafter referred to as ―NUWA‖) which implemented a 
policy of free provision of water services.307  
Tanzania‘s economy began experiencing poor performance in the late 1970s. 
This was characterised by chronic shortages of essential goods and services and 
plummeting living standards. Basic infrastructure facilities fell into disrepair due to a 
lack of maintenance. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania‘s largest city, the water and 
sewerage systems were in a bad state. This was characterised by a high number of 
damaged pipes, high levels of leakage, illegal connections, low billing, and 
inefficiencies in the collection of payments.308 At the time of the water privatisation, 
according to the World Bank, the water situation in Dar es Salaam was precarious.309 
This state of affairs was attributed to poor management, lack of resources, increased 
demand and insufficient capital expenditures over a period of decades. This led to a 
progressive worsening of the situation. The low tariffs historically charged after 1991 
had been insufficient to fund capital expenditures. The situation regarding sanitation 
was even worse.310 In a long term effort to address the serious public health and 
economic effects of the poor state of water and sewerage services, Tanzania 
decided to reform its water and sewerage services sector in Dar es Salaam.  
Within this economic environment, the government of Tanzania started a 
rethink of its policy of free water when it signed a structural adjustment programme 
with the IMF in 1986, the Economic Recovery Program. This was later modified to 
create the Economic and Social Action Program in 1989.311 In 1991, the government 
adopted the first National Water Policy later to be reviewed in 2002 through the 
adoption of the new National Water Policy (hereinafter referred to as NAWAPO).312 
Through such reforms the government removed subsidies for its water utilities and 
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prescribed that such utilities should be self-sustaining. In the city of Dar es Salaam, 
the government established a public agency, the Dar se Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Authority (hereinafter referred to as DAWASA).313 DAWASA merged the 
water operations of NUWA and the sewerage operations of the former Dar es 
Salaam Sewerage and Sanitation Department.314  
3 5 1 2 Dar es Salaam water privatisation 
In the framework of broader privatisation efforts, Tanzania obtained funding of 
US$140m from the World Bank, African Development Bank and European 
Investment Bank for a comprehensive programme to repair and extend Dar es 
Salaam‘s water and sewerage infrastructure. It must be emphasised that the funding 
was conditional on having a private operator replacing DAWASA.315 Additionally, the 
privatisation of DAWASA was one of the conditions imposed for Tanzania to qualify 
for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the 
IMF.316  
In preparation for the privatisation of water services, the Tanzanian 
government enacted legislation in the form of the Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority Act No 11 of 2001 to regulate the energy and water utilities.317 
Two corporations submitted a successful joint bid: Biwater International Limited, a 
British water multinational and HP Gauff Ingenieure, a German corporation 
(hereinafter referred to as ―Biwater‖).318 Biwater incorporated under Tanzanian law a 
local operating company, City Water, as mandated in terms of the bid. City Water 
thus entered into a contract with DAWASA in February 2003 to implement the project 
and was awarded a 10-year lease contract to operate and manage the Dar es 
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Salaam and designated coastal regions‘ water and sewerage system using 
DAWASA‘s pipeline network.319 
In terms of the contract, City Water was responsible for the billing and 
collection of tariff payments from customers. In addition, the latter assumed certain 
tariff and rental fee payment obligations to DAWASA in terms of the contract, 
including extending the water network to the poor, and rehabilitating the water and 
sewerage system.320 The evidence produced during the subsequent arbitration 
hearing321 shows that since City Water started managing and operating the water 
system, there was continuous deterioration in the quality of the service. Although 
both parties experienced serious difficulties in performing their contractual 
obligations, City Water in particular failed to achieve the level that was anticipated at 
the time of contracting.322 City Water experienced severe infrastructure problems and 
found it extremely difficult to bill and collect from customers for the services it 
provided. Numerous problems included failure to pay the tariff fees due to DAWASA 
on a regular basis, failure to provide sufficient investment as agreed in the 
privatisation agreement, as well as delays in project implementation.323 Information 
available to the amicus curiae324 shows that the investment failed mainly due to the 
company‘s poor performance, failed business judgment, incompetence and lack of 
sufficient managerial and financial resources dedicated to the project, rather than by 
acts or omissions of the Tanzanian Government.325   
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One of the reports on Tanzania's privatisation efforts, financed by the World 
Bank and provided by a former World Bank expert, is quite instructive. It stated that: 
 
―The primary assumption on the part of almost all involved, certainly from the donor 
side, was that it would be very hard if not impossible for the private operator to 
perform worse than DAWASA. But that is what happened.‖326 
Attempts by City Water to renegotiate the lease contract failed, resulting in 
DAWASA terminating the lease contract and taking over the operations of City 
Water. DAWASA also cited City Water‘s alleged failure to invest $8.5 million within 
the first two years of the contract period as one of the reasons for the termination of 
the agreement. DAWASA‘s allegation was that City Water had invested only $4.1 
million in breach of its contractual undertaking.327   
Following the termination of the contract, two arbitration proceedings 
commenced at the instance of Biwater. The first suit was based on the investment 
contract itself under the UN Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter 
referred to as UNCITRAL) rules. The second suit was premised on the UK-Tanzania 
bilateral investment treaty under the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as ICSID) rules alleging expropriation 
and violation of the principle of fair and equitable treatment.  In the first round of 
proceedings, Biwater filed a compensation claim with UNCITRAL on 16th May, 2005, 
challenging the legality of the termination of the lease contract. Biwater demanded 
compensation of between US$20 million and US$24 million for breach of contract.328 
In its 2008 decision, the UNCITRAL tribunal ruled in favour of DAWASA and awarded 
it US$ 3 million in damages. Citing World Bank evidence, the UNCITRAL tribunal 
found that the water and sewage services had deteriorated under City Water‘s 
management to a greater extent than under the management of the public agency, 
DAWASA.329 
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Biwater instituted a second round of proceedings against Tanzania at ICSID 
on 5th August 2005. Biwater claimed that the government of Tanzania had breached 
its obligations under the 1994 bilateral investment treaty between the UK and 
Tanzania.330  The suit was based on alleged acts of expropriation and breach of the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment by Tanzania.331 The ICSID tribunal declared 
the Tanzanian government to have breached the expropriation provisions of the UK-
Tanzania BIT by expropriating Biwater‘s investments.332 It is noteworthy that the 
tribunal ruled that there was no financial compensation due, as the action of the 
Tanzanian government did not cause any injury. The ICSID tribunal‘s opinion was 
that at the time of expropriation, Biwater‘s investment was of no economic value and 
was essentially worthless.333 
Akech notes that the Dar es Salaam water privatisation was presented as a 
fait accompli as there were neither public consultations nor participation pertaining to 
possible alternative policy options. The public was kept uninformed during the entire 
Dar es Salaam privatisation process. The privatisation documents were deemed so 
confidential that not even members of parliament had access to them.334 Rather, the 
privatisation process was conceived, developed and implemented by national and 
international technocrats without any public consultation.335 There is no doubt that 
this lack of transparency and public participation in the privatisation process made it 
difficult for the public to determine whether the privatisation process was in the public 
interest.336  
The Dar es Salaam privatisation thus raises significant accountability issues 
with regard to the right to water, such as the right to information concerning water 
issues, the right to public consultation and participation and the right to effective 
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remedies.337 I elaborate on these shortcomings further in section 3 5 below where I 
evaluate the human rights implications of the various water privatisation case studies 
to be discussed. These issues will be explored in further detail in chapter 6 where I 
develop an accountability model to guide States and non-State actors in the event of 
privatisation of water services and how such a model can be adapted to be 
responsive to different institutional arrangements in the provision of water services. 
A particularly significant issue which also arose during the arbitration is the 
question of human rights in the context of privatisation. The Dar es Salaam water 
privatisation specifically raises fundamental issues such as how the rights of ordinary 
people, who are the supposed beneficiaries of the privatisation processes, are to be 
protected in such disputes. The question of the impact of bilateral investment treaties 
on governmental autonomy to regulate privatisation processes to ensure the 
enjoyment of human rights such as the right to water is a significant issue.338 
Noteworthy is the question of how such human rights imperatives, in particular the 
right to water, are to be treated in investment arbitration. A comprehensive analysis 
of the human rights implications of bilateral investment treaties is beyond the scope 
of this chapter, but reference will be made to the issue where it pertains specifically 
to the impact of privatisation initiatives on the right to water.  
This question of the impact of investment treaties and the right to water is 
usefully examined in the context of the amicus curiae brief submitted to the ICSID 
tribunal by a number of non-governmental organisations, following the tribunal‘s 
ruling that it would accept such a brief.339 The amicus curiae argued that when the 
private sector investors failed to fulfill their contractual obligations, it was not simply 
the commercial bargain that was affected. The realisation of the right to water was 
imperilled.340 The amicus curiae further pointed out that engaging in human rights-
sensitive activities such as the management and distribution of water services should 
be understood to increase the standards of responsibilities of such private entities. It 
follows that when private actors choose to be involved in the distribution and 
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management of water services, they assume responsibilities that are linked to the 
achievement of fundamental human rights.341  
The finding of the arbitral tribunal that Tanzania had violated the expropriation 
clause in the BIT has been rejected by Akech.342 Akech argues that the actions of the 
Tanzanian government were predicated on, and constituted a legitimate attempt to 
regulate a privatisation process to safeguard human rights, in particular the right to 
water.343 Akech‘s argument is particularly important given that the privatisation of 
essential services such as water carry with it grave public health risks to the 
population at large. This is captured by the amicus curiae‘s persuasive argument in 
which it intimated that MNCs engaged in the provision of human rights-related 
services have a responsibility to meet their obligations as foreign investors before 
seeking the protection of international law.344  
The Biwater case illustrates the imperative need to impose responsibilities on 
private entities in order to secure the protection and realisation of basic services such 
as water. This is particularly relevant in the case of MNCs such as Biwater. BITs 
invariably grant foreign investors substantive rights without imposing corresponding 
obligations.345 The question of human rights responsibilities of non-State actors 
involved in the provision of water services is fully explored in chapter 5. 
General Comment 15346 requires States to prepare a plan for implementing 
the right to sufficient water at the national level. The strategy may involve the 
engagement of private actors through water privatisation processes to assist in the 
realisation of the right to water. It must be noted that the formulation and 
implementation of such national strategies requires compliance with both substantive 
and procedural safeguards regarding the right to water discussed in chapter 2.347 
The Biwater case highlights the importance of monitoring and regulatory 
mechanisms in to put a spotlight on the activities of water services providers. The 
Dar es Salaam privatisation contract was entered into in the absence of an 
independent regulatory body to monitor the privatisation agreement. Water Aid has 
pointed out that the contract was a large and complex document reflecting the desire 
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of the World Bank and other interests to curtail the problems that might arise in the 
absence of an independent regulatory body.348  
It is of the utmost significance to establish an independent regulatory and 
monitoring body in any privatisation initiative, particularly where the privatisation 
relates to a public good such as water. In such a situation, the role of an independent 
regulator is to separate policy-making from service provision in a way that preserves 
the regulator‘s independence.349 The Dar es Salaam privatisation study 
demonstrates that the regulatory function was not clearly divorced from policy-
making.350 The utilities regulatory body, the Energy and Water Regulatory Utilities 
Regulatory Authority, did not exist in an operational sense during the City Water 
operating period.351 This resulted in the responsibility for the monitoring and 
regulation of the privatisation arrangement defaulting to DAWASA and the Ministry of 
Water and Livestock Development.352 This clearly resulted in an untenable situation 
of vesting responsibility for regulation and performance monitoring in an organisation 
responsible for service delivery and investment financing thereby creating a potential 
conflict of interest.353 The absence of a regulatory and monitoring body meant there 
was no independent authority to establish tariff levels.354 
3 5 2 South Africa: Water privatisation and corporatisation  
3 5 2 1 Background 
Privatisation in South Africa is not a post-apartheid phenomenon.355 Although the 
privatisation debate has received heightened attention in the post-apartheid era, the 
apartheid government in South Africa had already started experiencing pressure from 
the business community to privatise State enterprises.356 Narsiah has argued that the 
National Party government subscribed to the neoliberal discourse that was being 
deployed by the institutional apparatus of the ―global north‖ during the period leading 
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up to the demise of apartheid.357 In Narsiah‘s view, the apartheid regime in South 
Africa was simply copying global trends.358 This of course is not to underestimate the 
internal business lobby that was also vigorously pushing for privatisation of State-
owned corporations.359 Chirwa also points to the influence of IFIs, noting that 
pressure to privatise mounted towards the end of the apartheid regime. The World 
Bank and IMF intensified their negotiations with the South African government, 
resulting in the adoption of the Normative Economic Model in March 1993.360 This 
policy framework emphasised privatisation, liberalisation, expenditure cuts and strict 
fiscal discipline as its key tenets.361  
The African National Congress (hereinafter referred to as ―the ANC‖) and its 
alliance partners adopted, in early 1994 as their election manifesto, ―a vaguely 
Keynesian State interventionist strategy‖ christened the Reconstruction and 
Development Plan (hereinafter referred to as ―the RDP‖).362 Dugard points out that 
the RDP made explicit recognition of water ―as a public good whose commodification 
would inherently discriminate against the majority poor.‖363 The RDP, for instance, 
undertook to enable free access to 20–30 litres of water per person per day within 
200 meters of a dwelling in the short term.364 It further provided for an amount of 50–
70 litres in the medium term and universal supply in the long term.365 By 1996 the 
new ANC-led government had decided on a market-led approach to development 
through its macro-economic blue-print, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
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program (hereinafter referred to as ―GEAR‖).366 Narsiah notes that the GEAR 
programme was premised on a market-oriented growth strategy. It promoted 
―increased private sector involvement through the preferred options of ‗ring-fencing,‘ 
corporatisation and outright privatisation.‖367 Additionally, GEAR emphasised on 
enunciated fiscal and monetary restraint, trade liberalisation and export orientation. 
This was a prelude to massive cutbacks in social spending.368 
3 5 2 2 Legislative framework for privatisation 
On the legislative front pieces of legislation and a host of policy papers relating to 
PPPs created the space for the private sector to play an increasingly significant role 
in the provision of public services.369 The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―Systems Act‖), made provision for the entry of the 
private sector and private sector governance principles into the public services. 
Section 76 of the Systems Act provides for the provision of municipal services by: 
 
―Any business unit devised by the municipality provided it operates within the 
municipality‘s administration and under the control of the council in accordance with 
operational and performance criteria determined by the council … [as well as] any 
other institution, entity or person legally competent to operate a business activity.‖370 
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Chirwa particularly notes the importance of the Systems Act in creating the 
necessary framework for the participation of private entities in the provision and 
management of water services in South Africa.371 There was no prescribed 
procedure in South Africa for engaging private actors in the provision of municipal 
services such as water.372 Consequently, earlier privatisation ventures raised 
questions as they were transacted with no participation nor information provided to 
affected communities.  
The Systems Act makes provision for the engagement of a private actor in the 
provision of basic municipal services and the procedures that must be followed. The 
Systems Act provides that a municipality has discretion to provide a municipal 
service through an internal or external mechanism.373 The external mechanism may 
be a community-based organisation, a non-governmental organisation or a private 
service provider. The Systems Act defines a ―basic municipal service‖ to mean a 
service necessary to ensure ―an acceptable and reasonable quality of life which if not 
provided, would endanger public health or safety or the environment.‖374 Water 
services invariably qualify as a municipal service. The Water Services Act 108 of 
1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Water Services Act‖) also gives allowance for 
private corporations to provide water services in South Africa. The Water Services 
Act provides that a water services authority may itself provide water services or enter 
into a written contract with a water services provider or form a joint venture with 
another water services institution to provide water services.375 The Water Services 
Act provides, however, that a water services authority may only enter into a contract 
with a private sector water services provider after it has considered all known public 
sector water services providers that are willing and able to perform the relevant 
functions.376 
3 5 2 3 Cutting of transfers to municipalities 
Funding for social services from central government to municipalities was being 
increasingly cut back in line with the fiscal restraint approach adopted by the national 
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government.377 McKinley points out that as part of the GEAR framework and 
following the economic advice of the World Bank and the IMF, the South African 
government drastically decreased grants and subsidies to local municipalities as well 
as support for private provision of basic services.378 
Municipalities came under considerable pressure from the national treasury to 
recover costs for the provision of services such as water from all areas, including 
poor communities.379 This approach is reflected in a report on the survey of water 
services across 15 municipalities conducted by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and the Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights, between November 2007 and July 2008.380 The report points to a generalised 
adherence by municipalities to a cost recovery approach in which water is viewed 
primarily as a commercial good and in most instances is one of the main sources of 
revenue for cash-strapped municipalities.381 
Jackie Dugard has argued that the gradual erosion of the progressive 
commitments of 1994 has been the domestic political reality of decentralised and 
under-funded local government in South Africa.382 Dugard further notes that within 
the overall structural arrangement, local government is an autonomous sphere of 
government in terms of which, each municipality has the right to govern, on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of a particular community.383 Dugard makes 
reference to the entrenching of local government autonomy and responsibility for 
water services which has resulted in national government withdrawing required 
financial support for the provision of basic social services such as water.384 A 1998 
study carried out by the Finance and Fiscal Commission indicated that 
intergovernmental transfers to municipalities were cut by 85 per cent between 1991 
and 1997.385 This was particularly a drastic measure, given that the study also 
revealed that municipalities relied on central government for up to 95 per cent of their 
funding. This created the impetus for municipalities to adopt stringent fiscal and credit 
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control measures to ensure solvency, thereby paving the way for privatisation, 
particularly in the provision of basic services such as water.386 
3 5 2 4 Forms of privatisation in South Africa 
Privatisation of water services, as indicated above, is operationalised in two ways. 
This can take the form of outright divestiture implemented in England and Wales as 
discussed above.  It can also take the form of various mixes of PPPs. As highlighted 
above, corporatisation is a more tacit form of privatisation.387 Bakker has referred the 
latter as institutional change where ―markets, efficiency measures, principles of 
competition, and economic equity guide management practice.‖ 388 
South African municipalities are of late resorting to corporatisation as a model 
of water provision. This is done as an alternative, and in some cases simultaneously 
with PPPs.389 The complete divestiture of water services is not possible under the 
current legal framework in South Africa. The Municipal Finance Management Act 56 
of 2003 prohibits the disposal of a capital asset of a municipality needed to provide 
the minimum level of a basic municipal service.390 Full divestiture is therefore not an 
option in the South African context for the purposes of private sector involvement in 
the provision of water services.391 Private sector involvement in water services 
provision and management in South Africa is not privatisation in the sense of a 
change in ownership. Rather, it is a form of water governance whereby market 
principles such as commodification and full cost pricing and water metering 
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technologies that mimic the private sector are implemented.392 Narsiah has noted 
that the prevalence of prepaid technology such as prepaid water metres suggests 
that the poor are now paying more than the rich for services. This is because they 
have to pay for the installation and maintenance of the prepaid metering technology 
in addition to paying for their water usage.393  
In South Africa, water privatisation has thus been mainly operationalised 
through PPPs whereby the State retains some degree of control over the service.394 
Local authorities often lease out certain activities to private enterprises. This involves 
outsourcing or contracting out specific activities to private actors such as water 
system management and supply, meter reading, pipe laying, water testing and water 
cut-offs. 395  
Corporatisation of water services is another prominent feature of water 
provision techniques in South Africa. As a way of avoiding the outright involvement of 
private entities, with the attendant controversy this attracts, some municipalities in 
South Africa such as Johannesburg and Durban, have resorted to corporatisation as 
a model of water provision as an alternative to, or simultaneously with, PPPs.396 
Corporatising a public service, as indicated above,397 entails the service embracing 
market principles which may not necessarily involve a private entity. These include 
full-cost recovery, treatment of water as an economic good and the mutation of 
citizens to customers of the entity. Often, corporatisation is the stepping stone 
towards involvement of private entities in the provision of water services.398   
3 5 2 5 Select municipalities 
3 5 2 5 1 Lukhanji, Amahlati and Nkonkobe 
Three towns in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, Lukhanji, Amahlati and 
Nkonkobe (formerly Queenstown, Stutterheim and Fort Beaufort respectively) were 
the first municipalities to experiment with water privatisation in South Africa.399 The 
Lukhanji water and sanitation system was the first to be privatised in 1992. The then 
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Queenstown Council entered into a 25-year contract with Water and Sanitation 
Services South Africa (formerly Aqua-Gold and a subsidiary of the French 
multinational Leonnaise des Eaux) (hereinafter referred to as ―WSSA‖).400 The 
privatisation contract, presumably for profit reasons, only covered White and 
Coloured (mixed race) areas. African townships were excluded from the contract.401 
The Amahlati and Nkonkobe municipalities also followed with water privatisation in 
1993 and 1994 respectively. In all the cases, WSSA won the management contracts 
in question.402 
It is noteworthy that in both the Lukhanji and Amahlati water privatisation 
contracts with WSSA, the latter‘s responsibilities are described as:  
 
― [The] management, operation and maintenance of the system; rehabilitation of the 
existing system; keeping and updating all records required for the proper 
management of the system; and other responsibilities as may be agreed upon by the 
parties.‖403  
 
In the case of Nkonkobe, the water privatisation contract with WSSA was 
nullified by the then Grahamstown High Court. The Nkonkobe municipality won a 
court battle to nullify a six year-old water privatisation contract.404 The municipality 
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brought the application after high management fees of R400 000 per month placed 
an intolerably high burden on its budget. The exorbitant fees charged by the private 
water services provider left the municipality reeling with no money to provide for other 
basic services. The municipality argued before the High Court that it would save R19 
million if the contract could be nullified. The High Court eventually nullified the 
contract on the basis that the municipality did not comply with the necessary 
consultation and public participation requirements. Such irregularities came to light 
following protest and campaigning from civil society. The Court ruled that the contract 
was invalid as it had not been published first for comment by members of the public. 
Furthermore, the approval of the local government Member of the Executive Council 
was never obtained as statutorily required.405 This case is fully discussed in chapter 6 
in the context of analysing the significance of public participation and consultation of 
affected communities during the water privatisation process.406 
According to Greg Ruiters' research, water tariffs increased up to three-
hundred percent between 1994 and 1999 in Lukhanji, Nkonkobe and Amahlati. 
These increases were particularly felt by residents of Ezibeleni and Mlungisi, the two 
African townships that were placed under the jurisdiction of Lukhanji with the result 
that the WSSA contracts were extended to them.407 It has been further noted that by 
1996, the average township household income was less than sixty dollars per month 
and more than half of township residents were unemployed.408 In Lukhanji, for 
instance, debt collectors and private security firms were delegated to recover 
overdue payments and perform water cut-offs of non-paying residents. The 
municipalities did not realise any profits because the revenue gained was needed to 
pay off WSSA charges.409  
3 5 2 5 2  Ilembe (formerly Dolphin Coast) 
Ilembe (formerly Dolphin Coast) in KwaZulu Natal province entered into a 
privatisation contract by agreeing to a 30 year concession contract with Saur 
International of France through its local subsidiary, Siza Water Company (hereinafter 
referred to as ―Siza Water‖) in 1999. The contract was seen as a pioneering example 
                                                     
405
 15-18. 
406
 See section 6 3 2, chapter 6. 
407
 Ruiters "The Political Economy of Public-Private Contracts‖ in The Age of Commodity 149. 
408
 149. 
409
 See International Consortium of Investigative Journalists The Water Barons: How a Few Powerful 
Companies Are Privatising Your Water (2003) 3. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 156 
 
of privatisation, justified by the government on the basis of lack of municipal capacity 
and inability to raise funding.410  
Under the concession contract, Siza Water assumed responsibility for 
providing water and sanitation services to what was then known as the Borough of 
Dolphin Coast, a locality in the iLembe District Municipality. In 2001, the private 
operator experienced financial problems. This resulted in Siza Water refusing to pay 
the scheduled R3.6m lease payment due. Siza Water successfully demanded a re-
negotiation of the contract in its favour and asked for relief under the contract, which 
provided for re-negotiation if returns were either above or below a predetermined 
range.411 The local authority approved a revised contract in May 2001, under which 
water prices were immediately increased by 15% to restore profitability and the water 
company‘s  investment commitment was reduced from R25m to R10m over five 
years.412  
3 5 2 5 3  Mbombela (formerly Nelspruit) 
Mbombela (formerly Nelspuit) in the Mpumalanga province of South Africa also 
entered into a privatisation agreement in 1999, signing a 30-year concession contract 
with Biwater‘s local subsidiary, Greater Nelspruit Utility Company (hereinafter 
referred to as ―GNUC‖). GNUC subsequently changed its name to Silulumanzi and 
subsequently sold to Sembcorp of Singapore in 2010.413 Despite the privatisation, 
Biwater had great difficulty in raising the money and has depended on finance from 
the public sector. Consequently, Biwater was on the verge of withdrawing because of 
high levels of dissatisfaction by water users. In July 2000, nearly two-thirds of the 
total finance for the project was finally obtained in the form of a loan from the State-
owned Development Bank of South Africa.414 This shows that the so-called investor 
was not in fact injecting finances into the water sector, but instead relying on 
borrowing from local financial institutions. 
 
 
                                                     
410
 D Hall & E Lobina ―Profitability and The Poor: Corporate Strategies, Innovation and Sustainability‖ 
(2007) 38 Geoforum 772–785. 
411
 Hall & Lobina 2007 Geoforum 778. 
412
 778. 
413
 Narsiah 2008 Development Southern Africa 27. 
414
 See Public Citizen Water Privatization Fiascos 7. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 157 
 
3 5 2 5 4 Johannesburg 
The corporatisation of the Greater Johannesburg water supply services by the City of 
Johannesburg was a response to the financial crisis engendered by funding cuts 
from central government. This was also evidenced by the grant of a five-year 
management contract to a private multinational entity as part of Johannesburg 
turnaround plan called Igoli.415 In January 2001, the City of Johannesburg 
established a municipal company, Johannesburg Water Pty Ltd (hereinafter referred 
to as ―Johannesburg Water‖) and subsequently signed a management contract with 
WSSA,416 a joint venture between Suez (ex-Lyonnaise des Eaux), its subsidiary, 
Northumbrian Water Group, and the South African company, Group 5. The contract 
was not extended when it expired in 2006.417 Johannesburg Water is a ring-fenced 
corporation with a corporate model approach to managing water services. This 
means that water services are run along largely commercial lines with the exception 
of the obligatory concessions to social equity such as the free basic water provision. 
This has resulted in the treatment of water as more of an economic good and less of 
a public and health-related good.418 
Shortly thereafter, in 2003 the City of Johannesburg adopted a new tariff 
structure. The new tariff structure resembled a ―steep-rising concave tariff curve for 
water, in contrast to a convex curve starting with a larger free basic water lifeline tariff 
block.‖419 Dugard argues that the latter tariff structure would have appropriately 
served the interests of poor and marginalised residents in enabling them to access 
water at a lower cost.420 Dugard further notes that from 2004, Johannesburg Water 
started implementing its cost recovery measures by installing prepayment water 
metres.421  
The automatic disconnection feature of prepayment water meters is absent 
from conventional water meters. Conventional water metres supply water on credit, 
and provide important procedural protections prior to any disconnection of the water 
supply.422 Such procedural safeguards include the purchase of water on credit with 
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reasonable notice in case of payment arrears, and possible disconnections from the 
water service. Section 4(3)(c) of the Water Services Act states that procedures for 
the discontinuation of water services must not result in a person being denied access 
to basic water services for non-payment, where that person proves that he or she is 
unable to pay for such basic services. Section 4(3) of the Water Services Act further 
provides that procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water must be fair and 
equitable and should provide for reasonable notice of intention to terminate water 
services, and most significantly, for an opportunity to make representations.423 
3 5 2 6 Water disconnections in South Africa 
The implementation of privatisation and other commercialisation policies relating to 
water in South Africa has paved the way for tariff increases in the provision of water 
services. This has resulted in an increasing number of disconnections of poor 
communities from accessing basic services such as water.424 For example, one study 
found that about 800-1000 disconnections per day were taking place in Durban in 
early 2003, affecting an estimated 25 000 people a week.425 Another study has 
revealed that, in 1999-2001, 159 886 households in Cape Town and Tygerberg 
experienced water cut-offs as a result of the failure to pay for water services.426  
The application of market principles in the KwaZulu-Natal province resulted, in 
August 2000, in a rash of disconnections of thousands of people from their previously 
free water supply. This was a consequence of the changing of the free communal tap 
system to a prepaid metering system. A cholera outbreak ensued, affecting 275,000 
households. The result was that 120,000 people were infected with cholera and more 
than 300 people died.427 This is an illustration that water commodification and cost 
recovery can have devastating implications for the health of people when not 
properly implemented.  
Dugard has highlighted the absence of a national water regulator in South 
Africa which she attributes to the laissez-faire approach by government to regulating 
water services in the public interest.428 The significance of a national regulator cannot 
be overemphasised. Such an entity is particularly relevant in ensuring that there is 
                                                     
423
 See section 4(3)(b) of the Water Services Act. 
424
 Chirwa Law, Democracy and Development 197. 
425
 197. 
426
 197. 
427
 McKinley ―The Struggle Against Water Privatisation‖ in Reclaiming Public Water 184. 
428
 Dugard 2010 Review of Radical Political Economics 181. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 159 
 
municipal compliance with national legislation, policies, and standards.429 Without a 
national regulatory body, the privatisation and corporatisation of water will focus on 
the economic good status of water, reduction of cross-subsidisation and disregarding 
human rights such as the right to water and social equity in the management and 
distribution of water services.430 
3 5 2 7 Regulatory and monitoring challenges 
The experience of the water privatisation initiatives in South Africa has also 
highlighted the problem of accountability for private actors involved in the provision of 
water services. The local authority in Nelspruit, for instance, did not have the capacity 
to effectively monitor the water concession hence its dismal failure.431 The 
Compliance Monitoring Unit set up by the City Council to monitor the performance of 
the private service provider has not been successful and was reported to have been 
dysfunctional.432 This has been replicated elsewhere. In the Eastern Cape where 
other municipalities have privatised water as discussed above, Greg Ruiters pointed 
out that most councillors mandated to monitor and regulate the privatisation contracts 
lack the requisite expertise to do so.433 Ruiters further notes that only a negligible 
number of councillors have either seen or understood the contracts they are 
supposed to regulate and monitor.434  
3 5 3 The Philippines: Manila water privatisation 
3 5 3 1 The context of privatisation in The Philippines 
The World Bank played a pivotal role in the privatisation of water and sanitation 
services in The Philippines capital, Manila.435 As The Philippines transitioned from 
the dictatorial rule of Ferdinand Marcos to the democratic administration of Corazon 
Aquino, international financial institutions led by the World Bank put pressure on the 
new government to privatise State-owned industries and utilities. In fact the 
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International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group was the advisor to The 
Philippines government on the privatisation process. One of the major arguments 
advanced to support privatisation was the efficiency factor discussed above.436 As 
will be recalled, the argument is that State-owned utilities are inefficient and private 
entities are better suited to managing utilities because they create incentives for 
expanded service and efficient use of resources.437    
In The Philippines, utility services such as water are ordinarily provided by 
local water boards or water districts. These are public administrative entities 
overseen by their respective local governments. Manila was chosen for privatisation 
because of the sheer number of residents (18 million) and the scale of the service 
problems the public provider was having. These were deemed to require 
internationally experienced water companies.438 Christian Wolf points out that before 
privatisation, the then Manila water provider, the Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sewerage System (hereinafter referred to as ―MWSS‖) was one of the worst 
performing water utilities in Asian cities.439 Service coverage was 67 per cent and 
water availability was only on average 17 hours per day. The underperforming 
MWSS, which had been providing water services in Metro Manila since the 1880‘s as 
a public utility, became obvious target for privatisation.440 
3 5 3 1 1 The Contracts 
Water privatisation in The Philippines began with the 1997 award of two concession 
contracts for Manila‘s water and sewerage systems, the biggest water privatisation 
initiative in the developing world at the time. In 1995, the Water Crisis Act 8041 of 
1995 was passed, providing the legal framework for the privatisation of MWSS. The 
privatisation process was implemented through two concession contracts, in which 
the private sector entities were given the task of operating and managing the water 
facilities, whereas MWSS preserved ownership of the infrastructure.441 
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The city was carved into two zones for the purposes of privatisation, the east 
and west zones. The MWSS granted the rights to operate and expand water and 
sewerage services to two consortia. The east zone was awarded to a consortium led 
by the US company Bechtel (hereinafter referred to as ―Manila Water‖). The west 
zone was awarded to Maynilad and Suez/Ondeo, a joint venture by the French 
Suez/Ondeo and the Filipino Benpres Holding (hereinafter referred to as ―Maynilad‖). 
The concession contracts were for 25 years and included targets with particular focus 
on coverage, service quality and economic efficiency.442 
3 5 3 1 2 Contractual expectations 
The privatisation agreement contained ambitious benchmarks. It provided for 
benchmarks on water quality. It also enjoined the private entities to ensure water 
connections of up to 100% of households in their respective concession areas. 
Additionally, they were to ensure a twenty-four hour uninterrupted provision of water 
services in each and every household. The privatisation agreement also aimed to 
drastically reduce water losses occasioned by damaged pipes and a plethora of 
illegal connections.443 
The privatisation concessions were awarded through international competitive 
bidding, which was regarded as a model of success at the time. However a 2003 
study by Water Aid and Tearfund indicate that both the consortia appeared to have 
made particularly low bids, perhaps on the assumption that the terms of the contract 
would be changed once it was won.444 
3 5 3 1 3 Tariff increases 
Some commentators have argued that, despite its promise, the privatisation of the 
MWSS has diminished the public‘s access to quality water.445 Although water tariffs 
initially declined and services improved in the immediate aftermath of privatisation, 
both the private operators requested a 15% tariff increases from the regulatory body 
within two years of the agreement.446 This was the first of a series of rate increases, 
which, over the course of nine years, eventually left tariffs 500-700% higher than their 
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pre-privatisation levels.447 In the western zone, Maynilad ran into financial difficulties. 
It then slowed down its investments and in April 2001, Maynilad stopped paying the 
concession fee to the government. Manila Water, on the other hand, did not initially 
invest in system expansion in its eastern zone.448 For most residents of the city, 
higher rates have resulted in a substantial portion of their income going to water and 
sewerage services. A 2003 World Bank study found that Manila was one of the worst 
major Asian cities, second only to Jakarta, in relation to water and sewer access.449  
An Asian Development Bank report further found that as of 2004, approximately 58% 
of the city was connected to the water network. 
3 5 3 1 4 Public health implications 
In spite of the privatisation of Manila water and the promised improvements, 
opponents have pointed out some health implications that have arisen. In 2003, the 
poor treatment of water by the private entities led to a cholera outbreak which left 
more than 600 people ill and six dead.450 A study conducted in the same year by the 
University of the Philippines‘ Natural Sciences Research Institute found that 
Maynilad‘s water was contaminated with E. coli bacteria at 16 per 100 ml of water or 
more than 700% of the national regulatory standard of 2.2 per 100 ml of water. This 
gave impetus to the arguments of opponents that privatisation of the water utility had 
created no meaningful improvements in water quality and failed to meet the 
standards of the concession agreement.451 
Targets concerning coverage, as in the Biwater experience in Tanzania 
discussed above, were adjusted downwards with agreement of the regulatory 
agency. A study of the two concessions concluded in 2002 that both were a "failure" 
and a "corporate muddle, whereby the supposed benefits of private sector 
participation disappear, and government and public administrators are seemingly 
unable to prevent it.‖452 Despite the tariff increases and the lowered targets, Maynilad 
went bankrupt in 2003. After a string of financial, legal and regulatory disputes the 
concession was bid out again and was bought in 2007. It was acquired by a 
consortium of the Filipino construction company, DMCI Holdings and the Filipino 
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investment firm, Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC). Suez continued to 
hold a 16%-minority share in Maynilad.453  
3 5 3 1 5 Regulation  
Regulation of the two private entities providing and managing water services is 
performed by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System - Regulatory 
Office (hereinafter referred to as MWSS-RO).454 Similar to the South African 
experience discussed above, regulation of the private water providers has been 
found to be highly unsatisfactory. The functions of the regulatory body includes, 
among others, handling water users‘ complaints, contract monitoring and 
enforcement, and rates review.455 One of the key challenges pertaining to the 
MWSS-RO is its lack of independence and expertise in the discharge of its regulatory 
functions. This was also buttressed by Nils Roseman‘s study of the Manila water 
privatisation. Roseman concluded that it was mainly the erroneous design of the 
privatisation process and the lack of political will to create a powerful regulatory 
agency that have led to the partial failure of this particular privatisation of Manila 
water.456 It has also been highlighted that the haste with which the privatisation of 
MWSS was carried out resulted in the lack of an adequate regulatory framework for 
the water sector.457  
A creature of the concession agreement, the MWSS-RO, has no legislative 
mandate and hence no statutory independence from the political principal.  This 
shortcoming was exposed in 2001 when the MWSS Board along with the 
concessionaires‘ presidents signed termination letters to two deputy regulators who 
had opposed a request for the hiking of water tariffs.458 This lack of an independent 
regulator thus undermined water regulation as a whole.459 
The right to water, as will be fully discussed in chapter 4, enjoins States to 
monitor and regulate compliance with the prescripts of the right.460 Monitoring and 
regulation are very important, particularly in situations where water services have 
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been privatised. This helps to ensure that the privatisation of the delivery of water 
services does not negatively impact on the sufficiency, safety and acceptability, 
affordability and physical accessibility of water services.461 The significance of of 
monitoring and regulating water service providers will be analysed in the last section 
of this chapter which comprises a human rights assessment of the of the privatisation 
of water services. The following section discusses the privatisation of water services 
in Cochabamba, Bolivia. 
3 5 4 Bolivia: Cochabamba water privatisation 
3 5 4 1 Background 
Counselled by IFIs, Bolivia embarked on ambitious economic reforms in the mid-
1980s leading to that country‘s reform process being deemed a textbook application 
of neoliberal ideals unprecedented in the Americas.462 Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins 
point out that the prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF opened up Bolivia‘s 
markets to foreign products, and the privatisation of so many State-owned 
enterprises. The latter measures were embarked upon in a bid to attract foreign 
direct investment in the economy.463   
The dominant and visible role of multinational private economic actors in 
Bolivia has been a particularly contentious and hotly debated issue. In the last two 
decades, such entities have literally taken over many of the functions previously 
performed by the State. Multinational private economic actors‘ presence is 
particularly pronounced in the petroleum industry as well as the management and 
distribution of public utilities.464 
The Bolivian privatisation of Cochabamba‘s water shows the enormous 
difficulties associated with water privatisation where the objective is solely full-cost 
recovery, and is characterised by a lack of consultation with the affected groups.465 
The World Bank had, from the 1990s, demanded privatisation of the Cochabamba‘s 
municipal water company, Servicio Municipal del Agua Potable y Alcantarillado 
(hereinafter referred to as SEMAPA). SEMAPA had been operating and managing 
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the Cochabamba‘s water system since 1967. It has been noted that as of 1997 only 
57% of Cochabamba's residents were connected to SEMAPA‘s water distribution 
system. The rest obtained water from private wells and vendors. The SEMAPA 
network was also highly inefficient, experiencing losses of 50% of the water 
transported.466 Lack of continuous access to water also resulted in the rationing of 
water in many parts of the city.467 
The IFIs pushing for SEMAPA‘s privatisation regarded it as the only solution to 
the water problems experienced in Cochabamba, Bolivia‘s third largest city with an 
urban population of 600 000. In 1996, the World Bank conditioned a US$ 14 million 
loan to SEMAPA upon its privatisation. In 1997, the IMF, the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank also demanded SEMAPA‘s privatisation as a 
condition for debt renegotiation and forgiveness of Bolivia‘s foreign debt.468 Bolivia 
complied with these structural adjustment conditionalities by forging ahead with the 
privatisation of SEMAPA.469 At the time of the privatisation of water services in 
Cochabamba, only 60 percent of the population was connected to the public water 
supply network. Those not connected to the water supply system relied on water 
from water vendors. The assumption underlying the privatisation process was that 
handing over the management and supply of water services to a private entity would 
not only increase efficiency but liberate public funds for investment in other priority 
areas.470 
3 5 4 2 The contract 
In 1999, a consortium led by International Water Limited (England), Bechtel 
Enterprise Holdings (USA) and two companies from Bolivia, ICE Ingenieros and the 
SOBOCE (hereinafter referred to as ―Agua del Tunari‖) entered into forty-year 
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water and sewerage utilities. 
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concession agreement to manage the Cochabamba municipal water system.471 The 
privatisation agreement granted Agua del Tunari exclusive control over all industrial, 
agricultural and residential water systems, as well as exclusive control over water 
rights in natural aquifers.472 In terms of the $2.5 billion, privatisation agreement, 
Aguas del Tunari undertook to provide water and sanitation services to the residents 
of Cochabamba. The privatisation agreement also guaranteed Agua del Tunari a 
minimum 15% annual return on its investment, which was to be annually adjusted to 
the United States' consumer price index.473 
The privatisation agreement specifically gave the private operator exclusive 
rights of exploitation of rural water supply sources that had traditionally been under 
the control of indigenous farmers.474 This move did not endear the government nor 
the water company to the local population.  In effect what the contract did was to give 
exclusive rights to all of the water in the Cochabamba valley to the water consortium. 
The intensely farmed Andean mountain valley in which Cochabamba is located, wells 
and streams are essential sources of drinking water and irrigation for indigenous 
farmers. The contract negatively interfered with the water rights of these indigenous 
farmers, which they have enjoyed since time immemorial and had been locally 
managed independent of external control475 Aguas del Tunari also undertook to 
install water meters on private wells and cooperative water supply systems that rural 
and peri-urban residents had built and financed.476 Shortly after the privatisation of 
Cochabamba‘s water supply and management, water bills arose to between 200% 
and 300%.477  
Four months into the privatisation agreement, Bolivia was engulfed by anti-
privatisation protests.478 A consumer rebellion broke out in the Cochabamba, and in 
rural and peri-urban areas people mobilised against Aguas del Tunari. These joint 
efforts ended in April 2000 with confrontations between protesters and security 
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forces, the declaration of a state of emergency, and hundreds of people wounded 
and one dead.479 Bakker has noted that a key unifying factor for the disparate group 
of protesters was the sacredness of water and its cultural resonance for the 
people.480 Social discontent was only quelled when the government terminated the 
Cochabamba water privatisation contract. On 10 April 2000, the government 
announced a termination of the contract and substantial changes in the law that had 
covered it and had left self-managed systems and rural customs unprotected.481  
 In response, the water consortium, led by Bechtel, instituted arbitration 
proceedings at ICSID against the Bolivian government for breach of contract and 
demanded $25 million in damages under the terms of the Netherlands-Bolivia 
bilateral investment treaty.482 In the face of worldwide public condemnation, Bechtel 
and the consortium abandoned the suit against Bolivia in 2006. Bolivia was also 
compelled to absolve the private foreign investors of any potential liability.483  
It is significant to note that the process by which the water privatisation 
process was embarked upon in Cochabamba never entailed participation with those 
most affected.484 The new water law passed to operationalise the contract lacked 
transparency and public participation. McFarland Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins point 
out that few opportunities for public input were availed to the public during the 
privatisation process.485 In particular, the government made no effort to communicate 
and disseminate information to the public, particularly those mostly affected like the 
indigenous farmers, on the privatisation agreement with Agua del Tunari. The 
government proceeded to pass ―the new water law in a hurried and deceptive 
manner, again undermining public participation.‖486 
Water privatisation can also be a means of ensuring access to water in 
fulfilment of the right to water. The critical issue is the manner in which any 
privatisation process is carried out, especially in human rights sensitive areas such 
as access to water. The privatisation of the Cochabamba's water system on its own 
did not constitute a violation of the right of access to water.487 Noteworthy is the fact 
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that even before the privatisation of the water management and distribution system in 
Cochabamba to Aguas del Tunari, the State had failed to fulfill its obligations under 
the right to water as nearly half of Cochabamba‘s 600 000 residents lacked access to 
safe and sufficient water. It is possible the privatisation of Cochabamba‘s water 
system may have improved access to clean and safe water to the poor and 
vulnerable residents of Cochabamba had it been carried out in accordance with the 
normative standards imposed by the right to water.488  
The privatisation process of the Cochabamba water supply system raises 
concerns about the impact of the privatisation on the realisation of the right to water.  
Of particular concern is the issue of economic accessibility of water, and interference 
with customary or traditional arrangements for water allocation by handing these over 
to a private entity without the consent of the affected indigenous farmers.489 There 
was a conspicuous lack of transparency and public participation in the decision 
making process leading to the privatisation of water. This constituted a violation of 
such procedural safeguards as public consultation and participation. Public 
consultation and participation with all the stakeholders before and during the 
privatisation process may possibly have led to substantive changes in the contract to 
accommodate the community‘s concerns.490 The following section consists of an 
assessment of water privatisations according to human rights principles. 
 
3 6  A human rights analysis of privatisation 
International human rights instruments are neutral as regard the economic models of 
service provision. Consequently, it is permissible within the human rights framework 
for private entities to be involved in the provision of human rights sensitive services 
such as water, health and education. Writing over a decade ago, Liebenberg argued 
that the State should be entitled to rely on private mechanisms of delivery in 
appropriate circumstances subject to appropriate monitoring and regulation.491 The 
CESCR, in General Comment No 3 has also asserted that:  
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―[T]he undertaking 'to take steps…by all appropriate means including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures neither requires nor precludes any particular form of 
government or economic system being used as the vehicle for the steps in question, 
provided only that it is democratic and that all human rights are thereby respected. 
Thus, in terms of political and economic systems the Covenant is neutral and its 
principles cannot be accurately described as being predicated exclusively upon the 
need for, or the desirability for a socialist or capitalist system, or a mixed, centrally 
planned, or laisser-faire economy, or upon any other particular approach. In this 
regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognised in the Covenant are 
susceptible of realisation within the context of a wide variety of economic and political 
systems, provided only that the interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of 
human rights, as affirmed inter alia in the preamble to the Covenant, is recognised 
and reflected in the system in question.‖492  
 
The CESCR has explained that that payment for water services must be 
based on the principle of equity.493 This would ensure that water services, whether 
privately or publicly provided, are affordable to all users including socially 
disadvantaged groups. In that regard, ―[e]quity demands that poorer households 
should not be disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to 
richer households.‖494 General Comment 15 further provides that States should take 
steps to prevent their own citizens and corporations from violating the right to water 
of individuals and communities in other countries.495 General Comment 15 further 
provides that States should take appropriate steps to ensure that the private 
business sector and civil society are aware of, and consider the importance of the 
right to water in pursuing their activities.496 General Comment 15 further provides that 
States may collaborate with the private sector in order to realise the right to water.497 
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The gist of the various provisions of the General Comment 15 cited above is to 
endorse the position that the human rights framework does not dictate any particular 
model of service provision.  Rather, the human rights approach is to leave to the 
State to determine the most effective ways in which to fulfill their human rights 
obligations. 
The four case studies discussed above reveal the potential deleterious 
implications of privatisation of water services if human rights imperatives, both 
substantive and procedural, are not taken into account.498 Although privatisation of 
water services, if not properly implemented, may violate both economic, social and 
cultural rights as well as civil and political rights, this human rights analysis of 
privatisation will limit itself to the right to water. It will also consider the implications of 
privatisation of water services on the various components of the right to water.  
General Comment No 15 makes it clear that water must be economically 
accessible. According to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―CESCR‖) in General Comment No 15: 
 
―States parties must adopt the necessary measures that may include, inter alia: (a) 
use of a range of appropriate low-cost techniques and technologies; (b) appropriate 
pricing policies such as free or low-cost water; and (c) income supplements. Any 
payment for water services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that 
these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for all, including 
socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer households should not be 
disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to richer 
households.‖499 
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The above prescription by the CESCR highlights the principle of equity: 
vulnerable and poor members of society should not be subjected to a 
disproportionate burden of paying for water.500  Exorbitant tariffs leading to lack of 
affordability of water services would be in breach of the principle of affordability. 
According to Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins, the right to water imposes a maximum 
limit on the cost of water in relation to people's ability to pay for it.501 The CESCR has 
pointed out that costs associated with securing water must be affordable, and must 
not threaten the realisation of other rights enshrined in the ICESCR.502 It therefore 
means that for water to be regarded as affordable, individuals should be in a position 
to secure a basic adequate supply for their personal and domestic needs.503 
The four cases discussed above show that water tariff increases varied from 
one country to the other though the effects were mostly felt by the poor and 
vulnerable. In such a case, the State is obliged to take measures to mitigate the 
impact of the tariff increases, especially on the poor and vulnerable members of 
society.504 Any exorbitant tariff increases will always put a tremendous strain on the 
poor and vulnerable who find themselves threatened with the satisfaction of a basic 
need such as water, a precondition for the fulfilment of other human rights.  
The CESCR has further asserted that the obligation to respect the right to 
water enjoins the State to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right. The 
obligation to respect precludes any arbitrary interference with customary or traditional 
arrangements for water allocation.505 The new water law, discussed above in the 
Cochabamba case, provided for charging indigenous people who drew water from 
their traditional and customary water sources covered by the privatisation 
agreement.506 Such provisions interfered with customary arrangements for water 
allocation thereby constituting a violation of the right to water as elaborated by the 
CESCR in the paragraph above.507  
The CESCR has pointed that one of the State's core obligations is the 
adoption and implementation of a national water strategy and plan of action geared 
towards addressing the water needs of the whole population. Additionally, the 
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strategy and plan of action should be devised, and periodically reviewed, on the 
basis of a participatory and transparent process.508 International human rights law 
requires that policies must be devised and implemented and in a manner that allows 
for public consultation and participation.509 Privatisation of water services necessarily 
raises the issue of accountability of both local authorities and private entities involved 
in the management or provision of water services. The CESCR has further 
emphasised the significance of public participation in decision-making and public 
access to information concerning water issues, noting that: 
 
―The formulation and implementation of national water strategies and plans of action 
should respect, inter alia, the principles of non-discrimination and people's 
participation. The right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making 
processes, that may affect their exercise of the right to water, must be an integral part 
of any policy, programme or strategy concerning water. Individuals and groups should 
be given full and equal access to information concerning water, water services and 
the environment, held by public authorities or third parties.‖510  
 
General Comment No 15 provides for the right of individuals and groups to 
participate in decision-making processes that may affect their exercise of the right to 
water as indicated above. This, according to Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins, means 
that the realisation of the right to water mandates a more direct opportunity for 
participation in decisions affecting water than is afforded by ordinary democratic 
processes.511 It is thus of utmost importance that privatisation policies entrench legal 
and administrative measures to guarantee democratic accountability, particularly by 
those affected by the privatisation of a particular service.512 Such an approach is in 
sync with ―meaningful engagement‖, a concept that has gained currency in South 
Africa over the last few years primarily through a series of Constitutional Court 
judgments relating to cases of evictions of poor people from their dwellings.513 In 
these decisions, the courts have compelled the State to ―meaningfully engage‖ with 
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those they want to evict before pursuing the actual forced removal.514 This means 
that the representative role of public authorities is not enough and cannot be used as 
a substitute to satisfy the right to participate in decisions concerning water.515 
One of the key issues raised in the above cases of privatisation is the paucity 
of effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure realisation of the right to water 
notwithstanding the privatisation of water delivery services. The duty to regulate and 
monitor enjoins the State to take appropriate positive action to protect its citizens 
from potentially deleterious acts of private actors.516 The State has an obligation to 
prevent third parties from threatening access to equal, affordable, sufficient, safe and 
acceptable water.517 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―Maastricht Guidelines‖) enshrine a 
similar approach, providing that, in the interpretation of economic, social and cultural 
rights, the State has a duty to ensure that the private entities over which they 
exercise jurisdiction do not deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural 
rights.518 The Maastricht Guidelines further provides for the responsibility of States 
for any violations of economic, social and cultural rights that result from their neglect 
to exercise the necessary control on the behaviour of such non-State actors.519 The 
State will only fulfill this duty to protect through the establishment of an effective 
regulatory system. Such a regulatory system, to be effective, must provide for 
independent monitoring, genuine public participation and provision of appropriate 
relief to those negatively impacted by the acts of such non-State actors.520  
The critical issue becomes how the role of the State changes in the context of 
privatisation.521 It must be noted that privatisation does not relieve the State of its 
legal responsibility under international human rights law.522 States are the primary 
duty bearers under the international human rights system. It necessarily means that 
States do not relinquish their international human rights obligations by privatising the 
                                                     
514
 See L Chenwi & K Tissington Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights 
– A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 9. 
515
 McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins 2003-2004 Fordham International Law Journal 1783. 
516
 Chirwa 2004 African Human Rights Law Journal 235. 
517
 CESCR General Comment No 15 (2002) para 24. 
518
 See The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 691 698. 
519
 698. 
520
 CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 24. 
521
 For further discussion see chapter 4 which builds on and analyses in greater detail the nature of the 
State‘s obligations while chapter 5 focuses on the obligations of non-State actors. 
522
 Vandenhole & Wilders 2008 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 409-410. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 174 
 
delivery of water services. A State should ensure that it continues to exercise 
adequate regulatory oversight in order to meet its obligation to realise the right to 
water when it engages non-State actors to manage and supply water services.  
 
3 7  Conclusion 
The past two decades have witnessed a trend in all the regions of the world to roll 
back the State and increasingly rely on the market as the distributor of goods and 
services. The State is no longer considered as the provider but the regulator. This 
chapter has highlighted the increase in privatisation of human rights sensitive areas 
such as water provision. In the water services sector, it has been shown that the 
concept of water as an economic good and the principle of full cost recovery have 
catalysed the privatisation of water services provision across the world. Private 
enterprises are taking control of the management, operation and ownership of public 
water systems. The result is that water has increasingly become subject to the rules 
and powers of markets and prices have been set for water services previously 
provided for free.  
A human rights approach to water privatisation mandates that privatisation of 
water services should have as its key objective the realisation of the right to water, 
especially by those currently unserved or underserved. Most significantly, any water 
privatisation initiative should be guided by the principles of indivisibility and 
interdependence of all human rights, non-discrimination, consultation and public 
participation, information accessibility and accountability mechanisms.  
Insufficient efforts have been made by governments and IFIs to assess the 
risks and limitations of water privatisation, and to put in place measures and 
standards to govern water privatisation processes. The State has an obligation 
imposed by the right to water to protect individuals and communities from the 
deleterious acts of non-State actors. Within the context of privatisation of water 
services, the State is enjoined to adopt legislative and other measures to regulate 
and monitor the conduct of non-State actors involved in the provision of water 
services. Most significantly, the State is further obliged to take measures aimed at 
ensuring access by everyone to water for personal and domestic uses. This 
obligation entails the requirement to adopt special measures in favour of 
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disadvantaged and vulnerable groups such as subsidies, cross-subsidies and other 
intervention mechanisms.  
 The State‘s duty to protect human rights against violations by private actors is 
an integral component of State responsibility under human rights treaties and 
customary international law. A State may be liable for a breach of its obligations 
should it fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and remedy 
such violations. The involvement of non-State actors in the provision of water 
services necessarily implies that a shift in emphasis takes place. The State, by 
privatising the delivery of water services, does not divest itself of its human rights 
obligations to ensure the realisation of access to water services. Although a 
privatisation arrangement may mean that the private actor is the direct provider of the 
service, the State retains regulatory and oversight responsibilities, to ensure that the 
private actor provides the service in accordance with human rights norms and 
standards. If this cannot be assured, the State must either avoid or withdraw from 
privatisation arrangements. 
This means that States should establish regulation and control mechanisms, 
which include independent monitoring, genuine public participation and the provision 
of remedies for non-compliance.523 The CESCR has pointed out that arbitrary 
disconnection from water services and discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the 
price of water constitute prima facie violations of the States‘ obligation on the 
realisation of the right to water.524 Such safeguards are very significant for the 
protection of the human right to water in the event of involvement of non-State actors 
in the provision of water services. 
The following chapter will discuss and analyse the obligations and duties 
which the right to water impose on State actors. Drawing on General Comment 15 on 
the right to water as well as the jurisprudence of international, regional and national 
courts, the chapter will also highlight the duties the right to water imposes on the 
State in relation to the involvement of private actors in the water services sector.  
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Chapter 4 
State obligations imposed by the human right to water 
4 1 Introduction  
One of the cardinal developments in international human rights theory and practice is 
the development of typologies to elaborate the nature of obligations imposed by 
human rights instruments. From the early 1980s, scholars started commenting on the 
nature and types of obligations that human rights treaties impose on States. Henry 
Shue, for example, proposed an approach of analysing State duties that went beyond 
the traditional hypothesis of a single correlative duty for each right.1 An approach 
emerged in terms of which State obligations under international human rights treaties 
were analysed as entailing three types or levels of obligations, the obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfill the rights in question.2 The method of analysis deployed by 
treaty monitoring bodies‘ view State obligations in terms of this typology.3  
This study will focus on the practice of treaty monitoring bodies under 
international human rights treaties and regional adjudicative mechanisms under 
regional systems for the protection of human rights. Although the main focus of this 
chapter is on the obligations imposed on States under international human rights law, 
the chapter will also analyse national jurisprudence from select jurisdictions. This will 
assist in illuminating to what extent, if any, national courts have applied the 
typologies approach in their interpretation of respective national constitutions and 
legislation providing for the right to water. This study will also pay special attention to 
the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
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referred to as the ―CESCR‖),4 as this is the body mandated to monitor State 
compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―ICESCR‖)5.  It must however be noted that other treaty 
monitoring bodies have also significantly contributed to the elaboration of State 
obligations imposed by human rights instruments. These will be considered where 
relevant. It is pertinent to note that Shue‘s analysis was not limited to States as the 
only duty bearers. His analysis of duties developed a classification of all duties 
imposed by human rights which should be implemented by States, individuals and 
institutions.6  
This chapter seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the obligations that the 
right to water imposes on States. It outlines and evaluates the approach of treaty 
monitoring bodies, customary international law, reports of the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to water and the jurisprudence of regional and national judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies in elucidating the scope of the obligations imposed by socio-economic 
rights in general and the right to water in particular. Identifying obligations imposed 
by the right to water is fundamental to the accountability model developed in chapter 
6. Significantly, States need to know what they are obliged to do in order to comply 
with their obligations engendered by the right to water.7 
This chapter is divided in four major parts. The first part describes and 
analyses the origins and development of typologies of State duties as well as their 
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their criticism of the typologies approach, see J Waldron Liberal Rights: Collective Papers 1981-1991 
(1993) 25. 
5
 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316. 
6
 See Shue Basic Rights 52. 
7
 MM Sepulveda Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2003) 4. 
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significance. The second part analyses in detail the obligations imposed on States by 
the right to water. It explores the scope of the duties to respect, protect, fulfill and 
promote the right to water. It further analyses the State‘s duty to monitor and regulate 
the privatisation of water services as part of its protective mandate. The third part will 
discuss the concept of minimum core obligations as it relates to the right to water. It 
will discuss and analyse those obligations the ICESCR has deemed to be of an 
immediate nature, the obligations to take steps and the obligation to guarantee 
realisation of the right to water without discrimination. This will be followed by an 
exploration of the concept of ―progressive realisation‖ of the right to water as 
provided for in international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR and 
elaborated by the CESCR, academic literature, and relevant case law in respect of 
the right to water. This part will further explore the concepts of ―retrogressive 
measures‖ and ―availability of resources‖ as they relate to the realisation of the right 
to water. The final part will discuss and analyse selected leading jurisprudence from 
regional and national courts to assess how the right to water has been judicially 
enforced. Particular attention is paid to how judicial organs have enforced the right to 
water in light of the analytic paradigm of respect, protect, promote and fulfil. 
4 1 1 Origin and development of typologies of State obligations 
The  ICESCR and the ICCPR, part of the international Bill of Human Rights adopted 
in 1966 after lengthy and protracted debates, reflected the ideological cleavages and 
polarisation engendered by the cold war. During the debates preceding the adoption 
of the above treaties, the notion had gained currency that civil and political rights 
were fundamentally different from economic, social and cultural rights.8 This led to 
the emergence of two conceptions of human rights. On one hand, was an approach 
strongly espoused by the United States (hereinafter referred to as the ―the US‖) and 
other Western countries. This block conceived the role of human rights as a 
mechanism to ensure the freedom of the individual from arbitrary State interference. 
Linked to this approach was the notion that civil and political rights only imposed 
duties of abstentation on the State to refrain from interference in the fundamental 
freedoms of the individual.9 On the other hand, Socialist countries conceived the role 
of human rights to be ensuring freedom and security through an active role for the 
                                                     
8
 A Eide ―State Obligations for Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Food‖ in O Hospes & I 
Hadiprayitno Governing Food Security: Law, Politics and the Right to Food (2010) 112. 
9
 112. 
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State in the satisfaction of all basic needs.10 Socio-economic rights were thus 
considered mainly to consist of duties imposed on the State to use its resources to 
provide for the needs of the people.11 This rather simplistic conception of human 
rights substantially contributed to the decision to split the human rights enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―UDHR‖) 
into two separate instruments in 1966, the ICCPR and the ICESCR.12 
Human rights activists, judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms and academic 
commentators began to challenge the assumption that civil and political rights were 
only passive and cost-free, and that socio-economic rights always required costly 
positive State interventions through the provision of resources.13 The American 
political philosopher, Henry Shue, is credited as being the first to introduce the 
concept of human rights instruments imposing a typology of obligations on States.14 
According to this typology, all human rights entail three forms of State obligations, the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill rights, commonly referred to as the ―tripartite 
typology.‖15  Writing in 1980, Shue pointed out that there was no distinction between 
rights.16 Rather, the useful distinctions are among duties as ―there are no one-to-one 
pairings between kinds of duties and kinds of rights.‖17 Shue argued that the effective 
protection of all human rights, be they civil and political, or economic, social or 
cultural, require a combination of negative duties of restraint on the State, and 
positive duties to protect and ensure the rights.18 Shue thus proposed a ―tripartite 
typology of duties.‖19 This approach emphasised the distinction between the duty to 
avoid depriving and the duty to protect human rights beneficiaries from deprivation by 
other people or institutions. This could be done through designing and enforcing an 
                                                     
10
 112. 
11
 112. 
12
 112. 
13
 For instance, it was pointed out that the effective functioning of an adequate system of courts and 
law enforcement apparatus (including legal aid where necessary) requires State resources as does 
the operation of political systems based on elections which require funding and far-reaching positive 
measures to achieve an appropriate electoral and administrative system. Conversely, in the realm of 
economic, social and cultural rights, many socio-economic rights such as the right of everyone to 
work, to form trade unions or the right to establish private educational institutions impose on the State 
obligations to respect these rights. See Eide ―State Obligations‖ in Governing Food Security 113. The 
duty to respect is fully explained in 4 1 3 below. 
14
Shue Basic Rights 52. See also Sepulveda who notes that the ―tripartite typology‖ proposed by Shue 
in 1980 ―has evolved and scholars have developed typologies containing more than three levels.‖ See 
Sepúlveda Obligations 157. 
15
 Shue Basic Rights 52. 
16
 52. 
17
 52. 
18
 52. 
19
 52. 
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appropriate regulatory system and designing institutions to prevent violations of 
human rights. Included in Shue‘s typology is the duty to aid the deprived.20 This 
entails the duty to ensure social and economic security for those who are not able to 
provide for themselves owing to, for example, being the victims of natural disasters or 
social failures in the performance of duties.21 According to Shue, the duty to aid, 
which is largely a duty of recovery, is owed to victims of rights violations from failures 
in the performance of the duties to respect and protect. In support of this typology of 
duties, Shue persuasively argued that: 
 
―For all its own simplicity, [the typology]...goes considerably beyond the usual 
assumption that for every right there is a single correlative duty, and suggests instead 
that for every basic right – and many other rights as well – there are three types of 
duties, all of which must be performed if the basic right is to be fully honoured but not 
all of which must necessarily be performed by the same individuals or institutions.‖22 
 
Shue‘s typology was further developed and introduced in the United Nations 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―UN‖) system by Asborn Eide, Special Rapporteur to 
the then UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities23 and thereafter UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.24 Eide 
proposed a tripartite typology and, in his 1987 report as the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, subsequently distinguished between the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfill human rights.25 In recent studies, Eide has further refined his 
approach and added a fourth level, the obligation to facilitate. The latter obligation 
requires the State to create opportunities by which rights can be enjoyed. Eide refers, 
as an example, to article 11(2) of the ICESCR which enjoins States to improve 
                                                     
20
 52. 
21
 52.Shue further elaborates, noting that:  
―The description in terms of fulfilment and promotion suggests that the rest of us would be 
going beyond duties to respect and to protect if we acted upon duties to fulfill and promote. 
The rights of some people need to be ‗fulfilled‘ or ‗promoted‘, however, because other people 
have already failed to perform duties to respect and protect. Rather than going beyond respect 
and protection, we are having to go back and make up for failures in respect and protection. 
This is more clearly conveyed by saying that we are assisting the deprived. If our assistance 
enables them to enjoy adequate food, physical security, or whatever else they have been 
deprived of, their right will in fact have been fulfilled.‖ See H Shue ―The Interdependence of 
Duties‖ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (1985) 83 86. 
22
 Shue Basic Rights 52. 
23
 Eide ―State Obligations‖ in Hospes & Hadiprayitno Governing Food Security 113. 
24
 For a discussion on the origins of the typologies of State obligations, see O de Schutter International 
Human Rights: Cases, Materials, Commentary (2010) 241-244; Sepúlveda Obligations 157-164. 
25
 See A Eide UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human 
Right: (1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 paras 67–69.  
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measures of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems.26 Eide underscored the importance of clarifying the correlative duties 
imposed by rights as such duties are not spelled out in great detail in the main 
human rights instruments. International and regional judicial human rights 
mechanisms, UN independent experts and special rapporteurs, academic literature 
and the practice of treaty monitoring bodies have played a pivotal role in gradually 
elaborating the nature and scope of duties that various human rights impose on 
States.27  
The effective protection and guarantee of human rights recognises that 
international human rights law imposes a combination of negative and positive 
duties.28 It is now generally accepted that obligations imposed by human rights 
instruments, both civil and political rights and socio-economic rights, impose at least 
four levels of duties on the State.29 These are the duties to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill human rights.30 Treaty bodies such as the CESCR have increasingly 
embraced the respect, protect, promote and fulfill typology as a framework for 
analysing and clarifying the nature and scope of State obligations imposed by 
international human rights treaties. The CESCR was the first UN treaty body to 
embrace the typology in its General Comment 12 on the right to food.31 It is, 
                                                     
26
 A Eide ―Universalisation of Human rights versus Globalisation of Economic Power‖  in  F Coomans, 
F Grunfeld, I Westerndorp & J Willems (eds) Rendering Justice to the Vulnerable: Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of Theo van Boven (2000) 99 110-111.  
27
 Eide ―Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights‖ in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2001) 22. 
28
 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 83. 
29
 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has adopted the quartet of State 
obligations in elucidating the obligations imposed by the various provisions of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) though the obligation to promote tends 
to be encapsulated under the obligation to fulfill. See for example United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 19, The Right to Social Security (art. 9) UN 
Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (2008) paras 47 & 49; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights General Comment 18, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18 para 28; United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 15, The Right to Water (2002) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2002/11 para 25; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General 
Comment 16 The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2005) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/3 (2005) para 21. 
30
 See Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 
para 44. 
31
 See United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 12, 
Right to Adequate Food (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 para 15 where the CESCR stated that ―[t]he 
right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or levels of obligations on 
States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. In turn, the obligation to fulfill 
incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obligation to provide.‖ 
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however, noteworthy that in all the General Comments that the CESCR has adopted 
up to date, the duty to promote is incorporated under the duty to fulfil. This is different 
from the approach of the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as ―the African Commission‖) where the duty to promote is 
treated as a stand-alone duty.32 The African Commission has analysed the 
obligations imposed by the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as ―the African Charter‖) as imposing four levels of State 
obligations, the duties to respect, protect, promote and fulfill human rights. The 
African Commission deployed this approach in its decision in The Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as ―SERAC‖) as an analytical tool to gauge Nigeria‘s 
human rights obligations under the African Charter.33 The SERAC case will be 
analysed in detail below.34 
Some academic commentators such as Koch have criticised the use of 
typologies as an analytical tool to delineate State obligations imposed by human 
rights treaties as a simplification of the issue.35 Koch observes that the negative 
features of the obligation to respect have been used to buttress the argument that 
socio-economic rights are justiciable rights. Koch questions whether there is such a 
thing as a negative obligation as ―one can hardly think of an obligation not to interfere 
which does not require some sort of positive measure.‖36 This is because the 
distinction between negative and positive duties ―is not a static or immutable quality 
of rights.‖37 Koch has questioned the insertion of the obligation to protect between the 
―predominantly negative‖ obligation to respect and the ―predominantly positive‖ 
obligation to fulfill in the tripartite approach.38 Koch‘s view is that the extension of 
State obligations to private disputes is a rather complex issue with many aspects due 
                                                     
32
 See the African Commission decision in The Social and Economic Rights Centre & the Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria Communication 155/96, Ref.ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (2002) 
para 44. 
33
 See Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 
paras 44-48. The case is fully discussed in section 4 3 5 2 below.  
34
 See 4 3 5 2 below for a discussion of the SERAC case. 
35
 IE Koch Human Rights as Indivisible Rights:  The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2009)13-14. Koch argues that the classification of State 
duties in terms of typologies is of little practical use due to the conception of the duty to respect as less 
demanding than the duty to fulfil. In that way, the typologies have become ―straitjackets‖ rather than 
helpful analytical tools. See IE Koch ―Dichotomies, Trichotomies and Waves of Duties‖ (2005) 5 
Human Rights Law Review 81 103. 
36
 Koch Human Rights as Indivisible Rights 17. 
37
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 86.  
38
 Koch 2005 Human Rights Law Review 19. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 183 
 
to increasing privatisation. Such a complex issue might not be addressed adequately 
if discussed in the context of human rights typologies.39 Koch further questions the 
assumption that the obligation to protect is always more positive than the obligation 
to respect and always less positive than the obligation to fulfil. She points out that:  
 
―the obligation to protect does not necessarily call for steps which are naturally to be 
placed on a scale in between a predominantly negative obligation not to interfere and 
a predominantly positive obligation to provide. Preventing third parties from interfering 
with a certain right does not necessarily require a more active and more costly effort 
than preventing public bodies from acting in the same way (obligation to respect).‖40 
Koch though concedes that the tripartite typology has some applicability in 
deciding what it takes in a concrete situation for a State party to comply with its 
human rights obligations.41 She however points out that many situations cannot be 
dealt with exclusively by means of one of the three levels of the tripartite obligation.42 
This is because some situations ―are so complex that they require efforts belonging 
to all three levels, respect, protect and fulfilment.‖43 For instance, the notion that the 
State‘s duty in respect of human rights enjoins only inaction and non-interference on 
the part of the State is reminiscent of the liberal political philosophy that advocates 
for a minimalist State which interferes as little as possible in the individual‘s 
autonomy and freedom. Such an approach creates a situation where those who have 
enjoyed their human right to water continue to benefit from their prevailing 
advantageous position while the situation of those who have not had access to the 
enjoyment of the right remains unchanged. It is often assumed that the 
implementation of the obligation to respect generally does not involve resource 
distribution or re-allocation measures.44 Consequently, it does not help to ameliorate 
the conditions of the less privileged and disadvantaged members of society to realise 
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 19. 
40
 Koch further points out that ―[i]f we ignore non-State actors, which is possible, what has only been 
achieved is only the substitution of the traditional positive/negative dichotomy with another 
dichotomous relationship between obligations to respect and obligations of fulfilment.‖ See Koch 
Human Rights 18-19. 
41
 19. 
42
 20. 
43
 Koch Human Rights 20. Koch further argues that―[t]he closer one gets to the complexity of the 
problems of everyday life the more frequently one would encounter the fact that the response to a 
concrete social demand requires measures of considerable complexity sometimes defying 
classification as relating exclusively to either respect, protection or fulfilment.‖ See Koch 2005 Human 
Rights Law Review 93 
44
 Eide ―State Obligations for Human Rights‖ in Governing Food Security 113.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 184 
 
the right to clean and adequate water for personal and domestic uses. Such an 
approach is not capable of challenging the patterns of social exclusion that might be 
extant in a particular society. 
Bruce Porter also argued against the futility of distinguishing between positive 
and negative duties.45 Porter cites, as an example, the need to install wheelchair 
ramps and elevators in public buildings as positive measures required to secure 
equality of participation in society by people living with disabilities.46 Porter‘s 
argument is that to define a right only in terms of the nature of the State obligation to 
provide does not challenge patterns of social exclusion that necessitate the need for 
the adoption of positive measures.47  
Liebenberg has appropriately warned that categorising a case in terms of the 
duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill rights should not be determinative of the 
interpretative approach to the rights in issue.48 The kind of measures required of the 
State in a particular situation should be predicated on ―a contextual evaluation of 
what types of actions...needed in the particular circumstances to secure the effective 
enjoyment of the relevant rights.‖49  
This dissertation will adopt the quartet layer of State obligations as elaborated 
by the African Commission. The use of a quartet layer of State obligations as an 
analytic tool will enable a systematic elaboration of the nature of obligations which 
human rights impose on States. It provides guidelines to States, groups and 
individuals on the interconnected and interdependent nature of the duties that must 
be complied with to achieve full protection of human rights such as the right to water. 
4 1 2 The importance of categorising State obligations 
The primary responsibility for the realisation of human rights rests with the State in 
which the persons concerned live.50 States are contracting parties to international 
and regional human rights treaties; hence they are principally responsible for their 
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 B Porter ―The Crisis of ESC Rights and Strategies for Addressing It‖ in J Squires, M Langford & B 
Thiele (eds) The Road to a Remedy: Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2005) 43 55-56. 
46
 55-56. 
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 55-56. 
48
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 87. 
49
 87 
50
 Art 2(2) of the ICESCR provides that ―[t]he State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination 
of any kind.‖ See also Eide ―Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights‖ in Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 22. 
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implementation.51 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action affirms 
that human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings 
and emphasises that their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of 
States.52 Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity provides that the primary actor for 
the implementation and enforcement of internationally protected human rights is the 
State party to the treaty.53 This is also consistent with the rule of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in which a State must be given the opportunity to remedy an 
alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic legal system before its 
international responsibility can be adjudicated at the level of regional or international 
organs.54 International human rights standards and mechanisms are there to 
augment and complement the domestic human rights standards, consistent with the 
subsidiarity principle.55  
The typologies approach has shattered the illusion that each set of human 
rights falls into a neat, compartmentalised category.56 It is now accepted in doctrine 
and jurisprudence that each human right imposes a variety of obligations.57 The 
degree of emphasis on any particular duty ultimately depends on the type of rights 
under consideration as well as the relevant contextual situation. The need to 
meaningfully enjoy some of the rights in a particular context may for example 
demand positive action from the State in terms of more than one of the duties.58 
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 DM Chirwa ―Privatisation of Water in Southern Africa: A Human Rights Perspective‖ (2004) 4 
African Human Rights Law Journal 218 232. 
52
 See United Nations Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23. 
See also Eide who states that the purpose of the international human rights conventions is to create 
legally binding obligations for States to implement the human rights protections and guarantees in 
such instruments. See Eide ―State Obligations‖ in Governing Food Security 111.  
53
 Although it has its roots in canonical law, in particular the Papal Encyclical of 1931 entitled 
Quadragesimo Anno, the principle of subsidiarity is applicable to various aspects of government, 
politics, management and particularly important in supranational and federal systems of government. It 
postulates that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, and should only perform those 
tasks which cannot be effectively performed at the local level. The principle is reflected in the Tenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution and article 70 of the Germany Basic Law and has become part of 
the European Union law. See C Shasho-Landau ―Reflections of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the 
European Union‖ (1996) 13 Ilan Law Studies 301 303-304. The principle of subsidiarity has been used 
mainly in federal systems such as the US and the EU constitutional discourse and it is therefore 
uncertain whether it has become a general principle of international law.  
54
 See AAC Trindade The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International 
Law: Its Rationale in the International Protection of Individual Rights (1983) 1. 
55
 See PG Carozza ―Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of Human Rights Law‖ (2003) 97 American 
Journal of International Law 38 38. 
56
 Sepúlveda Obligations 12. 
57
 See Eide, pointing that the ―active‖ and ―passive‖ duties imposed on States by human rights are 
cross-cutting on the entire spectrum of human rights. Eide ―State Obligations‖ in Governing Food 
Security 113. 
58
 SERAC v Nigeria para 48. 
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Analysing the different kinds of duties imposed on the State by a particular right using 
the respect, protect, promote and fulfill typology makes it easy to understand the 
specific State action required for the implementation of a right.59   
Human rights treaties generally deploy different formulations in their provisions 
with regard to States obligations. The ICCPR, for instance, obligates States to 
―respect and ensure‖ the rights provided in that instrument.60 This should be 
contrasted with the ICESCR which enjoins States to ―undertake to take steps…to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation‖ of the human rights guaranteed in that instrument.61 The Revised 
European Social Charter (hereinafter referred to as ―the European Charter‖) provides 
that Contracting parties consider themselves bound by the obligations laid down in 
that treaty.62 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the ―European Convention on Human Rights‖) 
mandates Member States ―to secure‖63 the rights whereas the International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons 
with Disabilities imposes on States an obligation ―to ensure and promote‖ the rights.64 
The African Charter, on the other hand, requires State Parties ―to recognise the 
rights, duties and freedoms…and undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them.‖65 It is pertinent to note that as part of the obligations imposed by 
the above treaties protecting socio-economic rights, States are enjoined to take steps 
with a view to achieving progressively the rights, including the adoption of legal 
measures.66 The major exceptions are the African Charter and the Convention on the 
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 Sepulveda Obligations 12. 
60
 See article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
61
 See article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
62
 See Revised European Social Charter (1996) ETS no 35 Part II. 
63
 See article 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) 213 UNTS 222. 
64
 See article 4 of the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (2006) UN Doc A/61/49. 
65
 See article 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (1981) OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/rev.5. 
66
 See for example article 2(1) of the ICESCR and article 4(2) of the International Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) UN Doc A/AC.265/2006/L.6 (hereafter ―The Disability 
Convention‖). See also Eide ―Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‖ in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook 17. Eide points out that the adoption of such legislative measures constitutes a 
process of ―positivisation‖ of economic, social and cultural rights at the national level. Eide however 
argues that the transformation of economic, social and cultural rights into positive law at the domestic 
level is not enough. The rights must be realised in fact, which may require comprehensive 
administrative measures and social action.  See also Epp who argues that ―[i]n the modern state, 
rights are empty promises in many contexts unless they are given life in administrative policies and 
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Rights of Child which do not explicitly enshrine the ―progressive realisation‖ clause in 
the treaty texts. 
The typology of State obligations is an important analytical tool in elaborating 
the duties that human rights such as the right to water impose on States.67 
Elaborating State obligations in this way highlights the fact that States have an active 
role to play in the implementation of human rights, rather than a mere obligation of 
non-interference with the enjoyment of human rights. As noted by Leckie, this 
methodology of outlining State duties has proven a durable means of establishing 
State accountability for the enforcement of socio-economic rights.68 Additionally, 
using the respect, protect, promote and fulfill analytic model has greatly assisted 
towards clearly ―identifying, deconstructing and redressing violations of these 
rights.‖69  
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR is central as an interpretive guide to the definition 
of State obligations imposed by the ICESCR. Craven has emphasised that the value 
of the ICESCR as a human rights guarantee is predicated upon a clear 
understanding of the precise nature of the State obligations found in article 2(1).70 
This is particularly so given the need to properly understand the import of ―obligation 
to take steps,‖ to the ―maximum of available resources‖ provisions in article 2(1). 
Scott and Alston have pointed out in respect of the ―availability of resources‖ 
component that ―it is one of the single most complex and misunderstood dimension 
of economic and social rights.‖71 National judicial organs have also at times 
misconstrued the concept of progressive realisation, resulting in the latter acquiring a 
―process-oriented meaning‖ rather than imposing an obligation to improve the quality 
of people‘s access to socio-economic rights on a progressive basis.72 The concept of 
progressive realisation is discussed below. 
Adopting the quartet of obligations framework, the human right to water 
imposes four types of obligations on the State, the obligations to respect, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
practices.‖ C Epp ―Implementing the Rights Revolution: Repeat Players and the Interpretation of 
Diffuse Legal Messages‖ (2008) 71 Law & Contemporary Problems 41 42. 
67
 Sepúlveda Obligations 12 and 172. 
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 S Leckie ―Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‖ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81 91. 
69
 91. 
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 Craven State Obligations 151. 
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 C Scott & P Alston ―Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise‖ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 
206 262-263. 
72
 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 470. 
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obligations to protect, obligations to fulfill and the obligations to promote the right to 
water.73 In line with all human rights, the right to water contains both freedoms and 
entitlements.74 The freedom component of the right to water entails non-interference 
with existing access in order to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary 
for the realisation of the right to water. This includes the right to be free from 
disconnections from basic essential levels of water supplies.75 The entitlements 
component of the right to water include the right to a system of water supply and 
management that facilitates the right of people to enjoy access to water in an 
equitable manner.76  
The following section analyses the concrete duties imposed on States by the 
right to water as elaborated by the practice of the CESCR in its analysis of State 
obligations engendered by the ICESCR through General Comments and Concluding 
Observations, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as well as 
the interpretive work of UN independent experts and special rapporteurs. This 
section will also discuss interpretations of other treaty bodies such the African 
Commission, the Inter-American Court and Commission and the European 
Committee of Social Rights.   
 
4 2  Nature of State Obligations 
4 2 1 Obligation to respect 
In its traditional sense, the obligation to respect requires the State to refrain from 
carrying out any practice, policy or legal measure that impinges on the integrity of 
individuals or groups without necessarily obligating it to take positive action to 
improve the situation of those who are currently not accessing water services.  Such 
an approach corresponds with what Liebenberg has referred to as ―negative 
constitutionalism‖ espoused in liberal constitutional theory.77 The obligation to respect 
thus entails the State‘s duty to refrain from acts or omissions whose effect is to 
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interfere or deprive individuals or groups‘ enjoyment of their right to water.78 In other 
words, the State is enjoined ―to respect right-holders, their freedoms, autonomy, 
resources, and liberty of their actions.‖79 The obligation to respect requires that 
States refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to 
water.  
The African Commission adopted a similar approach in the SERAC case, 
stating that the duty to respect socio-economic rights obliges the State to respect the 
free use of resources owned or at the disposal of the individuals or groups.80 The 
African Commission emphasised the importance of respecting resources belonging 
to collective groups as these communities use them to satisfy their needs.81 The duty 
to respect is particularly significant for the purposes of safeguarding the resources of 
indigenous, nomadic and rural communities. These groups are mostly vulnerable and 
often live with the risk of being deprived of their land and traditional drinking water 
sources as will be demonstrated in the Endorois case to be discussed below.82  
Another case in point is the Cochabamba water privatisation discussed in 
chapter 3 where the contract gave exclusive rights to all of the water in the 
Cochabamba valley to the water consortium.83 Such a drastic measure was done 
without any consultation or participation of the indigenous people whose water 
sources essential for drinking water and irrigation were unilaterally appropriated.84 
This was a clear breach of the duty to respect the right to water of the indigenous 
people of Cochabamba. States should therefore refrain from engaging in any acts 
that deny or limit equal access to adequate water. Additionally, General Comment 15 
makes it crystal clear that any unjustified interference with customary or traditional 
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arrangements for water allocation, for instance would be a violation of the right to 
water.85   
The obligation to refrain from impairing access to a relevant socio-economic 
right is broad enough to include the adoption of policies that result in denial of access 
by poor communities to the right, rather than simply prohibiting interference with 
existing access to the right.86 The obligation to respect requires abstention from 
water privatisation projects or full cost recovery measures that would undermine the 
possibility of individuals or communities gaining access to basic supplies of water for 
personal or domestic use.87  
  The CESCR in its General Comment 14 elaborated that a State may be in 
violation of its duty to respect human rights should it neglect to take into account its 
human rights obligations when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with 
other States, international organisations and other entities such as multinational 
corporations (hereinafter referred to as ―MNCs‖).88 As part of its obligation to respect, 
a State is enjoined to ensure that the advancement of the human right to water is a 
paramount objective that the privatisation of water services must achieve.89 Such 
water privatisation agreements should be operationalised in such a way that 
eradicates inequality in access to water rather than entrench such inequity.90 A State 
would therefore be in violation of its obligation to respect the right to water should it 
enter into a privatisation agreement that would favour one section of society over 
another,91 increase water tariffs beyond what is affordable for the entire population92 
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or takes unjustified retrogressive measures.93 Water privatisation measures must 
comply with the normative framework imposed by the right to water to be human 
rights compliant. In this regard, chapter 6 of this dissertation proposes an 
accountability model incorporating good practices from different jurisdictions. In 
illustrating the good practices, chapter 6 also highlights and contrasts with the bad 
practices that are not compliant with the right to water and should be avoided.  
The duty to respect the right to water requires the State to refrain from 
interfering with the enjoyment of the right, whether directly or in an indirect fashion.94 
This is particularly the case where privatisation results in the curtailment of 
individuals and groups‘ access to sufficient and safe water or makes the conditions of 
such access more onerous for such holders.95 States are therefore enjoined, not only 
to desist from interfering with enjoyment of the right to water, but also to refrain from 
obstructing or hindering the right by adopting water privatisation policies that 
negatively impact on communities and individuals‘ enjoyment of the right.  
In the Cochabamba privatisation discussed in chapter 3,96 Law 2029 on 
Potable Water Services and Sanitary Sewerage97 (hereinafter referred to as ―Law 
2029‖) allowed the possibility of charging traditional communities who drew water in 
the area covered by the concession agreement. It is pertinent to note that both Law 
2029 and the concession agreement granted to the private operator, Agua del 
Tunari, exclusive use of water resources in the area covered by the privatisation 
agreement.98 Significantly, the privatisation agreement conferred on Agua del Tunari 
the "right to obligate potential users to connect themselves to the systems of potable 
water and sewage of the concessionaire,‖ thereby interfering with the water users‘ 
freedom of choice.99 Furthermore, Law 2029 enjoined any persons who either owned 
or occupied buildings in the concession area to exclusively contract with and connect 
to water services provided by Agua del Tunari. The privatisation agreement further 
prohibited, six months after the privatisation agreement became operative, the use of 
any alternative water sources in the concession without the approval of Agua del 
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Tunari.100 Most significantly, the privatisation agreement gave Agua del Tunari the 
right to install meters on private wells and charge the owners of wells for such 
installation.101 In light of these provisions, users of water obtained from alternative 
water supply systems such as private wells would have been operating illegally had 
they neglected to get the approval of the private operator.102 In areas that were not 
covered by the privatisation agreement, the communities were obliged by Law 2029 
to obtain five-year, non-exclusive licenses for water provision.103  
The above requirements brought about by the State‘s privatisation of the 
Cochabamba water supply system impacted negatively on the right to water of such 
indigenous communities living in Cochabamba. The conditions imposed as part of 
the privatisation arrangement affected their traditional uses and customs with regard 
to water allocation. Such interference with pre-existing access constituted a violation 
of the right to water, in particular the obligation to respect existing enjoyment of the 
right.104 Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins point out, however, that if requiring indigenous 
communities to obtain their water supply through the concessionaire would mean 
improved access to safe water for them, the interference with customary 
arrangements would not have been arbitrary and without justification.105 The CESCR 
has elaborated that: 
 ―If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the 
 burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful 
 consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by reference to  the 
 totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant.‖106  
It must however be noted that Law 2029 was passed with little debate and 
consultation despite its interference with the right to water. The right of the 
community to participate in the decision-making processes like privatisation of water 
must be an integral part of such a policy.107  
Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins have pointed that the central problem in the 
process of privatisation of Cochabamba's water system and a major cause of the so-
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called ―water war‖ was the lack of transparency and public consultation and 
participation in the decision-making process.108 The effect of lack of public 
consultation and participation meant that the Cochabamba community was not 
availed an opportunity to challenge the proposed privatisation or present alternative 
proposals. The lack of public consultation and participation and the resulting 
interference with pre-existing access to water amounted to a violation of the duty to 
respect the right to water. Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins have argued that 
consultation with stakeholders during the negotiation process might have led to 
substantive changes in the contract thereby forestalling any ensuing problems.109 
General Comment 15 emphasises the importance of public participation in decision-
making about water, and public access to information concerning water services. The 
CESCR‘s view in General Comment 15 is that:  
 
―the right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making processes, that 
may affect their exercise of the right to water, must be an integral part of any policy, 
programme or strategy concerning water.‖110  
 
Although the CESCR has defined its understanding of the tripartite typology of 
State duties and applied it in its general comments such as the General Comment 15 
on the right to water, the CESCR does not use the language of respect, protect, 
promote and fulfill with great frequency in its concluding observations on State 
reports. The UN Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations related 
to access to safe drinking water and sanitation (hereinafter referred to as the ―Special 
Rapporteur‖) has also adopted the typologies approach in her recent report on the 
human rights obligations and responsibilities which apply in cases of non-State 
service provision of water and sanitation.111  
The Special Rapporteur has emphasised that the human rights obligations 
imposed on States by the right to water include the obligations to respect, to protect 
and to fulfill the right. In line with the approach of the CESCR in General Comment 
15, the Special Rapporteur further elaborated the obligation to respect as requiring 
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States to refrain from interfering with existing access to water services.112 Such an 
approach is similar to an earlier position adopted by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on a study on the scope and content of the relevant human rights 
obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation under 
international human rights instruments (hereinafter referred to as the ―UN High 
Commissioner Report‖).113 The UN High Commissioner Report explained this 
obligation as entailing prohibition against any practice or activity that denies or limits 
access to safe drinking water, or that pollutes water.114 Additionally, this obligation 
means that States must also guarantee that individuals have access to effective 
judicial or other appropriate remedies providing adequate reparation, including 
restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantee of non-repetition.115 
In its Concluding Observations on Mexico, the CESCR emphasised the 
obligation on the State to respect the socio-economic rights of indigenous and local 
communities whose livelihood was threatened by the construction of the La Parota 
dam.116 The CESCR was concerned that the construction of the La Parota dam 
would cause the flooding of 17,000 hectares of land inhabited or cultivated by 
indigenous and local farming communities leading to environmental degradation and 
massive displacements. Most importantly, such a massive dam project would violate 
the communal land rights of the affected communities, as well as their economic, 
social and cultural rights such as the right of access to water.117 The CESCR 
therefore recommended that the State ensure that indigenous and local communities 
affected by the La Parota hydroelectric dam project were duly consulted, and their 
prior informed consent sought before making any decision that directly or indirectly 
affect their rights.118 The following section discusses the obligation imposed on the 
State by the obligation to protect. 
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4 2 2 Obligation to protect 
While the duty to respect the right to water is about the imposition of limitations on 
the State‘s freedom of action, requiring it to abstain from deprivation of rights, the 
duty to protect enjoins the State to act positively to regulate, prevent and remedy 
interferences by non-State actors.119 In such a case, the State must ―regulate private 
interactions‖ to ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of the enjoyment of 
their right to water by other private individuals and groups.120 
 In contrast to the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect imposes a 
positive obligation on the State to adopt laws, policies and regulations to protect 
beneficiaries of the right to water from interference by non-State actors.121 The State 
is enjoined to ensure that remedies are available to victims of violations of the right to 
water and to penalise perpetrators for any interference with the right which amounts 
to a violation. In SERAC, the African Commission explained that the duty to protect 
beneficiaries of human rights imposes on the State an obligation to adopt the 
necessary legislation and provision of appropriate remedies in the case of 
violation.122 The CESCR has emphasised the State‘s obligation to protect individuals 
and group interests against third party interferences.123 The obligation to protect 
requires State parties to prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of 
the right to water.124 The State is thus obliged to adopt the necessary measures to 
prevent third parties from interfering with or denying equal access to adequate water.  
 The duty to protect is a clear recognition that the responsibility of the State 
goes beyond its own actions or that of its agents, to positive protection of the 
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individual from third party violation.125 Such measures may be in the form of 
legislation, policies and judicial decisions.126 The right to water thus imposes a duty 
on the State to prevent third parties from polluting water resources. It also requires 
that States prevent third parties from extracting water resources in an unsustainable 
manner. The State‘s obligation to protect assumes a greater importance due to the 
increased recourse to water services privatisation discussed in chapter 3. The State 
is enjoined to ensure that the non-State providers of water services comply with the 
standards imposed by the right to water despite privatisation of water services.127  
 The Special Rapporteur has explained that there is a shift to a stronger focus 
on the obligation of the State to protect where non-State actors are involved in 
service provision.128 The UN High Commissioner‘s report has also explained that this 
obligation includes the adoption of necessary and effective legislative and other 
measures to prevent third parties from denying access to safe drinking water. This 
obligation entails the State‘s duty to regulate and control non-State actors so that 
they do not compromise equal, affordable and physical access to safe water.129 The 
Special Rapporteur further notes that despite the involvement of non-State actors, 
the State has an obligation to develop a comprehensive plan of action which 
incorporates short, medium and long-term strategies aimed at the realisation of the 
right to water.130 The obligation to fulfil, according to the Special Rapporteur, requires 
the State to adopt the necessary measures to enable and assist individuals to enjoy 
their human right to water.131  
 The duty to protect further requires the State to extend special protection to 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. In its General Comment 5 on persons with 
disabilities, the CESCR alluded to the heightened duty of the State to protect the 
disabled, particularly in light of the current trend towards privatisation of services 
hitherto publicly provided. The CESCR pointed that:  
 
―In a context in which arrangements for the provision of public services are 
increasingly being privatised and in which the free market is being relied on to an 
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ever greater extent, it is essential that private employers, private suppliers of goods 
and services, and other non-public entities be subject to both non-discrimination and 
equality norms in relation to persons with disabilities.‖132 
 
4 2 2 1 The duty to protect in the context of the privatisation of water services 
The State has an obligation to prevent third parties from threatening access to equal, 
affordable, sufficient, safe and acceptable water.133 Kok has pointed that where water 
services are operated by private operators, the State has a duty to effectively 
regulate such entities to ensure that they do not interfere with the right to water.134 
The CESCR has also explained that: 
―Where water services (such as piped water networks, water tankers, access to rivers 
and wells) are operated or controlled by third parties, States parties must prevent 
them from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe 
and acceptable water.‖135  
The above approach reinforces the point that privatisation of water services does not 
relieve the State of its legal responsibility under international human rights law.136 
The duty to protect means that the State must prevent violations by third parties. In 
other words, should a particular privatisation scheme lead to a situation where 
various components of the right to water are infringed, the State may be held liable 
where it neglected to put in place mechanisms to prevent and redress violations by 
third parties.137 It necessarily follows that States do not relinquish their domestic nor 
international human rights obligations by privatising the delivery of water services. A 
State should ensure that it continues to exercise adequate oversight in order to meet 
its obligation to realise the right to water when it engages non-State actors to 
manage its water services. Should a water privatisation scheme result in the violation 
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of any of the constituent elements of the right to water discussed in chapter 2,138 the 
State may be liable for failing to discharge its duty to protect.139  
 
4 2 2 2  Duty to monitor and regulate as part of the obligation to protect 
International human rights instruments have iterated the duty of States to monitor 
and regulate the realisation of socio-economic rights as part of their protective 
mandate.140 This monitoring obligation arguably becomes more important where 
water services have been privatised. A State would be in violation of the duty to 
protect where lack of adequate monitoring and regulatory mechanisms in respect of a 
non-State actor involved in the provision and management of water services results 
in the breach of minimum international human rights guarantees relating to the right 
to water.141 
 One of the key issues raised in the cases of water privatisation in Tanzania, 
Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa discussed in chapter 3 was the paucity of 
effective monitoring and regulatory mechanisms to exercise oversight over the 
private providers. In The Philippines, a study of the Manila water privatisation 
concluded that it was mainly the erroneous design of the privatisation process and 
the lack of political will to create a powerful regulatory agency that led to the partial 
failure of that privatisation scheme.142 In South Africa, the local authority in Nelspruit 
did not have the capacity to effectively regulate the water concession contract hence 
its failure and, in some cases, officials mandated to monitor and regulate the 
privatisation contracts lacked the requisite expertise to do so.143 In the Dar es 
Salaam water privatisation, the absence of a regulatory and monitoring body meant 
there was no independent authority to formulate and monitor tariff levels.144 The duty 
                                                     
138
 See section 2 6 of chapter 2 above. 
139
 Kok ―Privatisation‖ in Privatisation and Human Rights 268. 
140
 See CESCR General Comment 12 (1999) para 19; CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) paras 24, 
42, 44(b)(ii), 50(e)& 52 and the Maastricht Guidelines. Para 15(d) of the latter provides that violations 
of economic, social, cultural rights can also occur through the omission or failure of States to take 
necessary measures stemming from legal obligations such as the failure to regulate activities of 
individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating economic, social and cultural rights. See 
also A Eide The Right to Adequate Food UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/231987 (1987) para 68 where 
he pointed out that the duty to protect requires the State to take measures necessary to prevent other 
individuals or groups from violating the integrity, freedom of action, or other rights of the individual. 
141
 Kok ―Privatisation‖ in Privatisation and Human Rights 268. 
142
 See 3 5 3, chapter 3. 
143
 See 3 5 2, chapter 3. 
144
 See section 3 5 1 of chapter 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 199 
 
to regulate and monitor enjoins the State to take appropriate positive action to protect 
beneficiaries of rights from the potentially deleterious acts of private actors.145 
In its Concluding Observations on Panama,146 the CESCR emphasised the 
State‘s obligation to protect indigenous people from abuse of their rights by third 
parties, including the right of access to water. The CESCR expressed concern that 
the land rights of indigenous peoples were being threatened by mining and cattle 
ranching activities undertaken with the approval of the State. This resulted in the 
displacement of indigenous peoples from their traditional ancestral and agricultural 
lands and abuse of other socio-economic rights such as access to water.147 A State 
can only fulfill the duty to protect through the establishment of an effective monitoring 
and regulatory system to exercise oversight over such non-State actors involved in 
the provision of water services.148  
Safeguards to prevent arbitrary disconnections and unaffordable water tariffs 
are very important for the protection of the human right to water in the event of 
involvement of non-State actors in the provision of water services. These 
independent monitoring mechanisms should ensure that the minimum international 
standards with regard to the right to water are maintained. The regulatory and 
monitoring mechanisms should have the mandate to scrutinise privatisation contracts 
to ensure their provisions and implementation do not encroach on the right to water. 
At the very least, they should mandate private or public operators of water services to 
meet the minimum quantitative or qualitative levels of water provision as provided in 
General Comment 15.149 The monitoring mechanisms should put in place strict water 
tariff control measures to prevent private water operators from charging exorbitant 
water tariffs thereby impeding the economic accessibility of water.150 It is also 
important that water services should be protected from disconnections where a 
beneficiary is unable to pay for the service. Kok has suggested that a water supplier 
should only be allowed to adopt measures necessary to limit an indigent beneficiary‘s 
supply to the minimum levels provided for under international law rather than 
completely disconnecting the water supply. If the national minimum standards are 
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higher than the international minimum standards, then the water supplier should limit 
the supply to a defaulting user to the minimum national standard.151 
The State‘s duty to put in place an effective monitoring and regulatory 
mechanism is particularly important in the case of discontinuation of water services 
for non-payment. Arbitrary disconnection of water services for non-payment is a 
pervasive practice, especially in instances where water services have been privatised 
or corporatised as borne out by the discussions on water privatisation in Tanzania, 
Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa explored in chapter 3.152 The State is under 
an obligation, as part of its duty to protect, to ensure that the procedure for 
discontinuation of water services is fair and equitable. Most fundamentally, such a 
procedure must protect the poor from disconnections of access to basic water 
services.153 It means that States have an obligation to ensure access to water and 
water facilities to those who lack sufficient financial means by adopting appropriate 
pricing policies such as free or low cost water.154  The South African Water Services 
Act 108 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Water Services Act‖) represents a 
commendable legislative measure for discharging this duty by the State.155 
 
4 2 3 Obligation to fulfil 
The obligation to fulfill the right to water requires the State to adopt appropriate 
legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures towards the full realisation of 
the right to water.156 The obligation to fulfill is key to the realisation of socio-economic 
rights. Craven pointed out that the obligation to fulfill is the principal concept around 
which article 2(1) of the ICESCR was built on.157 The obligation to fulfill imposed by 
the right to water entails the direct provision of water and water services in the event 
that individuals and groups lack the means to access these facilities by themselves. 
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The CESCR has disaggregated the obligation to fulfill the right to water into the 
duties to facilitate, promote and provide.158 The duty to facilitate enjoins the State to 
take positive measures to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right.159 
The CESCR in its Concluding Observations on States‘ Parties reports has referred to 
the obligation to facilitate in broad terms, mainly indicating the necessity to overcome 
obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to water.160 This requires the State to 
proactively engage in measures geared towards strengthening individuals and 
groups‘ access to and utilisation of resources and means to access water and water 
services.161 A State must be accorded the requisite margin of appreciation to adopt 
the necessary measures to facilitate the realisation of the right to water within its 
territory, given its unique circumstances.   
The Special Rapporteur, in the same vein as the CESCR, points out that the 
ultimate aim is the full realisation of the right to water. UN High Commissioner‘s 
report notes that this obligation requires the State to adopt the necessary measures - 
legislative, administrative, policies, programmes and others - to facilitate and promote 
universal access to safe water.162 Both reports have adopted the approach of the 
CESCR in General Comment 15 to disaggregate the obligation to fulfill into the 
obligations to facilitate, promote and provide.163  Resources constraints will mean 
that the right may have to be fulfiled on a progressive basis.164 The Special 
Rapporteur echoes the approach of the CESCR, pointing out that States are required 
to devote their maximum available resources and move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards full realisation of the right to water. 165 
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The CESCR has emphasised this obligation in its Concluding Observations on 
Serbia.166 The CESCR expressed its concern at the high number of Roma families 
that lived in sub-standard informal settlements without access to basic services such 
as electricity, running water, sewage facilities, medical care and schools.167 The 
CESCR pointed to the discrepancy in access to water, noting that 17.5 percent of 
rural households in Serbia do not have direct access to safe water, and for the few 
that do enjoy such access, the water is of the poorest quality.168 The CESCR 
recommended that the State ensure that the Roma have access to safe drinking 
water and other essential services. The CESCR emphasised Serbia‘s ―obligation to 
ensure access to safe drinking water within, or in the immediate vicinity, of each 
household.‖169  
Furthermore, States are obliged to adopt national water strategies and plans 
of action to realise the right to water as part of the obligation to fulfil.170 Where there 
is a lack of physical access to water resources within reasonable distances, the State 
is enjoined to ensure that water is physically accessible.171 The duty to fulfill should 
also be interpreted to require the State to accord the minimum amount of free water 
to those who lack the resources to pay for their water needs for personal and 
domestic uses.172 Denial of a basic water supply not only poses a serious health risk, 
but also deprives the victims of their inherent dignity. It strips individuals and groups 
of the possibility of living a dignified life.173 To achieve this objective, the State is 
enjoined to adopt intervention measures such as the use of a range of appropriate 
low-cost technologies and pricing policies such as free or low-cost water and income 
supplements,174 subsidies, cross subsidies and other related measures in favour of 
disadvantaged groups.175 South Africa provides an interesting legislative framework 
                                                     
166
 See United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Observations 
on Serbia (2005) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.108. 
167
 Para 31. 
168
 Para 32. 
169
 Para 60. 
170
 Para 26. 
171
 Para 12(c)(i). 
172
 Para 12(c)(ii). See also para 27 where the CESCR has commented: ―Any payment for water 
services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or 
publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that 
poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with water expenses as compared to 
richer households.‖  
173
 JD Visser, E Cottle & J Mettler ―Realising the Right of Access to Water: Pipe Dream or Watershed‖ 
(2003) 7 Law, Democracy and Development   27 48. 
174
 CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 27. 
175
 See Chirwa 2004 African Human Rights Law Journal 241. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 203 
 
in this regard which provides for the provision of a free basic water supply although 
the sufficiency of the free basic water supply was challenged in the Mazibuko 
case.176 This and other good practices towards the realisation of the right to water 
are explored in chapter 6.  
The obligation to fulfill is the most contentious and difficult to implement of all 
the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights as illustrated by the Mazibuko case 
in the context of the right to water. The difficulty emanates from the fact that it is often 
difficult to articulate a clear violation of the obligation to fulfill as that duty involves the 
judiciary evaluating the substantive adequacy of government programmes.177 Such a 
process involves difficult issues such as resource allocation, non-legal technical 
expertise, capacity building and inter-disciplinary cooperation.178 Nevertheless, the 
obligation to fulfill is important for the realisation of the right to water. This layer of 
duty mandates the State to proactively engage in a course of action designed to 
strengthen access to safe and sufficient water. The following section discusses the 
fourth layer of State duties imposed by the right to water, the obligation to promote.  
4 2 4 Obligation to promote 
In the context of the right of access to sufficient water, the State‘s duty to promote 
entails the adoption of educational and informational programmes designed to 
enhance awareness and understanding of the right of access to sufficient water.179 
The CESCR has pointed out that the proper exercise and respect for human rights 
can only take place in a situation where there is sufficient awareness of those rights 
by both the bureaucrats and individuals.180 The obligation to promote imposes a duty 
on the State to ensure that there is appropriate education concerning the hygienic 
use of water, protection of water sources and the sustainable use of water.181 The 
State is also obliged to take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education and 
public awareness concerning access to water programmes particularly in rural and 
deprived urban areas, informal settlements, or amongst indigenous peoples and 
other disadvantaged minorities.  
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A key component of this State obligation is the State‘s duty to provide 
individuals and groups the concomitant right to seek, receive and distribute 
information concerning water issues.182 The right to information in relation to water 
issues is one of the most significant aspects of the right to water. Access to 
information is fundamental to the right of people to participate effectively in decision-
making processes on water policies, programmes and actions.183 Access to 
information and participation by individuals and groups in water policies is particularly 
important in instances of the privatisation of water services. This is aptly illustrated in 
the Cochabamba case where there was a conspicuous lack of transparency and 
public participation in the decision making process leading to the privatisation of 
water.184 This constituted a violation of procedural safeguards such as public 
consultation and participation which was a breach of the State‘s duty to promote the 
right to water. Provision of adequate, timely and relevant information and meaningful 
consultation with all the stakeholders before and during the privatisation process may 
possibly have led to substantive changes in the contract to accommodate their 
concerns.185  
 
4 3 Use of typologies in select international and regional instruments 
4 3 1 The International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
The CEDAW imposes a number of different obligations on States. These include 
substantive obligations relating to the prohibition of discrimination as well as 
procedural obligations, mainly of a reporting nature. Substantive obligations can also 
be classified between those subject to immediate realisation and those subject to 
progressive realisation.186 The State obligations contained in the CEDAW are 
expressed in a variety of forms, and the relevance of the typologies analysis 
ultimately depends on the wording of the individual provisions of the treaty. What is 
clear is that many of the provisions of CEDAW are in fact specific instances of the 
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various levels the State duty to ensure equality and non-discrimination.187 The 
Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination (hereinafter the ―CEDAW 
Committee‖) has expressly adopted the typologies approach in its analysis of State 
obligations imposed by CEDAW.188 
Article 2 of CEDAW obliges States to prohibit discriminatory behaviour and to 
take appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of 
women in their enjoyment of human rights. Article 3 of CEDAW requires States to 
take ―all appropriate measures, including legislation‖ to guarantee women‘s 
enjoyment of human rights on an equal basis with men.‖189 In addition, article 4 
provides for the State‘s adoption of special measures aimed at accelerating equality 
and such measures should not be regarded as discrimination.190 The three main 
categories of obligations imposed by CEDAW on States include the obligations to 
―ensure/accord/grant the right,‖191 obligation ―to undertake‖192 and ―obligation to take 
all appropriate measures in order to ensure‖ rights guaranteed under that treaty.193 
Additionally, the CEDAW Committee has pointed out that article 2 obliges States ―to 
respect, protect and fulfill women‘s right to non-discrimination and to the enjoyment 
of equality‖ thereby expressly adopting the typologies approach discussed above.194 
The CEDAW explicitly refers to the right to water for rural women. It obliges 
States to cater for the specific needs of rural women and to ensure them the right to 
enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to access to water.195 This 
provision is also augmented by article 24 which enjoins States parties to adopt 
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necessary measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realisation of the 
rights recognised in CEDAW. These obligations, it is argued, are analogous to the 
obligation to fulfill discussed above.196 This means that the State is enjoined to adopt 
appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures geared towards 
the full realisation of the right to water for women. This entails the direct provision of 
water and water services to those women who lack the means to access these 
facilities by themselves. The State must proactively adopt temporary special 
measures as envisaged in article 4 of CEDAW aimed at strengthening vulnerable 
and indigent women‘s access to and utilisation of resources and means to access 
water and water services.197 It is significant to point out that, in spite of privatisation of 
water services, the duty to fulfill should be interpreted to enjoin the State to accord 
the minimum amount of free water to those women who lack the resources to pay for 
their water needs for personal and domestic uses.198  
Article 2(e) of the CEDAW entrenches the State‘s obligation to protect women 
against violation of their rights by third parties. This provision is similar to the 
obligation to protect discussed above. Article 2(e) requires States to adopt 
―appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organisation or enterprise.‖ Under this provision, a State party can, in addition to 
being responsible for the acts or omissions of its own agents or officials, be held 
legally accountable for its failure to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, 
punish  and remedy private acts of discrimination.199  
States are legally responsible for the failure to prevent, investigate and 
remedy such acts of discrimination whether such acts of private individuals take 
place in the domestic or public sphere.200 This duty is particularly significant in the 
context of privatisation of water services. This duty means that the State is obliged to 
prevent third parties from threatening women‘s access to equal, affordable, sufficient, 
safe and acceptable water. A State should ensure that it continues to exercise 
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adequate oversight in order to meet its obligation to realise the right to water when it 
engages non-State actors to manage its water services. Should a water privatisation 
scheme result in the violation of any of the constituent elements of a right to water, 
the State may be liable for failing to discharge its duty to protect.201  
Article 2 of CEDAW contains States parties‘ general undertaking to eliminate 
discrimination against women through the adoption of constitutional, legislative, 
administrative and other measures. A crucial component of the right to water is that 
everybody must be ensured access to water without discrimination, including the 
most vulnerable or marginalised groups. The principle of non-discrimination, which is 
a fundamental human right in itself and is included in all international human rights 
conventions, prohibits discrimination based on listed and analogous grounds. 
Significantly, article 2 can be interpreted as enjoining the State to eliminate 
discriminatory practices in access to water, both in law and in fact, on the basis of a 
person‘s defined characteristics such as sex. 
Non-discrimination entails more than mere prohibition of direct and indirect 
discrimination against women‘s access to water and water services. It includes 
proactive measures to ensure that vulnerable or marginalised groups such as women 
have access to safe water. The State is obliged to allocate resources and adopt 
policies that benefit a wide section of the population, rather than focusing on 
expensive facilities that benefit only a privileged few. Notwithstanding privatisation of 
water services, States should provide special attention to groups that are subject to 
historical patterns of discrimination such as women. This later approach is borne out 
by article 3 of CEDAW that requires States to take appropriate measures geared 
towards guaranteeing women‘s enjoyment of rights on an equal basis with men.202 
The CEDAW Committee has elaborated the obligation to respect human rights as 
requiring States to refrain from making laws, policies, regulations and programmes 
that result in the denial of equal enjoyment by women of their civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights.203 
The obligation to protect, as explained above, enjoins the State to protect 
women against discrimination by private actors. States are obliged to take steps 
aimed at eliminating customary and all other practices that prejudice and perpetuate 
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the notion of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, and of stereotyped roles 
for men and women.204 Article 2 is not limited to the prohibition of discrimination 
against women caused directly or indirectly by States parties. Article 2 also imposes 
a due diligence obligation on States parties to prevent discrimination by private 
actors. In some cases a private actor‘s acts or omissions may be attributed to the 
State under international law.205 States parties are thus obliged to ensure that private 
actors do not engage in discrimination against women. The appropriate measures 
States parties are obliged to take include the regulation of the activities of private 
actors in regard to education, employment and health policies and practices, working 
conditions and work standards, and other areas where private actors provide 
services such as banking, housing and water provision.206 
The CEDAW Committee has further interpreted the obligation to fulfill as 
enjoining States to take a wide variety of steps to ensure that women and men enjoy 
equal rights in law and in fact including, where appropriate, the adoption of temporary 
special measures. Accordingly, States should fulfill their legal obligations to all 
women through designing public policies, programmes and institutional frameworks 
that are aimed at fulfilling the specific needs of women leading to the full 
development of their potential on an equal basis with men.207 The obligation to fulfill 
encompasses the obligation of States to facilitate access to and provide for the full 
realisation of women‘s rights.  
In the case of AT v Hungary208 the complainant alleged failure by the State to 
protect the applicant from being subjected to regular and severe domestic violence 
and serious threats by her common law husband. Although not directly addressing 
the right to water per se, the views of the CEDAW Committee clearly show its 
adoption of the typologies approach to its interpretation of State obligations imposed 
by the CEDAW. The CEDAW Committee ordered the State to ―respect, protect, 
promote and fulfill women‘s human rights, including their right to be free from all 
forms of domestic violence.‖209 
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The above discussion clearly shows that the CEDAW Committee has explicitly 
adopted the typologies approach as an interpretive framework to elucidate the 
obligations imposed on States by CEDAW. This is also further reflected by the case 
of AT v Hungary in which the CEDAW Committee expressly ordered the State to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfill women‘s human rights. Utilising the typologies 
approach in such manner may provide guidance on the measures required to give 
effect to the specific obligations imposed by the various provisions of CEDAW, such 
as the right to water. 
4 3 2 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter 
referred to as ―ICERD‖)210 obliges States to prohibit discrimination of any kind and 
ensure everyone equality before the law. Article 5 of ICERD enjoins States to uphold 
rights to housing, health, culture, education and social services without 
discrimination. The right to water, apart from being a social service, is also 
encapsulated under the rights to health and housing as discussed in chapter 2.211 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as 
―CERD‖), the treaty body mandated to monitor State compliance with the ICERD, has 
stated that article 5 ―implies the existence and recognition of civil and political, social 
and economic rights‖ and that ―full respect for human rights is the necessary 
framework for the efficiency of measures adopted to combat racial discrimination.‖212 
The ICERD further obliges States to ensure everyone within their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies against any acts of racial discrimination.213 
The CERD has not consistently used the ―respect, protect, promote and fulfil‖ 
typology in its general recommendations and concluding observations on State 
reports.214 Nevertheless, an examination of some general recommendations and 
concluding observations adopted by CERD shows that the typologies as used and 
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developed by the CESCR also underpin the views of CERD on State reports. This 
section seeks to show the framework of analysis deployed by CERD in its analysis of 
State obligations under the ICERD and the relevance of such a framework for the 
right to water. The section does not intend to be a comprehensive analysis of the 
ICERD nor the concluding observations and general recommendations adopted by 
the CERD as that is beyond the scope of this study. A review however will be carried 
out on all aspects that are relevant to non-discrimination in the realisation of the right 
to water.  
The CERD has elaborated the duty to respect in a similar fashion as used by 
the CESCR. In its General Recommendation 27, for instance, the CERD stressed 
States‘ duty to refrain from placing the Roma in camps outside populated areas that 
are isolated and without access to healthcare and other facilities such as clean 
water.215 The CERD underscored the State‘s duty to respect rights, although within 
the context of eviction. As discussed above, this duty is applicable with respect to the 
right of access to water. The CERD committee, concerned about eviction or threat of 
eviction reportedly faced by most vulnerable groups, underscored States‘ duty to 
devise measures to prevent evictions or mitigate their negative effects.216 Similarly, in 
its General Recommendation 27, the CERD committee enjoined States to proscribe 
any measures denying residence to and unlawful expulsion of the Roma.217  
In its Concluding Observations on Australia, the CERD emphasised the duty 
to respect, obliging the State to refrain from adopting measures that withdraw 
existing guarantees of indigenous rights. The State was further obliged to make 
every effort to seek the informed consent of indigenous peoples before adopting 
decisions relating to their right to land.218 Access to land has implications for access 
to water, particularly as it relates to indigenous populations. The duty to respect 
indigenous people‘s access to land is thus very important. 
In its General Recommendation 30,219 the CERD has emphasised the need 
for States to respect the right of non-citizens to an adequate standard of physical and 
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mental health. In this regard, the CERD requires States to refrain from denying or 
limiting such group‘s access to preventive, curative and palliative health services.220 
Access to safe water as such is an underlying determinant for the right to health as 
highlighted in chapter 2 where I discussed the legal basis of the right to water.221 
While article 1(1) of the ICERD defines racial discrimination in terms of discriminatory 
acts performed in the public sphere, article 2(1)(d) requires States parties to bring to 
an end racial discrimination by any persons or group. This reflects the State‘s duty to 
protect against violation of rights by non-State actors, in a similar sense as used by 
the CESCR. The State‘s duty to protect is extremely vital to the extent that private 
institutions influence the exercise of rights or the availability of opportunities such as 
access to water. States parties must ensure that the result has neither the purpose 
nor the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. The South African 
context, for instance, demonstrates the importance of eliminating racial discrimination 
in the provision of water services. Impoverished black communities such as the Phiri 
community discussed in chapter 3 still experience disproportionately worse access in 
the quantity and quality of water.222  
Some States have argued that the prohibition and punishment of purely 
private conduct lies beyond the scope of government regulation, even in situations 
where personal freedom is exercised in a discriminatory manner.223 In such cases, 
the CERD has reiterated the State‘s duty to protect, pointing out that the State should 
review its legislation so as to criminalise private conduct which is discriminatory on 
racial or ethnic grounds.224 In its General Recommendation 27, the CERD Committee 
has emphasised the State‘s duty to protect and respect the rights of the Roma, 
noting that States should develop educational and media campaigns to educate the 
public about the Roma, their culture, and the importance of respecting the human 
rights and the identity of the Roma.225  
The CERD has also elaborated on the State‘s duty to promote human rights. 
Although discussed within the context of racial discrimination, such pronouncements 
are equally applicable in respect of access to water. Article 2(2) of the ICERD 
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prescribes States to adopt special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate 
development of certain racial groups to guarantee them full and equal enjoyment of 
human rights.  In this respect the State is obliged to adopt measures to ensure that it 
facilitates vulnerable groups‘ access to water. In General Recommendation 27 on the 
welfare of the Roma people, the CERD enjoins States to take steps to ensure the 
employment of Roma in both public and private institutions.226 Furthermore, the 
CERD has suggested that States adopt and implement special measures in favour of 
Roma in public employment such as public contracting and other activities 
undertaken by the government, or training Roma in various skills or professions.227 
This recommendation from the CERD clearly reflects the duty imposed on States to 
promote the rights of the Roma people, though not expressly stated in a manner 
similar to that adopted by the CESCR. Nevertheless, it shows the CERD‘s implicit 
adoption of the State duty to promote as used by the CESCR in its analysis of State 
obligations imposed by the ICESCR. The CERD has also elaborated the duty of 
States to recognise and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop and 
use their communal lands and resources which would obviously encompass water 
sources.228  
In its Concluding Observations on Suriname, the CERD pointed out that the 
State is not only obliged to respect but should also promote rights. The CERD noted 
that the State appeared content with limiting itself ―to not hampering the exercise by 
the various ethnic groups and their members of their cultural rights.‖229 The CERD 
recommended that the State not only respect, but also promote the indigenous and 
people‘s cultures, languages and distinctive ways of life.230 Similarly, the CERD 
expressed similar views in its Concluding Observations on Nepal.231 It noted the 
segregationist practises against the Dalits due to the impunity associated with the 
hierarchical social system in that country.232 Such discrimination results in the denial 
of access to public spaces, places of worship and public sources of food and water 
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for the Dalits.233 The CERD thus urged the State to take measures to prevent, 
prohibit and eliminate private and public practices that constitute segregation of any 
kind and which results in the denial of Dalits access to basic services such as 
water.234 
In its Concluding Observations on Slovakia,235 the CERD noted the critical 
health situation of some Roma communities, which is largely a consequence of their 
poor living conditions and lack of basic amenities such as safe water.  The CERD 
obliged the State to take further measures to address the issues of drinking water 
supplies and sewage disposal systems in Roma settlements.236 The CERD took a 
similar position in the case of Lithuania. It urged the State to take measures to 
address the issues of drinking water supplies and sewage disposal systems in Roma 
settlements due to the critical health situation of some Roma communities, which is 
largely a consequence of their poor living conditions.237 The CERD has also 
emphasised the State‘s duty to provide necessary facilities, particularly in respect of 
marginalised groups, for a dignified existence. The CERD has enjoined States to 
take necessary measures ―as appropriate, for offering Roma nomadic groups or 
Travellers camping places for their caravans, with all necessary facilities.‖238 The 
CERD further underscored the State‘s need to provide Travellers with more parking 
areas equipped with the necessary facilities and infrastructure located in clean 
environments.239 Such facilities inevitably encompass social services such as access 
to safe water among others. This reflects the State‘s duty to facilitate, which is part of 
the State‘s duty to fulfill as explained by the CESCR in its general comments. 
In its Concluding Observations on Slovakia, the CERD specifically enjoined 
the State to take measures to address the issue of drinking water supplies in Roma 
settlements.240 States are further enjoined to provide indigenous peoples with 
conditions allowing for sustainable economic and social development compatible with 
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their cultural characteristics.241 This entails indigenous peoples‘ access to water 
through their traditional means. In its Concluding Observations on Israel,242 the 
CERD expressed its concern at the unequal distribution of water resources to the 
detriment of Palestinians. It thus called upon the State to ensure equal access to 
water resources to all without any discrimination.243  
The above analysis of the general recommendations and concluding 
observations shows that the CERD has not explicitly adopted the quartet of 
obligations, which is the ―respect, protect, promote and fulfil‖ framework in its 
analysis of State obligations imposed by the ICERD. What is clear, however, is that 
the typologies framework appears to be implicit in the analytic work of CERD. The 
CERD has used such phrases as the State‘s duty to ―provide indigenous peoples 
with conditions allowing for a sustainable economic and social development‖ which is 
similar to the duty to the ―facilitate‖ component of the obligation to fulfil. The CERD 
has underscored the State‘s duty to ―provide necessary facilities‖ which is also 
analogous to the obligation to fulfill as used in the quartet typology. The CERD has 
also elaborated on the State‘s duty to ―take measures to prohibit and eliminate 
private practices that constitute segregation.‖ The latter is similar to the duty to 
protect as used by the CESCR or CEDAW Committee. The following section 
discusses the regional systems for the protection of human rights jurisprudence of 
regional treaty bodies as it relates to the right to water and the use of typologies as 
an analytic framework to delineate State obligations.  
4 3 3 The European Social Charter 
The European Social Charter was first adopted in 1961.244 In 1996, the Revised 
European Social Charter (hereinafter referred to as the ―Revised Charter‖) was 
adopted after a review of many of the socio-economic rights in the 1961 instrument 
was undertaken.245 In acceding to the Revised Charter every State Party agreed to 
consider Part 1 of that instrument as a ―declaration of the aims which it will pursue by 
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all appropriate means.‖246 States undertake to attain the conditions in which the rights 
and principles enumerated in Part 1 may be effectively realised ―by all appropriate 
means, both national and international in character.‖247 De Schutter has pointed out 
that this undertaking is, in principle, considered not to be the source of legal 
obligations. He points out that the objectives enumerated in Part 1 may guide the 
interpretation of the rights listed in Part II of the Revised Charter.248 State parties 
under the Revised Charter are not obliged to accept all the rights it contains and this 
constitutes part of the unusual a la carte system in which a State may decide to 
accept to be bound by a limited number of provisions.249 It has been explained that 
the reason for such a system was primarily due to the considerable discrepancies in 
the levels of economic development and social progress among the different Member 
States of the Council of Europe at the time when the original Charter was adopted.250  
Notable rights protected under the European Charter include the rights to 
housing,251 health,252 social security,253 protection against poverty and social 
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exclusion,254 social welfare services,255 healthy working conditions,256 social and 
medical assistance,257 among others. Unlike the socio-economic rights contained in 
the ICESCR, the rights contained in the European Charter are not in their formulation 
expressly subject to progressive realisation.258 The European Charter shares 
similarities with other instruments containing socio-economic or civil and political 
rights in that a number of its rights are ―framed in vague and hortatory language.‖259  
The European Committee of Social Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
―ECSR‖) is a body of independent experts which monitors State compliance with the 
Revised Charter. It plays a significant role in both the collective complaints procedure 
and reporting procedures under the Revised Charter. The ECSR has generated 
considerable jurisprudence through its conclusions on individual State reports and its 
findings on collective complaints. The ECSR has not expressly deployed the 
typologies approach in assessing State compliance with the obligations imposed by 
the Revised Charter in its decisions on collective complaints or conclusions on State 
reports. It has generated significant jurisprudence under articles 31, 16 and 11 of the 
Revised Charter dealing with the rights to housing, the right of the family to social, 
legal and economic protection, and the right to protection of health respectively. This 
section will discuss some of the jurisprudence of the ECSR to demonstrate the 
framework of analysis deployed by the ECSR in its adjudication of State obligations 
under the Revised Charter. The selected cases are also significant in that the ECSR 
derived the right to water under articles 31, 16 and 11 even though the right to water 
is not expressly provided for under such provisions. 
Article 31 of the Revised Charter imposes three distinct duties on States, to 
promote adequate access to housing of an adequate standard, to prevent and 
reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination, and to make the price of 
housing accessible to those with limited resources.260 In its analysis of article 31, the 
ECSR has pointed out that adequate housing means a ―dwelling which is structurally 
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secure, safe from sanitary and health perspective.‖261 It further elaborated that a 
dwelling is considered safe from a sanitary and health point of view if it possesses all 
basic amenities, such as water, heating and waste disposal.262 The ECSR‘s has 
adopted the position that rights of access to certain utilities such as water are 
included in the obligation and, at the very least, should be provided by the State to 
those who cannot provide them. The ECSR has further imposed on States an 
obligation to protect against the interruption of essential services such as water.263 
This reflects an obligation to respect pre-existing access to rights as used by such 
treaty bodies as the CESCR, the African Commission and the CEDAW committee. 
The ECSR has further pointed out that States are obliged to provide homeless 
persons with adequate housing if they so request it, within a reasonable period of 
time.264 This obligation, according to the ECSR, is clearly progressive and entails 
both reactive and preventive measures.265 As the ECSR noted in its assessment of 
France, reducing homelessness requires the provision of measures such as shelter 
and to help such people overcome their difficulties and prevent a return to 
homelessness.266 Although expressed in the context of the right to housing, such 
views are also applicable with respect to the right to water. The ECSR, as shown in 
the above paragraph, has not hesitated to derive a right to water from the right to 
housing. This is in line with the approach of other treaty bodies such as the CESCR 
as illustrated in chapter 2.267 The following section discusses some of the 
jurisprudence of the ECSR to demonstrate how the latter has elaborated the 
obligations imposed on the State by the rights protected in the Revised Charter. 
4 3 3 1  European Federation of National Organisations v France  
In the case of European Federation of National Organisations working with the 
Homeless (FEANTSA) v France (hereinafter referred to as ―FEANTSA v France‖),268  
FEANTSA argued that France had violated article 31 of the Revised Charter by not 
ensuring an effective right to housing for its residents. In particular, FEANTSA argued 
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that the measures in place in France to reduce the number of homeless people were 
insufficient and that a significant number of households lived in poor housing 
conditions.269 FEANTSA further alleged that the system for allocating social housing 
discriminated against immigrants in their access to housing.270   
The State argued that it had not violated article 31 of the Revised Charter as it 
interpreted this provision as only requiring States to take measures and that the 
numerous laws, policies and plans on housing adopted by the authorities prove that 
France respects this provision.271 In other words, France argued that article 31 only 
imposed on States an obligation of conduct. This meant that so long as suitable 
measures were taken with a view to securing the right to adequate housing, the 
situation would be in conformity with the Revised Charter.272 
The ECSR pointed out that article 31 cannot be interpreted as imposing on 
States an obligation of result.273 Nevertheless, the ECSR noted that the rights 
recognised in the Revised Charter must take a practical and effective, rather than 
purely theoretical, form.274 The ECSR therefore ruled that for a State to be in 
compliance with the provision, it must: 
―a. adopt the necessary legal, financial and operational means of ensuring steady 
progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter; 
b. maintain meaningful statistics on needs, resources and results; 
c. undertake regular reviews of the impact of the strategies adopted; 
d. establish a timetable and not defer indefinitely the deadline for achieving the 
objectives of each stage; 
e. pay close attention to the impact of the policies adopted on each of the 
categories of persons concerned, particularly the most vulnerable.‖275 
The ECSR explained that implementation of the rights in the Revised Charter does 
not only require States merely to adopt legal measures. Rather, States must also 
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provide resources and introduce the operational procedures necessary to give full 
effect to the rights.276 The ECSR, citing its earlier decision in Autisme Europe v 
France, 277 pointed out that:  
―When one of the rights in question is exceptionally complex and particularly 
expensive to implement, States parties must take steps to achieve the objectives of 
the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and making 
maximum use of available resources.‖278  
The ECSR pointed out that article 31(1) guarantees adequate housing for everyone, 
which means a dwelling which ―is safe from a sanitary and health point of view‖ and 
such a dwelling ―must also possesses all basic amenities such as water.‖279 
4 3 3 2  European Roma Rights Centre v Italy  
In the case of European Roma Rights Centre v Italy,280 the European Roma Rights 
Centre (hereinafter referred to as ―the ERRC‖) alleged that the housing situation of 
Roma in Italy amounted to a violation of article 31 of the Revised Charter. In 
particular, the ERRC alleged that Roma were denied an effective right to housing 
because of the shortage of and inadequate living conditions in camping sites, the 
forced evictions Roma people are often subjected to, and the fact that Roma have no 
access to accommodation other than camping sites. In addition, the ERRC alleged 
that segregationist policies and practices in the field of housing constituted racial 
discrimination contrary to article 31 read alone or in conjunction with Article E.281 
The ECSR reiterated its position that guarantees of access to adequate 
housing means a dwelling which is structurally secure, safe from a sanitary and 
health point and possesses all basic amenities such as water.282 The ECSR further 
pointed out that the prohibition against discrimination imposes an obligation on the 
                                                     
276
 Para 57. 
277
 Autisme Europe v France, Complaint no 13/2002, decision on the merits of 4 November 2003, para 
53. 
278
 FEANTSA v France para 57. 
279
 Para 76. 
280
 European Roma Rights Centre v Italy, Complaint no 27/2004, decision on the merits of 29 June 
2004.  
281
 European Roma Rights Centre v Greece Complaint no 15/2003, decision of 8 December 2004 para 
5. Article E of the European Charter contains an equality clause requiring States to ensure that the 
rights they have accepted are secured without discrimination on any of the listed grounds. In its 
conclusions on France, the ECSR stated unequivocally that the equal treatment obligation under that 
provision must be assured to the different groups of ―vulnerable persons.‖ See European Committee 
on Social Rights Conclusions on France (2003) 221. 
282
 Para 35. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 220 
 
State to ensure that vulnerable groups such as Roma benefit in practice from the 
rights protected under the Revised Charter.283 The ECSR ruled that by persisting with 
the practice of placing Roma in camps the State had failed to take adequate steps to 
ensure that the  Roma have access to housing of a sufficient quantity and quality to 
meet their particular needs in violation of articles 31 read with article E of the Revised 
Charter.284  
4 3 3 3  European Roma Rights Centre v Greece  
The ECSR has adjudicated the claims predicated on article 16285 of the Revised 
Charter which provides for the right of the family to social, legal and economic 
protection. The jurisprudence of the ECSR shows that this provision has implications 
for the right of access to water as reflected in the case of European Roma Rights 
Centre v Greece.286  
The ERRC alleged that the Greek government had violated its obligations 
under article 16 of the Revised Charter. The ERRC alleged that the Roma are denied 
an effective right to housing in that legislation discriminates against the Roma in 
housing matters. It was further alleged that there is widespread discrimination against 
Roma and the latter are often the subject of forced evictions.287 The ECSR, citing its 
earlier decision in the case of International Commission of Jurists v Portugal 288 
stated that the implementation of the rights protected in the Revised Charter requires 
the State to take not merely legal action, but also practical action to give full effect to 
the protected rights.289 Significantly, the ECSR pointed out that article 16 entails the 
exercise of many other rights – civil and political as well as economic, social and 
cultural290 as these rights are of central importance to the family. The ECSR further 
noted that article 16 obliges the State to promote the provision of an adequate supply 
of housing for families and such dwellings must have basic amenities such as safe 
water.291 
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The ECSR has not explicitly adopted the typologies approach as used by 
other treaty bodies. Nevertheless, the ECSR has stressed the need to look beyond 
the letter of the law to see how effectively it operates in practice. The ECSR stated in 
International Commission of Jurists v Portugal that ―the aim and purpose of the 
Charter, being a human rights protection instrument, is to protect rights not merely 
theoretically, but also in fact.‖292 It is pertinent to note that in the FEANTSA v France 
case discussed above, despite the wide array of legislative measures on housing that 
France had adopted, the ECSR‘s approach was to emphasise that a State may still 
be held to be in breach of its treaty obligations under the ECSR where such 
legislative undertakings have not been operationalised.  
This decision reflects the ECSR‘s interpretive approach. In its determination of 
State compliance with the rights in the Revised Charter, ―the objective of full 
implementation of rights is the ultimate assessment grid for public policies.‖293 The 
ECSR‘s approach is that it is not enough for the State simply to describe the efforts 
made to realise rights, without an evaluation of the outcomes of such policies. This 
approach is further reflected in the ECSR‘s approach in European Roma Rights 
Centre v Italy which insisted on legal remedies and legal aid to challenge forced 
evictions as an aspect of the right to housing. This may also be seen as an element 
of the obligation on the State to guarantee rights effectively. 
In respect of those positive obligations involving significant resources 
expenditure by the State, it should be noted that no allowance for resource 
constraints is made in the text of the Revised Charter. This is different from the text 
of the ICESCR which expressly provides for a defence predicated on lack of 
resources in the event of a State‘s inability to fulfill its obligations under the ICESCR. 
The issue of resources was raised by the ECSR in European Roma Rights Centre v 
Greece discussed above. The ECSR noted that the obligations imposed by the 
ECSR require States to take measures to realise the aims of the Revised Charter 
―within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an extent consistent with 
the maximum use of available resources.‖294 The phrases ―within a reasonable time‖ 
and ―measurable progress‖ parts of this formula are substantially similar to the 
obligations imposed on States under article 2 (1) of the ICESCR which enjoins States 
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to progressively realise the rights entrenched in that instrument. The ECSR appears 
to have adopted an implicit reasonableness review test. 
4 3 4 Inter-American System 
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights consists of a number of 
instruments. The significant ones include the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man (hereafter referred to as ―the American Declaration‖)295 and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as ―the American 
Convention‖),296 the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights on the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty,297 the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture,298 the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons,299 the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women,300 and the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereafter referred to as ―the Protocol of San Salvador.‖)301  
The American Declaration provides a full spectrum of socio-economic rights 
as well as civil and political rights. The socio-economic rights include the right to 
protection for maternity and childhood,302 the right to health,303 the right to 
education,304 the right to culture,305 and the right to employment and fair 
remuneration.306 Other rights protected include the right to housing,307 the right to 
property,308 the right to special protection for mothers, children and the family,309 and 
the right to social security.310 The American Convention also includes an extensive 
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catalogue of economic, social and cultural rights. These include the rights to 
adequate food, housing, health, social security, education, unionisation, employment, 
just labour conditions and to social security.311 The American Convention further 
protects the rights to life and personal integrity.312 These latter provisions are 
important, particularly with regard to the protection of economic and social rights 
including the right to water. The Inter-American Court of Human and People‘s Rights 
(hereafter ―the Inter American Court‖), as will be shown below, has addressed 
essential aspects of the right to water, health, education, food, recreation, sanitation 
and adequate housing all of which are important for a dignified life under the rights to 
life and personal integrity.313 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
the ―Inter-American Commission‖)314 and the Inter-American Court315 have generated 
extensive jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. Of particular significance is the 
willingness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court to develop 
standards relating to the duties of the State to protect and ensure the realisation of 
various rights, including the right to water. It is, however, noteworthy that unlike the 
African Commission, both the Inter-American Commission and court have not 
explicitly used the typologies framework as an analytical tool in their interpretation of 
State obligations imposed by the various human rights instruments under the Inter-
American system. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the typology is implicit in those 
institutions‘ interpretation of the obligations imposed on States by human rights 
instruments under that regional system. 
The protocol of San Salvador incorporates a catalogue of detailed and well-
defined socio-economic rights. These include the rights to health and a healthy 
environment, food, education, work,  just and equitable conditions of work, social 
security, benefits of culture,  and special protection of the family, children, the elderly 
and persons with disabilities.316 The Protocol of San Salvador entitles everyone to 
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―the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public 
services.‖317 This provision has been interpreted to encompass a right of access to 
water.318 The right of access to water is a vital component of a healthy environment. 
Lack of access to safe water, as discussed above, is one of the major causes of ill 
health and mortality. The right to a healthy environment necessarily incorporates the 
right to access safe water. 
The Inter-American Commission has been consistent in applying the same 
legal obligations to all human rights obligations protected in the regional instruments 
despite their characterisation as civil, cultural, economic, political or social.319 The 
Inter-American Commission has, for the purposes of assessing States‘ compliance 
with their obligations, applied the general duties to ―respect‖ and to ―ensure‖ through 
the adoption of appropriate, necessary or reasonable measures, and the free and full 
exercise of guaranteed rights to all individuals within a State‘s jurisdiction.320 The 
following section discusses some of the decisions of the Inter-American Commission 
and the Inter-American Court in order to analyse the interpretive framework used in 
determining States‘ compliance with their obligations, with particular reference to 
water rights. 
Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention provide for ―general obligations‖ 
that apply to all the rights protected in the treaty. These encompass the interrelated 
duties to respect all recognised rights and freedoms and to ensure their free and full 
exercise by all persons subject to the ratifying State‘s jurisdiction without 
discrimination.321 Article 2(2) of the American Convention buttresses the article 1(1) 
―duty to ensure‖ by noting that while formal guarantees of rights and freedoms are 
necessary, on their own they are not sufficient. Rather, State parties must ensure 
that protected rights and freedoms truly have domestic legal effect. 
The Inter-American Court has pointed out that articles 1(1) and (2) impose 
duties on States parties to adopt all necessary and appropriate measures, of a 
legislative, administrative, judicial or other character.322 Most recently, the Inter-
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American Court has expanded its understanding of the duty to ensure to include a 
duty to provide (or fulfil), also assessed on the basis of reasonableness in the 
circumstances. This duty arises where individuals cannot meet their own needs 
necessary for the enjoyment of their rights without affirmative State assistance. This 
includes such instances where persons are deprived of liberty in State-controlled 
custodial contexts, such as prisons and similar detention facilities.323 Notably, it also 
arises in situations of vulnerability that impede individuals from meeting, on their own, 
the basic needs necessary for the full and free exercise of their rights such as the 
right of access to water. The Inter-American Court has, in this sense, affirmed that 
―special conduct-based obligations‖ derive from the general duties in article 1(1) of 
the American Convention. Such obligations will be predicated on a particular right-
holder‘s needs of protection to respond to situations of particular stress or 
vulnerability.324 
The Inter-American Court has also emphasised the State‘s liability where a 
public authority fails to adopt appropriate measures to respond to the abusive 
conduct of a private party. In the Pueblo Bello case, the Inter-American Court pointed 
out that article 1(1) of the American Convention was essential in determining whether 
a violation of a human right recognised by that treaty can be imputed to a State 
Party.325 What is noteworthy under the Inter-American system for the protection of 
human rights is that distinctions between ―negative‖ and ―positive‖ duties are not the 
main criterion in deciding cases as the Inter-American Court has treated the two as 
inseparable. The result is that States are regularly found in simultaneous and 
coordinated breach of their international legal obligations to ―respect‖ and ―ensure.‖326 
A scenario like that, all too common in Latin America, may occur, for example, where 
a State grants a concession to a private company to exploit natural resources on 
lands ancestrally inhabited by indigenous communities (breach of the negative 
obligation to respect rights), without taking appropriate ―preventive‖ measures to 
delimit, demarcate and title the land in question (a breach of the positive duty to 
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protect rights).327 Some of the following cases reflect that approach of the Inter-
American Court. 
 
4 3 4 1 Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize  
In the Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize,328 Belize granted 
logging and oil concessions to a foreign oil extraction company on lands traditionally 
used and occupied by the Maya indigenous community. This was done without their 
consent and without any process of prior consultation. The Inter-American 
Commission found Belize internationally responsible for violating the rights of the 
Maya to property and to equality under articles XXIII and II of the American 
Declaration. The Inter-American Commission pointed out that the State was liable for 
failure: 
―To take effective measures to delimit, demarcate and officially recognise their 
communal property right to the lands that they have traditionally occupied and used, 
and by granting logging and oil concessions to third parties to utilise the property and 
resources that could fall within the lands which must be delimited, demarcated and 
titled without consultations with and informed consent of the Maya people.‖ 329 
Based on these findings, the Inter-American Commission recommended that 
the State recognise the Maya peoples‘ communal property right to the lands they 
have traditionally occupied. It further enjoined Belize to delimit, demarcate and title 
the territory in which their communal property right exists in accordance with the 
customary land use practices of the Maya people. The Inter-American Commission 
further recommended that the State and its agents must not interfere with the Maya 
territory until it is properly delimited, demarcated and titled.330 
 4 3 4 2 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay 
The case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay331 involved members of a 
displaced indigenous community living in extreme poverty and deprived of food, 
water and housing. The Yakye Axa community, a Paraguayan indigenous 
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community, filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission alleging that 
Paraguay had failed to acknowledge its right to property over ancestral land. Given 
the failure by Paraguay to comply with the recommendations of the Inter-American 
Commission, the later referred the matter to the Inter-American Court. Despite the 
inhuman conditions in which the community lived, and their settlement‘s proximity to 
their traditional water and food sources, a local domestic court had forbade the 
community re-entry into its ancestral land.  The community was unable to access 
traditional sources of potable water, cooking wood, building materials and food. The 
community‘s situation of extreme impoverishment was so grave that the State was 
compelled to declare a state of emergency.  
The Inter-American Court held that the State had violated the right to life of the 
members of the Yakye Axa community under article 4 of the American Convention. 
This was predicated on the State‘s failure to take appropriate and necessary positive 
measures to alleviate the horrendous conditions that limited the community 
members‘ possibility of having a dignified life.332  
The responsibility of the State emanated from two grounds. The local court 
order prohibiting the community members from entering their ancestral territory to 
access, on their own, clean water, food and traditional medicines was a breach of a 
negative obligation to respect the right to clean water, food and health. Additionally, 
the failure by the State to take positive responsive measures to address the urgent 
plight of the displaced community constituted violation of a positive duty to provide 
and facilitate access to water, health and food.333 The Inter-American Court 
emphasised the close link between access by indigenous peoples to their ancestral 
territory and enjoyment of their rights to health, food, clean water, education, and to 
cultural identity. The court considered all such rights necessary to ensure the 
community‘s ―right to a dignified existence.‖334 The Inter-American Court further 
pointed out that the State has a duty to generate the minimum conditions of life 
compatible with human dignity, and that this requires the adoption of positive, 
concrete measures oriented to the satisfaction of the right to a dignified life.335  
The Inter-American system has not explicitly adopted the typologies approach 
of respect, protect, promote and fulfill in its analysis of State obligations imposed by 
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human rights instruments under that system. The Inter-American Commission and 
Court have applied the general duties to ―respect‖ and to ―ensure‖ through the 
adoption of appropriate, necessary or reasonable measures aimed at guaranteeing 
the free and full exercise of rights to all individuals within a State‘s jurisdiction. What 
is noteworthy is that the typologies as discussed in the opening section of this 
chapter, although not explicitly articulated, are nevertheless implicit in the approach 
of the Inter-American Commission and Court.  For instance, in the Maya Indigenous 
Community of the Toledo District v Belize case, the Inter-American Commission 
enjoins the State to recognise the Maya peoples‘ communal property right to the 
lands they have traditionally occupied. It further enjoined Belize to delimit, demarcate 
and title the territory in which their communal property right exists in accordance with 
the customary land use practices of the Maya people. Furthermore, the Inter-
American Commission recommended that the State and its agents must not interfere 
with the Maya territory until it is properly delimited, demarcated and titled.336 In the 
Pueblo Bello case, the Inter-American Court emphasised the State‘s duty to 
―reasonably prevent‖ and ―appropriately respond‖ to human rights violations, through 
the adoption of necessary measures to prevent harms caused by third parties.337 
This clearly shows that the protect and fulfill duties were in the background of the 
Inter-American Commission and Court‘s determination of these cases. 
4 3 5 Jurisprudence of the African Commission 
4 3 5 1 Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire 
The African Commission has, on several occasions, been presented with an 
opportunity to rule on disputes that have implications for the implementation of a 
human right to water. As discussed in chapter 2, the African Commission has inferred 
the right to water from other related rights in the African Charter.338 In Free Legal 
Assistance Group v Zaire339 the African Commission emphasised the State‘s duty to 
fulfill the right to water. In that case, the complainants brought a claim against the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (then known as Zaire) alleging gross mismanagement 
of public funds by the State and violations of a host of other civil and political rights. 
These included torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, extra-judicial killings and 
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severe restrictions on freedoms of association and assembly.340 The complainants 
alleged that the abuse of public funds resulted in horrendous and degrading 
conditions reflected in shortages of medicine, education and basic services such as 
clean drinking water. The State was held to have failed to provide these services 
thereby impairing its people from accessing basic services.341 The African 
Commission held that the failure of the State to provide basic services such as safe 
drinking water constituted a violation of article 16 of the African Charter which 
provides for the right to health.342 
This case is significant in that the African Commission reiterated the State‘s 
obligation to fulfill socio-economic rights, including the right to safe and clean water. 
The African Commission made this determination on the backdrop of a factual finding 
that the State was abusing public resources. Its failure to provide clean water to its 
population was therefore not predicated on a lack of resources. 
4 3 5 2 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v 
Nigeria 
The African Commission has also delineated the State‘s protective duty with regard 
to the right to water in the SERAC case. The communication alleged that a 
consortium comprising the State-owned Nigerian Petroleum Company and a private 
entity, the Shell Petroleum Development Company had committed a range of human 
rights violations.343 It was alleged that the consortium had exploited oil resources in 
Ogoniland, Nigeria, without due regard for the health or environment of the local 
communities.344 This resulted in water, soil and air pollution causing serious health 
problems for local communities. The African Commission found Nigeria to have 
violated a range of civil, economic, social and political rights.345 These included the 
right not to be discriminated against, the rights to life, property, health, family 
protection, satisfactory environment and the right of peoples to freely dispose of their 
wealth.346  
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The African Commission emphasised both the duty of the State to respect the 
right to water by desisting from interference as well as the State‘s protective duty in 
the context of violations of this right by third parties.347 It decided that contamination 
of drinking water sources by the consortium amounted to a violation of article 16 of 
the African Charter which provides for the right to health and article 24 which protects 
the right to a satisfactory environment. The significance of the African Commission‘s 
finding is that it derived the rights to food and housing from a range of other rights in 
the African Charter thus explicitly endorsing the interelatedness of all human rights 
discussed in chapter 2.348  The derivation of the right to water from related rights 
such as health, food and a healthy environment illustrates an approach predicated on 
the interdependence of human rights explored in chapter 2. The approach of the 
African Commission reinforces the indivisibility and inter-dependant nature of all 
human rights.349 
 
 
 
4 3 5 3 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Another v Kenya  
In the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Another v Kenya 
(hereinafter referred to as ―Endorois‖),350 the communication alleged that the 
government of Kenya had violated various provisions of the African Charter in 
respect of an indigenous community, the Endorois people. This involved forcibly 
removing the Endorois from their ancestral land, failure to adequately compensate 
them for the loss of their property, the disruption of the community's pastoral 
enterprise, and violations of the right to practise their religion and culture as well as 
the overall process of development of the Endorois people.351 It was further alleged 
that the Endorois community had been unable to access the vital resources in the 
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Lake Bogoria region since its eviction from the game reserve,352 including the ability 
to use the salt licks, water, and soil of Lake Bogoria.353  
The complainants further alleged that the State had granted concessions for 
ruby mining on Endorois traditional land to a private company in 2002. This resulted 
in the poisoning of the only remaining water source used by the Endorois community, 
both for their own personal consumption and for use by their livestock.354 The 
complainants argued that the forced evictions and accompanying human rights 
violations constituted violations by the State of the rights to adequate food and the 
right to water implicitly guaranteed under articles 4, 16 and 22355 of the African 
Charter as informed by standards and principles of international human rights law.356 
The African Commission ruled that the State had violated its duty to respect 
the right to water implicitly guaranteed in the African Charter. The African 
Commission ruled that access to clean drinking water was severely undermined as a 
result of the eviction of the Endorois from their ancestral lands around Lake Bogoria 
which had ample fresh water.357 In this case, the State had violated its obligation to 
respect the right to water of the Endorois community by dispossessing the 
community of its land around Lake Bogoria from which the community obtained its 
fresh water supply. Additionally, the State had, through its economic policy, failed to 
respect the right to water by entering into an agreement with a private company to 
exploit ruby resources from the Endorois community‘s land, thereby polluting the 
community‘s water supply.358 Furthermore, the State failed to protect the Endorois 
people from the pollution of its water supply through the ruby mining activities of a 
non-State actor thereby violating the right to water.  
 This case clearly shows the importance of the respect, protect, promote and 
fulfill approach as an analytic tool to determine a State‘s compliance with its 
obligations imposed by the right to water. In this case, the State‘s duties to respect, 
protect and promote the Endorois‘s access to water were implicated. The approach 
of the African Commission in the Endorois case demonstrates its interpretive 
approach in emphasising the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. 
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The African Commission found that a violation of the State‘s obligations to respect 
and protect the right to water despite the absence of an explicit provision 
guaranteeing the right to water under the African Charter. Such an interpretive 
approach allows for an integrated approach to the adjudication of human rights in 
which attention is paid to the relationships amongst all human rights.359  
4 3 5 4 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Another v Sudan 
The Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v 
Sudan360 case involved complainants of alleged gross, massive and systematic 
violations of human rights by the government of Sudan against the indigenous Black 
African tribes in the Darfur region, in particular members of the Fur, Marsalit and 
Zaghawa tribes.361 The complainants alleged that the State‘s military campaign 
against suspected rebels had targeted the civilian population resulting in villages, 
markets and water wells being raided and bombed.362 The complainants further 
alleged that the State had perpetrated indiscriminate killings, torture, poisoning of 
wells, rape, forced evictions and displacement and destruction of property in violation 
of articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter.363 The complainants invited the African 
Commission to develop further its reasoning in the SERAC case by holding that the 
right to water was guaranteed under articles 4, 16 and 22 of the African Charter. 
They further argued that the State had violated the right to water by being complicit in 
the destruction and poisoning of water wells and denying civilians access to water 
sources in the Darfur region.364  
The African Commission ruled that Sudan, in complicity with the Janjawid 
militia, had violated the various rights delineated above, including the right to water, 
by actively participating in the violation of the rights such as the destruction and 
poisoning of water wells. The State was also found to have neglected its protective 
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mandate by failing to protect against the violation of the right to water and various 
other rights by the Janjawid militia in violation of article 16 of the African Charter.365 
The African Commission again reiterated the State‘s duty to respect the right 
to water that is non-interference with existing access to water sources. The 
destruction and poisoning of water sources was therefore a breach of the obligation 
to respect the right to water. The State also failed to protect the Darfur communities 
from destruction and poisoning of its water sources by a private entity, the Janjawid 
militia. The State therefore violated its obligations to respect and protect realisation of 
the right to water. It can also be argued that the State also violated its obligation to 
fulfill the right to water in light of its failure to supply the Darfur community with 
potable water after its own forces and a para-military entity had destroyed and 
poisoned water sources of people within its jurisdiction. 
 
 4 3 6 Conclusion 
The preceding section discussed one of the major developments in international 
human rights theory and practice from the early 1980s, the development of 
typologies to elaborate the nature of obligations imposed by human rights 
instruments. It was demonstrated that all human rights, including the right to water, 
impose a spectrum of duties and that the particular duty applicable in any situation 
depends on a contextual evaluation of the case at hand. Invariably, distinguishing 
between the various rights is not very helpful as an analytic model. The above 
discussion clearly showed that using the typologies of State obligations as an 
analytical tool has helped to dispel the notion of any fundamental differences 
between the various human rights. This represents a further step in debunking the 
negative/positive rights dichotomy as an over-simplification.366 Rather, the distinction 
should be between different levels of duties applicable in a particular case.  
The section further analysed and discussed the various typologies of duties 
imposed on States by the right to water as elaborated by the UN independent experts 
and special rapporteurs, academic commentators and the CESCR in its General 
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Comment 15. It was demonstrated that the right to water imposes a quartet level of 
obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the right 
to water. The section also analysed the approach of the CEDAW committee, the 
CERD and regional systems for the protection of human rights under the Inter-
American system and the European system, with a particular focus on the right to 
water. Some treaty bodies such as the CERD have not consistently used the 
―respect, protect, promote and fulfil‖ typology in their general recommendations and 
concluding observations on State reports. Nevertheless, an examination of some 
general recommendations and concluding observations adopted by the CERD 
committee shows that the typologies as used and developed by the CESCR also 
underpin the CERD committee‘s views on State reports.  
The ECSR has not expressly deployed the typologies approach in assessing 
State compliance with the obligations imposed by the Revised Charter in its 
decisions on collective complaints or conclusions on State reports. Nevertheless, the 
ECSR has generated significant jurisprudence under articles 31, 16 and 11 of the 
Revised Charter dealing with the rights to housing, the right of the family to social, 
legal and economic protection, and the right to protection of health respectively. 
However, the ECSR has read in the right to water under articles 31, 16 and 11 even 
though the right to water is not expressly provided for under such provisions. It was 
also shown that, although both the Inter-American Commission and Court have not 
explicitly used the typologies framework as an analytical tool in their interpretation of 
State obligations imposed by the various human rights instruments under the Inter-
American system, it can be argued that the typology is implicit in those institutions‘ 
interpretation of the obligations imposed on States by human rights instruments 
under that regional system. This clearly shows that the typologies were in the 
background in the Inter-American Commission and court‘s determination of the cases 
discussed above. 
The preceding section demonstrated that an analysis of State obligations 
imposed by the human right to water based on the above typology as an analytic 
model provides a better understanding of the scope and content of the right to water 
and helps to safeguard the right, whether water is provided by the State or a private 
operator. The following section will discuss the concept of the minimum core 
obligations as it relates to the right to water. It will also discuss and analyse those 
obligations the ICESCR has deemed to be of an immediate nature, the obligations to 
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take steps, and the obligation to guarantee realisation of the right to water without 
discrimination. This will be followed by an exploration of the concept of progressive 
realisation of the right to water as contained in the ICESCR and elaborated by the 
CESCR, academic literature and, where relevant, case law in respect of the right to 
water. This section will conclude with a discussion of two key but contentious 
concepts in socio-economic rights in general and the right to water in particular, the 
concepts of ―retrogressive measures‖ and ―availability of resources‖. This will be 
followed by the interim conclusion. 
 
4 4 Specific aspects of the States’ obligations 
4 4 1 The minimum core obligation 
The concept of minimum core was set out by the CESCR in its General Comment 3 
when it stated that: 
―[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party...[A] State 
party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, 
of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic 
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d‘être. By the same 
token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its 
minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying 
within the country concerned...In order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.‖367 
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The CESCR explains two components of a right‘s minimum core, first by 
distinguishing the immediate effect of the right from its full scope. The minimum core 
of the right is located at one end of a continuum and the individual is entitled to this 
basic core for the satisfaction of the essential levels of the right. The non-realisation 
of the basic core could only be justified by resource constraints but there would be a 
heavy burden of justification on the State to show that it has prioritised its resources 
to ensure its fulfilment.368 Over and above the minimum core entitlements, the State 
is obliged to adopt legislative measures to achieve progressively the full spectrum of 
the socio-economic rights guaranteed in the ICESCR.369 It further defines the nature 
of those steps that must be taken in the fulfilment of the right‘s immediate effect.370  
The idea of ―core content‖ for socio-economic rights was first formulated 
outside of the UN system, but has since gained widespread support from human 
rights practitioners and academics, culminating in its adoption by the CESCR.371 
Young has pointed out that this concept may have its origins in German Basic Law, 
where a right‘s basic content is protected from legal limitation.372 The idea of a 
minimum core obligation suggests that there are degrees of fulfilment of a right and 
that a certain minimum level of fulfilment takes priority over a more extensive 
realisation of the right.373 Bilchitz conceives of minimum core as the very basic 
interest people have in survival and the socio-economic goods required to survive.374 
Bilchitz further points out that: 
 
―The recognition of a minimum core of social and economic rights that must be 
realised without delay attempts to take account of the fact that certain interests are of 
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greater relative importance and require a higher degree of protection than other 
interests.‖375   
 
Protagonists of the minimum core concept whose positions are most 
developed in relation to the socio-economic rights provisions of the South African 
Constitution have argued for the concept‘s immediate enforceability as a benchmark 
against which government programmes can be assessed.376 Within the South African 
context, David Bilchitz has persuasively argued for the adoption of the minimum core 
concept.377 Bilchitz has argued that an analysis of obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights on the State should entail a minimum core obligation to realise, 
without delay, the most urgent survival interests.378 Bilchitz‘s position is that the 
recognition that the State has a minimum core obligation to realise essential levels of 
each right represents a viable and principled method of approaching the justiciability 
of socio-economic rights.379 Therefore, each substantive right imposes upon a State 
a variety of core obligations that the State is obliged to satisfy. These core obligations 
correspond to the satisfaction of the essential level without which a State is in 
violation of its obligations under the ICESCR.380 Each right must therefore give rise to 
an absolute minimum entitlement in the absence of which a State is to be considered 
in violation of its obligations.381  
                                                     
375
 Bilchitz 2003 South African Journal on Human Rights 11. McGraw also points out that ―[t]he 
minimum core concept ―essentially...posits that there are degrees of rights fulfilment, and that one of 
these degrees is a definable, basic threshold—or for our purposes, a minimum legal content— for 
socio-economic rights.‖ See McGraw 2011 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 131. 
376
 See for example S Liebenberg ―South Africa‘s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: 
An Effective Tool in Challenging Poverty?‖ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159-161; P de 
Vos ―The Essential Components of the Human Right to Adequate Housing—A South African 
Perspective‖ in D Brand & S Russel (eds) Exploring the Core Content of Economic and Social Rights: 
South African and International Perspectives (2002) 23 23-24. For a discussion of the minimum core 
concept see also Bilchitz 2003 South African Journal on Human Rights 1-26. 
377
 In Treatment Action Campaign, Grootboom and Mazibuko cases the South African Constitutional 
Court has rejected the minimum core concept in assessing the State‘s compliance with the positive 
obligations imposed by the economic, social and cultural rights in sections 26 & 27 of the Constitution. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the minimum core debate in South Africa‘s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence, see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 148-151 & 163-173.  
378
 Bilchitz 2003 South African Journal on Human Rights 2. For further discussion on the minimum 
core concept see also D Bilchitz ―Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its 
Importance‖ (2002) 118 South African Law Journal 484-501. 
379
 Bilchitz 2003 South African Journal on Human Rights 11. 
380
 Sepulveda Obligations 366. 
381
 Alston 1987 Human Rights Quarterly 352-353. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 238 
 
The failure to comply with the minimum essential level is a prima facie 
violation of the ICESCR and the burden of proof falls on the State to justify such 
situations.382 Bilchitz then links it with progressive realisation, noting that  
 
―the notion of progressive realisation links these two interests: it recognises that what 
the government is required to do is to provide core services to everyone without delay 
that meet their survival needs and then qualitatively to increase these services so as 
ultimately to meet the maximal interests that the State is required to protect.‖383  
 
In the Grootboom,384 Treatment Action Campaign385 and Mazibuko386 cases, 
the South African Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as ―the Court‖) declined 
to adopt the concept of the minimum core as model of review in assessing State 
compliance with the positive obligations imposed by sections 26 and 27 of the South 
African Constitution. In Grootboom, for instance, the Court pointed out that the 
determination of a minimum core in the context of the right to have access to 
adequate housing presents difficulties because there are people who need land, 
others need both land and houses yet others need financial assistance.387 The Court 
further declined to adopt the minimum core obligation concept on the basis of its lack 
of adequate information in order to determine the content of the minimum core 
obligations.388 This, according to the Court, should be contrasted with the CECSR 
which developed the content of the minimum core obligations on the basis of its 
extensive experience reviewing State reports under the ICESCR.389 
The Court pointed out that the formulations of sections 26 and 27 of the South 
African Constitution did not provide for an unqualified obligation to the State to 
provide access to the rights enshrined in those provisions immediately and on 
demand.390 Rather, the Court developed a model of reasonableness review for 
assessing State compliance with the positive duties imposed by socio-economic 
rights. The Court further pointed to the unrealistic demands imposed by the minimum 
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core obligations on the State. The Court cited the impossibility to give everyone 
access even to a core service immediately.391  
A number of scholars have also contested a model of review based on the 
concept of minimum core as better suited to the judicial review of positive socio-
economic rights claims.392 Kende has argued that the concept of minimum core 
obligations creates the danger that courts will transgress the boundaries of their 
institutional legitimacy and competency.393 Through defining and enforcing minimum 
core obligations, courts may be tempted to usurp government‘s law-making 
functions.394  
The minimum core concept has also been criticised due to its linkage to 
survival needs.395 Liebenberg has argued that threats to life can be relatively short, 
medium or long term. The survival standard therefore does not provide clarity as to 
socio-economic interventions to enjoy prioritised consideration in policy-making and 
adjudication.396 Liebenberg for instance points out that health education measures 
concerning the danger of smoking or the need for safe sex may not save lives in the 
short term, but may have a significant impact on long term mortality rates.397 
Liebenberg further argues that in its bid to establish clear and judicially manageable 
standards for the adjudication of socio-economic claims, there is a risk that the 
minimum core approach may encourage minimalism in social provisioning. This 
might prove to be problematic when the context may in fact ―render such minimalism 
unnecessary and inappropriate.‖398 Liebenberg has further criticised the minimum 
core on what she alleges to be its dependence on a two-tiered approach to the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights claims. This approach requires distinguishing 
between core needs and non-core needs. Liebenberg points out that socio-economic 
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needs are interconnected and there is no clear-cut distinction between core and non-
core needs.399 Wesson has also argued against the two-tier approach to the 
adjudication of positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights. This is because the 
strong prioritisation of core needs is likely to be counter-productive to the goals of 
longer-term development programmes.400 Wesson argues that the effect of this 
adjudicative approach will be to encourage the diversion of State resources from 
longer term, and often more efficient investments to temporary, emergency-type 
measures.401   
What is noteworthy is that opponents of the minimum core do not necessarily 
advocate for the rejection of the minimum core concept in its entirety. This is because 
the concept can play an important role in the evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
State‘s measures in realising socio-economic rights.402 It can also help in ensuring 
that the urgent material needs of disadvantaged groups receive immediate 
attention.403 The minimum core should not be exclusively grounded in the survival-
based standard. Rather, it should accommodate other cardinal values such as 
participatory democracy, equality, freedom and human dignity.404  
Liebenberg has pointed out that reasonableness has synergies with the 
approach of the CESCR to the interpretation of the obligations imposed upon States 
by article 2 of the ICESCR.405 The CESCR has held that States parties to the 
ICESCR are under an obligation to take steps that are deliberate, concrete and 
targeted as clearly as possible towards fulfiling their obligations under the treaty.406 
Liebenberg has further pointed out that reasonableness review further approximates 
the description of obligations of conduct imposed by socio-economic rights 
elaborated by the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.407 According to the Maastricht Guidelines, an obligation of conduct 
requires action reasonably calculated to realise enjoyment of a right.408 It is 
noteworthy that the standard of reasonableness review has also been explicitly 
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incorporated in the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.409 This dissertation will not 
explore further the highly complex scholarly debate on the merits of adopting either 
the reasonableness or minimum core model of review as analysis of such a 
protracted issue is beyond the scope of this chapter. The minimum core concept and 
reasonableness review are not necessarily either/or concepts and that, as the Court 
itself acknowledged, the minimum core concept can be incorporated within the 
reasonableness model of review. The analysis in this dissertation will follow the 
methodology set out in General Comment No 3 regarding the minimum core concept 
and progressive realisation whilst acknowledging that the reasonableness model of 
review can incorporate a minimum core concept.410 
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 As a model of review, the minimum core will help in defining the content of the 
rights, such as the right to water and providing a principled basis for the evaluation of 
State measures in the implementation of such a right. On the other hand, the 
reasonableness test provides a model for analysing and evaluating the nature of the 
State‘s obligations.411 Such an approach is reflected by the Court in the Grootboom 
and Treatment Action Campaign cases in which it did not completely reject the 
minimum core model of review. Pointedly, the Court indicated that it might take the 
minimum core in its assessment of the reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
the State.412 The combined model is a suitable one in that it combines both rights 
analysis and the evaluation of measures adopted by the State to realise socio-
economic rights such as the right to water. Such an approach will also help in 
dissolving the false dichotomy between minimum core and reasonableness 
approaches, and possibly contribute towards a more creative development of the 
reasonableness review standard envisaged under article 8(4) of the OP to the 
ICESCR. 
4 4 2 Minimum core State obligations imposed by the right to water 
The CESCR has defined the minimum core of the rights to housing, food, education, 
health care and water and the obligations they impose.413 McGraw has pointed out 
that the approach of the CESCR in each of these General Comments has been to 
place emphasis ―on core State obligations more than the right‘s core elements.‖414 
Such an approach has been criticised, particularly with regard to the right to water, 
given that this right is not expressly provided for in the ICESCR.415 Core elements of 
a right should carry directly correlative core obligations.416 The significance is that the 
relationship between the core content of a right and the core obligations could then 
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be clarified. Cahill notes that such an exercise could be used as an indicator as to 
whether there are any gaps in the guidelines provided by General Comment 15.417 It 
is pertinent to note that human rights instruments do not differentiate between rights 
and obligations hence the ―core elements of a right should carry directly correlative 
obligations.‖418   
States have a general obligation to progressively realise the right to water.419 
States, however, have immediate obligations in relation to the right to water that are 
not subject to progressive realisation. These include the guarantee that the right will 
be exercised without discrimination and the obligation to take steps towards full 
realisation of the right.420 These steps must be deliberate, concrete and targeted 
towards full realisation.421 States must not take retrogressive measures in relation to 
the right to water.422 General Comment 15 identifies a number of core obligations that 
States are enjoined to satisfy immediately. Core obligations are considered to be 
important in the sense that non-compliance with these obligations can have severe 
repercussions for disadvantaged and marginalised communities.423 
The core content of the right to water is thus an entitlement to support basic 
water needs. According to Kiefer and Brolmann, the core obligation engendered by 
the right to water, at the minimum, entitles everyone to essential quantities of safe 
freshwater for personal and domestic uses in order to prevent dehydration and 
disease.424 The CESCR thus appears to be adopting a survival-based approach in 
the deployment of the minimum core approach. The CESCR can refine its approach 
by adopting a minimum core approach that places human dignity at the forefront, for 
example, one‘s ability to wash oneself and one‘s clothes.425 It therefore places a 
weighty burden of justification on the State in cases where people lack access to 
basic needs such as essential amounts of water for personal and domestic use. 
People are not likely to live a life of dignity and freedom when they fail to access 
basic needs.426 The observations of the Court in the Grootboom case are equally 
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valid in this case although uttered in the context of the right of access to housing. The 
Court noted that a ―society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are 
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.‖427 
General Comment 15 outlines nine core State obligations engendered by the 
right to water. The State is obliged to ensure access to the minimum essential 
amount of safe water sufficient for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease.428 
Second, access must be enhanced in a non-discriminatory way in line with articles 
2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR.429 Additionally, States must take deliberate, concrete and 
targeted steps towards the full realisation of the right to water.430 These include 
recognition of the right in national legislation and policies, the adoption and 
implementation of a national water strategy that addresses everyone‘s needs,431 and 
the creation of a mechanism for water rights monitoring.432 These obligations are not 
subject to the ―progressive realisation‖ clause in ICESCR 2(1). It follows that a water 
privatisation process should not lead to the violation of the minimum threshold of the 
right to water. The State is under an immediate obligation to ensure that the core 
elements of the right to water articulated above are enjoyed by the population.433 The 
following section discusses the immediate/progressive dichotomy as articulated by 
the CESCR as these obligations are applicable to the right to water. 
4 4 3 Obligations of an immediate nature and progressive realisation 
The ICESCR imposes obligations which are of immediate effect despite the 
progressive realisation clause.434 The CESCR delineates obligations imposed by the 
ICESCR that are of an immediate nature, the obligations to take steps, and the 
obligation to guarantee rights without discrimination.435 The right to water imposes on 
States immediate obligations, that is, obligations not subject to the progressive 
realisation clause. These include the obligation to guarantee that the right to water 
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will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.436 Secondly, the State is obliged 
to take steps geared towards the full realisation of the right to water.437 This may 
entail an element of progressivity to achieve full realisation, particularly in a case like 
South Africa given its apartheid past in which the black majority was excluded from 
access to essential services such as water. Thirdly, such steps taken must be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted toward the full realisation of the right to water.438  
4 4 3 1 Obligation to take steps 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR obliges States to ―take steps…by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative‖ measures towards the full realisation 
of the guaranteed rights, including the right to water.439 This obligation is of 
immediate effect and is not subject to limitation by any considerations.440 The 
CESCR has elaborated on the scope of this obligation in its numerous general 
comments. The CESCR explained that while the ICESCR provides for progressive 
realisation and acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, 
it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect. One of the 
obligations is the undertaking to guarantee that the relevant rights will be provided 
without discrimination and the other is the undertaking in article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
―to take steps.‖441 Some of the steps that States are obliged to take are of an 
immediate nature.442 Other steps may be taken over a period of time, being 
progressive in nature, particularly the largely positive obligations that may require 
significant resource implications.443  
States are generally enjoined to adopt two types of measures, legislative and 
non-legislative measures. Legislative measures include the adoption of new 
legislation as well the reform, amendment and repeal of legislation inconsistent with 
the rights provided for in the ICESCR. The CESCR has for instance pointed out that 
the failure to adopt, implement, and monitor the effect of laws, policies and 
                                                     
436
 CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 17.  
437
 Para 17.  
438
 Para 17.  
439
 See CESCR General Comment 3 (1990) paras 2-3. 
440
 CESCR General Comment 3 (1990) para 2; CESCR General Comment 13 (1999) para 43; CESCR 
General Comment 14 (2000) para 30 and CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 17. See also the 
Limburg Principles para 16 which states that ―all State parties have an obligation to begin immediately 
to take steps toward full realisation of the rights contained in the Covenant.‖ 
441
 See CESCR General Comment 3 (1990) para 2. 
442
 General Comment 3 para 2. For further discussion, see S Joseph & A McBeth Research Handbook 
in International Human Rights (2010) 44.  
443
 44. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 246 
 
programmes to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination with respect to each of 
the rights in the ICESCR constitutes a violation of the rights in question.444 A sound 
legislative foundation provides a firm basis for the protection and provision of such 
rights as well as their enforcement in the event of infringement.  
In relation to the right to water, States parties have immediate obligations, 
such as the guarantee that the right will be exercised without discrimination. 
Significantly, States are further obliged to take deliberate, concrete and targeted 
steps geared towards the full realisation of the right to water.445 A State cannot 
therefore wait indefinitely to take steps. It is obliged to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the ultimate objective of full realisation of the right to 
water in respect of everyone within its jurisdiction.446 The obligation to take steps 
imposes on the State an obligation to adopt a national strategy or plan of action to 
realise the right.447 The formulation of such a strategy must be based on all aspects 
of the right to water and the corresponding obligations of States.448 Furthermore, the 
strategy must set targets to be achieved and provide for the corresponding time-
frames for their achievement. It is also significant that the strategy should also 
establish institutional responsibility for the process, identify the necessary resources 
available to attain the objectives and allocate resources appropriately.449 
Accountability mechanisms must be established to ensure the proper implementation 
of the strategy.450 
 
4 4 3 2 Non-discrimination 
Prohibition against discrimination is a cardinal principle under international human 
rights law.451 The principle of non-discrimination is enshrined in the UN Charter,452 
the UDHR453, the ICCPR454and the CRC.455 Article 2 of the ICESCR provides for a 
non-discrimination clause whose principles are applicable to all the rights contained 
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in the treaty, including the right to water.456 Specialist instruments such as ICERD,457 
CEDAW,458 the Disabilities Convention459 and the Convention on the Protection of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families460 are aimed at addressing specific 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
The principle of non-discrimination is of great importance to the ICESCR such 
that the CESCR has explicitly stated that ―the philosophy of the Covenant is based 
on the principle of non-discrimination and the idea of universality of human rights.‖461 
The CESCR has for instance, emphasised that the guarantees of equality and non- 
discrimination entrenched in the ICESCR should be interpreted in ways which 
facilitate the full protection of economic, social and cultural rights.462 The ICESCR 
thus describes discrimination as any distinction based on certain proscribed grounds 
whose effect is to impair enjoyment by all persons of all the rights protected in the 
ICESCR.463 
States are obliged to take steps to remove any de jure and de facto 
discrimination whose effect is to deprive individuals and groups of the means or 
entitlements necessary for the realisation of the right to water.464 This duty 
necessarily enjoins States to provide those who do not have sufficient means with 
the necessary water and water facilities and to prevent any discrimination in access 
to water services.465 This is particularly pertinent in times of severe resource 
constraints where vulnerable members of society would be disproportionately 
affected by such lack of access. Special focus should be on vulnerable groups such 
as women, children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, refugees, asylum seekers, 
internally displaced persons, migrant workers, prisoners and detainees.466 Non-
discrimination in access to water is one of the core obligations imposed by the right 
to water on States. States are particularly obliged to ensure access to water and 
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water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups.467 It follows that discriminatory or 
unaffordable increases in the price of water constitutes a violation of the right to 
water.468  
The immediate character of non-discrimination with regard to the right to water 
as elaborated by the CESCR in General Comment 15 must be understood to impose 
obligations on the State to desist from enforcing any discriminatory practises and the 
treatment of individuals and groups without discrimination in accessing water.469 
Additionally, a State must take steps to eliminate de facto discrimination with regard 
to water access as soon as possible.470 This implies in the context of water 
privatisation that a State has a special obligation to provide water and water facilities 
and any other appropriate intervention mechanisms to those who lack access. The 
State is further obliged to review its national laws with a view to assessing the 
existence of any discriminatory impact. The State must either amend or repeal any 
legislation whose impact might be to curtail access to water by individuals or groups 
within society.471 Most significantly, the State is obliged to take legislative measures 
to combat discrimination in access to water.472  
The concept of progressive realisation with respect to socio-economic rights, 
including the right to water has engendered considerable debate and, occasionally, 
jurisprudential confusion as to the nature and extent of obligations imposed by such 
rights. The following section explores the concept of progressive realisation as 
formulated by the CESCR, academic literature and where necessary, case law in 
respect of the right to water. 
4 4 4 Progressive realisation 
The concept of progressive realisation is a reflection of the resource-dependant 
nature of State obligations in relation to socio-economic rights such as the right to 
water. It also reflects the complexity of access to socio-economic rights given 
entrenched structural patterns of the economy and systematic disadvantage. South 
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Africa is a case in point where, as a result of apartheid policies, the black majority 
was subjected to systemic deprivation and discrimination in accessing basic services 
such as water, healthcare, housing, food, education and social security.473  Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR enjoins States to take the necessary steps towards ―achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in [the ICESCR].‖ The 
CESCR has pointed out that progressive realisation constitutes acknowledgement 
that the full enjoyment of socio-economic rights will generally not be able to be 
achieved in a short period of time.474 This can be contrasted with the wording of the 
ICCPR, which clearly imposes immediate obligations on States parties to the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR enjoins States to ―respect and ensure‖ the rights recognised in that 
instrument.475 It is significant, however, not to overstate the difference between the 
civil and political rights enshrined in the ICCPR and the economic, social and cultural 
rights contained in the ICESCR. Alston and Quinn have contended that civil and 
political rights also require heavy investment in institutions and the availability of 
resources for their full realisation. The suggestion that realisation of civil and political 
rights requires only non-interference on the part of the State and can be achieved 
without significant expenditure is not accurate.476  
Craven has pointed to concerns raised during the drafting of the ICESCR that 
reference to progressive realisation would allow States to postpone full enjoyment of 
the rights indefinitely or entirely avoid their obligations.477 However, it was argued 
that the implementation of the rights provided for in the ICESCR should be vigorously 
pursued so that full realisation could be achieved as quickly as possible.478 These 
concerns have been reflected in General Comment 3 where it states that:  
 
―Nevertheless, the fact that realisation over time, or in other words progressively, is 
foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation 
of all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, 
reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in 
ensuring full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'être, of 
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the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realisation of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.‖479  
 
Alston and Quinn have pointed out that the concept of progressive realisation 
is key to an understanding of the nature of States‘ obligations.480 If not carefully 
construed and applied, the concept of progressive realisation in the fulfilment of 
socio-economic rights is capable of depriving State obligations of any normative 
significance.481 Although it would appear that the implementation of the rights 
contained in the ICCPR is to be undertaken at the earliest possible moment, the 
same obligation can be said regarding the implementation of the rights contained in 
the ICESCR, notwithstanding the progressive realisation clause.482 It is clear from the 
wording of article 2(1) of the ICESCR that the chief constraint upon the immediate 
realisation of the rights will be the lack of resources.483  
States may therefore not delay in their efforts to realise the right to water. 
They are obligated to adopt a course of action which would achieve that objective in 
the shortest possible time.484 Thus, the fact that a State is unable to ensure the full 
realisation of the right to water in the short term does not absolve it from taking 
immediate steps to extend urgent relief to those lacking access to essential amounts 
of water. Admittedly, some dimensions of socio-economic rights may involve 
progressive realisation to a greater extent than civil and political rights. It is pertinent 
to note that in most democratic systems, the State has already invested in the 
infrastructure such as judicial institutions and electoral systems necessary to 
guarantee and protect civil and political rights.485 This should be contrasted with the 
distribution of welfare and other socio-economic benefits where private institutions 
such as the market and family have been deployed to provide them.486 This 
necessitates the imposition of an obligation on the State to ensure that everyone has 
access to socio-economic rights such as water. Inevitably, this will necessitate a 
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degree of State intervention which has significant implications, both for resource 
distributions and policy decisions.487 
Full realisation of all human rights requires States to develop policies which 
progressively ensure the realisation of the relevant rights.488 This does not imply that 
States have unfettered discretion to do as they please when it comes to the fulfilment 
of socio-economic rights under the ICESCR.489 In the Grootboom case, for instance, 
the Court interpreted progressive realisation to mean the dismantling of a range of 
legal, administrative operational and financial obstacles which impede access to the 
rights. The minimum core obligations discussed above places a strong obligation on 
the State to ensure that everyone has access to basic levels of water. Progressive 
realisation of the right to water in this context should therefore be understood as 
enjoining the State to gradually improve the quality of water access until the goal of 
full realisation of the right to water is achieved. Bilchitz has explained this approach in 
the context of the right to adequate housing in the South African Constitution, arguing 
that: 
 
―Progressive realisation involves an improvement in the adequacy of housing for the 
meeting of human interests. It does not mean some receive housing now, and others 
receive it later; rather, it means that each is entitled as a matter of priority to basic 
housing provision, which the government is required to improve gradually over 
time.‖490  
 
It follows that a State‘s lack of capacity to ensure the full realisation of the right 
to water in the short term, would not absolve it from the obligation to take immediate 
steps to provide relief, particularly to those in urgent need of water to foreclose the 
infliction of irreparable harm.491 Liebenberg further points out that in the case of 
pressing resource constraints in the provision of basic services such as water, it is 
important that the needs of marginalised and disadvantaged groups should receive 
particular attention.492 Progressive realisation, according to Liebenberg, must be 
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understood to entail the State‘s obligation to improve the nature and quality of the 
services to which people have access.493 This means that the standard of socio-
economic goods and services provided should be adequate, sufficient and 
acceptable. 
Progressive realisation, it must be noted, can also assist a claimant to 
establish the unreasonableness of a State‘s acts or omission where a State has not 
taken timely or effective steps in realising the right to water.494 The concept of 
progressive realisation must therefore be read in light of the objective of the ICESCR, 
which is to establish clear obligations for States to take steps towards full realisation 
of socio-economic rights such as the right to water.495  It was pointed out in chapter 
3496 that privatisation does not relieve the State of its legal responsibility under 
international human rights law to realise the right to water.497 The States are the 
primary duty bearers under the international human rights system.498 A State has an 
obligation to prevent third parties from threatening access to equal, affordable, 
sufficient, safe and acceptable water.499 States are therefore obliged to accord the 
minimum amount of free water to those who lack the resources to pay for their water 
needs for personal and domestic uses.500 This means the State, regardless of 
privatisation of water services, must adopt intervention measures such as the use of 
a range of appropriate low-cost technologies, appropriate pricing policies such as 
free or low-cost water and income supplements,501 subsidies, and other related 
measures in favour of disadvantaged groups.502 
It necessarily follows that States do not relinquish their international human 
rights obligations to progressively realise the right to water by privatising the delivery 
of water services. Rather, the State must move ―as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible‖ towards the full realisation of the right to water.503 The CESCR envisages 
possible collaboration between the State and private actors in the operationalisation 
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of a water strategy geared towards the progressive realisation of the right to water.504 
Furthermore, a State should ensure that it continues to exercise adequate oversight 
in order to meet its obligation to realise the right to water when it engages non-State 
actors to manage and supply water services. Privatisation of water services should 
therefore not result in the State neglecting its duty to progressively realise the right to 
water. The following section discusses the concept of retrogressive measures in 
relation to the right to water. 
4 4 5 Retrogressive measures 
The CESCR has held that the principle of progressive realisation entails a 
presumption against States against adopting retrogressive measures which have the 
effect of restricting or limiting access to socio-economic rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR.505 Retrogressive measures are deemed to be breaches of the duty of 
progressive realisation unless the State can show that such impugned measures 
were justified.506 
Under international human rights law, a retrogressive measure in respect of 
the right to water entails a diminution in the level of protection accorded to the right 
which is the consequence of an intentional decision by the State.507 For example, an 
ill-conceived water privatisation policy which results in arbitrary and exorbitant water 
tariffs disproportionately affecting disadvantaged groups will amount to an 
impermissible retrogressive measure. Judicial decisions annulling legislation enacted 
to operationalise the right to water or the repeal or suspension of legislation 
necessary for the continued enjoyment of the right to water would amount to a 
retrogressive measure. Additionally, the adoption of legislation or policies which are 
manifestly incompatible with pre-existing domestic or international legal obligations in 
relation to the right to water, for example, adoption of privatisation and liberalisation 
policies resulting in the price of water being unaffordable would amount to 
retrogressive measures.508 
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Although international human rights law anticipates that a State might 
embrace measures whose effect may be to negatively impact on the right to water, 
the CESCR has commented that retrogressive measures would need to be fully 
justified. Retrogressive measures can only be resorted to taking into account all the 
rights protected in the ICESCR ―in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources.‖509  
The CESCR and other treaty bodies have highlighted certain circumstances in 
which retrogressive measures may be justified. Retrogressive measures may be 
justifiable where a State is experiencing an economic crisis with the result that, even 
by utilising the maximum available resources, a deterioration of the situation is 
inevitable.510 Retrogressive measures may also be justifiable where a State can 
show that such measures are necessary to achieve equity in the realisation of the 
right or provide a more sustainable basis for the adequate realisation of the right to 
water.511 The Maastricht Guidelines also provide for the legal permissibility of 
retrogressive measures where the State is acting within a limitation permitted by the 
ICESCR, such as lack of available resources or force majeure.512   
The CESCR‘s approach that retrogressive measures require particular 
justification creates the basis for challenging the withdrawal of social programmes 
through, for example, such activities as full cost recovery associated with water 
privatisation. Such measures will be particularly susceptible to challenge should they 
result in the diminution of the quality and quantity of available water. In this vein, the 
Maastricht Guidelines provide that weighty justifications are required where 
retrogressive measures result in marginalised groups being denied access to basic 
socio-economic rights such as water.513 Privatisation of water services should 
therefore not result in the deterioration of the quality and quantity of water available 
to the population unless this can be strongly justified in relation to other socio-
economic rights. The obligation of non-retrogression also means that States have to 
be particularly careful that policies such as economic liberalisation, intellectual 
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property regimes and bilateral investment agreements that it enters into do not 
impede its capacity to provide socio-economic rights such as water.514  
The ICESCR imposes an obligation on the States to take steps, to the 
maximum of its available resources, towards realisation of the right to water. This 
concept has also been subject to sustained commentary in the academic literature 
and treaty monitoring bodies such as the CESCR. National courts have had to 
contend with this issue in a number of socio-economic rights cases. The following 
section turns to a discussion of this concept due to its significance in the 
determination of State duties towards realisation of the right to water.  
4 4 6 ―To the maximum of its available resources‖ 
The availability of resources for the fulfilment of socio-economic rights such as water 
is one of the contentious issues pervading the provisions of the ICESCR. There are 
many provisions in other universal and regional human rights instruments such as 
the ICCPR that are resource-dependant, for example, the provision of institutions of 
law enforcement and judicial guarantees.515 International human rights instruments, 
consistent with the principles of subsidiarity, fully respect States‘ margin of 
appreciation to adopt whatever measures a State considers the most appropriate for 
the realisation of the right water. Nevertheless in so doing, States must take 
deliberate, concrete and targeted steps within a reasonably short time towards the 
full realisation of the right to water.516  
The ―availability of resources‖ provision, though an important qualifier to the 
obligations to take steps, does not alter the immediacy of that obligation. One of the 
key challenges of adjudicating socio-economic rights claims such as access to water 
is where the resource implications of the claim are extensive and provision has not 
been made for such expenditure within existing budgetary provisions.517 This raises 
the question as to whether an adjudicatory body is confined to scrutinising existing 
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budgetary allocations for water services or whether it can scrutinise the State‘s 
budgetary or macro-economic policies more broadly. In a domestic constitutional 
context, this gives rise to considerations regarding courts‘ institutional capacity and 
capability to make such determinations.518 
The CESCR has interpreted the phrase ―to the maximum available resources‖ 
contained in article 2 of the ICESCR as entailing resources existing within a State as 
well as those available from the international community.519 The CESCR‘s position is 
to place great importance on transparent and participative decision-making 
processes at the domestic level in its assessment of whether a State has taken 
reasonable steps to the maximum of its available resources to achieve progressively 
the realisation of the right of access to socio-economic rights such as water.520 The 
CESCR has further stated that in its assessment of communications brought to it 
under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, other considerations that it will take into 
account in its evaluation of justifiability of resource constraints include: 
―(a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted 
towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights; 
(b) whether the State party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary manner; 
(c) whether the State party‘s decision (not) to allocate available resources is in 
accordance with international human rights standards; 
(d) where several policy options are available, whether the State party adopts the one 
that least restricts Covenant rights; 
(e) the time frame in which the steps were taken; 
(f) whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals or groups and, whether they were non-
discriminatory, and whether they prioritised grave situations or situations of risk.521‖ 
Such considerations can offer useful guidance in assessing a State‘s reliance 
on resource constraints justifications for the non-fulfilment of its obligations to realise 
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the right to water for those within its jurisdiction. The State should therefore be in a 
position to show that its policies and resource allocation decisions are predicated on 
a carefully reasoned consideration522 of obligations imposed by the right to water. As 
noted by Liebenberg:  
―The burden of adducing evidence regarding the availability of resources, distributive 
decisions, and the overall onus of proof in respect of the defence of resource 
constraints should rest on the State as this information is squarely within its own 
sphere of knowledge and expertise.‖523    
The CESCR has pointed out that a State is obliged to monitor and adopt 
remedial plans and strategies pertaining to the realisation of socio-economic rights 
even in circumstances of severe resources constraints.524 This is particularly the 
case if the resource in question constitutes a basic social need such as access to 
water. The denial of basic access to water has a severe impact particularly on 
disadvantaged and marginalised members of society. This should trigger heightened 
scrutiny of the State‘s resource-based justifications for such lack of access. Where a 
State is not in a position to ensure the full realisation of the right to water in light of its 
available resources, it is nevertheless enjoined to show that it has allocated a 
appropriate resources for the provision of short-term relief for those whose needs are 
urgent.525 Such an approach is in line with some of the good practices in relation to 
operationalisation of the right to water discussed in chapter 6.526 
Jurisprudence from national jurisdictions could also be helpful in the 
interpretation of the ―to the maximum of available resources‖ provision. The Court‘s 
jurisprudence, for instance, shows that orders with clear budgetary and resource 
implications will be made in situations where the State does not place sufficient 
evidence before the court demonstrating that it lacks available resources or has other 
competing urgent claims on its available resources.527 The CESCR has pointed out 
that resource constraints alone do not justify inaction. In General Comment 3, the 
CESCR has pointed out that even under circumstances of limited resources, the 
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State is obliged to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of socio-economic rights 
such as the right to water, even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate.528 Most fundamentally, the State must make serious effort to provide the 
necessary minimum protection particularly for the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged members of society. In that regard, a State must justify any measures 
it has pursued to ameliorate the situation of marginalised and disadvantaged 
members of society.529  
Where a State can show that it lacks the requisite resources to fulfill the 
elementary requirements of rights such as the provision of a minimum amount of 
water, it still remains under a duty to seek international cooperation and assistance 
under article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The ECSR, for instance, has stated that:  
―When the achievement of one of the rights in question is exceptionally complex and 
particularly expensive to resolve, a State Party must take measures that allow it to 
achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable 
progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources. 
States Parties must be particularly mindful of the impact that their choices will have 
for groups with heightened vulnerabilities as well as for other persons affected 
including, especially, their families on whom falls the heaviest burden in the event of 
institutional failure.‖530 
The ECSR held that France had failed to achieve sufficient progress in 
advancing the provision of education for persons with autism. It was therefore in 
violation of the Revised Charter531 not because of its failure to achieve a particular 
result, but because it had not proven that it had adopted measures to the maximum 
extent of its available resources in order to address, as a matter of priority, the 
situation of vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities.532 This decision of 
the ECSR shows how the requirement of non-discrimination may provide an 
important benchmark in evaluating the State‘s resource allocation priorities by 
identifying certain categories of individuals and groups who may require special 
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attention. A case in point is Black people in South Africa who were subjected to 
systemic deprivation, and discrimination in their access to socio-economic needs 
such as water, healthcare, food, housing, social security and education because of 
apartheid policies.533 
4 4 7 Conclusion 
The idea of minimum core obligations has been defined in respect of the rights to 
housing, food, education, healthcare, water and social security. The preceding 
section showed that minimum core obligations advance a baseline of socio-economic 
protection across varied economic policies and vastly different levels of resource 
endowment. The State‘s non-compliance with core obligations can have severe 
repercussions for disadvantaged and marginalised communities. It was shown that, 
even where a State has privatised its water delivery services, it remains responsible 
for the satisfaction of a minimum amount of water, particularly to satisfy the water 
needs of disadvantaged and marginalised communities. As indicated in the 
discussion above, privatisation does not relieve the State of its obligation to ensure 
that minimum essential levels of each right are enjoyed by individuals, particularly the 
most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups within society.  
The preceding section further showed that the right to water imposes on 
States immediate obligations, that is, obligations not subject to the progressive 
realisation clause. These include the obligations to take steps and to guarantee that 
the right to water will be exercised without discrimination of any kind. The section 
above showed that neither of the two obligations requires substantial resources to 
fulfil. The immediate character of the obligations to take steps and to ensure non-
discrimination in respect of the right to water enjoins the State to take steps geared 
towards full realisation of the right. The State must also abstain from denying or 
limiting access for all persons within its jurisdiction to the enjoyment of the right to 
water. 
The concept of progressive realisation in respect of the right to water was also 
discussed and it was shown that this notion is a reflection of the resource contingent 
nature of State obligations in relation to socio-economic rights such as the right to 
water. However, it was argued that progressive realisation of the right to water should 
not be used as an escape clause. States do not have unfettered discretion to do as 
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they please when it comes to the fulfilment of the right to water. Rather, a State has 
an obligation to gradually improve the quality of water to which people have access 
to until the goal of full realisation of the right to water is achieved. 
Although international human rights law anticipates that a State might adopt 
measures that have a negative impact on the enjoyment of the right to water, the 
preceding section showed that such retrogressive measures would need to be fully 
justified. Programmes such as privatisation of water services should not result in the 
deterioration of the quality and quantity of water available to the population unless 
this can be strongly justified in relation to other socio-economic rights. 
The discussion above showed that the principle of subsidiarity fully respects a 
States‘ margin of appreciation to measures it considers the most appropriate for the 
realisation of the right of access to water. Nevertheless in so doing, a State is obliged 
to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps within a reasonably short time 
towards the full realisation of the right to water. If resource constraints render it 
impossible for a State party to comply fully with its obligations imposed by the right to 
water, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made to 
use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy the minimum core of the 
right. It was argued in the preceding section that a State that is unwilling to use the 
maximum of its available resources for the realisation socio-economic rights such as 
the right to water will be in violation of its obligations imposed by the right to water. 
This is particularly the case where the State would have exercised its discretion in a 
discriminatory and arbitrary manner. The following section analyses select 
jurisprudence from national courts to assess how the right to water has been 
judicially enforced. Particular attention is paid to how judicial organs have enforced 
the right to water.  
 
4 5 National jurisprudence on the right to water 
A considerable body of jurisprudence in which a wide range of issues relevant to the 
realisation of right to water have been adjudicated upon has now been developed. 
These have ranged from lack of access to water, forced eviction away from water 
sources, disconnection of water supply services for non-payment, installation of 
prepayment water meters and pollution of water sources. This section will discuss 
select cases from national jurisdictions, focusing on South Africa, India and 
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Argentina. The section will also discuss a landmark judgment handed down by the 
Botswana Court of Appeal, the Mosetlhanyane and others v Attorney General of 
Botswana case (hereinafter referred to as ―Mosetlhanyane‖).534 The latter case is 
very important in so far as the court creatively protected the right to water by relying 
on a civil and political right as well as international law in enforcing the right to water. 
The selected countries, apart from Botswana, have generated considerable 
jurisprudence in the area of socio-economic rights in general and the right to water in 
particular. Additionally, South Africa is one of the few countries that has explicitly 
enshrined the right to water as a justiciable right in its Bill of Rights. Although 
Argentina has not explicitly provided for a right to water in its legal framework, it has 
nevertheless incorporated many of the international human rights instruments in its 
constitution, including the ICESCR. Additionally, as will be shown below, Argentinean 
courts have interpreted the right to a healthy environment to protect water related 
rights. Indian jurisprudence on the right to life and the right to a healthy environment 
has been innovative in terms of protecting socio-economic rights including the right to 
water.  
4 5 1 South Africa 
4 5 1 1 Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council 
The decision of the South Guateng High Court (formerly the Witwatersrand Local 
Division) in Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council535 (hereinafter referred to as ―Residents of Bon Vista‖) is significant as it was 
the first case under the South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence to confirm 
that the right of access to sufficient water guaranteed under the South African 
Constitution must be respected by all organs of State.536 According to the court, the 
right to respect implies that people may not be denied access to water without being 
given a genuine opportunity to make representations. Most significantly, the 
obligation also entails that a person may not be denied basic water services where 
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that person can prove to the satisfaction of the relevant water authority their inability 
to pay.537  
In the Residents of Bon Vista case, a municipality in Johannesburg had 
disconnected the water supply to a block of flats resulting in the applicant launching 
an urgent application for interim relief to order the municipality to restore the water 
supply.538 The court relied on section 4(3) of the Water Services Act, noting that 
water supply may not be discontinued if it would result in a person being subjected to 
denial of access to basic water services for non-payment. This is particularly so if the 
person subjected to the disconnection, has proved, to the satisfaction of the relevant 
water services authority his inability to pay for basic water services.539  
The court considered section 4 of the Water Services Act which enjoins a 
water service provider to set conditions on the circumstances in which water services 
may be discontinued, and the procedures for discontinuing water services. The court 
also took into account section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution which enshrines the right of 
access to water and section 7(2) which obligates the State to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. The court held that if a municipality 
disconnects an existing water supply to consumers, this is prima facie a breach of its 
constitutional duty to respect the right of (existing) access to water, and requires 
constitutional justification in terms of the general limitations clause entrenched in 
section 36 of the South African Constitution.540 
The court noted that the municipality had not complied with the conditions and 
procedures set out in section 4(3) of the Water Services Act. For any termination of 
water services to comply with the legal regime, the procedures have to be fair and 
equitable. Such procedures must provide for reasonable notice for termination of 
supply, and for an opportunity to make representations. Additionally, the 
disconnection procedures should not result in a person being denied access to basic 
water services for non-payment where that person has proved, to the satisfaction of 
the water services provider that he or she was unable to pay for basic services.541 
It is pertinent to note that in the Residents of Bon Vista case, access to water 
existed before the municipality disconnected the supply. The court found that 
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disconnecting the water supply was prima facie in breach of the local authority‘s 
constitutional duty to respect the right of access to sufficient water, in that it deprived 
the residents of existing access. This placed an onus on the municipality to justify the 
breach.542 The court was convinced that the Bon Vista residents had shown a prima 
facie right to a continuing water supply, which right was being infringed.  
The Residents of Bon Vista case also illustrates the State‘s duty to respect the 
right of access to water, particularly in the case of interference with existing access. 
Even though the local authority was justified in disconnecting the water supply 
service, it failed to comply with the minimum statutory requirements of notice and 
availing the water users an opportunity to make representations before any 
disconnection. This denied the applicants an opportunity to make representations for 
the purposes of proving, to the satisfaction of the water services provider, should 
their circumstances were such that they were unable to pay for their water supply. In 
that case, the water service provider was obliged to refrain from terminating the 
service in terms of section 4 of the Water Services Act.  
The approach adopted in this case is consistent with international law in that a 
State is prohibited from carrying out unjustified disconnection or exclusion from water 
services.543 Additionally, the human right to water imposes a duty on States to 
provide water or water facilities to those who cannot afford through their own 
means.544 The State has a core obligation to ensure access to the minimum essential 
amount of water for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease.545  
4 5 1 2 Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council  
In Manqele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council 546 the applicant, who 
occupied premises with seven children, had her water supply disconnected due to 
the non-payment of her water account. She sought a declaratory order that the 
discontinuation of water services to her premises was unlawful. She claimed that the 
disconnection was unlawful in that it resulted in her being denied access to basic 
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services, even though she was unable to pay for these.547 She relied on section 3(1) 
of the Water Services Act, but not specifically on her constitutional right of access to 
water protected in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution.548 The former Durban High 
Court (now KwaZulu Natal High Court, Durban) held that the right to water as 
included in the Water Services Act was at that point incomplete and therefore 
unenforceable. The local authority successfully argued that as no regulations had at 
that time been promulgated to give meaning to the right to a basic water supply, the 
right the applicant relied on had no content.  
It is important to note that the Regulations549 which defined the term ―basic 
water supply‖ and set up the basic water supply of 25 litres per day per person or six 
kilolitres per household per month had not yet been promulgated at the time. 
Therefore, the court concluded that it had no guidance from the legislature or 
government on how to interpret the right of access to water embodied in section 3 of 
the Water Services Act. The court pointed out that these were policy matters that are 
linked to the availability of resources and thus outside the court‘s remit.550 Although 
the applicant argued that the provision of the Water Services Act must be understood 
in a way to at least fulfill the constitutional  obligation imposed by section 27 the court 
did not accede to this contention, holding that a case based on a violation of a 
constitutional right must be made properly and set up in the founding papers.551  
The local authority‘s act clearly constituted a breach of the duty to respect as 
provided for under section 7(2) of the South African Constitution. The disconnection 
of water services amounted to a breach of a pre-existing water supply. The applicant 
clearly fell within the ambit of section 4(3)(c) of the Water Services Act as she had 
shown that she was unable to pay for water services. Even though at the time of the 
litigation the Regulation which defined basic water supply had not been promulgated, 
the court should have refrained from dismissing the applicant‘s reliance on the 
constitutional right to water late in the litigation. This interpretation by the Courts was 
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characterised by unnecessary rigidity and formalism, which is not consonant with 
South Africa‘s transformative constitution.552  
The court could also have sought inspiration from international law in 
accordance with section 39(1)(b) of the South African Constitution. In the case of 
Joseph v City of Johannesburg (hereinafter referred to as ―Joseph case‖), the 
Constitutional Court emphasised the duty of public service providers to comply with 
procedural fairness requirements under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ―PAJA‖) before taking a decision to disconnect 
basic services.553 Significantly, the Court emphasised in the Joseph case that the 
local government is constitutionally obliged to meet the basic needs of all inhabitants 
of South Africa.554 
4 5 1 3 Mazibuko & Others v Government of South Africa & Others 
In the Mazibuko case, the applicants, residents of Phiri, a poor township in Soweto 
brought a case against the City of Johannesburg, Johannesburg Water555 and the 
national minister responsible for water and forestry.556 The first issue that the Court 
had to determine was whether the City of Johannesburg‘s policy with regard to the 
supply of free basic water of 6 kilolitres per household per month was in conflict with 
section 1 of the Water Services Act and the right of access to sufficient water in 
section 27 of the South African Constitution. Section 1 of the Water Services Act 
defines a ―basic water supply‖ as the prescribed minimum standard of water supply 
services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of water 
for households, including informal households, to support life and personal hygiene. 
This provision is relevant for the purposes of ascertaining the sufficiency of the right 
of access to sufficient water enshrined under section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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Additionally, Regulation 3 of the regulations providing for compulsory national 
standards and measures to conserve water557 defines the minimum standard for 
basic water supply services to be ―a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres 
per person per day or 6 kilolitres per household per month.‖558 The applicants argued 
that the City of Johannesburg should have provided more free basic water, in light of 
its constitutional obligations to act in a reasonable manner in ensuring that a poor 
community such as Phiri had access to sufficient water. The second issue the 
Constitutional Court was called upon to determine was whether the installation of 
pre-paid water meters in Phiri which charged consumers for use of water in excess of 
the free basic water allowance was lawful. 
The applicants also challenged the lawfulness of prepaid meters installed in 
Phiri on several grounds. The applicants pointed out that the Phiri residents were 
previously provided with water services on the basis of a deemed consumption tariff. 
They argued that the implementation of Operation Gcin‘amanzi, which led to the 
installation of prepaid meters, constituted a deprivation of their existing right of 
access to sufficient water. This resulted in a breach of the City of Johannesburg‘s 
obligation to respect the right of access to water.559 The case also dealt with the 
State‘s duty to fulfill the right to water. The applicants argued that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal had erred in determining that the sufficient amount of water required by 
section 27 is 42 litres per person per day, rather than 50 litres per person per day. 
The applicants further argued for an order declaring that the City of Johannesburg 
was obliged to provide this amount of water free of charge to all the residents of Phiri 
who cannot afford to pay for their own water.560 
In addition, the appellants challenged the installation of pre-paid metres on the 
basis that they breached the equality and non-discrimination guarantees in section 
9(3) of the South African Constitution. They argued that the installation of prepaid 
meters in Phiri Township of Soweto discriminated unfairly between poor black South 
Africans and wealthy white South Africans. The residents of Phiri were only offered 
the option of a water supply delivered to their homes on condition that they accepted 
a pre-paid water meter. The Phiri residents were not offered the option of a credit 
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meter offered in the wealthy, formerly white suburbs. Significantly, those who obtain 
water through a credit meter have a grace period within which to pay for water 
already consumed. They are also entitled to procedural safeguards such as a fair 
hearing and an opportunity to make representations prior to any disconnection of 
water services.561 
The High Court (South Gauteng) had found the installation of prepaid water 
meters unlawful and unfair. The High Court had ruled that the City of Johannesburg's 
Free Basic Water policy was unreasonable in terms of section 27(2) of the 
Constitution and therefore unlawful.562 The High Court had also ruled that the City of 
Johannesburg should provide 50 litres of free basic water per person daily to the 
applicants and similarly placed residents of Phiri.563 On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that 42 litres of water per person per day would be sufficient water within 
the meaning of section 27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution.564 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal therefore directed the City of Johannesburg to reformulate its policy 
in light of this decision.565 The Supreme Court of Appeal further held that the 
installation of prepaid water meters was unlawful.566 It grounded its finding on the 
failure by the City of Johannesburg‘s by-laws to make provision for prepaid meters 
and that the cut-off in water supply that occurs when the free basic water limit has 
been exhausted constituted an unlawful discontinuation of water supply.567   
On appeal, the Court overturned the Supreme Court of Appeal decision.568 
The Court held that the right of access to sufficient water does not require the State 
to provide upon demand to every person with sufficient water. The right, according to 
the Court, only requires the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
progressively to realise the achievement of the right within available resources. The 
Court rejected the applicants' argument that the court should adopt a quantified 
standard determining the content of the right not merely its minimum content.569 The 
Court further stated that the positive obligations imposed upon government by socio-
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economic rights will be enforced by courts where government fails to take steps to 
realise the rights. Courts will also intervene where measures adopted by the 
government are unreasonable or fail to give effect to the latter‘s duty under the 
obligation of progressive realisation to continually review its policies.570  
The Court therefore found that the City's Free Basic Water policy fell within the 
bounds of reasonableness and therefore did not contravene either section 27 of the 
Constitution or national legislation regulating water services. The Court noted that the 
City of Johannesburg continually reconsidered and reviewed its policy and 
investigated ways and undertook research to ensure that the poorest inhabitants of 
the City gained access to water.571 The Court therefore found the City of 
Johannesburg‘s free basic water policy was not unreasonable.572 On the question of 
the constitutionality of the prepaid water meters, the Court held (contrary to the High 
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal‘s findings) that national legislation and the 
city's own by-laws authorised the latter to introduce prepaid water meters.573 
According to the Court, the cessation in water supply caused by a prepaid meter 
stopping is better understood as a temporary suspension in supply, not a 
discontinuation in water supply. In the Court‘s view, the installation of prepaid meters 
was therefore not in violation of the constitutional provision.574 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that even if the prepaid water meter system was 
discriminatory in its impact, it would not be unconstitutional ―if it can be shown that 
the purpose for which the policy was introduced was not unfair for the purposes of s 
9(3).‖575 The Court further pointed out that the purpose of the measure was to 
eradicate severe water losses in Soweto hence it was a laudable objective.576 The 
Court explained that credit meter users were also not afforded a choice to have a 
pre-payment meter system with its reduced tariffs unless certain strict conditions 
were satisfied. The Court therefore justified restricting consumer choice in altering 
the water delivery system on the basis of the substantial cost of the installation of 
either system.577 The Court thus concluded that the installation of the pre-payment 
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meter system did not constitute unfair discrimination in respect of the Phiri 
residents.578 
Liebenberg has argued that the Court adopted a narrow frame of reference in 
ascertaining the deleterious impact of the pre-payment meter system on 
impoverished communities.579 This is particularly the case with poor households who 
are only limited to the free basic provision of 6 kilolitres per household per month 
should they be unable to pay for additional water supplies. This has negative 
implications for the life, health and dignity of such communities. Additionally, the 
absence of procedural safeguards prior to the discontinuation of water supply 
services from a household should they fail to pay for additional water puts them at a 
further disadvantage.580 
The Court should have done better by adopting a substantive and contextual 
conception of equality. The Court‘s failure to do so resulted in its inability to 
appreciate the impacts of a prepaid system in comparison to a credit metered water 
supply system taking into account the socio-economic background of the community 
in question.581 This is because households from the former white suburbs 
experiencing financial challenges in paying for their water consumption are afforded 
statutory procedural safeguards of notice. They are also entitled to make 
representations and, if need be, enter into an arrangement with the water services 
supplier for a staggered payment of any arrears on their water bills. Such safeguards 
are not available to poor households such as those in Phiri. This has led Liebenberg 
to argue that: 
―The benefits afforded by the statutory procedural safeguards are not merely formal. 
In the context of a basic need and a fundamental constitutional right, they allow for an 
individualised consideration of the actual circumstances of the consumer. This is a 
critical safeguard against the impersonal disconnection of water services, particularly 
in circumstances that pose a threat to people‘s lives, health and human dignity. The 
values of human dignity and equality are implicated when an impoverished 
community is denied the opportunity afforded to affluent communities of making 
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representations on their particular circumstances prior to the disconnection of their 
water supply.‖582 
The Mazibuko case clearly raised a number of a State‘s obligations imposed 
by the right to water, principally the obligations to respect, protect, fulfill and promote. 
For instance, contrary to those with conventional credit meters, the poor residents of 
Phiri are not provided with procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to 
make representations in the event of difficulties in paying for water consumption 
beyond the free basic supply. Liebenberg has argued that: 
 
―In the context of a basic need and a fundamental constitutional right...(procedural 
safeguards) allow for an individualised consideration of the actual circumstances of 
the consumer. This is a critical safeguard against the impersonal disconnection of 
water services, particularly in circumstances that pose a threat to people‘s lives, 
health and human dignity.‖583 
 
Liebenberg has pointed that the Court‘s dismissal of the challenge to the 
sufficiency of the free basic water supply shows the limitations of a reasonableness 
review disconnected from a ―substantive analysis of the normative purposes and 
values underpinning the relevant socio-economic rights.‖584 Such an approach, 
according to Liebenberg, resulted in the Court failing to give any significance to the 
right of access to sufficient water enshrined in the South African Constitution. This 
was despite the applicants having argued for the Court to assess the reasonableness 
of the measures adopted by the City of Johannesburg in respect of the Phiri 
community in light of the normative standards and values imposed by the right to 
water provided in the Constitution.585 
What is particularly noteworthy is that the Court failed to emphasise the City‘s 
obligation to progressively improve the quality of access to water for the Phiri 
community. Rather, the Court interpreted progressive realisation to imply the 
obligation of the State to continuously review its policies and to be flexible and 
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adaptable to changing circumstances.586 Liebenberg points out that although such 
can be useful tools of accountability, they avoid the substantive dimension of 
progressive realisation.587 It is pertinent to refer to General Comment No 3 in which 
the CESCR defined the concept of progressive realisation as placing a substantive, 
positive obligation on the State to move expeditiously towards achieving the full 
realisation of socio-economic rights.588 
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal had, as noted above, upheld the 
argument that the installation of prepaid water meters had not been authorised by 
any law, the Court dismissed the various grounds on which the applicants challenged 
the legality of the prepaid water meters installed in the Phiri community. The Court 
interpreted the City of Johannesburg‘s by-laws to permit the installation of pre-paid 
meters.589 Liebenberg has argued that the Court adopted a particularly restrictive and 
formalistic interpretation of the Water Services Act and the relevant by-laws.590 
Quinot has pointed out the absence of any detailed reference by the Court to the 
perilous personal circumstances of many of the residents of Phiri and the effect of the 
limitation of water introduced by Operation Gcin‘amanzi on their lives.591 This is 
despite the detailed submissions made in that regard by the appellants in their 
papers to the Court. Quinot further points out that in its summary of the case‘s 
background, the Court approached the facts from the perspective of the City of 
Johannesburg. For instance, the Court points out to "significant water losses in 
Soweto and the problem of non-payment,‖ ―ostensible success‖ and ―customer 
satisfaction‖ of the project.592 
Despite the legislative requirements for an opportunity to make 
representations prior to the termination of a person‘s water supply, the Court‘s finding 
that these procedural safeguards are not applicable to people with prepaid meters is 
open to criticism.593 Such an interpretation implies that the fundamental guarantees 
of procedural fairness in the Water Services Act depends on the technical 
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mechanisms through which a person‘s water supply is measured.594 Consequently, 
procedural fairness is a preserve of those with credit meters. Such an interpretative 
approach undermines the purposes of section 4(3) of the Water Services Act. 
Section 4(3) is clearly designed to provide fair and equitable procedures for the 
limitation or discontinuation of water services.595 Furthermore, it also expressly 
provides for circumstances where there can be departures from the requirements of 
notice and provides for an opportunity to make representations.596  
The safeguards provided in section 4(3) of the Water Services Act are 
intended to apply to any interference in people‘s access to water. Any exclusions 
from the procedural safeguards in section 4(3) need to be in express terms had this 
been the legislative intention.597 The Mazibuko decision shows that formalism 
pervaded the Court‘s analysis of equality and procedural fairness rights raised by the 
applicants.598 Ultimately, the Court ended up engaging in a superficial analysis of the 
impact of the City of Johannesburg‘s policies on the Phiri community.599 
Quinot further points to what he refers to as the Court‘s ―reframing‖ of the 
applicants‘ case.600 The Court cast the applicants‘ argument in favour of a specific 
amount of free water as a minimum core argument.601 The Court interpreted the 
appellants‘ arguments as advocating for a minimum core to the right to water under 
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section 27(1) of the Constitution. On the contrary, the appellants had argued for the 
recognition of a substantive standard of water provision against which the 
respondents‘ conduct should be assessed in light of the reasonableness approach 
developed by the Court in its earlier jurisprudence. Quinot argues that the latter 
argument is not the same as advocating for a minimum core approach.602 Ultimately, 
the Court's interpretation of the applicants' argument as a minimum core one allowed 
it to rely on its earlier decision in such cases as Treatment Action Campaign and 
Grootboom to reject the minimum core argument.603 The result is that the Court 
adopted a formalistic reasoning technique to avoid the substantive question in the 
case, which was the standard of water provision against which the respondents‘ 
conduct should be assessed in light of the constitutional provision guaranteeing the 
right of access to water.604   
The Court‘s reasoning thus leads to a largely process-orientated view of the 
enforcement of the right of access to water and other socio-economic rights 
protected under section 27 of the Constitution. Williams has also argued that the 
Court‘s judgement in Mazibuko failed ―to give the idea of accountability a searching 
and robust content.‖605 Particularly noteworthy is the Court‘s failure to engage into a 
deeper inquiry and analysis of the evidence of how the City of Johannesburg arrived 
at its quantitative targets of the amount of free basic water. The Court acquiesced to 
the City of Johannesburg‘s free basic water policy ―under a reasonableness standard 
in terse, conclusory language without providing probing analysis.‖606 In doing so, the 
―Court gave presumptive validity to the City‘s data and calculation methods, thereby 
failing to hold the City accountable in any meaningful way.‖607 Williams has further 
pointed out that another short-coming of the Mazibuko judgement was the Court‘s 
failure to provide the respective arms of government with minimal direction in setting 
standards and guidance to future litigants and the public as to the criteria and 
inquiries that will comprise reasonableness review in socio-economic rights cases. 
What is particularly noteworthy is that the Court failed to emphasise the City of 
Johannesburg‘s obligation to progressively improve the quality of access to water for 
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the Phiri community. Rather, it interpreted progressive realisation to imply the 
obligation of the State to continuously review its policies and to be flexible and 
adaptable to changing circumstances.608 The following section discusses an 
illuminating decision of the Botswana Court of Appeal in Mosetlhanyane and others v 
Attorney General of Botswana. 
4 5 2 Mosetlhanyane and others v Attorney General of Botswana 
In the Mosetlhanyane and others v Attorney General of Botswana609 case, the 
Botswana Court of Appeal relied on international law and the a civil and political right 
protected in the Constitution of Botswana to emphasise the State‘s duty to desist 
from interfering with a community‘s enjoyment of access to water services. This was 
particularly creative on the part of the court, given that Botswana‘s legal framework 
does not provide for a right to water. Botswana is also not a State party to the 
ICESCR. Botswana‘s 1966 Constitution610 does not provide for socio-economic rights 
and only protects civil and political rights. Although Botswana has signed and ratified 
a significant number of international and regional instruments such as CEDAW, 
ICCPR and the African Charter, these have neither been incorporated into the 
Constitution nor municipal law of Botswana.  
In 1985 De Beers mining company agreed that a borehole it had drilled for 
prospecting purposes, but no longer needed, could be used as a water source by the 
Basarwa/San people, residents of Central Kalahari Game Reserve (hereinafter 
referred to as ―CKGR‖).611 Between 1986 and 2002, the local authority had 
maintained the borehole and regularly supplied water in tankers to the Basarwa 
residents of the reserve and other parts of the CKGR.612 The Government of 
Botswana later evicted and resettled the Basarwa outside of the CKGR as it felt that 
human settlements were incompatible with the conservation of wildlife in the game 
reserve.613 In an attempt to dissuade the Basarwa from returning to the reserve, the 
State dismantled the pump engine and water tank installed for the purpose of using 
the borehole, which was the only source of water within a 40km radius.614 In an 
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earlier ruling handed down by the Botswana High Court in Sesana and Others v 
Attorney General of Botswana case in 2006, the court had found that this eviction 
was unconstitutional and ruled that the Basarwa should be permitted to return to the 
CKGR.615 
The main issue before the Botswana Court of Appeal was whether the 
appellants had a right to use water for domestic purposes at their own expense in 
terms of section 6 of the Water Act Chapter 34:01 of 1968.616 In this case, the 
Botswana Court of Appeal went further and found that because the Basarwa were 
lawful occupiers of the CKGR, they have a right to utilise existing boreholes and drill 
new ones to procure water for domestic uses. The court further ruled that lawful 
occupiers of land such as the appellants must be able to utilise underground water 
otherwise their occupation would be rendered meaningless.617  
The applicants also deployed a typical civil and political right to buttress their 
claim, relying on the domestic constitutional provision proscribing the infliction of 
torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.618 After referring to 
section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana which guarantees the right not to be 
subject to inhumane or degrading treatment, the court held that the State‘s actions 
constituted a violation of the applicants‘ fundamental rights.619 The court 
acknowledged the existence of ―international consensus for the government to refrain 
from inflicting degrading treatment.‖620 The court referred to the CESCR‘s General 
Comment 15 and the 2010 UN General Assembly resolution on the right to safe and 
clean drinking water621 to affirm that water is a human right and an underlying 
determinant of the rights to health and life. Significantly, the court noted that States 
have particular obligations to prevent encroachment and pollution on indigenous 
people's lands, and to provide resources for indigenous groups to design, deliver and 
control their access to water.622  
Despite the court‘s creativity in the decision, the ruling is disappointing in 
some respects. The court only emphasised the State‘s duty of non-interference 
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despite relying on some provisions of the General Comment 15 and the 2010 
General Assembly resolution on the right to water. The court should have seized the 
moment by drawing inspiration from the African Commission decisions in Endorois 
and Sudan Human Rights Commission/COHRE v Sudan discussed above. Given 
that the Basarwa constitute a vulnerable indigenous group and Botswana is a State 
party to the African Charter, the court should have drawn inspiration from the above 
cases and emphasised the State‘s duty, especially in respect of an impoverished and 
vulnerable indigenous group, to fulfill the right to water by providing resources to the 
group in order for it to design, deliver and control its access to water. The following 
section discusses some case law from Argentina on the right to water. 
4 5 3 Argentinean case law 
4 5 3 1 Quevedo Miguel Angel y Otros c/ Aguas Cordobesas S.A. 
The Quevedo Miguel Angel y Otros c/ Aguas Cordobesas S.A.623 case involved the 
disconnection of water services to a poor community. This gave the court an 
opportunity to adjudicate the protective duty of the State imposed by socio-economic 
rights. The water supply to a group of low income and indigent families living in the 
City of Cordoba had been disconnected by a private water company due to non-
payment.624 The applicants sued the water service company, arguing that the 
disconnection was illegal in that the company had failed to comply with its regulatory 
obligation to provide 50 litres of water daily per family which was to be provided 
regardless of payment.625 The applicants further petitioned the court to obligate the 
company to provide them with at least 200 litres of water per family per day, arguing 
that even that minimum supply obligation was too low.626 It is significant to note that 
the court appeared to endorse the minimum core approach to the provision of water. 
The court held that ―the provision of a minimum quantity of potable water...because 
of its public utility character, must be guaranteed to all individuals.‖627  For that 
reason the court found 50 litres of water per family per day not sufficient to satisfy 
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that minimum as ―it cannot guarantee basic conditions of hygiene and health.‖628 The 
court held that the company had the right to reduce (but not to disconnect) the 
applicants‘ water supply for non-payment. The court held that the right to have 
access to the provision of drinking water concerns the health and physical integrity of 
the affected individuals.  
The lack of access to water has many deleterious implications for the health of 
the appellants, especially those from the low income bracket. The court stated that by 
virtue of its character as a public utility, the provision of a minimum quantity of 
drinking water must be guaranteed to everyone.629 The court relied on a provincial 
law that provided for everyone‘s right to receive adequate public services to meet 
their basic needs to rule that the State is responsible for providing drinking water, as 
it is an essential service.630 The court further stated that: 
 ―Were the State to fail to provide adequate public utilities at the required quality and 
quantity, at low cost and with regulated tariffs, taking into account the situation of the 
less well-off, the State would not only be violating the very principles that justify the 
reasons of its existence (ensuring the general well-being and promoting the common 
good), but also Constitutional norms that regulate its functions – such as Article 42 of 
the National Constitution that expressly obliges the State to ensure the existence of 
adequate and efficient public utilities services and to effectively regulate and control 
them.‖631 
 
The court therefore ordered the private company to provide a minimum of 200 litres 
of potable water per family.632 The court proceeded to stipulate that an arrangement 
be reached between the company and State authorities for compensation over the 
costs incurred by such action. The court was therefore asserting the State‘s duty to 
protect against violation of the right to water by a third party through deprivation of 
water services supply. The court also reiterated the State‘s duty to provide access to 
a minimum quantity of water services by ruling that the State was going to bear the 
financial costs of the provision of 200 litres of potable water daily per family.633 
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 Most of the cases dealing with disconnections of water services or installation 
of water meters by municipalities such as the Residents of Bon Vista and Mazibuko 
focus on the State‘s duty to respect the right to water in respect of an existing water 
supply. The above case however dealt with disconnection of a water supply carried 
out by a private non-State actor. Such a scenario does not relate to the State‘s 
obligation to respect as it is not the State acting to deprive people of their access to 
water supply services. Rather, the State‘s duty to protect the right to water in the 
context of water services privatisation by establishing the necessary regulatory 
framework becomes relevant. This is consistent with the approach stated above that 
the State has an obligation to prevent third parties from threatening access to equal, 
affordable, sufficient, safe and acceptable water especially in privatisation contexts.634  
4 5 3 2 Menores Comunidad Paynemil 
In the Menores Comunidad Paynemil case,635 the Neuquen Province's Official 
Defender of Minors filed a complaint alleging the pollution of water with heavy metals 
by an oil company. This resulted in the contamination of water sources with lead and 
mercury on which an indigenous Mapuche community of Paynemil in Neuquen 
depended for its water supply. Studies had revealed high levels of toxic metals in 
people‘s blood and urine. An ―acción de amparo‖ (an expedited procedure) was 
launched against the government on the grounds that the latter had violated its 
obligation to protect the community‘s right to health by failing to regulate the private 
oil company.636 The applicant petitioned that the State be ordered to provide 
sufficient drinking water to ensure the survival of the affected community, to conduct 
diagnosis and treatment of affected minors, and to adopt adequate measures to 
prevent future soil and water pollution.637  
 The Division II of Neuquen's Civil Court of Appeals (hereinafter the ―Court‖) 
held that the State had not taken any reasonable measures to address the pollution 
problem, even though it was timeously informed about this deleterious situation 
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threatening the health of the Paynemil community.638 The court ordered the State to 
supply the Paynemil community with 250 litres of drinking water per family daily. The 
court further ordered the State to ensure the provision of drinking water by 
appropriate means within 45 days of the granting of the order.639 The court held that, 
due to the serious consequences of water pollution, any delay in providing resources 
and in adopting steps necessary to reverse the prevailing situation constituted an 
illegal omission violating the Paynemil community‘s constitutional rights to health and 
to a safe environment.640 
This case illustrates the close relation and interlinked nature of the different 
obligations imposed on the State by the right to water. The court made a finding that 
the government had violated its obligation to protect the Mapuche community from 
pollution of its water source by the non-State actor. In doing so, it emphasised the 
State‘s protective mandate towards public goods such as water, notwithstanding the 
management of this resource by a private actor. This is consistent with the 
international law position where States are obliged to take steps to prevent third 
parties from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in their 
jurisdictions. The court proceeded to rule that the State has an obligation to fulfill the 
right to water, at least in the form of the interim relief it granted.  In the long-run, 
however, a sustainable solution would have to be found to foreclose the pollution of 
the indigenous community‘s drinking water sources by the non-State actor, again 
buttressing the State‘s duty to protect. 
 
4 5 3 3 Marchisio José Bautista y Otros 
In the Marchisio José Bautista y Otros,641 the applicants, residents of a poor 
neighbourhood in the city of Córdoba, alleged an unconstitutional lack of access to 
the public water system and that existing water resources were being contaminated 
by untreated sewage.642 The claimants had no connection to the public water 
distribution network, hence relied on domestic groundwater wells for their water 
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supply. A water and sewage treatment plant was located upstream on the river close 
to these neighbourhoods. Due to the insufficient capacity of the treatment plant, 
untreated sewage from the plant was spilt into the river resulting in the claimants‘ 
water wells being polluted with faecal matter and other contaminants.643 
Even though the Argentinean legal framework does not expressly recognise 
the right to water, the court held that this right is implied in the right to health hence 
the State had violated the right to water. The significance of the decision lies in the 
district court‘s endorsement of the interdependence of human rights. The court not 
only focused on the right to health only but also found a violation of the right to water 
under article 66.2 of the provincial constitution of Córdoba which protects the right to 
health. This allowed the court to order authorities to provide the applicants with 200 
litres of safe drinking water per household per day until full access to the public water 
services could be ensured.644 The court once again supported its minimum core 
approach as reflected in the Marchisio José Bautista above by ordering the 
authorities to provide 200 litres of water per family per day. McGraw has noted that 
the standard set in the Marchisio José Bautista case has been replicated in other 
cases as recently as 2007. The Special Administrative Chambers of Buenos Aires 
has confirmed that the State has an obligation to provide vulnerable populations with 
adequate access to water even if this will entail costly measures.645 
The court referred to the various international human rights instruments 
incorporated in the Argentinean Constitution, particularly article 25 of the UDHR and 
articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR. It also relied on General Comment 15 thus 
reiterating that the right to access safe water is indispensable for the right to 
health.646 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the right to health encompasses 
measures to prevent damage to health such as providing water and this obliges the 
State to take positive measures.647 The court therefore ordered the State to 
immediately take urgent measures to minimise the environmental impact of the plant 
until a permanent solution is found. The court further ordered the State to provide 
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200 litres of safe drinking water per household per day until full access to the public 
water services is ensured.648  
The Marchisio José Bautista y Otros case is very important as the court order 
included a positive obligation for the State to provide safe drinking water in the long-
term by constructing a sewage treatment plant that has sufficient capacity. The 
urgency of the situation was such that the court ordered the State to avail the 
complainants with short-term relief in the form of 200 litres per household per day. 
The court‘s approach is in line with the international law injunction of ensuring 
―access to the minimum essential amount of water that is sufficient and safe for 
personal and domestic uses to prevent disease.‖649 
The above jurisprudence from Argentina clearly demonstrate that the full 
typology of human rights obligations engendered by the right to water can and have 
been adjudicated by courts, though not in a direct and explicit manner. The courts 
have dealt with a plethora of issues, ranging from disconnection of water services by 
private companies such as in the Quevedo Miguel Angel y Otros Aguas Cordobesas 
S.A case above referring to water privatisation to water pollution and the lack of 
access to water supply thereby emphasising the State‘s duty to protect. Notably, with 
regard to the obligation to fulfil, the Argentinean courts, like their South African 
counterparts, have distinguished between short-term relief and sustainable long-term 
solution meeting of minimum core obligations as well as the obligation to achieve 
progressively the full realisation of the right to water.  
The Indian legal framework does not explicitly recognise access to safe water 
as a human right. Additionally, the Indian Constitution provides for economic, social, 
and cultural rights only in the form of non-justiciable Directive Principles of State 
Policy. Nevertheless, these Directive Principles of State Policy are important in the 
formulation of public policy, governance, and the interpretation of constitutional rights 
despite their character as non-justiciable.650 The following section discusses some of 
the jurisprudence from the Indian courts relating to the right to water.  
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4 5 4 India 
The right to water has evolved in India, not through legislative action but through 
judicial interpretation. Indian courts, in particular the Indian Supreme Court have 
primarily derived the right to water from the right to life guaranteed under article 21 of 
the Indian Constitution. This right has been interpreted to include all facets of life to 
encompass the right to a clean environment to sustain life.651  While upholding the 
Indian government‘s decision to construct over 3,000 dams on the river Narmada, the 
Indian Supreme Court described water as a basic need for the survival of human 
beings and part of the right of life.652 In the case of Subhash Kumar,653 the court 
stated that the right to life under article 21 ―includes the right of enjoyment of pollution 
free water and air for full enjoyment of life.‖654 This position has since been 
expressed in many cases. This section only presents a limited selection to illustrate 
the extent to which Indian courts have adjudicated on the right to water.  
4 5 4 1 FK Hussain v Union of India 
In the case of FK Hussain v Union of India 655 the High Court of Kerala had to 
adjudicate on a case involving the situation on certain coral islands where fresh water 
resources are scarce. The local authority adopted a programme to augment drinking 
water supply by extracting more groundwater using modern ground water technology 
to cater for the demands of the increasing population. The petitioners argued that the 
increased extraction of fresh water from ground water reserves would upset the fresh 
water equilibrium and lead to salinity of groundwater.656 The court held that the local 
authority‘s action would amount to an infringement of article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution as the right to life ―is much more than the right to animal existence...[t]he 
right to sweet water, and the right to free air, are attributes of the right to life.‖657   
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The court therefore directed the local authority to ensure that its action would 
not result in salt water intrusion in order to protect the existing water supply and 
thereby to respect the right to water of the inhabitants of the islands.658 The case is 
important in so far as it recognised the right to water and affirmed a State‘s duty to 
respect existing access to water. 
 
4 5 4 2 Perumatty Grama Panchayat v State of Kerala 
In Perumatty Grama Panchayat v State of Kerala659 the High Court of Kerala 
discussed at length the State‘s duty to protect access to water. The case concerned 
a petition for the cancellation of a licence of a non-alcoholic beverages entity due to 
its excessive exploitation of groundwater resources. It was alleged that the excessive 
extraction of underground water had resulted in the drying up of water sources, 
leading to acute drinking water scarcity in the region.660 The village council had 
subsequently refused the company permission to extract groundwater. The company 
argued that there was no law governing the exploitation and use of groundwater 
resources, and for that reason everybody had the right to extract any groundwater 
available on their land.661  
The court pointed out that the arguments advanced by the company were 
incompatible with the emerging environmental jurisprudence developed around 
article 21 of the Indian constitution. The court made reference to Principle 2 of the 
Stockholm Declaration (discussed in chapter 2),662 and stated that the natural 
resources of the earth must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future 
generations.663 Additionally, the court relied heavily on the public trust doctrine based 
on English common law, pointing out that ―[t]he State is the trustee of all natural 
resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.‖664 On that basis, 
the court ruled that the State has an obligation to protect natural resources.665 The 
court ruled that the underground water belongs to the public and must be protected 
by the State against excessive exploitation. According to the court, the State‘s 
neglect of its duty of protection would constitute an infringement of the right to life 
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protected under article 21 of the Indian Constitution as the right to clean water is a 
constituent component of the right to life.666  
Although the court acknowledged a land owners‘ customary right to extract 
reasonable amounts of ground water under their land for domestic uses and to meet 
agricultural requirements, the court ruled that in the present case the amount of water 
that was withdrawn exceeded this quantity.667 The court concluded that the excessive 
extraction of groundwater by the company was illegal and the State had a duty to 
prevent this, thereby emphasising the State‘s protective mandate as part of its 
obligation to protect access to water.668 The CESCR has emphasised this aspect of 
the State‘s protective duty, enjoining the latter to adopt the necessary and effective 
legislative and other measures to restrain third parties from polluting and inequitably 
extracting from water resources.669 
4 5 4 3 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India 
In the landmark case of Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India,670 the court 
explicitly linked environmental concerns to the right to water. The petitioners were 
concerned about water pollution caused by more than 900 tanneries that were 
discharging untreated effluent in agricultural fields, waterways and open land. The 
untreated effluent from the tanneries ended up in the river Palar which was the main 
source of water supply for the residents of the area. Although the court 
acknowledged the importance of the leather industry to the Indian economy, it 
emphasised that this development must be sustainable as any developmental project 
must not destroy the ecology and constitute a hazard for human health.671  
The court ruled that the Indian Constitution protected the right to clean water, 
citing the right to a clean environment as the source of the right.672 The court thus 
ordered the government to implement the precautionary and polluter-pays principles 
and to ensure compensation for the victims of the water pollution.673 In addition, the 
tanneries were ordered to set up pollution control devices, failing which the court 
                                                     
666
 Para 34. 
667
 Para 34. 
668
 Para 34. 
669
 See CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 23. 
670
 Vellore Citizens‘ Welfare Forum v Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647. 
671
 Paras 11-14. 
672
 Para 16. 
673
 Para 16. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 285 
 
would order them to be closed.674 This case is particularly important as it clearly 
illustrates the State‘s obligation to prevent third parties, in this case tanneries, from 
infringing on the right to water of others and to protect people from the pollution of 
their drinking water. The court thus enforced the State‘s obligation to prevent third 
parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to water by polluting water 
resources.675 
 
4 5 4 4 S K Garg v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 
In the case of S K Garg v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,676 the petitioner 
approached the Allahabad High Court to compel the State of Uttar Pradesh to ensure 
regular water supply in the city of Allahabad whose water supply system was in a 
state of disrepair. This resulted in many neighbourhoods receiving very limited 
quantities or no water at all.677 The court held that ―the right to get water is part of the 
right to life guaranteed by article 21 of the Constitution.‖678    
As part of its order, the court appointed a 11-member committee679 that was 
directed to explore the problem of lack of access to water supply and to find a 
sustainable solution and submit a report to the court.680 The court further ordered the 
committee to consider immediate remedial steps as well as long term solutions to 
address the situation. Although the court made several suggestions, it admitted that it 
lacked the technical expertise to make a decision on the best way to address the 
situation.681 The court also issued a number of immediate orders against the State 
authorities. These included an order to repair the existing tube wells and hand pumps 
that had broken down within a week of the order as well as to regularly test water to 
ensure its drinking water quality.682  
The court had to adjudicate the positive obligation to fulfill the right to water 
due to the lack of access to water supply. Significantly, the court acknowledged its 
lack of expertise to decide on how the government had to solve the problem and 
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realise the right to water. It therefore turned to the innovative solution of setting up a 
committee that was directed to investigate and resolve the issue. The State was in 
violation of its obligation to fulfill the right to water by neglecting to take all necessary 
steps to ensure the realisation of the right to water by residents of the city of 
Allahabad.683 The court in this case affirmed the State‘s obligation to fulfill (provide) 
the right where individuals are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise that 
right themselves by the means at their disposal.684 
 
4 6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed one of the key developments in international human rights 
theory and practice from the early 1980s, the development of typologies to elaborate 
the nature of obligations imposed by human rights instruments on States. It was 
demonstrated that all human rights, including the right to water, impose a spectrum of 
duties and that the duty applicable in a particular situation depends on a contextual 
evaluation of the case. Invariably, distinguishing between the various rights is not 
very helpful as an analytic model. The use of typologies as an analytical tool has 
contributed immensely to the further clarification of the normative content and the 
obligations that the right to water imposes on States. This chapter showed that using 
the typologies of State obligations as an analytical tool has helped to dispel the 
notion that there are any marked differences between human rights. Rather, the 
distinction should be between different levels of duties applicable in a particular case. 
This analytic model provides a better understanding of the scope and content of the 
right to water and helps to safeguard the right, whether water is provided by the State 
or a private operator.  
The framework reinforces the point that privatisation of water services does 
not relieve the State of its duty to prevent violations of the right to water by third 
parties. A privatisation scheme should not lead to a situation where various 
components of the right to water are impinged upon. The State must put in place 
mechanisms to prevent and address violations by third parties. For a State to 
effectively discharge its protective mandate particularly where water services have 
                                                     
683
 See CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 44 (c). 
684
 Para 25. 
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been privatised, it is important for it to put in place a regulatory and monitoring 
mechanism to monitor the performance of water services providers. 
Additionally, even in case of privatisation of water services, the State should 
put in place mechanisms to ameliorate the condition of less privileged and 
disadvantaged members of society. Denial of a basic water supply as a result of 
privatisation of water services not only poses a serious health risk, but also deprives 
the victims of their inherent dignity. The State should adopt intervention measures 
such as the use of a range of low-cost technologies and appropriate pricing policies 
such as free or low-cost water and income supplements, subsidies, and other related 
measures in favour of disadvantaged groups.  
 The above international regional and domestic case law reinforces the point 
that privatisation of water services does not relieve the State of its legal responsibility 
under international human rights law. A human rights approach to water privatisation 
mandates that privatisation of water services should have as its key objective the 
realisation of the right to water, especially by those currently unserved or 
underserved.  
The next chapter discusses and analyses the question as to whether 
international human rights law, and in particular the human right to water, is directly 
binding on non-State actors involved in the provision of water services. This will help 
in the formulation of an accountability model explored in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
The right to water: The obligations of non-State actors 
5 1 Introduction 
International human rights law imposes obligations on States to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfill the human rights of those within their jurisdiction.1 Not least among 
these are obligations to adopt policies and measures geared towards the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights such as the right to water.2  Human rights treaties 
are State-focused in their nature and envisage ratification only by States. This is not 
surprising given that the former were adopted at a time when the State‘s leading role 
in the provision of certain goods and services fundamental to the functioning of 
society such as access to water, education and health services was unrivalled.3 
Globalisation,4 liberalisation and privatisation5 as highlighted above6 have resulted in 
the loosening of the State‘s stranglehold in the provision and management of goods 
and services such as water, health and education. This has resulted in the 
concomitant prevalence of non-State actors involvement in the provision of goods 
and services.7  
Despite the involvement of non-State actors in the provision of goods and 
services, the importance of water and other socio-economic rights to the wellbeing 
and dignity of individuals and groups remains unchanged. McBeth has argued that a 
                                                     
1
 See chapter 4 above, sections 4 2 1 - 4 2 4. 
2
 A McBeth ―Privatising Human Rights: What happens to the State‘s Human Rights Duties when 
Services are Privatised?‖ 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 133 133. 
3
 133. 
4
 According to Bertucci & Alberti: 
―[G]lobalisation is a complex phenomenon, which encompasses a great variety of tendencies 
and trends in the economic, social and cultural spheres. It has a multidimensional character 
and thus does not lend itself to a unique definition. For purposes of simplicity, it may be 
described as [the] increasing and intensified flows between countries of goods, services, 
capital, ideas, information and people, which produce cross-border integration of a number of 
economic, social and cultural activities.‖ See G Bertucci & A Alberti ―Globalisation and the 
Role of the State: Challenges and Perspectives‖ in DA Rondinelli & G Shabbir (eds) 
Reinventing Government for the Twenty-First Century, State Capacity in a Globalising Society 
(2003) 17 17.  
5
 See chapter 3 section 3 2 3 above for definitions of liberalisation and privatisation. 
6
 See chapter 3 above. 
7
 Isa notes that: 
  ―With respect to the reduction of the role of the State, it is clear that liberalisation, privatisation 
and deregulation spawned by neoliberal globalisation are aimed at reducing the role of the 
State in economic and social systems... As a result, sectors previously covered by the public 
sector are left in the hands of the market.‖ Isa further argues that such a process has ―steadily 
weakened human rights protection in a number of countries, primarily affecting economic, 
social and cultural rights.‖ FG Isa ―Globalisation, Privatisation and Human Rights‖ in K De 
Feyter & FG Isa (eds) Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (2005) 9 13. 
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change in an entity operating a prison, for example, does not alter the prisoners‘ right 
to be treated with dignity.8 Similarly, the involvement of non-State actors in the 
provision of socio-economic goods such as water, health and education should not 
down-grade the significance of such goods to human welfare.  
The relationship between human rights and non-State actors has become a 
highly topical area in current international and comparative law.9 In recent decades, 
especially the 1990s, global markets have expanded significantly. This can be 
attributed to free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and domestic 
liberalisation and privatisation.10 The rights of transnational corporations have 
become more securely strengthened in national laws as part of market liberalisation. 
Such rights are increasingly being defended through compulsory arbitration before 
international arbitral tribunals through free trade and bilateral investment 
agreements.11  
One of the fundamental issues engendered by privatisation as discussed 
above12 is the prevalence of non-State actor involvement in the provision of basic 
goods such as water. The increase in privatisation entails that access to such basic 
services is increasingly dependent on the actions and policies of private service 
providers.13 The traditional approach maintains that the protection of human rights 
                                                     
8
 See McBeth 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 134. 
9
 DM Chirwa ―In Search of Philosophical Justifications and Suitable Models for the Horizontal 
Application of Human Rights‖ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 294 294. See further 
discussions in DM Chirwa "The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding 
Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights" (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1-36; 
K De Feyter & FG Isa (eds) Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (2005); P 
Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005); A Clapham Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors (2006); SR Ratner ―Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility‖ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443-545; M McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & T Higgins ―No 
Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of ECOSOC Rights in Bolivia‖ (2004) 27 
Fordham International Law Journal 1663-1805; C Jochnick ―Confronting the Impunity of non-State 
Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights‖ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56-79. 
10
 See Wels and Elias noting that these processes make it difficult to regard States as controlling their 
own separate economies as ―States find that their role has become increasingly complex in a more 
highly interdependent world and take on the role of attempting to attract international capital rather 
than regulating it.‖ See C Wels & J Elias ―Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on 
the International State‖ in P Alston Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005) 141 147.   
11
 See United Nations Human Rights Council Business and Human Rights-Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts: Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises (2007) A/HRC/4/035 para 2. 
12
 See chapter 3 above. 
13
 See P Bond, D McDonald & G Ruiters ―Water Privatisation in Southern Africa: The State of the 
Debate‖ (2003) 4 Economic and Social Rights Review 1 10. 
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remains exclusively the responsibility of States regardless of private involvement in 
the human rights sensitive goods and services.14  
The State is obliged to regulate private relationships to ensure that individuals 
are not arbitrarily deprived of the enjoyment of their right to water by other private 
individuals and groups.15 Recent experiences have demonstrated that private actors, 
like State actors, can and often do infringe on human rights of groups and 
individuals.16 Feminist and children‘s rights scholars have also highlighted the 
limitations of the State-centric approach to human rights, arguing that women‘s and 
children‘s rights are particularly susceptible to infringement by non-State actors in 
private relations.17 This has reinforced arguments against the view that human rights 
bind the State only with private actors exempt from such binding human rights 
obligations. This leads to the question as to whether a human right to water under 
international human rights law imposes any direct obligations on non-State actors 
involved in the provision of water services. This question is relevant because the 
involvement of non-State actors such as Multinational Corporations (hereinafter 
referred to as ―MNCs‖) in the water sector has brought to the fore the issue of lack of 
accountability.18 
The privatisation of human rights-sensitive services such as water brings with 
it a fundamental shift in the method for delivering positive human rights outcomes 
given the involvement of non-State actors.19 Such actors are not directly addressed 
by human rights treaties despite their increasing involvement in the management and 
                                                     
14
 Chirwa 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 3. 
15
 Craven The International Covenant 112.  
16
 See Chirwa (2004) Melbourne Journal of International Law 3. 
17
 See for instance C Romany ―State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in Human Rights Law‖ in R Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National 
and International Perspectives (1994) 85 95. See also Chirwa 2004 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 2. 
18
 See Chapter 3 above on the involvement of non-State actors in the provision of water services. 
19
 The activities of MNCs often have a positive effect on economic, social and cultural rights. They 
provide much needed employment thus facilitating the right to work itself instrumental in the realisation 
of related socio-economic goods. Their innovation and the associated skills‘ transfer can lead to the 
creation of new products, such as new medicines which facilitate the enjoyment of socio-economic 
rights such as the rights to health or an adequate standard of living. However, corporate ownership or 
control of goods for human welfare such as water or patents in life-saving drugs may drive the price of 
such goods out of reach of poor people if not properly regulated. In a recent decision South Africa‘s 
Supreme Court of Appeal has ruled that public interest considerations must be taken into account 
when balancing the interests of the patentee and the infringer in determining whether or not to grant 
an interim interdict. The Supreme Court of Appeal however held that on the facts of the particular 
case, the public interest concerns did not weigh in favour of allowing infringer to sell its generic cancer 
drug in violation of the patentee's patent. See Cipla Medpro v Aventis Pharma (139/12) Aventis 
Pharma SA v Cipla Life Sciences and Treatment Action Campaign as amicus curiae (138/12) 2012 
ZASCA 108 paras 46, 49 & 61. 
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distribution of social goods. Chapter 3 above discussed the prominence of non-State 
actors in the provision of water services as a result of the privatisation movement. 
The fundamental question that arises is whether this transfer of functional 
responsibility gives rise to a corresponding human rights duty on such non-State 
actors? This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part questions the efficacy of 
the State-centric focus of human rights approach, given the emergence of powerful 
non-State actors capable of abusing human rights in cases where the State is unable 
or unwilling to protect against such abuses. It proceeds to discuss the necessity as 
well as limitations of imposing direct obligations on non-State actors under 
international law. The second part discusses and analyses the emergence of 
voluntary soft law initiatives to impose human rights responsibilities on non-State 
actors. It discusses some of these initiatives and their potential for holding 
corporations responsible for the right to water in privatised contexts. The third part 
considers some concrete initiatives such as corporate codes of conduct, domestic 
legislation and other multi-stakeholder initiatives and their practical application for 
holding private corporations involved in the provision of water services accountable. 
 
5 1 1 Imposing human rights duties on non-State actors 
It is not rare in the literature to find the concept of non-State actor left undefined due 
to the elasticity of the concept.20 Some authors such as Andrew Clapham and Philip 
Alston have attempted to define the term non-State actor.21 Clapham starts from the 
premise that the concept of a non-State actor is generally understood to refer to any 
entity that is not a State such as armed groups, civil society and corporations.22 
Clapham notes that the open-ended nature of the term defies a restrictive definition 
and as such gives rise to misunderstandings and tensions. This is because 
                                                     
20
 P Alston ―Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?‖ in P Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights 3 14. 
21
 A Clapham ―Non State Actors‖ in V Chetail (ed) Post-Conflict Peace-building: A Lexicon (2009) 200-
212. 
22
 Clapham ―Non-State Actors‖ in Post-Conflict 200. Senjonjo, for instance, pointed out that the term 
non-State actor is virtually open-ended. He thus defined the term to encompass all actors other than 
States. This includes Transnational Corporations (TNCs), professional bodies and other non-
governmental organisations. It also extends to United Nations (UN) agencies, other international 
organisations, and specialist bodies within the UN system such as the World Health Organisation, the 
UN Children‘s Emergency Fund, the International Labour Organisation, the UN Development 
Programme and other intergovernmental organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and regional development banks.  See M 
Senyonjo ―Non State Actors and Socio-Economic Rights‖ in MA Baderin & R McCorquodale (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2006) 109 111-112. 
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―corporations find themselves branded in the same category as rebel groups and the 
UN finds itself branded with paramilitaries.‖23 Clearly such an expansive 
understanding of non-State actors is evidence of the extent to which the meaning 
attributed to the term has become heavily context-dependent.24 This definitional 
problem is further noted by Philip Alston who concedes that ―membership of this 
group is difficult to define and virtually open-ended.‖25 Ratner has pointed out that in 
a legal system based and centered on States as the primary subjects, it is logical to 
describe the other actors as non-State actors.26 
What is particularly noteworthy is that the term ―non-State actor‖ has been 
used to refer to a wide range of actors. These include entities such as MNCs, 
intergovernmental organisations such as the African Union (hereinafter referred to as 
the ―AU‖), the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter referred to as the ―WTO‖), the 
International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as the ―IMF‖) and the World 
Bank.27 It has also been used to refer to supranational organisations such as the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the ―EU‖), liberation movements, 
insurgent groups, and voluntary associations.28 
The European Commission identifies three criteria for an organisation to 
qualify as a non-State actor. The first criterion is that the organisation must have 
been created voluntarily by citizens. Secondly, although the organisation can be a 
for-profit or not-for profit one, it must be independent of the State. The third criterion 
is that the organisation must have as its main aim defending an issue or defending 
an interest. According to the EU, such non-State actors include non-governmental 
organisations (hereinafter referred to as ―NGOs‖), trade unions, employers‘ 
                                                     
23
 Alston also alludes to the difficulties of defining a non-State actors, pointing out that: 
 ―[T]he resulting grab-bag of miscellaneous players ranges from transnational corporations 
and small time business and contactors, through religious and labour groups, organised 
epistemic communities, civil society…international organisations to terrorist bands and armed 
resistance groups.‖ See Alston ―Not-a-Cat Syndrome‖ in Non State Actors 5. 
24
 17. 
25
 4-6.  
26
 Ratner 2001 Yale Law Journal 461- 462.  It is interesting to note that one of the leading scholars on 
the issue of non-State actors and human rights, Andrew Clapham has a 613-page monograph on 
human rights obligations of non-State actors but nowhere is the concept defined. See Clapham Non-
State Actors i-613. 
27
 Clapham Non-State Actors 109-193. 
28
 109. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 293 
 
associations, universities, associations of churches and other confessional 
movements and cultural associations.29  
Josellin and Wade have proposed what is ostensibly a comprehensive 
definition of the concept of non-State actor.30 According to the criteria laid down by 
the two authors, any entity meeting the following three criteria qualifies to be 
regarded as a non-State actor. Firstly, an entity must be substantially or entirely 
autonomous from State funding and control.31 Secondly, the organisation in question 
must operate or participate in networks which extend across State borders in the 
process engaging in transnational relations, linking socio-political systems and 
societies.32 Under this criterion, entities engaged solely at the domestic level in one 
                                                     
29
 See Communication from the European Commission to the European Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee COM (2002) 598 para 1.2 
<http://www.enpi-info.eu/enpidoc/content/commission-communication-participation-non-state-actors-
eu-development-policy> (accessed 16.02.2012). The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the EU 
and African, Caribbean and Pacific States. Although that provision does not define non-State actors, it 
envisages cooperation between States and non-State actors such as the ―private sector, economic 
and social partners, including trade union organisations, civil society in all its forms according to 
national characteristics‖ in developmental initiatives. See articles 4 and 6 of the Cotonou Agreement 
between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific States (2000) < 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/Cotonou_1_body_-2.pdf> (accessed 16.02.2012). This issue is 
however not so clear-cut. Noteworthy is the South African constitution which defines an organ of State 
as, inter alia, any functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation. See section 239(b)(ii) of the South African Constitution. In the South African 
case of Balolo and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and Others, the court adopted a broad 
meaning of the term ―organ of State‖, noting that a university qualified as an organ of State as that 
term must include (i) statutory bodies; (ii) parastatals; (iii) bodies or institutions established by statute 
but managed and maintained privately, such as universities, law societies, the South African Medical 
and Dental Council, etc; (iv) all bodies supported by the State and operating in close cooperation with 
structures of State authority; and (v) certain private bodies or institutions fulfilling certain key functions 
under the supervision of organs of State. See Balolo and Others v University of Bophuthatswana and 
Others 1995 4 SA 230 (B). In Inkatha Freedom Party and Anor v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and Others 2000 3 SA 119 (C), the court stated that ―the definition of organ of State in the 1996 
Constitution expands the definition beyond such institutions for it includes within the definition those 
institutions or functionaries who might otherwise be outside the State but which exercise public 
power.‖ The above position was further emphasised by the Constitutional Court in the case of 
Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality where the Court found that the 
Independent Electoral Commission was an organ of State in terms of section 239 of the Constitution. 
This finding was based on the fact that the Independent Electoral Commission ―exercises public 
powers and performs public functions in terms of the Constitution.‖ See Electoral Commission v 
Langeberg Municipality 2001 3 SA 925 (CC). Geo Quinot has pointed out that: 
―[a]lthough the control test is the most important factor..[in determining whether an entity is a 
State organ], it is not the sole criterion. The public nature and statutory source of its functions 
remain contributing factors, especially to distinguish institutions of a commercial character 
under State control from other similar bodies under analogous private control.‖ See G Quinot 
State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework 64. 
30
 See D Josselin & D Wallace ―Non State Actors in World Politics: A Framework‖ in D Josellin & D 
Wallace (eds) Non State Actors in World Politics 1 3-4. 
31
 3. 
32
 4. 
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State are not part of the definition. The focus of Josellin and Wade‘s definition is 
limited to those entities with a transnational dimension.33  
Josellin and Wade‘s definition is wide enough to encompass a wide range of 
actors. Its fundamental weakness is its exclusive focus on those actors with a 
transnational outlook. Such a definition excludes entities operating only at the 
domestic level. It is also not clear as to the level of State funding or the extent and 
nature of government control that might exclude an entity from the definition of a non-
State actor.34 It is however important to note that the term non-State actor is 
increasingly assuming a specific meaning according to the particular context in which 
it is used. Within the context of arms control, the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines uses the term non-State actor to refer to such entities as rebel groups, 
irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerrillas and liberation 
movements.35 
This dissertation will use the concept of non-State actor to refer to both MNCs 
and domestic corporations unless the context indicates otherwise. The main focus of 
this dissertation is on businesses such as MNCs and domestic businesses 
enterprises. MNCs and national corporations are key players in the privatisation of 
water services, either individually or in the form of consortia as illustrated in the 
Cochabamba and Dar es Salaam privatisation cases discussed above.36 
Furthermore, MNCs evoke particular concern in relation to global trends. MNCs are 
very active in some of the most important sectors of national economies such as 
extractive industries, health provision, agriculture and the provision of water 
services.37 Other studies have focused on the human rights obligations of entities 
                                                     
33
 It is unclear why the two authors restrict the definition of non-State actors to entities engaging in 
transnational relations while excluding purely domestic entities. 
34
 Senyongo ―Non State Actors‖ in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 112. 
35
 Alston ―Not a Cat Syndrome‖ in Non State Actors and Human Rights 14.  
36
 See section 3 5 1 of chapter 3 above. In the Dar se Salaam privatisation case, two MNCs, Biwater 
International Limited, a British water multinational, and HP Gauff Ingenieure, a German corporation 
submitted a successful bid and proceeded to incorporate under Tanzanian law a local operating 
company, City Water. City Water in turn proceeded to enter into a concession agreement with 
DAWASA, the State regulatory agency. In Bolivia, the consortium which won the concession to 
manage the Cochabamba municipal water system involved MNCs led by International Water Limited 
(England), the utility firm Edison (Italy), Bechtel Enterprise Holdings (USA), Abengoa (Spain) and two 
local corporations from Bolivia, ICE Ingenieros and the cement maker SOBOCE. 
37
 D Weissbrodt & M Kruger ―Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights‖ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 
901 909. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 295 
 
such as the World Bank and IMF,38 but these institutions will not be discussed within 
the limited scope of this chapter.  
It was noted in chapter 3 that privatisation and trade liberalisation has seen 
the emergence of powerful MNCs with resources greater than those of many 
States.39 Although the term MNC is often used in literature on non-State actors, the 
United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the ―UN‖) system tends to use the term 
Transnational Corporations (hereinafter referred to as ―TNCs‖). This dissertation will 
not distinguish between these terms and will use them interchangeably to refer 
broadly to any economic entity, whatever its legal form, operating in more than one 
country.40 Significantly, much of the discussion relating to MNCs will be applicable 
and of relevance to domestic corporations generally. Although the adjective 
―transnational‖ or ―multinational‖ can be employed to emphasise different 
characteristics of certain corporations, it does not really change the nature of the 
corporation as a legal entity.41 The term corporation will thus be used loosely to refer 
to both MNCs and domestic business enterprises. 
It is likely that larger corporations may be expected to have greater 
responsibilities with regard to human rights obligations in general and the right to 
water in particular since they are the dominant players in the water industry. 
Nevertheless, there is no logical reason to omit national corporations for the 
purposes of discussing obligations of non-State actors with regard to the right to 
water. Significantly, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―OECD Guidelines‖) state that the same expectations from MNCs 
are relevant to both multinational and domestic enterprises.42 The International 
Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (hereinafter referred to as the ―ILO Tripartite 
Declaration‖) is also equally applicable to MNCs and domestic corporations. It 
specifically states that:  
                                                     
38
 See generally F Gianviti ―Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary 
Fund‖  in P Alston (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights 113-138; SI Skogly The Human Rights 
Obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2001). 
39
 D Shelton ―Protecting Human Rights in a Globalised World‖ 2002 (25) Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 273 273. 
40
 Alston ―Not-a-Cat' Syndrome‖ in Non-State Actors 1-36. 
41
 Clapham Non State Actors 201. 
42
 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD Guidelines: Concepts and 
Principles (2011) para 5 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en> (accessed on 10.02.2012).  
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―The principles laid down in this Declaration do not aim at introducing or maintaining 
inequalities of treatment between multinational and national enterprises. They reflect 
good practices for all. Multinational and national enterprises, wherever the principles 
of this Declaration are relevant to both, should be subject to the same expectations in 
respect of the their conduct in general and their social practices in particular‖43 
 
5 1 2 Questioning the State-centric focus of human rights 
States are the primary duty bearers for the full range of human rights under the 
international human rights system hence the primary focus of accountability for the 
realisation of human rights.44 The traditional international law approach conforms to 
the State-centric view of world politics. Such a system conceptualises the State as 
the primary actor in the international system, with international law principally 
perceived as a mechanism to regulate relations between States.45 Such an approach 
is predicated on the idea that humankind is organised into territorially-defined 
discrete, political communities in which the State claims exclusive authority over and 
allegiance from the people.46 The above approach ensures that only States are 
parties to international human rights treaties. It is therefore not surprising that only 
                                                     
43
 International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (2006) para 11 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_pdf.> 
(accessed 15.04.2012). 
44
 See Ratner 2001 The Yale Law Journal 461; See also J Oloka-Onyango ―Reinforcing Marginalised 
Rights in an Age of Globalisation: International Mechanisms, Non State Actors and the Struggle for 
Peoples‘ Rights in Africa‖ (2002 – 2003) 18 American University International Review 815 815. See 
also section 4 1 2 in chapter 4 above; Senyongo ―Non State Actors‖ in Economic, Social and Cultural 
109. See also R McCorquodale ―Human Rights and Global Business‖ in S Bottomley & D Kinley (eds) 
Commercial Law and Human Rights (2002) 89 92–94 emphasising the primary responsibility of States 
in maintaining international human rights law and that this obligation remains that of the government 
even if the violator is a non-State actor such as a corporation. See also S Joseph ―Liability of 
Multinational Corporations‖ in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (2008) 613 615-616 stating that ―States have duties to respect, 
protect and fulfill human rights under international human rights law.‖ 
45
 A Cassese International Law (2001) 1. This State-centric focus of international human rights can be 
traced to the development of human rights. The State‘s dominant position and potential to abuse its 
position of authority to the detriment of individuals‘ interests was the basis for human rights to insulate 
the latter against State interference.
45
 In this respect, human rights act as a shield to protect the 
freedom of the individual against unlimited State control, and are viewed primarily as being 
exercisable against the State. It therefore follows that all arms of government, be it the executive, 
legislature and judiciary are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State for any wrongful acts 
that violate the rights of groups or individuals. See Senyongo ―Non State Actors‖ in Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Action 109. 
46
  See Wels & Elias ―Corporate Complicity‖ in Non-State Actors 145. 
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States can be cited as respondents under treaty complaints mechanisms even in 
clear situations evidencing infringement of rights by a non-State actor.47  
The above position is further buttressed by a 2011 statement released by the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―CESCR‖). The CESCR stated that in terms of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
―ICESCR‖),48 States have the primary obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the 
rights of all persons under their jurisdiction in the context of corporate activities 
undertaken by State-owned or private enterprises.49  
The position has been emphasised in the recently adopted United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―UN 
Guiding Principles‖).50  The former Special Representative to the Secretary General 
on ―Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises‖, 
John Ruggie explicitly stated in the UN Guiding Principles that States are the primary 
duty-bearers under international human rights law and trustees of the international 
human rights regime.51 This position is further aptly captured in the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action which provides that the promotion and 
protection of human rights ―is first the responsibility of government.‖52  
The State‘s duty to protect against violations of human rights by non-State 
actors is often raised as an argument against the need to recognise and impose 
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direct human rights duties on non-State actors.53 The current global economic trends 
towards privatisation and the withdrawal of the State in human rights sensitive 
services such as water discussed above have cast aspersions on the utility of relying 
solely on the State‘s duty to protect.54 This approach is insufficient to protect against 
human rights breaches by non-State actors. This is particularly the case where non-
State actors operate across State borders, as MNCs do, making it extremely difficult 
to attribute legal responsibility to a single State.55 Protecting human rights through 
the mechanism of State obligations and concomitant State responsibility for violations 
of such obligations might seem uncontroversial if States represent the only threat to 
the enjoyment of human rights such as the right to water, health or education. This 
might also appear an easy obligation to fulfill if States could be counted on to 
effectively restrain non-State actors from violating human rights.  
A system in which the State is the sole addressee of international human 
rights obligations may not be sufficient to effectively protect groups and individuals 
against infringement of their human rights by non-State actors.56 Nowadays access 
to essential medicines, for example, is not only dependent on the policies and actions 
of the State but also on the decisions and policies of pharmaceutical corporations.57 
Significantly, banks and other financial institutions play a very significant role in 
ensuring access to housing.58 Such actors are equally capable of abusing human 
rights, and creating barriers which prevent people from gaining access to rights such 
as health care, housing and water.  
Privatisation and trade liberalisation has seen the emergence of non-State 
actors with powers akin to, and in some cases dwarfing those of States. These non-
State actors are not only influencing State policies concerning the provision of social 
services but also directly participate in the provision of human rights sensitive goods 
such as water services.59 John Ruggie put in succinctly when he stated that: 
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―Clearly, a more fundamental institutional misalignment is present: between the scope 
and impact of economic forces and actors, on the one hand, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences, on the other. This misalignment 
creates the permissive environment within which blameworthy acts by corporations 
may occur without adequate sanctioning or reparation. For the sake of the victims of 
abuse, and to sustain globalisation as a positive force, this must be fixed.‖60   
The capacity of States to manage the adverse consequences of non-State 
actors‘ infringements of human rights is limited. Some MNCs have become such 
powerful global actors that a number of States, (particularly developing countries) 
may lack the resources or will to control them. Developing countries, in particular, 
may lack the necessary regulatory capacity or be unwilling to regulate MNCs in the 
conduct of their business activities.61 Some States may have the necessary 
environmental and labour legislation but lack of monitoring and enforcement 
capacities may undermine the effectiveness of such laws.62 Significantly, competition 
for direct foreign investment often creates a race to the bottom that limits how strictly 
some States may be willing to regulate and enforce existing environmental, labour 
and tax legislation against MNCs. Graham and Woods have pointed out that many 
developing States often view strengthening labour and environmental regulation as 
hampering economic growth due to the perception that stricter standards will 
discourage inflows of foreign direct investment in favour of States with lower 
environmental and labour standards.63 In some cases, States go as far as soliciting 
corporations to cooperate in impinging human rights. This was clearly the case as 
determined by the African Commission in the SERAC case discussed in chapter 4.64 
Such realities cast aspersions on the utility relying exclusively on States‘ protective 
obligations against potentially harmful conduct of non-State actors.65 The lack of 
willingness or inability of States to regulate non-State actors has therefore brought 
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into sharp focus the lack of accountability of non-State actors for activities that 
interfere with human rights of individuals and groups.66 
 
5 2 Necessity of imposing human rights obligations on non-State actors 
Obligations imposed by international human rights law should extend to the private 
sphere in order to provide a normative and remedial framework for redressing abuse 
of human rights perpetrated by non-State actors. Clapham, for instance, has pointed 
out that: 
―The application of human rights in the private sphere squarely addresses the 
effectiveness of human rights protection and so goes some way to answering those 
critics who point to the empty formal nature of rights. The criticism is often based on 
the failure of a rights discourse to address all forms of oppression and suffering. This 
is particularly important in an era of powerful corporations, ambiguous State 
intervention, increasing privatisation, and racial and sexual violence.‖67 
The imperative to impose direct human rights obligations on non-State actors, 
according to one commentator, is a practical necessity since rights are entitlements 
that must be respected by all.68 It is noteworthy that human rights treaties are 
generally drafted by reference to specific entitlements, for example, the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living or the right to health.69  McBeth argues 
that he impacts for the victim are the same whether the perpetrator is a State or non-
State actor.70 UN treaty bodies have recognised the significance of holding non-State 
actors for human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the treaty bodies have acknowledged 
their own limited mandate flowing from the provisions of the relevant treaties that 
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permit them to only monitor State compliance with treaty obligations.71 The CESCR 
has for instance observed within the context of the right to health that: 
―While only States are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for 
compliance with it, all members of society — individuals, including health 
professionals, families, local communities, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organisations, civil society organisations, as well as the private  business sector — 
have responsibilities regarding the realisation of the right to health.‖72 
 
5 2 1 Limits to holding non-State actors accountable for human rights violations 
International human rights law principally contemplates two sets of actors who may 
be held liable for violations of human rights. These are States through the concept of 
State responsibility and individuals through the concept of individual responsibility, 
which is primarily criminal.73 This approach however relies on the presence of a 
sound domestic legal system that will ensure that non-State actors such as 
corporations are held directly or indirectly accountable for human rights.  
It is easy to refer to the State‘s duty to regulate as part of obligation to protect, 
but it must not be underestimated that such regulation requires financial and human 
resources. This might be challenging for developing States where resource 
constraints present another difficulty for regulating and controlling the human rights 
sensitive activities of non-State actors.74 It is also significant to note that in this era of 
globalisation, capital has become quite mobile. This often forces many States to 
compete for investment opportunities. The result is a rush to the bottom which results 
in the lowering of human rights standards to attract or retain investments. It is 
therefore difficult (if not impossible) to impose high levels of control and regulation on 
non-State actors without uniform international standards of regulation. It has for 
instance been pointed out within the context of the privatisation of water services that 
current estimates suggest that a State could save about 10 per cent of the total 
operation costs of the service if it were to effectively monitor the non-State actor 
operator.75 
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Relying on criminal responsibility is not adequate for the purposes of 
regulating corporations. Individual criminal responsibility applies to a smaller range of 
abuses such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.76 However, the direct 
accountability of non-State actors before international adjudicative tribunals remains 
underdeveloped, something underlined by the International Criminal Court‘s lack of 
jurisdiction over corporations.77  
The inadequacy of solely relying on the State‘s protective obligation under 
international human rights law has been highlighted by scholars. Susan Strange, for 
instance, has emphasised the significance of conceptualising power beyond political 
power to include economic power embedded in markets.78 Non-State actors are 
increasingly influencing government policies concerning the provision of social 
services due to their immense power and influence. The limitations and obstacles 
attendant on the State‘s duty to protect means that other efforts aimed at fostering 
the accountability of non-State actors such as through legally enforceable direct 
human rights standards on non-State actors should not be abandoned.79 The above 
clearly makes a strong case for imposing direct human rights obligations on non-
State actors.  
5 2 2 Limitations on holding corporations accountable under domestic jurisdictions 
There is an emerging domestic practice recognising the applicability of human rights 
on binding non-State actors. Chirwa‘s study of the relevant jurisprudence from the 
US, Canada, Germany, South Africa and Ireland revealed an emerging trend 
demonstrating that non-State actors are increasingly being bound by human rights 
provided under the constitutions or applicable domestic laws of those countries.80 
The South Constitution81 expressly provides for the horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights.82 Section 8(1) provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and 
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binds all organs of the State.83 Section 8(2) of the South African Constitution provides 
that a provision in the Bill of Rights ―binds a natural and juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of 
any duty imposed by the right.‖ Furthermore, section 8(3) provides that whenever a 
court has to give effect to the horizontal application of a right in the Bill of Rights, it 
―must apply, or if necessary, develop the common law to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to the right.‖84 Section 39(2) is another important provision as it 
enjoins a court, tribunal or forum when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law ―to promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.‖85 The above provisions create the possibility for socio-
economic rights such as the right to water to apply in legal relations between private 
parties.86  
The Malawian Constitution also envisages the direct application of 
constitutionally protected rights to private conduct or non-State actors.87 Section 
15(1) of the Malawian Constitution provides that the human rights protected in that 
document ―shall be respected and upheld…where applicable to them, by all natural 
and legal persons in Malawi.‖ Furthermore, section 12(iv) of the Malawian 
Constitution states that ―all institutions and persons shall observe and uphold the 
constitution and the rule of law.‖ Chirwa has explained that the above provisions of 
the Malawian Constitution envisage direct horizontal application and present the 
possibility of applying constitutional rights directly to the conduct of non-State 
actors.88  A number of factors are important for determining whether a particular right 
can be applied to a non-State actor. It is important to have regard to the nature of the 
protected right in question, the language used by the constitution in identifying the 
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right, and the nature of the duties imposed by the right.89 A significant number of 
rights such as non-discrimination, labour rights, children‘s rights and women‘s rights, 
are relevant to private relations and can be enforced against non-State actors.90  
Additionally, constitutions of Ghana,91 Namibia,92 Ghana,93 The Gambia,94 Lesotho95 
and Cape Verde96 also expressly recognise that constitutional rights bind non-State 
actors. The recognition of binding human rights on corporations may assist in 
addressing some of the challenges posed by non-State actors.97 
A University of Oxford study covering 13 national jurisdictions focusing on 
access to justice under the domestic laws of Australia, Canada, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), the European Union, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, 
the People‘s Republic of China, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States illustrates the challenges for holding corporations accountable under 
domestic laws.98 The study highlights the various substantive, procedural and 
practical obstacles in holding MNCs accountable under domestic jurisdictions. 
Victims of corporate abuse may face other challenges such as the cost of litigation, 
the logistics of bringing a claim in a foreign country, and access to relevant 
information. Victims may also lack the requisite legal knowledge and expertise to 
investigate potential causes of actions in foreign jurisdictions.99 These factors make it 
difficult for victims of human rights abuses by corporations to obtain adequate and 
prompt compensation in the home States of MNCs.100 The study showed that 
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existing criminal and civil laws do not directly refer to human rights and do not 
generally have extraterritorial operation.101 This makes it difficult in human rights 
litigation undertaken against corporations.  
There are also significant challenges in attempting to obtain redress in the 
MNC‘s home State. The key challenge is the non-extraterritorial application of the 
domestic laws of most States which are not intended to operate outside of the State 
in which they are enacted.102 This poses a significant obstacle in holding MNCs 
accountable in their home States for wrongful activities committed against individuals 
or communities in host States.103 Furthermore, claimants may have to contend with 
the potential conflict of laws of each home State in order to establish the jurisdiction 
of the home State‘s courts to adjudicate over the claim.104 Significantly, even where 
claimants may establish jurisdiction under the domestic law of the host or home 
State, the claim may be challenged on the basis of the forum non conveniens - that 
the home State is not the appropriate forum to adjudicate the claim against the 
corporation.105  
Survivors and relatives of the dead in the 1984 Bhopal Tragedy, represented 
by the Indian government,  sought compensation in the United States against Union 
Carbide corporation in the wake of the disaster. The argument of forum non 
conveniens was highlighted by Keenan J of the New York District Court in the case. 
The judge dismissed the claim against Union Carbide on the grounds that the Indian 
connection with the case far outweighed the interests of citizens of the United States 
in the matter hence the United States courts were an inconvenient forum.106 In a 
claim filed under the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the ―US‖)‘s 
Alien Tort Claims Act in Sequihua v Texaco, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit dismissed the claim against Texaco filed by Ecuadorian plaintiffs on the basis 
of forum non conveniens.107 The court proceeded to point out that there were crucial 
factors pointing to the selection of Ecuador as a more appropriate forum than Texas. 
These, according to the court, included access to evidence and witnesses, the 
possibility of inspection, the cost of travel between Ecuador and the United States 
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and the uncertainty of whether a ruling handed down in Texas would be enforced in 
Ecuador.108 In the Wiwa v Shell case, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, in 1998, dismissed the case on the grounds of forum 
non conveniens.109 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed 
the district court‘s dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that the US 
was a proper forum for adjudicating the case.110 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in reaching this decision, cited as a factor the United States‘ strong public 
interest in adjudicating international human rights litigation.111 
It is also important to note that even in those cases where victims of human 
rights abuses by corporations obtain redress, a study of the above jurisdictions 
reveals that not a single case has ever been determined in favour of foreign 
litigants.112 Significantly, all cases in which complainants have received 
compensation have resulted from out-of-court settlements. For instance, out-of-court 
settlements were reached in such cases as Wiwa et al v Dutch Petroleum Company 
et al, Doe v Unocal113 in the United States, Lubbe and Others v Cape Plc114 in the 
United Kingdom and Dagi v BHP in Australia.115 In the case of Lubbe v Cape Plc, 
court-sanctioned settlement trusts have been established which will grant 
compensation to existing and future claimants though such cases are in the 
minority.116  
The practice of out-of-court settlements before disputes are determined by a 
court, while benefiting the claimants in a case, impact upon the development of 
jurisprudence and precedent in human rights litigation against corporations. What is 
clear is that out of court settlements prevent the development of a settled body of law 
relating to the human rights obligations of corporations. The uncertainty as to 
whether victims of corporate human rights abuses may actually obtain final judgment 
in such cases may operate as an obstacle to such victims launching actions. This 
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may provide incentives for other claimants to go for meagre out-of-court 
settlements.117 
5 2 3 Is international human rights law applicable to non-State actors? 
The question of the human rights obligations of non-State actors under international 
law has been at the heart of academic discussion over the last twenty years.118 
Human rights theory and practice has increasingly questioned the utility of solely 
relying on State responsibility to address the challenge posed on human rights by 
non-State actors. It has been suggested that, in some circumstances, human rights 
already give rise to directly enforceable duties on non-State actors although this may 
not be the case for all human rights in all circumstances.119 Some of the core UN 
human rights treaties, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as the ―ICERD‖),120 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred 
to as the ―ICESCR‖), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―ICCPR‖),121 do not expressly impose duties on non-
State actors such as corporations. They impose generalised obligations on States to 
ensure the enjoyment of rights and to prevent abuse by non-State actors of the 
protected rights.  
The ICERD requires that each State party prohibit racial discrimination by ―any 
persons, group or organisation.‖122 Some human rights treaties such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(hereinafter referred to as ―CEDAW‖), the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(hereinafter referred to as ―CRC‖)123 and the International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities124 do appear to 
directly address the responsibilities of non-State actors. A closer look however, 
shows that such instruments do so through the prism of the State‘s duty to protect. 
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The CEDAW, for example, requires States to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any enterprise125 in the context of bank 
loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit.126 The section below analyses 
some of the provisions from human rights instruments which have been referenced 
as being a source for potentially binding human rights duties on non-State actors. 
5 2 3 1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
It has been argued that international human rights law clearly envisages a role for 
non-State actors in the realisation of human rights.127 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―UDHR‖) laid the normative framework 
for the subsequent human rights instruments adopted after 1948. The UDHR 
arguably establishes the basis of human rights responsibilities for non-State actors. 
The preamble to the UDHR provides that:  
―The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance (emphasis added).‖ 
One of the contentions is that ―organs of society‖ in the sense as used in the 
preamble to the UDHR encompass businesses since such entities clearly play crucial 
social and economic functions in society in the distribution of resources.128 Louis 
Henkin, a notable international law scholar, argued that the notion of every individual 
and organ of society in the UDHR includes corporations. Henkin further argued for 
the applicability of the UDHR on MNCs, pointing out that: 
―At this juncture the Universal Declaration may also address multinational companies. 
This is true even though the companies never heard the Universal Declaration at the 
time it was drafted. The Universal Declaration is not addressed only to governments. 
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It is a ‗common standard for all peoples and all nations.‘ It means that ‗every 
individual and every organ of society shall strive – by progressive measures … to 
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance among the people of 
the member States.‘ Every individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and 
every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace. The 
Universal Declaration applies to them all.129‖ 
Other notable provisions include article 29 of the UDHR which provides that 
everyone has ―duties to the community.‖ Article 30 prohibits groups or persons from 
engaging in any activity aimed at the destruction of any of the rights protected in the 
UDHR. Article 30 of UDHR could equally apply to any individual or groups, including 
corporations who may potentially infringe the rights protected in the UDHR.130 The 
broad human rights provisions contained in the UDHR have since been incorporated 
in legally binding form in many international human rights instruments though there 
are no specific obligations imposed on corporations.131  
Although Henkin is correct that the UDHR‘s aspirations and moral claims were 
addressed and apply to all humanity, Ruggie has argued that such does not equate 
to legally binding effect.132 The problem with the above provisions of the UDHR is 
that although they make reference to individual duties, they are silent on what 
precisely the ambits of these duties are.133 It is also worth noting that the duties are 
owed to the community and not to specific human rights holders. The lack of 
subsequent State practice and opinion juris makes it rather doubtful that the above 
provisions of the UDHR and customary law emanating from it create binding human 
rights obligations on non-State actors as MNCs.134  
                                                     
129
 L Henkin ―The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets‖ (1999) 25 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 24 25. 
130
 International Council Beyond Voluntarism 60. 
131
 SC McCaffrey ―A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications‖1992 (5) 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1 8. 
132
 Human Rights Council Business and Human Rights-Mapping Report para 37. 
133
 JA Hessbruegge ―Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors‖ (2005) 11 
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 21 35. 
134
 Hessbruegge has further argued that para 10 of the UDHR should not necessarily be understood to 
extend obligations under the UDHR to non-State actors. Hessbruegge further states that it is equally 
conceivable that the UDHR tasks ―every individual and every organ of society‖ to strive to ensure that 
States continue to adhere to their human rights obligations.‖ After all, the UDHR states quite clearly 
that ―Member States have pledged themselves to achieve …the promotion of the universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.‖ See Hessbruegge 2005 Buffalo Human 
Rights Law Review 35.   
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The UDHR,135 as a General Assembly resolution is not binding per se.136 
However, its most fundamental provisions are generally thought either to have 
crystallised into customary international law or to constitute an authoritative 
interpretation of the UN Charter obligations.137  It is therefore widely accepted that 
some provisions of the UDHR have become binding customary international law on 
States though it is unclear which provisions of the UDHR have now attained the 
status of customary law. Furthermore, if the UDHR is going to be interpreted as 
imposing direct human rights obligations, such an assertion may be challenged on 
the grounds that States are the only addressees of international human rights 
treaties. Adherents of the State-centric approach will thus challenge any notion that 
the UDHR imposes direct human rights obligations on non-State actors. The 
emphasis is mostly on the State‘s duty to protect against any deleterious activities of 
such non-State actors which impinges on human rights. 
5 2 3 2 Other provisions in international instruments 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR both expressly declare in their preambles that the 
individual is under responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognised in those instruments. Similarly, common article 5(1) to both the 
ICESCR and ICCPR use language identical to article 30 of the UDHR, providing that:  
―[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognised herein, or at their limitation to 
a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.‖  
                                                     
135
 See chapter 2 above, section 2 5 2 3. 
136
 See A Eide (ed) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (1992). Although this 
Commentary does not expressly contend that the UDHR has acquired the status of binding customary 
law, the Commentary conceives of the UDHR as a serious document with enormous legal 
repercussions. State officials, judges, lawyers and human rights advocates have invoked some of the 
provisions and often accepted them as binding. See HH Koh Transnational Public Law Litigation 
(1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2347 2366. See also Brownlie who has referred to the UDHR as a 
―good example of an informal prescription given legal significance by the actions of authoritative 
decision-makers.‖ See I Browlie Principles of Public International Law (2003) 535. Navar has also 
pointed out that ―[a]t the present time, though, to say that the Universal Declaration has no legal effect 
is to deny the potency and creative force it has amply demonstrated over the years since its adoption.‖ 
See MGK Nayar ―Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy‖ (1978) 19 
Harvard International Law Journal 813 815–816. Gleick further notes that, although not legally binding, 
such declarations often either express already existing norms of customary international law or, as in 
the case of some of the fundamental rights provisions in the UDHR, may over time crystallise into 
customary norms. See P Gleick ―The Human Right to Water‖ 1999 (1) Water Policy 487 503. 
137
 SC McCaffrey ―A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications‖ 1992 (5) 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1 8. Gleick also supports such a position, see 
Gleick 1998 Water Policy 490. 
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Similar provisions are contained in the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man,138 the European Convention on Human Rights,139 the American 
Convention on Human Rights,140 and the African Charter on Human and People‘s 
Rights.141 Article 28 of the African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights requires 
that ―every individual shall have a duty to respect and consider his fellow beings.‖ 
Article 20 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child imposes 
duties on parents towards their children.142 Article 24 of the ICCPR grants every child 
―the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on 
the part of his family, society and the State.‖ Such measures include an obligation ―to 
ensure that children do not take a direct part in armed conflicts.‖143 
It is arguable that the above provisions are merely guidelines for the behaviour 
of both States and non-State actors, and should not be considered as imposing any 
direct accountability on non-State actors.144 Treaty monitoring bodies, for instance, in 
their interpretive work have avoided any mention of direct human rights obligations 
on non-State actors even in clear abuse of human rights by such actors as evidenced 
in the SERAC v Nigeria case discussed in chapter 4.145 Rather, treaty monitoring 
bodies have been limited to emphasising the State‘s duty to protect and this has 
been emphasised in various general comments of the CESCR.146 
                                                     
138
 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 
articles 29-30. 
139
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213 UNTS 222, 
article 10(2). 
140
American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 1144 UNTS 123 articles 13, 17 and 32. 
141
 African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights (1981) OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/rev.5 articles 27-29. 
142
 See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
143
 See ICCPR article 24. 
144
 Senyongo ―Non State Actors‖ in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 125. 
145
 See Chapter 4 section 4 3 5 2 above. 
146
 The role for non-State actors under international human rights treaties has also been noted in the 
General Comments of treaty-monitoring bodies in relation to the rights to water (General Comment 15 
paras 27, 33, 49 & 50), freedom from discrimination(United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination General Recommendation XX on Article 5 of the Convention (1996) UN Doc 
A/51/18 (1996) para 5),  freedom of movement (Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27: 
Freedom of Movement (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 para 6), adequate housing, (CESCR 
General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (1991) UN Doc E/1992/3 (13 December 1991) 
para 14), adequate food (CESCR General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food (1999) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1999/5 paras 20, 27 &29), education, (CESCR General Comment 13 (1999)  paras 41, 54 and 
59), s the rights of women (CEDAW, General Recommendation 19 on Violence against Women 
(1992) UN Doc A/47/38 para 9), indigenous people (CERD, General Recommendation on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (1997) UN Doc A/52/18 para 3), and disabled persons  (CESCR General 
Comment 5 on  Persons with Disabilities (1994) UN Doc E/1995/22 paras 11 & 12) 
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5 2 3 3 International criminal law  
States have accepted the idea of duties of non-State actors through the corpus of 
international criminal law. Individuals have criminal responsibility in respect of 
international crimes such as war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, 
slavery, forced labour, apartheid, and forced disappearances.147 The International 
Military Tribunals established after World War II was the first to confirm that 
individuals carry responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.148 The adoption in 1998 of the Rome Statute for an International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the ―Rome Statute‖) has clarified the 
international obligations that attach to individuals, both State and non-State actors in 
different types of armed conflict.149 The Rome Statute further elaborates on the 
individual criminal responsibility of non-State actors for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.150  
These mechanisms of accountability have served to dissipate much of the 
confusion and doctrinal debate which surrounded the issue of international human 
rights obligations of non-State actors in conflict and non-conflict situations. While the 
Nuremberg Charter required State involvement in a crime against humanity,151 this is 
no longer a pre-requisite for a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.152 
Specific crimes against the human person, such as slavery have never required 
State involvement. Non-State actors can commit these crimes. The Rome Statute is 
clear that crimes against humanity can be committed by both State and non-State 
                                                     
147
 Paust has, for instance, identified numerous cases in which individuals have had civil and criminal 
responsibility under customary and treaty-based international law. Paust argues that at least for the 
last 250 years public and private individual actors can be prosecuted for various types of crimes under 
international law, including piracy, war crimes, breaches of neutrality, territorial infractions, aggression, 
unlawful capture of vessels, the slave trade, violence against foreign ministers and officials, poisoning, 
assassination, professional arson, counterfeiting of foreign currency, banditry and brigandry terroristic 
publications, violation of passports, and violation of safe-conducts. JJ Paust ―Nonstate Actor 
Participation in International Law and the Pretence of Exclusion‖ (2011) 51 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 977 984. 
148
 See generally JJ Paust ―Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations‖ (2002) 35 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 80-825. 
149
 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) 2187 UNTS 90.  
150
Some treaties make an individual criminally responsible only if he was an agent of the State or 
some other entity controlling territory: See art. II of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced 
Disappearance of Persons (1994) 33 ILM 1529, 1530; art. 1 of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85. 
151
 See article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) (1945) 
<http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/charter-international-military-tribunal/p26372> (accessed 
16.02.2012). 
152
 Hessbruegge 2005 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 43. 
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actors.153 It is also noteworthy that the conference delegates at the drafting of the 
Rome Statute considered the possibility of giving the International Criminal Court 
jurisdiction over corporations. The proposal was withdrawn and did not make it in the 
final text of the treaty.154 This is often cited as proof that the conference delegates 
had accepted in principle that international criminal law applies to legal persons.155 
The non-inclusion of corporate responsibility in the Rome statute is perhaps 
an indication that at the time of the drafting of that treaty, there was no general 
acceptance of corporate criminal responsibility in international law. However, this 
does not mean that such an evolution cannot be envisaged. A significant number of 
national legal systems impose criminal responsibility on corporations as indicated 
above. It would not require much creativity to impose such criminal responsibility on 
corporations under international law. Inspiration can be derived from the fact that 
individuals bear criminal responsibility under international criminal law. This is despite 
the fact that such individuals do not necessarily possess legal personality under 
international law. 
 
5 2 4 Conclusion 
The above section discussed the State-centric nature of the contemporary 
international human rights system. It is clear that the primary focus of accountability 
for human rights is the State. However, it was argued that an exclusive focus on the 
State as the sole bearer of human rights obligations is inadequate. Privatisation and 
liberalisation have seen the emergence of non-State actors with immense powers, in 
some cases dwarfing those of the State. This is the reality in many spheres, including 
in the provision of basic services such as water. Some non-State actors have 
become so powerful that States may neither have the resources nor the will to control 
them even though their activities impinge on human rights obligations of States. In 
such situations, the State‘s duty to protect against abuse of the right to water by non-
State actors such as corporations in situations of water privatisation is greatly 
curtailed. The following section discusses and analyses the emergence of global soft 
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 Clapham Non State Actors 2 
154
 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory Committee 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (1998) UN Doc/A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 articles 
23.5-23.6. 
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law initiatives attempting to impose human rights responsibilities on non-State actors 
and the usefulness of such mechanisms for holding corporations accountable for the 
right to water. 
 
5 3 Global initiatives to impose human rights responsibilities on non-State 
actors 
5 3 1 Introduction 
The move towards imposing direct human rights obligations on MNCs at the 
international level began in the 1970s.156 The impetus derived mainly from the newly 
independent States which sought to assert their rights to economic independence. 
They also wanted to avoid political interference in their domestic affairs by powerful 
MNCs.157 In the 1960s and 1970s, attention began to focus on the role of MNCs in 
sustaining systematic human rights abuses and interference with local political 
processes especially in developing countries.158 The period witnessed significant 
calls for tighter regulation against the backdrop of instances of interference by MNCs 
in the domestic politics of host countries. A notable incident was the involvement of a 
US entity, ITT Corporation in the overthrow by military coup of Chilean President 
Salvador Allende in 1973.159 The insistence on an improved control of the activities of 
MNCs was accompanied by developing States‘ call for a new international economic 
order.160 Developing States sought recognition of their permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources within their territories and on the need to improve the supervision 
of MNCs‘ activities.161  
Some of the earliest international efforts towards holding MNCs accountable 
include the 1976 Organisation on Economic Corporation and Development 
(hereinafter referred to as ―OECD‖)‘s Declaration and Decisions on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the 1977 Sullivan Principles on 
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 PT Muchlinski ―Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of 
UNCTAD‘ in MT Kamminga & S Zia-Zarifi (eds) Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
International Law (2000) 97 98. 
157
 98. 
158
 CJ Dias ―Corporate Human Rights Accountability and the Human Right to Development: The 
Relevance and Role of Corporate Social Responsibility‖ (2011) 4 JUJS Law Review 495 496. 
159
 L Turner ―Multinational Companies and the Third World‖ (1974) 30 The World Today 394 396-397. 
160
 See generally SJ Rubin ―Economic and Social Rights and the New International Economic Order‖ 
(1986) 1 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 67-96. 
161
 See the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 1 May 1974, calling 
for a New International Economic Order (UN Doc A/Res/3201 (S-VI)).  
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Apartheid,162 the International Labour Organisation (hereinafter referred to as ―the 
ILO‖)‘s 1977 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy, and the UN‘s Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations initiated in the 1970s and concluded in 1992. While these initiatives 
may have had only limited effects on corporate behaviour, they played a crucial role 
in establishing normative expectations for corporate accountability.163 
One of the earliest attempts at establishing binding obligations on MNCs was 
the UN‘s Commission on Transnational Corporations created by the Economic and 
Social Council in 1974 with a mandate to draft a UN Code of Conduct on TNCs.164 
The resulting draft UN Code of Conduct on TNCs was the first attempt at the UN 
level to usher in binding norms to regulate the activities of MNCs. The draft UN Code 
of Conduct on TNCs provided, inter alia, that:  
―Transnational Corporations shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the countries in which they operate. In their social and industrial relations, 
transnational corporations shall not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, language, social, national and ethnic origin or political or other opinion. 
Transnational Corporations shall conform to government policies designed to extend 
equality of opportunity and treatment.‖165 
                                                     
162
 The Sullivan Principles were originally adopted as a code of conduct for US corporations doing 
business in South Africa adopted in 1977. The Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Black Baptist minister and 
member of the board of directors of the General Motors Corporation launched the original Sullivan 
Principles in 1977. The Sullivan Principles were designed to help persuade US corporations with 
investments in South African to treat their African employees the same as they would their American 
counterparts. The original code had six principles that became known as the Sullivan Principles. 
These called for the desegregation of the workplace, fair employment practices for all employees, 
equal pay for equal work, job training and advancement of Blacks, increasing the number of Blacks in 
management, and the improvement of the quality of workers' lives outside of the work- place. In 1984, 
the code was revamped to influence other MNCs operating in South Africa to follow similar equal 
rights principles and support the end of all apartheid laws. The Sullivan Principles were relaunched in 
1999 as the Global Sullivan Principles for Corporate Social Responsibility. See MP Mangaliso 
―Corporate Social Responsibility and the Sullivan Principles‖ (1997) 28 Journal of Black Studies 219 
238. 
163
 W Mwangi, L Rieth & H Peter Schmitz ―Encouraging Greater Compliance: Local Networks and the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) in T Risse, S Ropp & K Sikkink (eds) From Commitment to 
Compliance: The Persistent Power of Human Rights (2011) 6 (forthcoming) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers> (accessed 23.06.2012). 
164
 The Commission on Transnational Corporations was established after a report from an expert 
group to the UN Economic and Social Council. See UN ECOSOC The Impact of Multinational 
Corporations on the Development Process and on International Relations, Report of the Group of 
Eminent Persons to Study the Role of Multinational Corporations in Development and in International 
Relations (1974) UN Doc E/5500/Rev.1/Add1. 
165
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Disagreements ensued between the industrialised countries and the 
developing countries which resulted in failure to adopt the envisaged instrument.166 
The capital exporting States where most of the MNCs are headquartered wanted an 
instrument that could be used primarily as a means of protecting MNCs against 
discriminatory treatment contrary to international minimum standards accepted by 
these States. Countries belonging to the Group of 77, supported by the then socialist 
States, on the other hand, wanted to use the instrument as a means of subjecting the 
activities of MNCs to greater regulation.167 This resulted in an impasse, leading to the 
abandonment of the initiative in 1992.168 
The failure to adopt the draft code led to a shift of international efforts from the 
development of binding obligations on corporations to the adoption of voluntary and 
non-voluntary initiatives on corporate social responsibility. At the international level, 
the demands of developing countries have not resulted in the adoption of any binding 
human rights standards for corporations. On the contrary, a range of non-binding 
initiatives have since been developed in an attempt to impose human rights 
responsibilities on non-States actors. Some of the key initiatives are the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development‘s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the OECD Guidelines),169 the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles, the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations (hereinafter referred to as ―the Norms on TNCs‖)170 and the UN Global 
Compact.171  These initiatives have been widely discussed in literature hence this 
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 See W Spröte ―Negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations‖ 
(1990) 33 German Yearbook of International Law 331-348. 
167
 Muchlinski ―Accountability‖ in Liability of Multinational Corporations (2000) 100. 
168
 Chirwa 2006 South African Journal of Human Rights 79. 
169
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (2011) 3 <available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf> 
(accessed 18.04.2012). The OECD Guidelines have been adopted by the thirty-four OECD member 
states as well as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru, and Romania. 
170
 UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights (2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. 
171
 The then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, proposed the adoption by corporations of a global 
compact in 1999. The Global Compact involves different non-State actors mainly in the private sector. 
Additionally, six specialised UN agencies, the International Labour Organisation, the United Nations 
Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation actively 
participate in the UN Global Compact (hereinafter referred to as the ―Global Compact‖). In addition 
non-governmental organisations, labour associations, business associations, think tanks and 
government representatives are part of the initiative. As of April 2012, the Global Compact reported 
that it had over 8700 corporate participants from across 130 countries, which it claims is the largest 
voluntary corporate initiative in the world. The global compact requires MNCs to commit to ten core 
principles within their spheres of influence. Two of the principles deal with human rights, four with 
labour standards, three with environmental standards and one with anti-corruption. The Global 
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chapter will not conduct an in-depth discussion and analysis of such initiatives.172 
Rather, the chapter will attempt to draw accountability mechanisms provided in those 
instruments that are of specific relevance to water privatisation.  
Other key initiatives adopted by the UN Human Rights Council include: the UN 
Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights 
adopted in 2008 (hereinafter referred to as ―the UN Framework‖);173 the UN Human 
Rights Council adopted the UN Guiding Principles 2011 to operationalise the UN 
Framework;174 the UN Global Compact Chief Executive Officer Water Mandate 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―CEO Water Mandate‖) is a corporate-driven initiative 
housed within the UN Global Compact launched in 2007.175 These State-backed, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Compact explicitly states that the principles are derived from the UDHR, the International Labour 
Organisation's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The first two 
principles make explicit reference to human rights. They provide that ―[b]usinesses should support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their spheres of influence‖ and 
―make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.‖ See Principle 1 of the UN Global 
Compact provides that ―Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights‖ while Principle 2 enjoins corporations to ―make sure that they are not 
complicit in human rights abuses.‖ For a discussion and analysis of the UN Global Compact, see 
Chirwa (2006) South African Journal of Human Rights 89-92; Bilchitz The South African Law Journal 
759 & S Joseph ―Liability‖ in Social Rights Jurisprudence 617. 
172
 Chirwa 2006 South African Journal of Human Rights 76-98; PT Muchlinski Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law (1999); Skogly The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund; Joseph ―Liability of Multinational Corporations‖ in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence 613-627; D Bilchitz ―Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations‖ (2008) 124 South African Law Journal 754-789; D 
Weissbrodt & M Kruger ―Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights‖ (2003) American Journal of International Law 901-
922; P Bernhagen ―The Private Provision of Public Goods: Corporate Commitments and the United 
Nations Global Compact‖ (2010) 54 International Studies Quarterly 1175–1187;  S Deva ―Global 
Compact: A Critique of the UN‘s ‗Public-Private‘ Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship‖ 
(2006) 34 Syracuse Journal of  International Law  and Commerce 107-151 and  A Rasche & G Kell 
(eds) The United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (2010). 
173
 See UN Human Rights Council A Framework for Business paras 47-49. 
174
 See UN Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business para 47. 
175
 See UN Global Compact CEO Water Mandate <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Environ/CEO> 
(accessed 13.05.2012). The CEO Water Mandate is a corporate-driven initiative housed within the UN 
Global Compact. It was designed ostensibly to help the private sector better understand and address 
its impacts on, and management of water resources.
175
 The CEO Water Mandate recognises that the 
business sector, through the production of goods and services, directly or indirectly impacts on water 
resources. Corporations endorsing the CEO Water Mandate acknowledge a responsibility to make 
sustainable water-resources management a major priority as part of addressing the global water 
challenge. As of May 2012, 85 corporations from across the world had endorsed the CEO Water 
Mandate. The CEO Water Mandate covers six elements: Direct Operations; Supply Chain and 
Watershed Management; Collective Action; Public Policy; Community Engagement; and 
Transparency. It seeks to build an international movement of committed companies in the sustainable 
management of water resources. The initiative is open to companies of all sizes and from all sectors, 
and from all parts of the world. The initiative requires the endorsement of a company‘s Chief Executive 
Officer, or equivalent. A company wishing to join the initiative should indicate their endorsement of the 
CEO Water Mandate and its six elements by submitting a letter, signed by the Chief Executive Officer. 
However, it is important to note that participation in the CEO Water Mandate is restricted to existing 
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multi-stakeholder and other soft law initiatives will be discussed below in so far as 
they are relevant for holding non-State actors accountable in situations where water 
services have been privatised. In the absence of binding international standards, 
voluntary mechanisms have become the principal means through which MNCs have 
expressed their commitment to respecting human rights.176  
There are ongoing attempts at the UN level to identify, clarify and elaborate 
international standards and practices regarding business and human rights. Such 
initiatives are important in understanding the human rights duties and responsibilities 
of non-State actors involved in the provision of water services in privatisation 
scenarios. These include the UN Framework and Guiding Principles referred to in the 
preceding paragraph. The second is the current work of the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to water and sanitation. The CEO Water Mandate adopted under the 
auspices of the UN global Compact was designed to help corporations understand 
their impacts on water resources. These initiatives and their potential relevance for 
holding corporations accountable are discussed in the following section.    
5 3 2 The UN Respect, Protect and Remedy Framework and Guiding Principles  
This section considers the UN‘s most recent effort at developing a transnational 
regulatory framework for MNCs and other business enterprises. The framework was 
developed by the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, John Ruggie (hereinafter referred to as ―the SRSG.‖)177 The failure by 
the UN Commission to adopt the Norms on TNCs led to the establishment of a 
mandate of the SRSG to undertake a new process culminating in the appointment of 
John Ruggie. In its 2005 session, the UN Commission requested the UN Secretary 
                                                                                                                                                                     
corporate endorsers of the Global Compact. Some of the largest water providers on the endorsing list 
include GDF Suez (France), Groupe Danone (France) and Veolia Water (France). Some of the largest 
water consumers are also on the list of endorsing corporations and these include The Coca-Cola 
Company (USA), Heineken NV (The Netherlands), Nike Inc. (USA), PepsiCo Inc. (USA), SABMiller 
(South Africa) and Unilever (UK).
175
 There is a provision though that companies that are not currently 
signatories of the Global Compact may endorse the CEO Water Mandate provided they intend to join 
the Global Compact within six months of endorsing the CEO Water Mandate. See Global Compact 
CEO Water Mandate. 
176
 Chirwa 2006 South African Journal of Human Rights 76. 
177
 The SRSG mandate was replaced by a Working Group on Business and Human Rights. See UN 
Human Rights Council Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
(2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1 para 6. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 319 
 
General to appoint a Special Representative on the issue of human rights and TNCs 
to proceed with the project.178 The SRSG, who served from 2005 to  
2011, responded by promulgating the UN Framework and Guiding Principles179 The 
latter was officially adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2011.180  
The SRSG was mandated to identify and clarify standards of corporate 
responsibility and accountability for TNCs and other business enterprises with regard 
to human rights.181 The SRSG was further mandated to elaborate on the role of 
States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of TNCs and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights. As part of his mandate, the SRSG was 
charged with researching and clarifying the implications for corporations of concepts 
such as ―complicity‖ and ―sphere of influence.‖182 The SRSG‘s mandate also required 
him to develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights impact 
assessments of the activities of TNCs and other business enterprises. He was further 
requested to compile a compendium of best practices of States and TNCs and other 
business enterprises.183  
It is against this background that the SRSG proposed a three-pillar framework 
on the application of human rights standards on corporations to the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2008, the UN Framework.184 The UN Framework is based on the 
                                                     
178
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/L.87. 
179
 See UN Guiding Principles. For a discussion of the Guiding Principles, see JH Knox ―The Human 
Rights Council Endorses ‗Guiding Principles‘ for Corporations‖ (2011) 15 American Society of 
International Law Insight <http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf> (accessed 23.05.2012); 
D Bilchitz ―The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human Rights Obligations? 
2010 (7) International Journal on Human Rights 199-229; S Deva ―Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implications for Companies‖ (2012) 9 European Company Law 101–109; LC Backer 
―On the Evolution of the United Nations ‗Protect-Respect- Remedy‘ Project: The State, the Corporation 
and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context‖ (2010) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
101-156; Kenan Institute for Ethics The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
Analysis and Implementation: A Report from the Kenan Institute for Ethics (2012) < 
http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/UN-Guiding-Principles-on-Business-and-
Human-Rights-Analysis-and-Implementation.pdf> (accessed 23.04.2012); JH Knox ―The Ruggie 
Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916664 
(accessed 23.04.2012); RC  Blitt "Beyond Ruggie‘s Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance (2012) 1-21. 
180
 See UN Human Rights Council Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations ―Protect, Respect and Remedy‖ Framework (2011) A/HRC/17/31.  
180
 See UN Human Rights Council Protect, Respect and Remedy para. 9. 
181
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises Resolution 2005/69 para 1. 
182
 Para 1. 
183
 Para 1. 
184
 See UN Human Rights Council Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights paras 47- 49. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 320 
 
notion of ―differentiated but complementary responsibilities.‖185 It encompasses the 
following three principles: the State duty to protect human rights, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, and access to remedies.186 
The SRSG emphasised that the UN Framework required no changes to 
existing law, only a better understanding of it. The first prong of the UN Framework 
provides for the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties 
through regulation and adjudication. The second prong of the UN Framework enjoins 
corporations to respect human rights under a due diligence standard intended to 
avoid infringing on human rights of others. Under this leg of the framework, 
corporations are enjoined to desist from infringing on the rights of others and to 
address any adverse impacts resulting from their operations. The third prong of the 
UN Framework seeks to enhance access for victims of human rights violations to an 
effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.187 This part of the prong emphasises 
the need for more effective remedies for corporate human rights abuses.  The SRSG 
proceeded to operationalise the framework by developing concrete and practical 
recommendations which he ultimately set forth in the UN Guiding Principles. After 
endorsing the Guiding Principles, the UN Human Rights Council proceeded to 
establish a working group mandated to effectively disseminate and help in the 
implementation of the UN Framework and Guiding Principles.188 
5 3 2 1 State duty to protect 
The State‘s duty to protect was discussed in chapter 4 above.189 The UN Framework 
as well as the UN Guiding Principles focus on the State duty to protect.190 The 
Guiding Principles provide for States to protect against human rights abuses within 
their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.191 
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States are required to take steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such 
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.192  
The weaknesses of over-reliance on the State‘s duty to protect from human 
rights abuses by non-State actors such as corporations have been explained 
above.193 Non-State actors such as MNCs tend to operate at a transnational level 
and have the capacity to disappear or move from one jurisdiction to another.194 
Often, some States are either unwilling or unable to act against non-State actors that 
violate human rights of marginalised communities. Most notably, developing 
countries that take a hard-line stance against human rights abuses by MNCs might 
impair their competitiveness to attract much-needed foreign investment.195 The effect 
of such factors is to undermine the capacity of States to establish regulatory 
mechanisms at the municipal level.  
These limitations on a State‘s obligation to protect against human rights 
violations by non-State actors notwithstanding, the SRSG‘s Framework over-relied 
on this regulatory technique. Despite the limitations of State-focused regulation, the 
State‘s duty to protect remains an important component for holding non-State actors 
in water privatisation scenarios. The State‘s protective mandate has been discussed 
above hence this section will primarily focus on the responsibilities of non-State 
actors as enunciated in the UN Framework and Guiding Principles.  
5 3 2 2 Corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
The second leg of the UN Framework provides for the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. The SRSG‘s response to any potential State incapacity to 
regulate corporations is to rely on the corporation‘s obligation to respect human 
rights. In the SRSG‘s view, the responsibility stems from societal expectations196 
rather than human rights law.197 The corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
is not mediated through the primary State duty to protect. Rather, in terms of the UN 
Framework and Guidelines, the responsibility to respect human rights applies directly 
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to corporations. The corporation‘s duty to respect human rights exists independently 
of States‘ duties.198 It is important that the duty imposed on corporations to respect 
human rights exists independently of the ability or willingness of States to fulfill their 
own human rights obligations in relation to the duty to protect.199  Furthermore, the 
responsibility to respect human rights applies to all companies regardless of size, 
sector, operational context, ownership and structure. The burden of responsibility 
however varies in proportion to the size or sector of the corporation and the severity 
of adverse human rights impacts caused.200 The responsibility to respect human 
rights, according to this framework, requires not only that corporations avoid causing 
adverse impacts to human rights themselves..201  
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles interpret the current international 
human rights framework as imposing few positive human rights obligations on 
corporations. Such positive duties include the duty to prevent and mitigate harm as 
well as the duty to provide reparations for abuse of human rights.202 The SRSG did 
expect some level of positive obligations.203 The SRSG utilised the example of non-
discrimination policies that may require the adoption of specific recruitment and 
training programmes.204 Reparations also might include compensation, restitution, 
guarantees of non-repetition, amendments to the relevant law and public 
apologies.205 
The obligation to respect appears primarily in negative terms: the corporation 
should not interfere with the enjoyment of a human right. Additionally, a corporation 
should avoid being complicit when a State violates human rights.206 The UN Guiding 
Principles, in their elaboration of the UN Framework, state that corporations must 
respect, at a minimum, those human rights recognised in the International Bill of 
Rights and the ILO‘s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.207 
However, there is an exception to this ―baseline responsibility‖208 where corporations 
perform public functions. It is however unclear from the SRSG‘s framework as to 
                                                     
198
 UN Guiding Principles para 12. 
199
 See UN Guiding Principles, Principle 26 and Commentary. 
200
 Principle 11 and Commentary. 
201
 Principle 13. 
202
 See UN Framework pars 24, 55, 73, 93-95. 
203
 Para 55. 
204
 Para 55. 
205
 Para 83. 
206
 Paras 24, 54, 73. 
207
 UN Guiding Principle 12. 
208
 Para 54. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 323 
 
what is meant by public functions. Deva, for instance, points that a corporation 
managing a detention centre or a hospital might arguably be performing public 
functions. A corporation supplying water services could be regarded as performing a 
public function.209 
An integral part of implementing the responsibility to respect human rights is 
the requirement that corporations should conduct human rights due diligence. At the 
heart of human rights due diligence lies the principle that an investigative process 
must be undertaken to assess actual and potential human rights risks that may be 
associated with a corporation‘s operations and relationships for the purpose of 
preventing harm.210 Due diligence requires a corporation to make itself aware of, and 
prevent any negative human rights impacts resulting from its operations.211 The UN 
Framework‘s due diligence process enjoins corporations to adopt a human rights 
policy, integrate it throughout the company, and conduct human rights due diligence 
throughout its operations.212 The UN Framework further provides that corporations 
should undertake human rights impact assessments before initiating new projects as 
well as monitoring and auditing ongoing projects.213 Corporations are further enjoined 
to track the effectiveness of their responses to any impacts, and publicly 
communicate their responses.214  
It is also noteworthy that contrary to the approach adopted by the Norms on 
TNCs, the UN Framework rejects the concept of a ―sphere of influence‖ as a fixed 
sphere.215 According to the UN Framework, a corporation‘s responsibility is not a 
fixed sphere nor is it based on influence. Rather, a corporation‘s sphere of influence 
depends on actual human rights impacts resulting from a company‘s business 
activities and the relationships connected to such activities.216 Although the SRSG 
noted that it may be appropriate to ask corporations to support human rights 
voluntarily where they have influence, attributing legal responsibility to them on that 
basis alone is inappropriate.217 
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5 3 2 3 Criticism of Ruggie‘s conception of the corporate duty to respect human 
  rights  
There are a number of problems with the second leg of the UN Framework and 
Guidelines as espoused by the SRSG. Such limitations may dilute the efficacy of the 
initiatives in elaborating the responsibilities of corporations in situations of water 
privatisation. The UN Framework and Guiding Principles do not offer any sound 
normative basis for why non-State actors such as corporations should have human 
rights responsibilities. The only justification that one could decipher from the UN 
Framework and the Guiding Principles is that corporations should have a 
responsibility to respect human rights because ―it is the basic expectation society has 
of business.‖218 Furthermore, the SRSG‘s use of the term ―responsibility‖ to respect 
rather than the ―obligation‖ to respect human rights appears to suggest that human 
rights responsibilities of corporations do not generate any legal consequences.219  
The UN Guiding Principles define human rights to mean, at a minimum, all 
internationally recognised human rights. These are explained as the rights 
enumerated in the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the principles concerning 
fundamental rights in the eight ILO core conventions set out in the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.220  However, the Commentary to the UN 
Guiding Principles indicates that corporations might need to look beyond this 
minimalist human rights approach. They are expected to consider other international 
human rights instruments related to groups of people for example women, children, 
people with disability, and indigenous people.221 The UN Framework also does not 
catalogue the human rights duties that corporations must adhere to. It does not 
define obligations for corporations in respect of specific human rights, but rather 
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gives a general perspective on how corporations should function in relation to human 
rights.222  
This circular approach of cataloguing human rights responsibilities of 
corporations creates particular challenges. Corporations are expected to surf through 
many State-focused human rights instruments to ascertain their own human rights 
responsibilities.223 Deva has also argued that the minimalist definition of 
―internationally recognised human rights‖ does not offer concrete guidance to 
companies in ascertaining their human rights responsibilities. 
The UN Framework and Guidelines in this respect are in line with States‘ 
desire to maintain the traditional form of international law in which they remain the 
principal duty-bearers in respect of human rights. The UN Framework and its Guiding 
Principles provide very little to assist those States that, due to their precarious 
political or economic situation, are in a weak position to regulate corporations 
effectively. The Guiding Principles appear to assume the ideal of a stable State, able 
to exercise its responsibilities to protect and remedy. They make no effort at 
addressing the complex questions inherent in situations where States are either 
unwilling or unable to enforce corporate behaviour which infringes human rights. 
Rather, the Guiding Principles adopt an easier path of referring companies to 
international instruments that were drafted with States as the duty bearers. Such an 
approach of transplanting human rights obligations meant for States onto 
corporations might create some conceptual problems.224 Deva gives the example of 
article 12 of the ICESCR which provides for the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Deva asks whether 
such a right can be translated into responsibilities for corporations. Lack of 
clarification may mean that corporations would struggle to distil the nature of the 
duties imposed on them by the human rights instruments.225  
The other weakness of the system is in the human rights due diligence 
approach as provided in the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles. Although the 
UN Framework and Guiding Principles provide for corporations to adopt due 
diligence mechanisms, the actual process for developing, implementing, and 
monitoring assessment rests on the corporations. Such an approach may not be 
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problematic in States with a functional judiciary and other regulatory mechanisms in 
place to address negative human rights impacts by corporations. The primary 
challenge exists in those States with a dysfunctional judicial system. Victims of 
human rights violations by corporations may be left with the weak self-assessment 
system of corporations as the principal means of human rights protection under the 
UN Framework and Guiding Principles. 
5 3 2 4 Duty to remedy 
The third leg of the UN Framework which provides for access to remedies is quite 
critical because rights may not mean much in the absence of effective remedies for 
their enforcement.226 Both businesses and States are responsible for ensuring an 
adequate remedy when abuses occur.227 States must take judicial, administrative, 
legislative or other appropriate steps to ensure that victims of such violations have 
access to effective remedies as part of their duty to protect against human rights 
violations by corporations.228 The commentary to the UN Guiding Principles explains 
that potential remedies may range from apology to restitution, rehabilitation, 
compensation, injunction and punitive sanctions.229 States should facilitate access to 
effective business administered industry, multi-stakeholder and other collaborative 
initiatives that are based on respect for human rights-related standards.230 
States are obliged to establish or strengthen effective judicial as well as non-
judicial mechanisms to address corporate human rights abuses.231 The UN Guiding 
Principles set out criteria that such mechanisms should meet to be legitimate. They 
must be accessible, predictable, equitable, and transparent.232 In this regard, States 
should take steps to overcome legal, practical or procedural barriers that could 
impede access to effective remedies. Such barriers could be in the form of such 
concepts as forum non conveniens, corporations‘ misuse of the principle of separate 
legal personality, lack of legal representation and non-availability of class actions in 
civil suits.233  
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The UN Framework‘s provision for multiple implementation mechanisms and 
strategies that ought to be employed to make MNCs accountable for human rights 
abuses is laudable.234 The major weakness of this leg of the framework is that the 
UN Framework makes it clear that the right to a remedy is a duty enforceable against 
the State, and not the corporation.235 Relying on the State to ensure access to 
victims of human rights abuse by a corporation without creating corresponding duties 
on the latter may be problematic. The same accountability problems arise where the 
State is unable or unwilling to protect those within its jurisdiction from the human 
rights impairing activities of a corporation.  
5 3 2 5 Corporation level grievance procedure 
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles also enjoin corporations to establish or 
participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and 
communities whose human rights may be adversely impacted by their operations.236 
This operational-level grievance mechanism is normally administered by the 
corporation. Such corporation-initiated operational-level grievance mechanisms 
should be accessible directly to individuals and communities adversely impacted by 
the human rights-infringing activities of the corporation.237  
The UN Guiding Principles provide for the criteria that operational level 
grievance mechanisms must comply with in order to be credible. The operational 
level grievance procedure must be legitimate and thus evoke trust from the 
stakeholder groups for whose use it is intended, and should provide for a fair conduct 
of grievance processes.238 The grievance procedure must be accessible to all 
individuals and groups for whose use it is intended, and should render adequate 
assistance to those who may face particular barriers to access.239 The grievance 
procedure must also be predictable thus providing a clear and known procedure. In 
particular, it must indicate a timeframe for each stage, clarity on the types of process 
and potential outcomes available, as well as a means of implementing the 
outcome.240 The grievance procedure must also be equitable and should seek to 
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ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access to sources of information and 
advice. It must also provide for the expertise necessary to engage in a grievance 
process on fair, informed and respectful terms.241 The UN Guiding Principles further 
provide that the grievance procedure must be transparent, ensuring that the parties 
to a grievance are kept informed about progress in processing the complaint.242 
Finally, the corporation must ensure that the operational level grievance procedure is 
rights-compatible: in other words the outcomes and remedies must accord with 
internationally recognised human rights.243 
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles are the first corporate human 
rights responsibility initiative ever to be approved by the UN which seeks to elaborate 
the human rights responsibilities of MNCs. This initiative attempts to chart a 
consensual, albeit minimalist approach, towards defining and enforcing human rights 
responsibilities for corporations.244 However, the UN Framework and the Guiding 
Principles should not be treated as the final pronouncement on this subject. Rather 
this initiative should be regarded as an important step in holding non-State actors 
such as corporations accountable for their activities that impinge on human rights. 
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles provide significant guidance to non-State 
actors such as corporations, States, individuals and communities who may be at the 
receiving side of human rights infringing activities from corporations.245 The adoption 
of the UN Framework and Guiding Principles signify an emerging global consensus 
that ―business as usual‖ is not acceptable and that corporations have human rights 
responsibilities, including the right to respect and protect water and related 
services.246 This initiative is important in elaborating the responsibilities of 
corporations in water privatisation situations as will be clear below where I 
demonstrate the significance of the initiative in relation to water privatisation 
scenarios. 
5 3 3 Non-State actor responsibility to respect the right to water 
It was observed above that in its traditional sense, the obligation to respect entails a 
duty to refrain from acts or omissions whose effect is to interfere or deprive 
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individuals or groups‘ enjoyment of their right to water.247 As pointed above, the 
obligation to respect is broad enough to proscribe the adoption of policies that result 
in denial of access by poor communities to the right, rather than simply prohibiting 
interference with existing access to water services.248 Categorising a case in terms of 
the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill rights should not be determinative of 
the interpretative approach to the rights in issue.249 International human rights law 
imposes a combination of negative and positive duties for the effective protection and 
guarantee of all human rights, including the right to water.250 At a minimum, 
corporations involved in supplying water on behalf of organs of the State should be 
required to ensure that the quality of the water is safe so as to ensure protection of 
people‘s health, and to meet their basic water needs in relation to personal and 
domestic use. This is especially important for marginalised members of society.251 
 The UN Framework and Guiding Principles discussed above provide 
authoritative elaboration on the meaning of non-State actor‘s responsibility to respect 
the right to water.252 Non-State actors have a responsibility to respect the right to 
water. In order to ensure that this obligation is complied with corporations will need to 
take certain positive steps, for example human rights impact assessments and other 
aspects of due diligence..253 The Norms on TNCs recognise the responsibility of 
corporations to respect the right to water, amongst other duties, stating that: 
 
―Within their respective spheres of activity and influence transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment 
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognised in international as 
well as national law.‖254 
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The corporate responsibility to respect the right to water has two significant 
but related aspects. Firstly, non-State actors have a duty to avoid causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities that impair 
the right to water.255 Secondly, non-State actors should seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse impacts linked to their operations that infringe on the right to water.256  
The OECD Guidelines explicitly provide that MNCs should respect the 
international human rights obligations of the countries in which they operate.257 
These include the domestic human rights obligations of the host State.258 It is 
significant to note that whereas the text of the OECD Guidelines employs the verb 
―should,‖ the Commentary to the OECD Guidelines suggests that corporations have 
an obligation to respect human rights. The Commentary to the OECD Guidelines 
explains that respect for human rights is the global standard of expected conduct for 
corporations.259 The OECD Guidelines further provide that the obligation to respect 
imposed on MNCs enjoins them to desist from infringing on the human rights of 
others through their activities. Furthermore, corporations are obliged to address 
adverse human rights impacts resulting from their activities.260  
The UN Framework also emphasises that non-State actors should observe 
internationally recognised human rights even where national law is weak, non-
existent or not enforced. Non-State actors involved in the provision of water services 
are enjoined to give particular attention to water use in contexts of extreme poverty. 
They should also be conscious of how conflicts or humanitarian emergencies might 
impact on the right to water as part of their responsibility to respect the right to 
water.261 The right to water thus remains an important right even in situations where 
the national government is oppressive, national laws are not enforced, or local 
authorities are unwilling or unable to observe national law.262 In this sense, 
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corporations cannot simply wait for regulation. Rather, they have a positive role to 
play in pressing for standards to be respected.263  
Non-State management of water services often raises the concern that such 
entities might limit or impede the right of access to water. Any regulatory approach 
that is consistent with the human right to water should ensure that the provider does 
not over-emphasise full-cost recovery and other commercial objectives at the 
expense of other social objectives. Particularly important in privatisation scenarios 
are issues concerning disconnections and tariffs. 
5 3 3 1 Human rights due diligence in respect of the right to water  
Human rights due diligence or impact assessments are a relatively new tool in the 
toolbox of human rights practitioners. Human rights impact assessment entails a 
systematic process to investigate and measure the impact of policies, programmes, 
projects, and interventions on human rights.264  There is a growing realisation, even 
in the corporate community, of the need to integrate human rights in corporate 
policies and practices.265  
The Norms on TNCs further provide for an obligation on corporations to 
undertake periodic human rights impact assessments of their operations and 
activities.266 The commentary to the Norms on TNCs explains that a corporation must 
study the human rights impacts of any intended project before it embarks on such 
project.267 It is significant to note that impact assessments are quite an established 
procedure under environmental law. Human rights impact assessments by non-State 
actors before and during the life of a project may serve a useful purpose in 
forestalling actual and potential human rights violations by non-State actors.268 
The private provider of water services should undertake a human rights due-
diligence process as part of its responsibility to respect the right to water. The private 
water provider should take steps to become aware of, prevent and address adverse 
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human rights impacts as part of its human rights due diligence.269 This process 
should enable the corporation to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for any 
impacts on the right to water as a result of its operations.270  
A number of tools have been developed to examine a range of activities from 
a human rights perspective. These include the impact of development programmes 
of foreign governments on beneficiary countries, the impact of government policy and 
legislation on domestic protection of human rights, and the impact of MNCs on 
human rights.271 Some of the key examples are the human rights impacts 
assessments models by Rights and Democracy, the IFC‘s, jointly developed in 
association with the International Business Leaders Forum and the UN Global 
Compact, and the Health Rights of Women Assessment Instrument developed by 
Aim for Human Rights.272 Rights and Democracy has undertaken various studies on 
human rights impact assessments. The studies focused on water privatisation in 
Argentina, mining operations in The Philippines, Peru and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo as well as the use of information technology in China.273 Such a model 
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provides a useful template in conducting human rights impact assessments before 
and during the management and provision of water services by a private provider. 
Such an approach will help to maximise any positive impacts that non-State 
involvement in the water sector can have for the realisation of the right to water. It 
helps corporations involved in the water sector to avoid impairing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts and address such impacts when they occur. 
The UN Special Rapporteur explained that the provision of water services is 
characterised by special features in that the service relates directly to the fulfilment of 
human rights.274 Corporations are enjoined to observe particular requirements in 
exercising due diligence as part of their duty to respect the right to water.275 The 
Special Rapporteur has clarified that in order to be able to respect the right to water, 
non-State actors need to know the actual and potential impacts on access to 
water.276 It must be noted that such due diligence entails a comprehensive, proactive 
attempt to uncover risks, actual and potential towards the realisation of the right to 
water. The assessment should be explicitly based on human rights, including the 
right to water and should specifically address the human rights impact on the most 
excluded and marginalised groups. Such risk assessment should be ongoing, 
recognising that the human rights risks to the right to water may change over time as 
the corporation‘s context and operating context evolve.277 The responsibility to carry 
out human rights due diligence to respect the right to water may also require 
corporations to take some positive steps. Such steps involve putting into place the 
necessary policies, mechanisms to identify actual and potential harm to human right 
to water and the provision of grievance mechanisms.278 
In exercising due diligence, non-State service providers are expected to 
consider the country and local context in which they carry their activities such as the 
institutional capacities of the State in order to identify specific human rights 
challenges.279 Furthermore, the non-State provider of water services must also 
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consider whether it might contribute to abuse of the human right to water through its 
relationships with other actors.280  
Where a non-State actor is involved in the provision of water services, service 
delivery should also be assessed against the standard of the human right to water.281 
This means that, despite the involvement of a private service, water must be 
available in a quantity sufficient to satisfy all personal and domestic needs.282 
Significantly, water must be safe so as not to pose a threat to human health and 
should comply with the World Health Organisation Guidelines for Drinking Water 
Quality.283 It is important that the non-State actor provider ensure that the water 
supply is sufficiently reliable to allow for the collection of sufficient amounts for 
personal and domestic needs over the entire day.284 The non-State actor should also 
ensure that the water is available within or in the immediate vicinity of the household, 
healthcare facility, school or public place.285  
Although water does not necessarily have to be provided for free, the non-
State actor provider should meet human rights standards laid down by the right to 
water. The tariffs and connection costs must be designed in such a way that makes 
them accessible to all sections of the community, including the marginalised 
individuals and groups living in extreme poverty. This necessarily means that despite 
non-State actor involvement, individuals must have access to ―minimum essential 
levels of water‖ despite their inability to pay.286  
Developing States might lack the necessary expertise in drafting or 
understanding water privatisation agreements. Providing essential services to groups 
of people who are poor and marginalised, ensuring that water services are affordable 
and avoiding water disconnections when users are unable to pay are some of the 
challenges likely to be encountered in water privatisation agreements. It is important 
to ensure the quality of water services and the presence of a sound regulatory 
capacity for enforcement. Monitoring of performance and the establishment of 
effective complaint mechanisms are important human rights issues in any water 
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privatisation arrangement.287 These concerns should be addressed by States and 
corporations when they negotiate the terms of privatised delivery of water services, 
agree on contracts, and implement them. Specifically, a service provider should 
expect to engage with State authorities on these issues to ensure its own conduct or 
practices do not contribute to abuses of the human right to water.288 
5 3 3 2 Non-State actor responsibility to provide for grievance mechanisms 
The importance of grievance and enforcement mechanisms as part of realising the 
right to water cannot be over-emphasised. The provision of effective grievance 
mechanisms constitutes a significant component of the UN Framework and 
Guidelines discussed above. Such mechanisms are important where water services 
have been privatised to ensure the accountability of the private service provider. 
Grievance mechanisms and access to effective remedies with respect to the right to 
water are essential. Such grievance mechanisms provide a framework for holding 
water service providers accountable for any deteriorating services, unmet 
performance standards, and unjustified tariff increases.289 A non-State service 
provider has a responsibility to put in place mechanisms that allow individuals and 
groups to bring alleged human rights abuses of the right to water to the attention of 
the service provider.290  
 The allocation of oversight roles should avoid any conflicts of interest, for 
instance, between ensuring the effectiveness of the grievance mechanism on the one 
hand and defending the actions or decisions of certain parts of the corporation on the 
other. For such grievance mechanisms to be legitimate, they should be easily 
accessible to individuals and groups affected by the non-State actor‘s operations.291 
The provision of grievance mechanisms is an integral part of exercising human rights 
due diligence. Such mechanisms enable the non-State actor involved in the provision 
of water services to become aware of its acts or omissions that impact negatively on 
the realisation of the human right to water.292 Where the non-State provider identifies 
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any abuse of the right to water as a result of its acts or omissions, it is expected to 
provide remediation through legitimate processes.293  
The OECD Guidelines also provide for MNCs to provide an effective remedy 
for any adverse human rights impacts caused by corporations. The OECD Guidelines 
provide that MNCs must ensure effective measures to address human rights impacts 
arising from their activities.294 The Commentary to the OECD Guidelines elaborates 
that MNCs must have processes in place to enable remediation in cooperation with 
judicial or State-based non-judicial mechanisms.295 Apart from such State-based 
non-judicial mechanisms, MNCs are expected to provide for operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for those potentially impacted by a corporation‘s activities. To 
be legitimate, such internal grievance mechanisms must be accessible, predictable, 
equitable and compatible with the OECD Guidelines and provide for transparent 
procedures.296 
UN Guiding Principles 25-31 set out principles that should underpin judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms that provide remedies for abuses involving 
corporations. Such principles are directly relevant to companies whose activities 
have a bearing on individuals or communities‘ access to water services. In the 
context of water privatisation, the private water operator must establish a grievance 
mechanism to receive and facilitate resolution of the individuals and communities‘ 
concerns and grievances about the corporation‘s activities on their right to water. 
Mechanisms such as the IFC‘s Performance Standards on Environment and Social 
Sustainability and the297 Specific Instance procedure under the OECD Guidelines for 
MNCs provide useful templates that can be transplanted into water privatisation 
scenarios to hold non-State actors accountable for infringing on the right to water.   
It is important that any corporate grievance mechanism must be designed so 
as to address any risks and adverse impacts on the communities‘ right to water and 
other related rights.298 The grievance mechanism should seek to resolve concerns 
promptly, using an understandable and transparent consultative process that is 
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culturally appropriate and readily accessible, and at no cost.299 It is important that the 
grievance mechanism should ensure that there is no retribution to any individual or 
community that files a complaint.300  
5 3 3 3 Effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
An effective grievance mechanism should help in the early identification of problems, 
early and agreed solutions, increased trust, and the avoidance of public protest, 
litigation or other forms of opposition to the water privatisation project.301 On the other 
hand, a poorly designed or administered grievance mechanism may distort 
assessments of how well human rights risks impacting on the right to water are being 
managed thereby compounding affected individuals and communities‘ sense of 
grievance.302  
The non-judicial mechanisms provided for by the non-State provider should be 
effective and credible so as to enable trust from all stakeholder groups for whose use 
they are intended. The grievance mechanisms should be accessible to all 
stakeholder groups and should provide adequate assistance for those who may face 
particular barriers to access them. The mechanisms must also be predictable and 
should provide clear and known procedures, clarity on the types of process and 
outcome available and means of monitoring implementation. The procedures for 
grievance remediation must also be equitable and should ensure that aggrieved 
parties have reasonable access to sources of information and advice necessary to 
engage in a fair grievance process. It is also important that the procedures must be 
rights-compatible by ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord with the right to 
water and related human rights.303  
The internal mechanisms should augment but not compete with or undermine 
State-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. Non-State service providers must 
therefore not obstruct individuals and groups from accessing State-based 
accountability mechanisms such as court proceedings.304 State-based adjudicative 
mechanisms are particularly important in the absence of an amicable resolution 
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between the rights beneficiaries and the water service provider. State-based 
mechanisms and other alternatives include courts, the State ombudsman or 
complaints offices specific to an industry, a labour standards office, a National 
Contact Point,305 a national human rights institution, or any other State-administered 
or statutory body empowered to take such a role.306 Other alternative grievance 
mechanisms may also include local and traditional mechanisms used by indigenous 
or other communities. In some cases, a mechanism administered by a multi-
stakeholder initiative might have a role in resolving the grievance.307 
The private operator should, in appropriate circumstances, seek expert advice 
on the extent to which such mechanisms in their local operating environment are 
likely to be able to remedy the grievance.308 Any grievance procedure must be 
credible in the eyes of the complainant. The grievance procedure should be free of 
corruption or manipulation for its outcomes to be human rights compliant.309 The 
section below discusses a promising grievance mechanism for holding corporations 
accountable for human rights abuses, including the right to water.   
 
5 3 4 UN Global Compact Chief Executive Officer Water Mandate 
The CEO Water Mandate is a corporate-driven initiative housed within the UN Global 
Compact. It was designed to help the private sector better understand and address 
its impacts on, and management of water resources.310 The CEO Water Mandate 
was launched in 2007 by the UN Secretary-General and a number of international 
business leaders. The CEO Water Mandate recognises that the business sector, 
through the production of goods and services, directly or indirectly impacts on water 
resources.311 Corporations endorsing the CEO Water Mandate acknowledge a 
responsibility to make sustainable water-resources management a major priority as 
part of addressing the global water challenge. As of May 2012, eight-five 
corporations from across the world had endorsed the CEO Water Mandate.312  
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The CEO Water Mandate seeks to build an international movement of 
committed companies in the sustainable management of water resources. The 
initiative is open to companies of all sizes and from all sectors, and from all parts of 
the world. The initiative requires the endorsement of a company‘s Chief Executive 
Officer, or equivalent.313 A company wishing to join the initiative should indicate its 
endorsement of the CEO Water Mandate and the six elements by submitting a letter 
signed by its Chief Executive Officer or equivalent.314 It is however important to note 
that participation in the CEO Water Mandate is restricted to existing corporate 
endorsers of the UN Global Compact.315 Some of the largest water providers on the 
endorsing list include GDF Suez (France), Groupe Danone (France) and Veolia 
Water (France). Some of the largest water consumers are also on the list of 
endorsing corporations, including the Coca-Cola Company (USA), Heineken NV (The 
Netherlands), Nike Inc. (USA), PepsiCo Inc. (USA), SABMiller (South Africa) and 
Unilever (UK).316 The mandate contains a provision to the effect that corporations not 
currently signatories of the UN Global Compact may endorse the CEO Water 
Mandate provided they intend to join the UN Global Compact within six months of 
endorsing the CEO Water Mandate.317 
5 3 5 Implementation of the Global Compact CEO-Water mandate 
Endorsing companies are required to report annually on progress in implementing 
the CEO Water Mandate‘s six elements. This provision was introduced through the 
Transparency Disclosure Policy for the CEO Water Mandate (hereinafter referred to 
as the ―Transparency Policy‖) established by the UN Global Compact office in 2008.  
The CEO Water Mandate endorsers are required to publish an annual report to their 
stakeholders about progress in implementing the CEO Water Mandate‘s six 
elements.318 According to the Transparency Policy, communication on progress is an 
important demonstration of a participant‘s commitment to the initiative and its 
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objectives.319 While there is no specific format for the implementation report, the CEO 
Water Mandate Transparency Report provides that the report must encapsulate the 
following basic elements.320  
Firstly, the implementation report must contain an explicit statement of the 
corporation‘s continued support for the CEO Water Mandate. This is considered to 
renew a corporation‘s commitment to the initiative and its six elements.321 Secondly, 
the report must contain a description of policies and practical actions that the 
corporate endorser has adopted to implement the CEO Water Mandate elements.322 
At the very minimum, the endorsing corporation is expected to explicitly address past 
or planned activities for all of the CEO Water Mandate elements.323 In this regard, it 
is expected that within five years of the initial endorsement, the endorsing corporation 
must address concrete activities and policies that reflect implementation of all six of 
the CEO Water Mandate elements. Thirdly, the implementation report must contain a 
measurement of outcomes or expected future outcomes using broadly accepted 
water-related indicators.324 Failure by an endorsing corporation to prepare a publicly 
available implementation report results in the change of status (to ―non-
communicating.‖)325 Such a change of status is a precursor to the eventual delisting 
of an endorser from the CEO Water Mandate. 
The CEO Water Mandate is the only recognisable global corporate voluntary 
initiative explicitly relating to water. However, there are aspects of the initiative that 
needs to be improved for it to be effective as a mechanism for imposing human rights 
responsibilities on corporations involved in the provision of water services. Although 
the initiative was elaborated under the aegis of the UN Global Compact, it remains a 
non-legally binding corporate-driven initiative. The six core elements make no 
reference to the duties imposed by the right to water which are binding on endorsing 
corporations. It is important that respect for the right to water is explicitly incorporated 
in the CEO Water Mandate as one of the initiative‘s core principles. The reporting 
mechanism provided for under the Transparency Policy does not provide for 
independent monitoring in respect of the CEO Water Mandate‘s six core elements by 
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the endorsing firms. Furthermore, there is no provision for any complaints 
mechanism for individuals or groups whose right to water may be infringed by an 
endorsing corporation. The CEO Water Mandate might be strengthened by requiring 
endorsing corporations to establish or participate in effective operational or industry 
level grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities whose right to water 
and other related rights have been adversely impacted by their operations. 
 
5 3 6 Study by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water 
and Sanitation  
The mandate of the Independent Expert on the human right to safe drinking water 
and sanitation was initially established by the UN Human Rights Council in March 
2008.326 The UN Human Rights Council, in March 2011 extended and changed its 
title to Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation 
(―hereinafter referred to as Special Rapporteur.‖)327 The Special Rapporteur‘s overall 
mandate entails undertaking a study to clarify the content of the human rights 
obligations, including non-discrimination, in relation to access to safe drinking water 
and sanitation. The Special Rapporteur‘s mandate includes studying the normative 
content of human rights obligations in relation to access to water and sanitation. The 
Special Rapporteur is further mandated to study the responsibilities of the private 
sector in the context of the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation among 
others.328 In 2010, the Special Rapporteur prepared a report on private sector 
participation in the provision of water and sanitation services.329 In the report, she 
focuses on the human rights obligations and responsibilities which apply in cases of 
non-State service provision of water and sanitation. The Special Rapporteur 
specifically stated that she considered her work as building upon the UN Framework 
as well as operationalising it by specifically applying it to the provision of water 
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services.330 The Special Rapporter also proposed a conceptual difference between 
the human rights obligations of States and the responsibilities of non-State service 
providers.331 
In the same vein as the UN Framework, the Special Rapporteur proposed that 
parallel to the obligation of the State to protect, the non-State service provider must, 
as a general obligation, comply with the laws and regulations of the State.332 The 
Special Rapporteur relies on the UN Framework to underscore the need for non-
State actors involved in the provision of water services to carry out a human rights 
impact assessment of their activities in order to be able to effectively respect human 
rights.333 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur emphasised the importance of 
providing grievance mechanisms to address any water-related disputes. The non-
State actor should provide internal grievance mechanisms to address the water-
related rights of individuals and communities that may be negatively impacted by the 
water services provider.334  
The above are some of the important principles related to the human rights 
responsibilities of corporations in relation to the right to water elaborated in the 
Special Rapporteur‘s study. The importance of the principles enunciated in the 
Special Rapporteur‘s study and related initiatives will be discussed below in so far as 
they are relevant for making corporations accountable in cases of water privatisation. 
The following section discusses some corporate driven mechanisms adopted outside 
the UN system and their relevance for attempting to impose human rights 
responsibilities on corporations. 
5 3 7 The OECD‘s Specific Instance Procedure 
A particularly interesting feature of the OECD Guidelines is the Specific Instance 
Procedure, a complaint procedure introduced in 2000 as part of the revision to the 
OECD Guidelines.335 The complaint procedure allows NGOs to submit a ―specific 
instance‖ or ―complaint‖ about alleged breaches of the OECD Guidelines by a 
corporation to the National Contact Point (hereinafter referred to as the NCP).336 
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The OECD Guidelines represent a landmark development in an attempt to 
impose human rights responsibilities on MNCs, particularly in light of the new chapter 
on human rights adopted in the 2011 revision. Before the adoption of the Ruggie 
Framework by the Human Rights Council in June 2011, the OECD Guidelines were 
the only multilateral international instrument adopted by States to hold MNCs to 
account. Additionally, the geographical scope of the OECD Guidelines extends 
beyond the territory of the State Parties to the OECD to allow other States outside of 
that economic grouping to adhere to the OECD Guidelines.337 Although it has its 
weaknesses one of which is its non-judicial nature, the complaints mechanism under 
the OECD Guidelines remains the only existing international mechanisms for 
regulating MNCs.338 Through its specific instance mechanism, the OECD Guidelines 
possess a unique feature that provides the means to actively attend to and potentially 
resolve conflicts between aggrieved communities and corporations.339 The 
mechanism makes it relevant for holding corporations to account in water 
privatisation situations. 
The OECD Guidelines provide for any legal or natural person to submit any 
complaint to the relevant NCP under the Specific Instance Procedure340 of the OECD 
Guidelines. Such complaints can be against MNCs operating from an adhering 
country. Upon receipt of a complaint, the NCP is obliged to make an initial 
assessment of whether the issues raised merit further examination. Where the NCP 
determines that the complaint merits further examination, it offers its good offices to 
help the parties involved to resolve the dispute.341 If an NCP decides to proceed to 
examine a complaint, it is expected to play a mediation role in bringing the parties 
together to resolve the issue. The results of the procedure can only be made public 
after consultation with the relevant parties. Confidentiality may be maintained if it is 
determined that preserving confidentiality would be in the best interests of effective 
implementation of the OECD Guidelines.342  
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An analysis of the grievance procedure under the OECD Guidelines clearly 
illustrates its positive contribution. The grievance procedure, as will be illustrated 
through the discussion of some cases below, has contributed to some form of 
remedy for the victims of corporate abuse. The mechanism has contributed to 
behavioural change in the way corporations operate their business activities and 
improvements in the environmental and human rights conditions on the ground.343 
The Specific Instance Procedure may be an important forum for holding non-State 
water providers accountable given that the majority of such entities have as their 
home States OECD member States. The world‘s biggest water corporations such as 
Veolia Environment (France), Suez Environment (France), ITT Corporation (USA), 
United Utilities (UK), Severn Trent (UK) and Thames Water (UK) are from OECD 
member States. This makes the OECD Specific Instance Procedure a promising 
avenue for holding such corporations accountable for the human right to water in 
privatisation situations. 
5 3 8  Select ―jurisprudence‖ under the OECD‘s Specific Instance Procedure 
As of March 2012, a total of 128 cases have been filed under the Specific Instance 
Procedure by NGOs against corporations from the time the first case was filed in 
2001. Of these 128 cases, 106 related directly to human rights concerns, 38 
concerned information disclosure, 44 related to employment and industrial relations, 
68 were concerned with environmental issues, 21 to bribery, 8 related to consumer 
interests among others.344 This section highlights select cases decided by various 
NCPs under the OECD‘s Specific Instance Procedure. Although the cases do not 
directly relate to the right to water within privatisation contexts, they serve to illustrate 
the potential of the Specific Instance Procedure to hold MNCs accountable for human 
rights, including those involved in the provision of water services.  
5 3 8 1 The Centre for Human Rights and Environment and others v Nidera 
The complaint was filed with the Netherlands NCP on 26th June 2011 by a group of 
Argentine and Dutch NGOs.345 The complainants alleged that Nidera, a Dutch based 
MNC, had abused the human rights of temporary workers at its corn seed processing 
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operations in Argentina in breach of the OECD Guidelines. The complaint detailed 
the poor living and working conditions at the seed plants.346 The complainants 
demanded that Nidera should develop and implement an effective company-wide 
human rights policy and commitment including concrete human rights due diligence 
procedures.347 Such procedures would enable Nidera to identify, prevent and 
mitigate any actual and potential adverse human rights impacts throughout its global 
operations, especially the company‘s hiring and employment processes of temporary 
workers in its operations.348  
The NCP conducted an initial assessment and subsequently accepted the 
case for further consideration. The NCP facilitated a series of meetings in which the 
parties to the complaint agreed on the best way to address the issues raised in the 
complaint.349 The resulting agreement enjoined Nidera to strengthen its human rights 
policy. Furthermore, Nidera agreed to adopt human rights due diligence procedures 
for temporary rural workers, and allowed the NGOs to monitor its Argentine corn 
seed operations through field visits.350 This agreement was publicised through a 
statement issued by the Netherlands NCP on the 5th March 2012.351 
5 3 8 2 European Centre for Constitutional and others v Otto Stadtlander 
GmbH and others 
The complaint was filed with the France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK NCPs.352 
Human rights NGOs, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights 
(hereinafter referred to as ―ECCHR‖), Association Sherpa and German Forum for 
Human Rights filed a joint complaint on 25th October 2010 against seven cotton 
dealers from France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The 
complainants alleged that the seven corporations were knowingly profiting from child 
labour in the Uzbek cotton industry in breach of the OECD Guidelines.353  
The UK NCP proceeded to facilitate an agreement between ECCHR, Cargill 
Cotton and ICT Cotton UK on a number of concrete measures to be undertaken by 
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the companies in order to improve the human rights situation of their operations in 
Uzbekistan. The parties also agreed to regularly inform each other about progress 
made in improving the human rights situations of their supply chains.354 
The Swiss NCP also accepted the three complaints against Swiss companies 
ECOM, Paul Reinhart and Louis Dreyfuss in March 2011. The Swiss NCP 
acknowledged the corporations‘ responsibility for conditions in their supply chains. 
The companies accepted the NCP‘s offer to facilitate a dialogue between the parties. 
Mediation was successful, and in the final agreement the corporations acknowledged 
their responsibility for the child labour situation in their Uzbekistan supply chains. 
Significantly, the corporations promised to take steps to eradicate and prevent child 
labour in their Uzbek supply chain.355  
The case against Otto Stadtlander was handled by the German NCP. The 
corporation agreed to an NCP-mediated dialogue with ECCHR that ended 
successfully with an agreement in December 2011. The company agreed to take 
measures to avoid forced child labour in its supply chains and to report back to the 
NCP on the action it had taken within one year. The agreement gained further 
significance when the German government subsequently took a strong position 
against the use of child labour in the Uzbekistan cotton industry.356 
5 3 8 3 Framtiden i våre hender (Future in Our Hands) v Intex Resources 
The complaint was filed against Norway-based Intex Resources with the Norwegian 
NCP on 26th January 2009 and concluded on 28th April 2011. The complaint alleged 
that the company‘s planned nickel mine and factory in the Mindoro Province of The 
Philippines would violate the human and environmental rights of indigenous 
peoples.357 The complaints argued that the company‘s prospecting agreement 
encroached on the Mangyan, Alangan and Tadyawan indigenous groups‘ land. The 
complainants further argued that although the indigenous groups had property rights 
in the land in question, they were not properly consulted on the proposed project. In 
addition, the complaint alleged that the proposed factory threatened vital water 
resources because of its proximity to rivers that provide water to neighbouring 
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villages and agricultural fields.358 The corporation refused to participate in the 
mediation proposed by the Norwegian NCP.  
The NCP‘s issued its statement on the 28th April 2011 in which it recognised 
the importance and relevance of obtaining the free, prior and informed consent of 
affected indigenous peoples in compliance with the OECD Guidelines.359 The 
Norwegian NCP concluded that Intex had failed to undertake a systematic risk 
assessment of the affected indigenous groups and had not properly consulted the 
affected groups.360 Although Intex had acquired the free, prior informed consent of 
two affected indigenous groups, the NCP stated that such a process was inadequate 
as the company did not translate crucial information into local indigenous languages. 
The NCP pointed that the two indigenous groups were not able to understand vital 
information regarding the potential negative effects of the project on the communities 
and their environment. The NCP also recommended that Intex identify and consult all 
indigenous communities potentially affected by the proposed project. The NCP 
affirmed the importance of corporations conducting due diligence assessments 
throughout all stages of a project, including the initial planning phase.361 The NCP‘s 
statement contains several recommendations for how Intex can better bring itself in 
line with the OECD Guidelines. The recommendations addressed issues such as 
community engagement, disclosure of relevant, timely and understandable 
information, transparency and the importance of establishing company-level 
grievance mechanism.362 
5 3 8 4 Citizen Participation Forum for Justice and Others v Barrick Gold 
Corporation 
The complaint was filed on 9th June 2011 and is still pending before the Argentina 
NCP. The complaint alleged that Barrick Gold Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
―Barrick‖) has breached the OECD Guidelines‘ provisions on disclosure, environment 
and general policies at the company‘s Veladero and Pascua Lama gold mines in the 
Argentine San Juan province.363The complainants allege that Barrick has 
systematically polluted groundwater, air, soil and glaciers leading to the loss of 
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biodiversity around the mines.364 The complainants also highlighted the corporation‘s 
negative impact on the local population‘s health and the deteriorating regional 
economy resulting from the destruction of natural landscapes and restrictions on 
access to land and water resources.365  
The complainants further alleged that Barrick has violated the right to 
information and improperly involved in local political decision making, and used 
violence against social and environmental organisations. The complainants 
demanded Barrick to actively engage with and consult the affected communities, 
conduct an interdisciplinary environmental analysis, and to initiate studies to 
investigate negative impacts on the local population‘s heath.366 
5 3 8 5 Significance of the OECD Guidelines‘ Specific Instance Procedure 
The outcomes from some of the mediated agreements under the OECD‘s 
Specific Instance Procedure illustrate the positive elements of the mechanism and its 
immense potential for holding corporations accountable for human rights.367 Even in 
cases where there was no agreement, statements from the NCPs, for instance in the 
Norwegian case, acknowledge the validity and legitimacy of the complainant‘s 
concerns. Furthermore, the NCP proceeded to make a determination on whether the 
OECD Guidelines were breached. The statement also provides recommendations to 
the corporation on how it can better implement and uphold the OECD Guidelines.  
In some cases, the existence of a complaint can prompt a resolution of the 
case in another forum. A case lodged by Germanwatch against Continental AG 
provides a good example.368 The complaint attracted media attention and eventually 
members of the German parliament helped to settle the case even though there was 
no agreement within the Specific Instance Procedure under the Mexican or the 
German NCPs.369 A complaint under the Specific Instance Procedure can generate 
media attention, raise awareness, and lead to increased public pressure on 
corporations to improve their human rights behaviour.370 A case raised by the 
Australian Conservation Foundation against ANZ Bank was rejected by the 
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Australian NCP.371 The media attention generated by the case resulted in a review of 
the applicability of the OECD Guidelines to the financial sector. This resulted in ANZ 
becoming the first Australian bank to develop a forestry and biodiversity policy.372 
This should be regarded as a positive outcome.  
Significantly, the State-backed weight attached to the OECD Guidelines 
provides authority to NCP statements and the importance of an NCP‘s findings and 
recommendations. Furthermore, the fact of the NCP publicly finding corporations to 
be in breach of the OECD Guidelines should not be underestimated. Additionally, a 
clear and strong statement from the NCP and the accompanying recommendations 
can contribute to a better understanding of how corporations should conduct their 
operations in a human rights compliant manner.373 The above clearly makes the 
Specific Instance Procedure a promising mechanism for holding water corporations 
accountable for any breaches of the right to water in privatisation situations. The 
procedure might need strengthening especially in the enforcement of the NCPs‘ 
findings to make such decisions more credible. The OECD Specific Instance 
Procedure is nevertheless a potentially revolutionary procedure for holding 
corporations accountable in the absence of directly binding norms for such entities 
under international law.  
 
5 4 Emergence and rise of voluntary corporate standards 
Corporations have, for the most part vigorously resisted mandatory regulation under 
international law.374 Corporations are, however, attempting to address the gap in 
global economic governance by using their powerful position to adopt voluntary 
minimum standards of their own. The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of 
multi-actor initiatives, initially collaborations between corporations and non-
governmental organisations (hereinafter referred to as ―NGOs‖) and more recently, 
trilateral voluntary schemes involving States, corporations and NGOs.375  
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Some big corporations have responded to public demand and reputational 
concerns by adopting corporate codes of conduct and sectoral self-regulation 
initiatives.376 Graham and Woods have referred to this ‗‗self-regulation‘‘ as ―attempts 
by corporations to establish rule-based constraints on behaviour without the direct 
coercive intervention of States or other external actors.‖377 Prominent among these 
are corporate codes of conduct, trade association codes, multi-stakeholder codes 
and State-backed voluntary codes. Such codes commit participants to minimum 
standards of human rights, labour, environmental and related standards.378   
States most directly concerned with pressing problems are increasingly 
collaborating directly with business and civil society to establish voluntary regulatory 
systems in specific operational contexts.379 Thus, in addition to the increasing 
number of sectoral and internal corporate codes of conduct, one can observe a 
progression into increasingly complex multi-actor voluntary regulatory initiatives.380 
These innovative State-backed and multi-stakeholder hybrid mechanisms make them 
relevant in regulating non-State actors in situations where water services have been 
privatised. This is particularly so in the absence of international instruments directly 
binding on non-State actors.381  
A body of scholarship has focused on the rise of these self-regulation and 
other multi-stakeholder voluntary initiatives. The focus is on the ways in which 
corporations and NGOs could play an increasingly important role in generating, 
deepening, and implementing transnational norms in such areas as human rights.382 
Teubner has referred to this development as the lex mercatoria, noting that: 
 
―[An] increasing role is played by non-State actors, even in law making, as has been 
demonstrated by the emergence of the new lex mercatoria...the transnational law of 
economic transactions.‖383  
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This development has also been described as forming a constituent part of global 
administrative law ―though much of this transformation takes place beneath the 
surface of the international legal order and often goes unnoticed.‖384 Bob Hepple has 
also used the theory of reflexive regulation as an entry-point for understanding 
legislatively and judicially motivated models of participation in employment equity and 
socio-economic rights in South Africa.385 Abbot and Snidal have referred to this 
adoption and implementation of non-binding, voluntary standards of business 
conduct by corporations, NGOs and Intergovernmental Organisations (hereinafter 
referred to as ―IGOs‖) as forms of ―regulatory standard-setting.‖386 The two authors 
argue that this cacophony of soft law norms is developing into a system of 
transnational governance for business.387   
5 4 1 Characteristics of this new regulatory phenomenon 
Abbott and Snidal have pointed to two particularly striking features about these new 
regulatory initiatives.388 The first is the central role of private actors, operating singly 
and through novel collaborations, and the correspondingly modest and largely 
indirect role of the State.389  Significantly, most of these arrangements are monitored 
by NGOs, labour unions, corporations and industry groups whose own activities or 
those of their supply chains are the targets of regulation.390 Although States are not 
central to their governance or operations, States and IGOs often support and even 
participate in some of these largely corporate-driven initiatives.391  
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Significantly, traditional State-based international regulatory arrangements 
have begun to take innovative forms.392 IGOs such as the UN, through its Global 
Compact, and the OECD through its OECD Guidelines engage firms they are meant 
to influence in the regulatory process. The second feature is the voluntary rather than 
State-mandated nature of these regulatory norms as corporations or NGOs lack the 
authority to promulgate binding law.393 It is however noteworthy that even IGO 
initiatives such as the UN Global Compact or the OECD Guidelines, for instance, 
operate through a voluntary soft law approach rather than the traditional hard law of 
binding treaties.394 
 
5 4 2 Examples of corporate-driven voluntary initiatives 
This section highlights some corporate-driven voluntary initiatives. Although such 
initiatives do not necessarily directly apply to water privatisation situations, some of 
these mechanisms provide good practices for holding corporations accountable. The 
best practices, principles and accountability mechanisms derived from such 
mechanisms can be useful tools for holding corporations involved in the provision of 
water services accountable in the absence of binding norms. Two early corporate 
initiatives, The Body Shop‘s Trade Not Aid Initiative adopted in 1991395 and GAP 
Incorporated‘s Individual Labour Rights Scheme adopted in 1992 represent the 
subsequent cascade of corporate self-regulation.396 Another earlier sectoral initiative 
is the chemical industry‘s Responsible Care programme launched in 1985 by the 
Canadian Chemical Producers Association as a response to the 1984 Bhopal Gas 
Disaster in India. It is an early industry-wide self-regulatory global initiative that drives 
continuous improvement in health, safety and environmental performance, together 
with open and transparent communication with stakeholders.397 It has since evolved 
into a global soft law mechanism in that sector through the adoption of a UN backed 
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Responsible Care Global Charter in 2006.398 Initiatives such as the Forestry 
Stewardship Council (hereinafter referred to as the ―FSC‖) represent joint efforts 
between NGOs and corporations to promote sustainable forestry through the 
Forestry Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria for Forestry Stewardship. The 
FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship was adopted in 1994 and recently 
amended in 2012 and contains 10 principles that must be applied in any forest 
management unit before it can be granted FSC certification.399 
Although many of these soft law initiatives entail an indirect role for the State, 
for instance the use of State-created standards, a growing number involve significant 
State participation. The Global Reporting Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the 
―GRI‖) works closely with intergovernmental organisations such as the UN 
Environment Programme and the International Organisation for Standardisation to 
develop organisational reporting guidance for corporations on environment and social 
justice.400 It also helps in ensuring corporate transparency and accountability in the 
conduct of operations through the use of a Sustainability Reporting Framework.401  
Some of the key initiatives include the Equator Principles, a banking industry initiative 
encouraged by the World Bank‘s International Finance Corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―IFC‖) and based on the IFC Environmental and Social and 
Standards.402 The ILO Tripartite Declaration, although a State-backed mechanism, 
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also serves as a platform for the engagement of governments, labour and business 
in standard-setting.403   
Some of the more recent initiatives include the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights drafted by States, energy corporations and human rights 
NGOs to promote corporate human rights risk assessments and training of security 
providers in the extractive sector.404 The participating States are Canada, Colombia, 
Switzerland US, UK, the Netherlands and Norway. Some of the participating 
corporations are BHP Billiton, BP, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Rio 
Tinto, Shell and Statoil. Human rights and humanitarian organisations such as 
Amnesty International, Fund for Peace, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, 
International Alert, Oxfam and the International Committee of the Red Cross are also 
participants in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Other State-
backed organisations such as the International Finance Corporation and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross have observer status.405 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (hereinafter referred to as 
―KPCS‖) was initiated by Southern African diamond-producing States in 2000 to stem 
the flow of conflict diamonds and became operational from 2003.406 The KPCS is one 
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of the major multi-stakeholder initiatives that have played a crucial role in helping to 
reduce the flow of conflict diamonds.407 Participants in the KPCS can only legally 
trade with other participants who have also met the minimum requirements of the 
scheme. Significantly, the KPCS rules provide that any international shipments of 
rough diamonds by a participating entity must be accompanied by a KPCS certificate 
guaranteeing that such diamonds are conflict-free.408 As of July 2012 the KPCS had 
50 participants, representing 76 countries, with the European Union and its Member 
States counting as a single participant, civil society organisations and the World 
Diamond Council representing the international diamond industry.409  
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the 
―EITI‖) is another key voluntary mechanism composed of States,410 corporations, civil 
society groups such as Transparency International, Open Society Institute, Oxfam 
and Global Witness and intergovernmental organisations such as the African Union, 
the European Commission and the OECD. The EITI is a globally developed standard 
that promotes revenue transparency at the local level in which corporations report on 
the proceeds they pay to the State and the State reports on the revenue it receives 
from mining corporations.411  
 
5 4 3 Significance of soft law initiatives for holding non-State actors accountable 
Most voluntary mechanisms have been created from the bottom up by societal 
actors, often in response to perceived State failure to regulate as well as pressure 
from the public and civil society actors.412 Developing States‘ inability or 
unwillingness to regulate gives these voluntary initiatives significant potential to 
ameliorate such State regulatory inadequacies which created space for these 
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mechanisms to develop.413 These initiatives seek to close regulatory gaps that 
contribute to human rights abuses by corporations. It is important to note that as 
these soft law initiatives strengthen their accountability mechanisms, they also begin 
to blur the lines between the strictly voluntary and mandatory spheres for 
participants.414 A good example is the IFC Performance Standards for 
Corporations415 and the Equator Principles.416 No corporation is obliged to accept 
World Bank funding through the IFC. If, however, a corporation accepts such funding, 
it must comply with certain performance criteria provided under the Equator 
Principles and the IFC Performance Standards For Corporations to be eligible for 
continued funding. States and corporations are free to join and participate in the EITI, 
but if they do, extractive corporations are required to issue public reports of their 
payments to States. States also have to report on the revenue they receive from 
corporations within their jurisdiction participating in the EITI. Significantly, suspension 
or expulsion from KPCS has a direct economic impact on States and corporations 
involved in the diamond mining industry.417  
One study has, for example, shown that the OECD Guidelines‘ ―soft 
sanctioning power has the potential to alter corporate behaviour in the long run‖ if the 
OECD Guidelines‘ ability to ―consistently discriminate between good and bad 
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performers‖ is improved.418 There is also evidence that voluntary international 
environmental standards have a positive effect on corporate behaviour. Potoski and 
Prakash have analysed US firms‘ compliance with the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO 14001)‘s environmental programme and found a positive 
impact on corporate behaviour.419 It is also generally acknowledged that the KPCS 
has reduced the flow of conflict diamonds to one percent of the total market from 
three or four percent since the voluntary scheme became operational in 2003.420  
Although voluntary initiatives contain flexible norms and procedures 
throughout the regulatory process, from a legal pluralist perspective, however, these 
norms may be seen as ―law‖ for participating firms. This is because they complement 
or substitute for mandatory ―hard law.‖421 The MNCs‘ involvement in the provision of 
water services to a considerable extent is beyond the control of one single State. 
This is due to the size and geographical operations of such MNCs coupled with home 
States‘ reluctance and host States‘ inability to regulate. Tamanaha has noted that 
legal pluralism can be observed through a multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest 
local level to the most expansive global level. These include State, regional, village, 
town, or municipal, transnational and international laws of various types.422 In 
addition, in many societies there are customary, indigenous and religious laws 
connected to distinct ethnic or cultural or religious groups within a society. There is 
also an evident increase in quasi-legal activities, from private policing and judging, to 
privately run prisons, to the ongoing creation of the new lex mercatoria, a body which 
is almost entirely the product of private law-making activities.423 
While most academic and political debates about the law are still directed at 
the concept of a national legal order with a centralised and public legislation, more 
and more law-making actors appear besides the national legislators which operate in 
different transnational legal fields and on different levels.424 Examples include the 
European Union law that fundamentally transforms the national law of the member 
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States. Of significance is also the law making powers of institutions such as the 
World Bank, IMF and the WTO. Although the later organisations still submit to the will 
of their member States, the same is not true for the many non-State actors operating 
on the different transnational fields. In areas such as the World Wide Web, 
technology and sports, for instance, private entities create their own law without any 
involvement of public legislatures. MNCs, as indicated above, are likely to solve their 
contractual conflicts according to MNC-established lex mercatoria which is 
interpreted by private arbitration tribunals.425  
The above issues are important in the understanding of law. Firstly, when 
there are many different public and private law-making entities participating in 
different areas and on different local, international or supranational levels, then a 
uniform concept of law is hard to maintain.426 Rather, legal theory has and must deal 
with many different and diverse normative systems.427 Günther argues that the 
positivist concept of a ―single legal system that is logically ordered and hierarchically 
differentiated turns into a plurality of legal regimes.‖428 Legal pluralism, according to 
Günther, seems to ―turn the idea of a unified legal system into a mere fiction.‖429 The 
importance of legal pluralism is in its recognition of various norms beyond State-
promulgated norms to include norms created by corporations and other non-State 
actors. Such norms, albeit with some weaknesses, constitute an important 
development in a bid to hold corporations to account in the absence of international 
law norms directly binding on corporations. 
John Braithwaite has argued that these voluntary initiatives are valuable for 
developing States that lack essential capacities for traditional regulation in the 
absence of internationally binding obligations on corporations.430 Some voluntary 
initiatives draw on the often greater resources and capacities of corporations. For 
example, inspections of suppliers may be more effective when performed by 
knowledgeable corporations or NGOs than by public inspectors who may lack the 
necessary expertise. The water privatisation experience in South Africa discussed 
above highlighted the local authority‘s incapacity to effectively monitor the water 
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concession which also contributed to its dismal performance.431 For instance in the 
case of Nelspruit, the Compliance Monitoring Unit set up by the City Council to 
monitor the performance of the private water provider was dysfunctional. In some 
cases, such as that of the Eastern Cape municipalities, the councillors mandated to 
monitor the private water providers lacked the requisite expertise to do so.432 Such 
voluntary initiatives will likely reduce resource demands on the State. This constitutes 
a significant advantage in an era when many States and agencies face both 
shrinking resources and budget cuts.433 
 
5 4 4 Limitations of voluntary schemes 
Although voluntary mechanisms show real promise for strengthening international 
regulation by filling regulatory gaps,434 a ―wholly decentralised and spontaneous 
standard-setting process can produce a cacophony of incompatible standards.‖435 
Corporations pressured to adhere to multiple voluntary initiatives face heightened 
―transaction, implementation, and organisational costs.‖436 Significantly, corporations 
that face a multiplicity of voluntary initiatives of different degrees of stringency can 
shop for the most corporate-friendly. This may create incentives for competing 
initiatives to relax their standards.437 There is the added problem that some firms may 
prefer self-regulation for its business-friendly standards and perceived lower 
compliance costs. This results in self-regulation being limited in its efficacy to 
influence corporate behaviour. This potentially leaves many openings for 
opportunism by corporations simply joining a voluntary initiative for public relations 
purposes. Such a phenomenon may create credibility problems for sincere 
corporations committed to be bound by norms and principles provided in a particular 
initiative.438 Although corporations may have unparalleled business expertise and 
managerial capacity to manage such voluntary initiatives, some mechanisms often 
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lack independence and are likely to be motivated by corporations‘ narrow economic 
interests.439  
Some of the limitations of voluntary codes include lack of principled normative 
development applicable on the basis of equality of rights-holders and duty-bearers. 
Additionally, some corporate codes usually include only vague non-operational 
statements on respect for human rights, and are lacking in transparency and effective 
enforcement mechanisms.440 Corporations are often not willing to be subjected to 
independent external monitoring procedures that would ensure compliance with their 
own codes. The result is that such voluntary standards tend to be limited to what the 
corporation already does well and ignore the problematic issues.441  
Despite these challenges, voluntary initiatives remain helpful for holding non-
State actors accountable in the absence of directly binding human rights obligations 
on corporations. Such mechanisms, in conjunction with domestic legislation can play 
a role in holding private water providers accountable in the face of inability or 
unwillingness of States to regulate. 
 
5 4 5 The State‘s role in voluntary regulatory mechanisms 
It is significant to note that despite the voluntary nature of the emerging voluntary 
mechanisms, the State can still play an important role especially with regard to 
corporate-driven initiatives operating within their domestic jurisdictions. States can 
convene, encourage and provide material and logistical support in the creation of 
multi-stakeholder voluntary initiatives. States can also participate and collaborate in 
such initiatives and influence ―their norms, structure, and procedures through their 
terms of collaboration.‖442 States can also provide legitimacy and moral support for 
such mechanisms by participating in such schemes.443 States can also require such 
voluntary mechanisms to abide by procedural and substantive norms applicable to 
public law such as due process and set minimum standards and other substantive 
parameters.444  
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Abbott and Snidal have argued that for those voluntary mechanisms operating 
within their domestic jurisdiction, the State should be in a position to step in with 
mandatory regulation. The threat of such intervention reinforces the effectiveness of 
such voluntary mechanisms.445 Hepple has also explained the importance of the 
State‘s sanctioning power lurking in the background to enhance the effectiveness of 
voluntary mechanisms.446 According to Hepple, this kind of regulation involves three 
interlocking mechanisms.447 The first involves internal scrutiny by the organisation on 
its own to ensure effective self-regulation. The second mechanism involves interest 
groups who must be informed, consulted and engaged in the process of change.448 
The third is an enforcement agency which should provide the back-up role of 
assistance and imposing sanctions where voluntary methods prove ineffectual.449 
According to Hepple, these interlocking mechanisms create a triangular relationship 
among those regulated, stakeholders whose interests are affected, and the 
enforcement agency to safeguard the public interest.450 The following section 
discusses the above initiatives and related voluntary mechanisms‘ relevance in 
holding non-State actors accountable within the context of water privatisation. 
 
5 4 6  Potential of soft regulatory mechanisms as a basis for development of binding 
norms 
The role of the above UN inspired, NGO, IGO and corporate mechanisms and their 
potential to crystallise into hard law both at the national and international level is 
important for holding non-State actors accountable in situations where water services 
have been privatised. These non-binding mechanisms, in the absence of binding 
norms, help to shape and constrain the practises of corporations involved in the 
provision of human rights sensitive services as water. Furthermore, such 
mechanisms may be eventually incorporated into binding national or international law 
leading to their accretion into hard law.   
The significance of the UN Global Compact in the water privatisation sector, 
for instance, is that it has brought some degree of awareness about corporate 
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responsibility for human rights such as water to many MNCs and business 
corporations. Such an approach has provided a measure of impetus for change of 
policies.451 One study demonstrated that the UN Global Compact signalled 
constructive engagement with corporations.452
 
 In particular, the UN Global Compact 
has accelerated policy changes and also revealed practices taking place in local 
affiliates of MNCs.453 The UN Global Compact‘s importance in the water sector is 
also illustrated by the adoption of the CEO Water Mandate discussed above which 
specifically addresses water related issues.
 
   
The UN Global Compact, for instance, has strengthened its compliance 
mechanism by adopting, in February 2011, a revised Communication on Progress 
(hereinafter referred to as ―COP‖).454 Such a mechanism might, despite the voluntary 
nature of the initiative, help focus the spotlight on the human rights-infringing 
activities of those MNCs members to the UN Global Compact involved in the 
provision of water services.455 
The COP is the most important expression of a participant's commitment to 
the UN Global Compact and its principles. A water corporation would, for instance, 
be required to post its COP on the UN Global Compact website and to share it widely 
with its stakeholders.456 Any infringement by the corporation of its COP policy (for 
instance failure to disclose details of any human rights due diligence relating to its 
water project) will result in a change in participant status to non-communicating. This 
can eventually lead to the expulsion of the participant.457  
The Norms on TNCs also constitute a significant approach to corporate 
responsibility for the human right to water especially where water services have been 
privatised. This is despite the SRSG‘s criticism of the Norms on TNCs for their 
alleged ―exaggerated legal claims‖ that human rights law directly imposes a wide 
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range of duties on corporations.458 The Norms on TNCs mark a radical departure 
from previous international efforts aimed at addressing the obligations of non-State 
actors with regard to human rights.459  The intention of the UN Sub-Commission in 
relation to the Norms on TNCs was clearly to provide for legally binding and 
enforceable obligations for non-State actors. It is also significant to note that, unlike 
previous initiatives, the Norms on TNCs extend the human rights responsibilities 
beyond TNCs and provide for the human rights obligations of other business 
enterprises.460 The Norms on TNCs offer the promise of holding water corporations 
directly liable for any infringement of the human right to water. Significantly, the 
Norms on TNCs provide for monitoring mechanisms that recognise the importance of 
internal self-regulation and external monitoring. Their interpretation of human rights 
instruments as imposing direct human rights obligations on corporations differ from 
the traditional approach which focuses exclusively on States as the sole bearers of 
human rights obligations.461 This makes the Norms on TNCs a more promising tool 
for ensuring that non-State actors such as MNCs and business enterprises involved 
in the provision of water services respect and protect the right to water.462 
The UN Framework, Guiding Principles and the Special Rapporteur‘s study 
are equally important in understanding the role of corporations in water privatisation 
scenarios. Although these UN initiatives do not constitute changes to the existing 
international law, they offer a better understanding of it. These initiatives clarify the 
duty of corporations to respect the human right to water human as well as the need 
to carry out due diligence assessments intended to avoid infringing on human rights 
of others. The above initiatives also elaborate the corporate duties not to infringe on 
others‘ right to water. They underscore the necessity of addressing any adverse 
impacts on the right to water resulting from corporate activities. The above UN 
initiatives also emphasise the importance of access to an effective remedy (both 
judicial and non-judicial) for victims of infringements of the right to water.463  
The OECD Guidelines represent a landmark development in an attempt to 
impose human rights responsibilities on MNCs, particularly in light of the new chapter 
on human rights adopted in the 2011 revision. The OECD Guidelines‘ chapter on 
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human rights explicitly recognise the State‘s obligation to respect and protect human 
rights including the right to water. Corporations, including those involved in the 
provision of water services, regardless of size, sector, operational context, ownership 
and structure are duty-bound to respect human right to water and other related rights 
wherever they operate. The OECD Guidelines, despite their voluntary nature, clearly 
illustrates their potential contribution to holding corporations involved in the provision 
of water services accountable. The outcomes from some of the mediated 
agreements under the OECD‘s Specific Instance Procedure illustrate the positive 
elements of the mechanism and its immense potential for holding corporations 
accountable for fulfilling their duties in respect of the right to water. The grievance 
procedure has thus contributed to some form of remedy for the victims of corporate 
abuse. The mechanism has the potential to contribute to behavioural change in the 
way corporations involved in the provision of water services operate. 
 
5 5 Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the State-centric nature of the current international human 
rights framework and the challenges it poses for holding non-State actors 
accountable for human rights in the era of privatisation and liberalisation. Recent 
experiences have demonstrated that non-State actors such as corporations can (and 
often do) abuse human rights such as the right to water. This is particularly the case 
where States are unable or unwilling to reign in such entities. Such actors are not 
directly addressed by international and regional human rights treaties despite their 
increasing involvement in the distribution of human rights sensitive services such as 
the provision of water. Newly independent States initiated the impetus towards 
imposing direct human rights obligations on MNCs in the 1970s to prevent incidences 
of political interference in their domestic affairs by powerful MNCs. One of the earliest 
attempts at establishing binding obligations on MNCs was the 1974 UN Code of 
Conduct on TNCs which was the first attempt at the UN level to usher in binding 
norms to regulate the activities of MNCs. As shown above, disagreements on the 
content and scope of application of the draft code between the industrialised 
countries and the developing countries resulted in failure to adopt the envisaged 
instrument.  
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A range of non-binding initiatives have since been developed in an attempt to 
impose human rights responsibilities on non-States actors. The UN has also 
succumbed to pressure to adopt binding norms on MNCs by embarking on studies 
aimed at attempting to identify, clarify and elaborate international human rights 
responsibilities as reflected in the UN Framework and Guiding Principles discussed 
above. Recent years have seen the emergence of voluntary soft law initiatives 
involving corporations, States, NGOs, and IGOs in an attempt to impose human 
rights responsibilities on corporations in the absence of binding international 
standards. 
This chapter sought to identify and discuss the relevance of these norms 
within the context of water privatisation for holding water corporations to account for 
their obligation imposed by the human right to water. It was shown that, despite the 
limitations posed by the breadth and voluntary nature of such initiatives, these 
mechanisms show real promise for strengthening regulation by filling regulatory gaps 
against non-State actors. Such initiatives are valuable especially for developing 
States that are either unwilling or lack the essential capacities to regulate MNCs. 
These emerging mechanisms, if properly harnessed alongside strengthening the 
domestic legislation of States, can play an important role in holding private water 
providers accountable for the human right to water.  
It was argued that, in addition to the State‘s duty to protect against third party 
infringements of the right, human rights obligations are also imposed directly on 
corporations by the human right to water. These include the corporation‘s 
responsibility to respect the right to water, and the duty to prevent and mitigate 
abuses of the right to water that are directly linked to their operations. This chapter 
argued that the private provider of water services should undertake a human rights 
due diligence process as part of its responsibility to respect the right to water. This 
process should enable the corporation to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
any impacts on the right to water as a result of its operations. The process should 
enable the corporation to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for any impacts on 
the right to water as a result of its operations. Significantly, such a process should 
specifically address the human rights impact on the most excluded and marginalised 
individuals and groups. Additionally, the duties to prevent and mitigate abuse of the 
right to water related to their operations enjoins them to establish or participate in 
effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities 
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whose human rights may be adversely impacted by their operations. Clarity on the 
human rights standards applicable to MNCs is thus important in elaborating the 
responsibilities of and holding corporations in water privatisation situations. The 
following chapter focuses on the creation of an accountability model to guide States 
and non-State actors in the event of privatisation of water services. 
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Chapter 6 
Towards an accountability model to guide State and non-State actors in 
privatisation of water services 
6 1 Introduction 
Water privatisation measures must comply with the normative framework imposed by 
the right to water to be human rights compliant.1 Special measures have to be taken 
to ensure that, in the context where water services are privatised, the services 
provided guarantee the availability, accessibility, quality and acceptability of water 
services to all people, especially vulnerable communities.2 To ensure accountability, 
States and other actors involved in the provision of water services should have 
clearly designated roles and responsibilities. Involving non-State actors in the 
provision of water services requires clearly defining the scope of functions delegated 
to such entities. It is also important to oversee the activities of water services 
providers through establishing regulatory standards and monitoring compliance with 
the set standards.3 
Over and above the obligations attaching to the State with regard to the right 
to water, non-State actors also have duties imposed on them by the right to water.4 
This includes the responsibility to respect the right to water and, depending on the 
constitutional, statutory or contractual provisions in a particular jurisdiction, may 
involve other duties. The corporate duty to respect the right to water exists 
independently of the ability or willingness of States to fulfill their own human rights 
obligations with regard to the right to water.5 The corporate responsibility to respect 
the right to water has two significant but related aspects. Firstly, non-State actors 
have a duty to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through 
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their own activities that impair the right to water.6 Secondly, non-State actors should 
seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts linked to their operations that infringe on 
the right to water.7 The latter includes the provision of grievance mechanisms that 
allow individuals and groups to bring alleged human rights abuses of the right to 
water to the attention of the service provider.8 
It was explained above that privatisation of water services typically exhibits a 
continuum of possible institutional arrangements.9 The continuum involves State 
ownership and management of water services at one end, and private ownership of 
water services at the other end, while in between are various shades of so-called 
public-private partnerships.10 States‘ privatisation of their traditional domestic 
functions such as water provision has in some cases weakened regulation at the 
national level.11 The weakening of regulation is mainly a result of investor pressure 
and new international free trade rules and bilateral investment treaties.12 
Furthermore, privatisation experiences from Tanzania, Bolivia, South Africa and the 
Philippines also noted the lack of independence and expertise of regulatory bodies 
as one of the failures of some of the water privatisation experiments in those 
countries.13 Problems often include lack of political will to create independent and 
effective regulatory agencies as illustrated in the case of the Philippines and South 
Africa.14 
This chapter proposes an accountability model incorporating good practices 
from different jurisdictions. A number of factors were taken into account in selecting 
the practices to be discussed. First, I draw on a cross section of jurisdictions from 
different parts of the world representing diverse legal systems. Second, this chapter 
also focuses on those practices available in English or where English translations 
were available. Third, the practices were selected on the basis that they give effect to 
the values and purposes underpinning water as a human right15 even though some of 
them do not explicitly refer to the right to water. A deliberate position was taken to 
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use the expression ―good practices‖ rather than ―best practices.‖ Using the term ―best 
practices‖ would be too ambitious as it gives the impression that a thorough 
examination of all practices in the world has been done and the best have been 
selected.16 Such a task would be impossible given the limited remit of this chapter 
which is rather to select practices which are illustrative of sound implementation of 
the right to water in a privatisation context. In illustrating the good practices, I will also 
highlight and contrast with the ―bad practices‖ that are inconsistent with the normative 
values and duties imposed by the right to water and should be avoided.  
An important prong of the model is the State‘s duty to protect against human 
rights abuses of the right to water by third parties, including corporations, through 
appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication. The accountability model 
emphasises the responsibility of water services providers, including non-State actors, 
to respect the right to water.17 The duty to respect the right to water has both positive 
and negative dimensions and this will be illustrated in the elaboration of the 
accountability model.18 The duty to respect is broad enough to proscribe the adoption 
of policies that may result in denial of access by poor communities to safe water, 
rather than simply prohibiting interference with existing access to water services.19 It 
also enjoins the State to prevent, investigate, and punish abuse of the right to water 
and to provide access to appropriate remedies. The duty to protect means that 
corporations should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the right, and to address 
any adverse impacts on the right to water as a result of their actions. Both the State 
and the non-State actor should, at different stages of the conception and 
implementation of a privatisation contract, identify groups and individuals who may 
be significantly affected by the agreement. The State and the non-State actor should 
pay particular attention to the privatisation initiative‘s human rights impact on 
individuals and groups that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability and 
marginalisation.20 The accountability model also emphasises the need for victims to 
access effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial. Such effective remedies 
should be available, both at the State level and at the corporate level. The 
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accountability model is thus an inter-related and dynamic system of preventative and 
remedial measures involving both the States and corporations through ―differentiated 
but complementary responsibilities.‖21 It must be noted that, in terms of the 
accountability model developed in this chapter, it is impossible to surgically separate 
the obligations of the State and the responsibilities of a non-State provider. In many 
respects the State‘s obligations and the responsibilities of the water services provider 
overlap and complement each other. I will however attempt to disentangle and 
highlight the respective obligations of the State and those of the water services 
provider with respect to the right to water. 
The water services provider must comply with the normative content of the 
right to water discussed above which encompasses both substantive and procedural 
components.22 This chapter will focus on how such norms can be implemented in 
practice by discussing model legislation and good practices from across the world. 
The previous chapters discussed attempts at international, regional and national 
levels, firstly to explicitly recognise the right to water, and secondly, the attempt to 
impose human rights responsibilities on non-State actors in respect of the right to 
water. The significance of explicitly enshrining a right is to confer on people an 
entitlement, which States and other actors must respect, protect, promote and fulfill 
within a framework of law and policy.23 This is done through clarifying and 
operationalising such norms. This chapter thus considers good practices in the form 
of legal frameworks, national policy initiatives, strategies, plans, regulatory systems 
and institutions employed by States and other actors consistent with the norms 
imposed by the right to water.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses and analyses the 
procedural elements of the accountability model focusing on the decision whether or 
not to privatise provision of water services, the terms of a water privatisation contract, 
and the operation of water services. It also discusses procedural components of the 
right to water such as consultation, participation, and access to information and how 
such standards have been implemented in practice. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the normative content of the right to water focusing on availability, quality 
and accessibility of water services and how these norms should be operationalised in 
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practice. This section also explores the importance of regulation and monitoring 
mechanisms and relevant models from different national jurisdictions. It examines 
certain frameworks from different jurisdictions with respect to the right to water 
followed by the conclusion. 
 
6 2 Accountability model: The State duty to protect in the context the 
privatisation of water services 
The State‘s duty to protect the right to water from interference by third parties was 
analysed in chapter 4.24 The State has an obligation to prevent third parties from 
threatening access to equal, affordable, sufficient, safe and acceptable water.25 The 
State may be held liable where it neglects to put in place mechanisms to prevent and 
address abuse of the right to water by third parties.26 The State is under an obligation 
to ensure that the involvement of non-State actors does not result in abuse of the 
right to water. This obligation entails the State‘s duty to regulate and control water 
service providers to prevent the latter from compromising equal, affordable and 
physical access to water of a good quality.27 The duty to protect also enjoins the 
State to grant special protection to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. States will 
be able to discharge this obligation by establishing appropriate laws, regulations, as 
well as monitoring, investigation and accountability mechanisms.28  
 The State is obliged to adopt laws, policies and regulations to protect 
beneficiaries of the right to water from interference by non-State actors.29 It must 
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 See section 4 2 2, chapter 4. 
25
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prevent third parties from polluting water resources, and prevent third parties from 
extracting water resources in a manner which is not sustainable thereby threatening 
the availability of water resources for present and future generations.30 Furthermore, 
the State has a duty to ensure that remedies are available to victims of violations of 
the right to water. This section analyses examples of good practices and 
accountability mechanisms from across the world on the implementation of the right 
to water. There is, however, a risk that even the best normative frameworks can lead 
to policies and implementation strategies that are not compliant with the human right 
to water if they do not explicitly recognise the right. Accordingly, for the purposes of 
this section, the laws and policies are examined as examples of the type of 
legislation and implementation and accountability mechanisms that can best support 
efforts to operationalise the standards imposed by the right to water. 
6 2 1 The decision to privatise provision of water services 
The decision as to whether or not to privatise water services must take place in the 
context of a sound overall strategy that stipulates how the State aims to achieve 
universal access to water. Prior to exploring whether to privatise water services, a 
local authority must give notice to affected individuals and groups of its intention to 
do so. This is primarily duty which rests on the relevant organs of State since at this 
stage a non-State actor is not yet involved. Additionally, the relevant sphere of 
government must establish a mechanism and programme for community involvement 
and information dissemination regarding the water privatisation contract before it 
enters into such an agreement. Furthermore, any decision to privatise the provision 
of water services to a private corporation must be adopted following a democratic, 
participatory and transparent process. It is important that participation of all 
concerned must be active, free and meaningful.31 The requirements of an 
inclusionary participatory process are discussed in section 6 3 2 below. 
There was no public participation process in the decision to privatise water 
services in the Cochabamba water privatisation case discussed in chapter 3. 
Therefore no opportunity was afforded to those affected by the privatisation scheme 
to provide their views on the proposed privatisation scheme and its impact on their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
individuals will be able to freely realise their rights and freedoms.‖ See Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 para 46. 
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 See for example section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). 
31
 Special Rapporteur Report para 34. 
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lives.32 The decision to privatise was essentially made by the World Bank. The World 
Bank would only grant approval of loans to upgrade Cochabamba‘s water network on 
condition that the City of Cochabamba‘s public water provider, the Municipal Drinking 
Water and Sewage Service of Cochabamba, was privatised.33 In the Dar es Salaam 
water privatisation the public was kept uninformed during the entire privatisation 
process.34 The water privatisation was presented as a fait accompli as there were no 
prior consultations or public deliberations on alternative policy options.35 The water 
privatisation documents were deemed so confidential that not even members of 
parliament had access to them.36 Rather, the privatisation process was conceived, 
developed and implemented by national and international technocrats without any 
public engagement.37 There is no doubt that this lack of transparency and public 
participation in the privatisation process made it impossible for the public to 
determine whether the privatisation process was in the public interest.38   
Some of the practical issues of public interest in any water privatisation project 
include the cost of water services. It is important that any water privatisation 
arrangement should not result in a two-tiered system where investment in water 
services focuses on the wealthy neighbourhoods at the expense of the poor and 
marginalised communities. Other issues of public interest in any water privatisation 
initiative include the quality of water services, the environmental impacts, and the 
potential closure of public spaces if the privatisation initiative is not properly 
designed. Such issues must be subjected to meaningful public deliberation. In the 
Cochabamba privatisation case, for example, the privatisation contract gave the 
water consortium mandated to operate water services exclusive rights of exploitation 
over rural water supply sources that had traditionally been under the control of 
indigenous farmers.39 This move was one of the major reasons leading to the 
Cochabamba ―water war‖ discussed in chapter 3. It is therefore important that any 
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decision to privatise water services should be subjected to a human rights 
assessment as discussed in chapter 5.40 
6 2 2 The bidding process 
Once the important decision to privatise water services has been made, the 
tendering, bidding and contract negotiation processes must be transparent. It is 
important that the terms of reference and the draft contract be made available for 
public scrutiny and commentary.41 This is mainly the responsibility of the State as at 
this stage a private water service provider is not involved. Significantly, issues such 
as commercial confidentiality must not imperil the transparency requirements. 
Public authorities may be under pressure to accept confidentiality clauses 
when entering into water privatisation contracts with non-State actors so that 
information relating to the bidding processes or contractual terms, its value and 
performance will be exempt from public disclosure. Many of the tendering processes 
for the privatisation of public utilities such as water have been traditionally carried out 
on the basis that most, if not all, the information concerning commercial relationships 
between the public authority and private bidder would remain confidential.42 This 
issue is canvassed in section 6 2 4 below where I discuss disclosure of appropriate 
information relating to the privatisation agreement.  
It is important that the tendering and bidding processes be based on accurate 
information relating to the bidding corporation‘s technical and financial competencies 
so as to avoid strategic underbidding.43 The selection of a private contractor for the 
provision of water services should not only be determined by the price. Other 
elements must be considered such as the quality of the service, due diligence, 
empowerment and training of the employees. In South Africa, for instance, one of the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003 is to establish a 
legislative framework in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in 
the South African economy.44 Corporations bidding for a water privatisation contract 
should be requested to provide relevant information and documents, possibly by a 
standard procurement questionnaire to facilitate the selection process. Contractual 
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 See section 5 3 3 1, chapter 5. 
41
 Special Rapporteur Report para 36. 
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 Information Commissioner‘s Office Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No 5: 
Commercial Interests 1 available < www.ico.gov.uk> (accessed 17.09.2012). 
43
 Special Rapporteur Report para 36. 
44
 See section 2 of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 375 
 
processes between State entities and private water corporations are often 
characterised by secretive bidding processes as illustrated in the Dar es Salaam and 
Cochabamba water privatisation processes.45 Such a practice should be avoided to 
ensure transparency in the privatisation process.  
The information and documents to be requested should provide information on 
the ownership and, if applicable, the structure of subsidiary corporations. Other 
relevant information could include documents on the financial situation of the bidding 
corporation. Such information should include financial statements of overall turnover 
and profits over the preceding few years, audited accounts and proof of adequate 
liability insurance. Additionally, the bidding corporation should also provide 
information on the qualifications, skills and expertise of its management. The 
corporation should also be asked to provide information on any contracts relating to 
the provision of water services provided in the last few years as well as on 
concessions awarded for the provision of water services similar to the one applied 
for.46 The above information will help the State in assessing the technical, financial 
and social suitability of the corporation to operate and manage water services in a 
way that is compatible with the right to water. The above processes are important 
from a human rights perspective as any instrument delegating service provision, 
including privatisation contracts for water services, must comply with human rights 
standards. The requirement to disclose the above information is consistent with the 
right to water in which access to information relating to water issues is an integral 
component of the right to water. The CESCR elaborated that this right includes ―the 
right to seek, receive and impart information on water issues.‖47 It is important that 
the above information be provided to all stakeholders affected by the privatisation 
process to assist them in the decision-making processes affecting their right to water. 
Such information will help local authorities and communities to assess the bidding 
corporation‘s financial and technical capacity to manage the water services in a way 
that is compatible with the community‘s enjoyment of the right to water.48 The 
respective obligations and duties of the State and water services providers are 
discussed in section 6 2 4 below.  
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Such information may also be helpful to the State in its selection process and 
the eventual awarding of a water privatisation agreement. In the security services 
sector, for instance, the Sarajevo Client Guidelines for the Procurement of Private 
Security Companies contain systematic procedures facilitating the assessment of 
tenders for the provision of security services.49 Such elements include personnel 
standards, contract management, implementation and reporting standards.50 The 
procedure, if suitably adapted for the context of water delivery, provides a useful 
template for assessing the information provided by corporations tendering for water 
services provision. 
6 2 3 Contract negotiations 
One of the challenges with water privatisation is the problem of strategic 
underbidding as reflected in the Dar es Salaam water privatisation process discussed 
above. Budds and McGranahan point out that water corporations often purposely 
submit bids which reflect amounts less than that required to implement a contract.51 
Private contractors may sometimes intentionally underbid in order to win contracts, 
artificially lowering costs and securing more favourable terms in subsequent 
renegotiations of contracts.52 The intention would be to renegotiate the contract for a 
higher price once the bid has been accepted. Such practices often lead to higher 
costs for individual users of water services, and thus conflict with the principle of 
affordability of water services.53 The Special Rapporteur on the right to water and 
sanitation (hereinafter referred to as the ―Special Rapporteur‖) has explained that 
renegotiations are not generally a problem from a human rights perspective.54 
Changes in the operating circumstances and new information may require that the 
privatisation contract be adapted or amended.55 Renegotiations may also be 
necessary to adapt contracts to human rights requirements imposed by the right to 
water. The problem is where contract renegotiations are the result of strategic 
underbidding by water corporations seeking more favourable terms, this often leads 
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to tariff increases and delays or decreases in investment obligations undertaken by 
corporations.56  
In the Dar es Salaam water privatisation case, the private operator made a 
number of attempts to renegotiate the contract and submitted an unsuccessful 
request for an increase in the company‘s revenues under the contract. This included 
an attempt to renegotiate the terms of the privatisation contract as a whole.57 Internal 
communications at the private water services provider, City Water, publicised during 
the arbitration hearing showed fairly desperate attempts by the latter‘s senior 
management to force the Tanzanian government to renegotiate the contract. For 
example, an email communication by a senior manager stated that if City Water did 
not get the tariff increased, it would ―try to force the government‘s hand‖ by among 
other things, stopping payments of contract fees and retrenching City Water‘s staff.58 
In South Africa, the private water provider which won the water concession contract, 
Siza Water, assumed responsibility for providing water and sanitation services to 
what was then known as the Borough of Dolphin Coast, a locality in the iLembe 
District Municipality.59 The privatisation agreement had to be renegotiated in 2001 at 
the instance of the private operator. The renegotiation resulted in a substantial 
reduction in both the investment requirements for the private entity and the provision 
of free basic water.60 It is noteworthy that the renegotiation of the contract was due to 
lack of profits, with research showing that the private entity regularly cut off services 
to poor people. In 2001, the private operator experienced financial problems. This 
resulted in Siza Water failing to pay the scheduled R3.6m lease payment due to the 
local municipality. The corporation successfully demanded a re-negotiation of the 
contract in its favour and asked for relief under the contract, which allows for re-
negotiation if returns are either above or below a predetermined range.61 The local 
authority approved a revised contract in May 2001. In terms of the revised contract, 
water prices were immediately increased by 15% to restore profitability and the water 
                                                     
56
 Para 36. 
57
 F Aldston ―Biwater v Tanzania: Do Corporations Have Human Rights and Sustainable Development 
Obligations?‖ (2010) 18 Environmental Liability 58 62. 
58
 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania)Ltd  v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case No ARB/05/22 paras 149 
and 123. 
59
 For a discussion see section 3 5 2 5 2, chapter 3. 
60
 See chapter 3 section 3 5 2 5 2 above. 
61
 D Hall & E Lobina ―Profitability and the Poor: Corporate Strategies, Innovation and Sustainability‖ 
(2007) 18 Geoforum 772 778. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 378 
 
corporation‘s investment commitment was reduced from R25m to R10m over five 
years.62   
In the Manila water privatisation discussed in chapter 3, the two privatisation 
concessions were awarded through international competitive bidding, which was 
regarded as a model of success at the time.63 However, a 2003 study by Water Aid 
indicated that both the consortia appeared to have made particularly low bids, 
perhaps on the assumption that the terms of the contract would be renegotiated once 
it was won.64 Water Aid‘s study notes the following: 
 
―The two companies submitted bids for high service qualities at a low price, and then 
once the contract was signed, tried to re-negotiate, to chisel down quality, to scale 
down and postpone targets, and to exploit the loosely defined regulatory rules for 
price adjustments.‖65 
Negotiation skills are particularly important, especially on the part of the State. It is 
therefore important to strengthen the negotiation capacity of local governments 
thereby reducing power asymmetries. This will help prevent frequent contract 
renegotiations as a result of deliberate underbidding by corporations to win contracts. 
Strengthening the negotiating capacity of local authorities helps make certain that the 
resulting contract pays attention to ensuring that disadvantaged and maginalised 
communities have equitable access to water services.66  
6 2 4 The water privatisation contract 
This section considers practical issues that arise in the context of contracting water 
service provision to a private provider. It also discusses contract elements and 
benchmarks against which to assess the private water provider within the normative 
framework created by the right to water, including ensuring water availability for every 
person in sufficient quantities for personal and domestic uses. The privatisation 
contract must entrench provisions ensuring that water services for domestic use must 
be free from contamination, are within safe physical reach, and be affordable.67 The 
above issues are important to ensure that any privatisation arrangement complies 
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with the normative content of the right to water, including the duty to ensure that 
water services are accessible to all members of society without any discrimination.  
The human right to water should be protected before and throughout the 
privatisation contract. This requires continuous assessment by both the State and the 
non-State provider of whether the measures taken pursuant to the privatisation 
agreement contribute to the realisation of the right to water.68 The privatisation 
contract, as the instrument delegating service provision to a private corporation, must 
meet human rights standards imposed by the right to water. Although this is primarily 
a State obligation, non-State service providers have a responsibility to exercise due 
diligence in this regard.  
The affordability of water services is one of the key issues in water 
privatisation negotiations. The State‘s obligation to ensure that the right to water is 
enjoyed by all without discrimination should be kept in mind when negotiating 
possible tariff structures as part of the privatisation package.69 Strengthening the 
negotiating capacity of local authorities will help ensure that any subsequent water 
tariffs are affordable and do not compromise the realisation of other human rights.70  
Many of the aspects relating to water privatisation should be regulated by 
national legislation, instead of terms of contractual negotiations which can leave local 
authorities without normative guidance, and can place poorer municipalities at a 
disadvantage in negotiations with more powerful corporate actors. It is vital, taking 
into consideration the State‘s duty to protect human rights, that many key criteria and 
conditions for privatisation are specified through legislation and not left to local 
government discretions. National legislation should provide normative guidance on 
such issues such as the technical conditions of existing or proposed extensions of 
supply; norms and the determination and structure of tariffs; the conditions for 
payment; the circumstances under which water services may be limited or 
discontinued; and the procedures for limiting or discontinuing water services.71 In 
South Africa, any water privatisation contract should comply with the minimum 
normative standards provided for in various pieces of legislation. For example, the 
Water Services Act 108 of 1997 empowers the Minister responsible for water 
services (hereinafter referred to as ―Minister‖) to prescribe compulsory national 
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standards relating to the provision of water services and the quality of water 
services.72 In prescribing such national standards the Minister is enjoined by the 
Water Services Act to consider issues such as the need for everyone to a reasonable 
quality of life and the need for equitable access to water services.73 The Water 
Services Act also provides procedural requirements that must be complied with 
whenever a local authority decides to delegate the provision of water services to a 
private provider. These standards will be considered in section 6 3 6 below in further 
detail in the context of the discussion of good practices in the privatisation of water 
services. 
The negotiation of water privatisation contracts is an extremely complex task. 
The water privatisation contract must clearly delineate the responsibilities of the 
water services provider, allocate risks, set delivery and coverage targets.74 Water 
privatisation contracts should comply with any standards and norms provided for 
under national constitutional and statutory provisions. General Comment 15 provides 
an important normative standard in the absence of applicable national standards. 
The privatisation contract should establish complaint mechanisms and specify 
penalties for non-compliance with the terms of the contract by either party. In this 
regard, negotiation skills and technical expertise especially on the part of State 
representatives are crucial. Local governments authorities are often less experienced 
than large and experienced multinational corporations (hereinafter referred to as 
―MNCs‖) in negotiating water privatisation contracts.75 The asymmetry in negotiating 
skills may result in the privatisation contract excluding the necessary human rights 
safeguards imposed by the right to water.76 It is therefore important to strengthen the 
negotiation capacity of local authorities. This will help to ensure that the resulting 
contractual terms comply with the State‘s international and domestic human rights 
obligations, including the right to water.   
The water privatisation contract is a tool for regulating the private service 
provider. Despite the private water industry‘s declared commitment to the right to 
water through initiatives such as the UN Global Compact CEO Water Mandate, no 
evidence is publicly available that shows that the human right to water has been 
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referenced in water privatisation contracts anywhere in the world.77 This is despite 
the fact that contracts in other business sectors such as the garment and textile 
sector, the electronics industry and private security forces are beginning to integrate 
human rights considerations.78 Furthermore, corporations are also increasingly 
interested in integrating human rights risks into purely business oriented contracting 
processes such as joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions.79 This makes it 
important that particular care be given in drafting privatisation contract terms that 
deal with an essential public good as water. The most direct way of ensuring 
compliance with international standards in relation to the right to water is national 
legislation and possibly delegated legislation such as regulations. The privatisation 
contract itself has an important role to play in ensuring such compliance within the 
regulatory framework of national and delegated legislation.80 The capacity of local 
authorities to craft, negotiate and manage complex water privatisation contracts will 
determine whether the benefits of water privatisation are realised. Issues such as the 
need to clearly define responsibilities and allocate risks, set delivery and coverage 
targets, and establish penalties for non-compliance must be dealt with in the 
privatisation agreement.81  
The municipal laws and the regulatory framework of a State hosting an MNC 
providing water services must lay down conditions corporations must satisfy in order 
to be allowed to operate within the territory of the State. The CESCR‘s General 
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Comments have emphasised the importance of national framework legislation with 
respect to the right to water.82 The CESCR has explained that existing legislation, 
strategies and policies should be reviewed to ensure that they are compatible with 
obligations arising from the right to water.83 South Africa‘s Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 200084 lays down important procedural requirements for 
contracting basic municipal services such as water services provision to a private 
actor. Other relevant pieces of legislation include the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000, the Water Services Act 108 of 1997, and the relevant 
regulations as well as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. This 
section will refer to the relevant provisions of these respective legislative enactments 
where they illustrate important aspects of the contracting process.  
6 2 4 1 Responsibility of the non-State provider to analyse privatisation contract 
The Special Rapporteur has explained that any water privatisation agreement must 
meet human rights standards.85 Although this is primarily a State obligation, the 
Special Rapporteur has also identified responsibilities of non-State actors as part of 
their due diligence analysis. Non-State actors who are the beneficiaries of a 
privatisation agreement have a ―responsibility to analyse the proposed instrument 
from a human rights perspective‖ in order to detect any risks to the right to water.86 
Although non-State actors involved in the provision of water services cannot 
unilaterally change the terms of the water privatisation agreement, they are 
nevertheless expected to avoid complicity in human rights abuses. They should not 
enter into a privatisation agreement which appears likely to result in the infringement 
of the right to water and other human rights.87  In this regard, non-State actors have a 
positive duty to engage proactively with the State to identify and address human 
rights concerns in respect of the right to water during contractual negotiations.88 
The privatisation contract should specify the water coverage to be achieved in 
the designated areas and the service levels that must be met.89 It should include 
clear goals, such as the targets to be reached, investment levels, and pricing 
                                                     
82
 CESCR General Comment 15 (2002) para 45. 
83
 Para 46. 
84
 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act No 32 of 2000. 
85
 Special Rapporteur Report para 38.  
86
 Para 38. 
87
 Para 38. 
88
 Para 38. 
89
 Para 40. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 383 
 
arrangements.90 The privatisation contract must explicitly provide that the water 
services provider and its employees comply with the legislation of the host State as 
well as all applicable international law, including the right to water. It should oblige 
the non-State actor to comply with relevant constitutional and international human 
rights obligations binding on the host State. Such a provision would avoid the 
uncertainty as to whether the non-State actor is bound by the obligations attaching to 
the human right to water.91 It is however possible that a host State may not have 
entrenched the standards relating to the right to water in its domestic law. In a 
situation such as this, it is advisable that the privatisation contract explicitly 
incorporate international human rights norms imposed by the right to water. 
Incorporating the human rights norms imposed by the right to water in the 
privatisation contract will also avoid doctrinal issues and debates on whether 
particular international human rights norms are binding on non-State actors. 
6 2 4 2 Contractual stabilisation clauses 
MNCs making long-term, high value investments often emphasise the need to 
achieve the highest possible degree of legal predictability and investment stability 
before they commit themselves to investing in host countries. This is the case where 
there is a risk of arbitrary changes in law and regulation that may compromise their 
investments. Stabilisation clauses are normally incorporated in investment 
agreements, particularly Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter referred to as 
―BITs‖) between the home State of corporations and the investment host State. 
Stabilisation clauses are aimed at insulating corporations from changes in laws of the 
host State, and the consequences of such changes to their investments. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has proposed principles for 
responsible contracting that are relevant to water privatisation arrangements.92  
The incorporation of a stabilisation clause in a water privatisation contract may 
have a deterrent effect on the regulatory powers of the host State in several ways. 
The host State may be unwilling to pass domestic legislation implementing the 
human right to water or to apply such laws to water services in order to avoid paying 
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compensation to investors.93 Furthermore, States may impose less effective human 
rights and other standards on water privatisation projects in order to avoid infringing 
stabilisation clauses in water privatisation contracts.94 
The incorporation of a stabilisation clause into a water privatisation contract is 
particularly problematic when the host State is a developing country.95 Developing 
States often rely on external funding for improving their water infrastructure as shown 
in chapter 3. As a result, their negotiating power when agreeing to loans for 
upgrading water infrastructure may be weaker than that of investors and related 
financial institutions funding the privatisation project.96 Significantly, many developing 
States‘ legal systems may not be sufficiently developed so as to allow proper 
implementation of their international obligations imposed by human rights such as the 
right to water. These States may need to pass new laws and regulations to bring their 
legal systems into full compliance with standards imposed by the right to water.97 The 
long-term nature of water privatisation contracts that are subject to stabilisation 
clauses makes it imperative that the host State retains regulatory flexibility to protect 
the population in line with international human rights standards imposed by the 
human right to water.98 Any protections for the private water provider against any 
future changes in law should not interfere with the State‘s bona fide efforts to 
implement laws, regulations or policies in a non-discriminatory manner in order to 
realise the right to water.99 The following section will discuss the procedural 
components of the right to water as well as a discussion of the good practices from 
different jurisdictions. 
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6 3 Procedural obligations imposed by the right to water 
6 3 1 Human rights due diligence in respect of the right to water 
The importance of ―human rights due diligence‖ or ―impact assessments‖ was 
discussed in chapter 5.100 The State and the water services provider have a 
responsibility to undertake these assessments so as to accurately detect the actual 
and potential impact of their policies or actions on the right to water.101 In this respect 
they should investigate and measure the impact of policies, programmes, projects, 
and interventions on the right to water and other related human rights.102 The Special 
Rapporteur has recommended that, in a water privatisation scenario, the decision to 
privatise water services should be preceded by an ex ante assessment that carefully 
considers the potential impact of privatisation of water services on the right to 
water.103 This is clearly a State obligation given that in most cases a private provider 
is not involved at this stage. Human rights impact assessments should also be 
carried out over the duration of the contract as they may forestall actual and potential 
abuses of the human right to water.104 The carrying out of human rights assessments 
during the life of a privatisation contract is both the responsibility of the State and the 
water services provider. It is important for the State to incorporate into the 
privatisation contract, or adopt legislation that imposes on the water services provider 
the obligation to carry out a human rights impact assessment.105 The assessment 
must take into account the substantive and normative standards imposed by the right 
to water.106  
The international non-governmental organisation, Rights & Democracy, has 
established a model for human rights compliant impact assessments for the private 
provision of water services. Firstly, any water privatisation project should be 
underpinned by an understanding of the indivisibility of the human right to water and 
other economic, social, civil, cultural and political rights.107 Secondly, the human 
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rights impact assessment of any water privatisation project should give equal 
attention to the ability of affected groups to participate meaningfully in the water 
privatisation project and equally express dissent in relation to the project.108 This, in 
turn, requires the affected individuals and community‘s enjoyment of freedom of 
expression and opinion, security of the person, and the right to privacy. Thirdly, any 
credible human rights impact assessment should be transparent in both process and 
content. This entails the human right to seek and receive information.109 Fourthly, any 
human rights impact assessment of a water project should be based on non-
discrimination and must give special attention to policies and practices that do not 
result in discriminatory outcomes.110 This requires the identification of individuals and 
groups most vulnerable to the water privatisation project and the incorporation of 
specific steps aimed at their protection and empowerment. Such steps might include 
designing an impact assessment tool that facilitates meaningful participation by the 
affected communities in the human rights impact assessment process.111 This and 
other procedural aspects of the human rights impact assessment are discussed 
below. 
6 3 2 Consultation and participation with communities affected by the water 
 privatisation agreement 
The right of individuals and groups to be consulted and participate in decision-making 
processes that may affect their exercise of the right to water must be an integral part 
of any policy, programme or strategy concerning water.112 Involvement of affected 
communities is important for identifying the most appropriate investments and 
strategies for the realisation of the right to water. A thorough understanding of the 
actual condition of water services is a prerequisite in order to establish effective 
strategies and policies. An accurate assessment of the current situation, data and 
water sources available requires the involvement of affected communities.  All those 
affected by a privatisation policy, particularly the poor and the marginalised sections 
of the community, must be given the opportunity to participate and give input in key 
decisions relating to water services.113  
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International human rights law emphasises the need for policies to be 
conceived and implemented in a manner that allows for public consultation and 
participation.114 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for 
instance, provides that States must obtain indigenous peoples‘ ―free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them.‖115 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
further provides for the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands to be specially 
safeguarded.116 Such rights ―include the right of these peoples to participate in the 
use, management and conservation of their resources.‖117 The UN Human Rights 
Council has emphasised the importance of consultation and participation of 
communities and other stakeholders affected by any project as reflected in the UN 
Guiding Principles and the Special Rapporteur‘s report.118 The CESCR has 
particularly emphasised the significance of public consultation and participation in 
decision-making must be an integral part of any policy, programme or strategy 
concerning water issues, including privatisation of water services.119 Public 
consultation and participation must apply at different levels and stages of the 
process. This should include participation in the formulation of relevant legislation 
relating to water services as such legislation will govern the privatisation process. 
6 3 2 1 Public consultation and participation: State obligations 
The State must consult and ensure participation of communities at different stages of 
the process. Such consultation and participation should be intergral to the adoption of 
framework legislation governing water services, the decision whether or not to 
privatise water services, as well as the privatisation process. The State must ensure 
that public consultation and participation process is free of external manipulation, 
interference, coercion, or intimidation and must enable meaningful participation by 
the community.120 Furthermore, such participatory processes should be conducted in 
such a way that fully reflects the different concerns of both men and women. This 
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may be done through separate forums for males and females. The State must also 
ensure that the community consultation process is sensitive to the language 
preferences of the communities, their decision-making processes, and the needs of 
disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.121 The State should document the entire 
consultation process and propose measures to avoid or minimise risks to and 
adverse impacts on the community and advise the community on the measures 
taken to ameliorate the latter‘s concerns.122 Furthermore, such community 
representatives should be relied upon to faithfully communicate the results of 
consultations to the community.123  
McFarland Sanchez-Moreno and Higgins point out that few opportunities for 
public input were provided to the public during the privatisation process.124 The 
government made no effort to communicate and disseminate information to the 
public, particularly those mostly affected, such as indigenous farmers. The 
government proceeded to pass ―the new water law in a hurried and deceptive 
manner, again undermining public participation.‖125 In the Dar es Salaam water 
privatisation case, the decision to privatise was made a condition of the funding 
availed to Tanzania by the World Bank. In terms of the loan agreement, Tanzania 
was obliged to appoint a private operator to manage and operate the water and 
sewerage system. No public input was ever sought on the decision to privatise Dar 
es Salaam water provision.126 
Brazil‘s 2007 Basic Water and Sanitation Law 11445 of 2007 (hereinafter 
referred to as ―Law 11 445‖),127 developed through a multi-stakeholder process, 
underscores the importance of participation to achieve the goal of universal access to 
water services, with a focus on marginalised groups and those living in poverty. The 
Bill of Law 11 445 was finalised at the first Conference of the Cities in 2003, a 
national process of debates including conferences in the municipalities and states.128 
The legal basis for this process is contained in the Estatuto da Cidade (City Statute) 
Law 10 257 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as ―Law 10 257 of 2001‖). Law 10 257 
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considers local and national conferences as tools for achieving the democratic 
administration of cities through a participatory framework.129 Launched in 2003, the 
consultation process for Law 11 445 involved 320 000 citizens and 3457 
conferences.130 Law 11 445 was subsequently approved by an inter-ministerial 
working and the Conselho das Cidades (Council of the Cities), the representative 
body of the conference system created in 2004. This multi-stakeholder body was set 
up to discuss and make decisions on urban issues, including the allocation and use 
of water resources.131 The draft law was also reviewed by legal academics.132 Law 
11 445 provides that, in order to receive funds from the central government, each 
municipality needs to develop a fully articulated plan, including data collection and 
monitoring processes. Furthermore, the law reiterates that water services providers, 
both public and private, are responsible for delivering services to all persons living in 
urban areas, including marginalised communities living in informal settlements. 
Significantly, the law mandates extensive public participation in decision-making 
processes through the Council of Cities.133  
6 3 2 2 Public consultation and participation: Responsibilities of the water 
services provider 
The corporation should engage with the communities affected by the water 
privatisation contract as part of its human rights due diligence as early as possible in 
the life of a privatisation project.134 The public consultation and participation should 
enable ongoing processes of interaction and dialogue between the private operator 
and the community affected by the privatisation arrangement. It is suggested that the 
corporation must conduct a human rights impact assessment even before the 
contract has been awarded in order to properly cost the implementation of the project 
in the bidding process. This will also enable the water services provider to obtain an 
accurate socio-economic profile of the community, so as to inform the water services 
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provider as to what water services they can afford, and therefore what subsidies 
might be required. This information would, in turn, need to be factored into the 
contract negotiations.  
The corporation must again conduct a human rights impact assessment once 
the contract has been awarded, but before implementation of the contract. This 
would enable the corporation to hear, understand and respond to community 
interests and concerns on the operation of water services, including through 
collaborative approaches.135 Such an assessment is not a substitute but rather 
complements the impact assessment carried out by the State on the decision on 
whether or not to privatise water services. A sound practice would be for the State 
and the water services provider to work together after the award of the contract to 
integrate human rights norms into water policies thereby ensuring compliance with 
the standards imposed by the right to water.136  
Full and meaningful public consultation and participation is one of the defining 
tenets of the human rights framework and must be a central component of any water 
privatisation initiative. When communities are subject to identified risks and adverse 
impacts from the water privatisation project such as evictions, for instance, the 
private water provider must also undertake a process of consultation.137  It is 
important for the water services provider to develop and implement a community 
consultation and participation plan. Issues that can be discussed and agreed upon 
during the consultation process include the sufficiency, quantity, water quality, 
regularity of supply, the accessibility, as well as the affordability of water services. 
The corporation‘s consultation with communities affected by the water 
privatisation agreement provides important insights into their perspectives and 
concerns regarding the corporation‘s operations and the implications these have for 
their human right to water and related rights.138 Significantly, such consultation can 
also help to ensure that human rights concerns relating to the right to water are 
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mainstreamed in the privatisation project.139 This can help to build trust and make it 
easier to find ways to address any potential and existing impacts on the community. 
The water services provider must also ensure that the consultation and participation 
of affected communities is carried out with particular sensitivity to cultural differences 
and any perceived power imbalances.140 
The International Finance Corporation‘s Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability of 2012 emphasise the importance of a 
corporation‘s consultation with communities affected by an investment project and 
the steps that must be taken.141 Consultation with the affected community is essential 
for managing the impact of a water privatisation agreement. Disadvantaged 
communities such as indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to the loss and 
exploitation of traditional water sources, land and access to natural and cultural 
resources. This was clearly the case in the Cochabamba privatisation discussed 
above.142 
The water services provider must ensure that it discloses and disseminates 
information, relating to grievance mechanisms and other relevant data on water 
issues to enable meaningful participation by the affected communities.143 The nature, 
frequency and level of effort of the public consultation and participation may vary 
considerably and will be commensurate with the project‘s risks and adverse impacts 
and the project‘s phase of development.144 The International Finance Corporation‘s 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability emphasise the 
importance of participation of all stakeholders affected by World-Bank funded 
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projects.145 The principles contained therein provide a useful template and are 
equally relevant given that the bulk of water privatisation projects frequently tend to 
have World Bank funding.  
6 3 3 Public consultation and participation: Good practices in comparative and 
international law 
Examples abound in the water and other development sectors where lack of 
participation of project beneficiaries has led to the implementation of projects that do 
not fulfill people‘s needs, often resulting in the collapse of such initiatives.146 In the 
case of Nkonkobe water privatisation case discussed in chapter 3,147 the water 
privatisation contract with Water Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd was nullified by the 
then Grahamstown High Court in South Africa. The Nkonkobe municipality won a 
court battle to nullify a six year-old water privatisation contract.148  
The Nkonkobe municipality argued that the provisions of section 173(4) (a) 
and (b) of the Municipal Ordinance No 20 of 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 
―Ordinance‖)149 were not complied with at the time the water privatisation contract 
was entered into hence the agreement was ultra vires and therefore invalid.150 
Section 173(1) of the Ordinance empowered a local authority to enter into contracts 
with third parties. The Ordinance, however, provided that no such contract shall 
come into force until the Council has given notice of its intention to enter into such a 
contract through publishing a formal notice in the press.151 Furthermore, such a 
contract had to be approved by a Member of the Executive Council of the relevant 
province.152 The Ordinance also provided details on the publication procedure in a 
schedule. This included publication of the notice in a newspaper setting forth the 
details of the envisaged contract and specifying the place and hours during which 
particulars thereof would be available for inspection.153 The Ordinance also provided 
for the publication of a copy of the notice at the municipal office and that such copy 
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had to be displayed for a period of not less than 21 days from the day on which the 
notice was so published.154 
The court eventually nullified the contract on the basis that the municipality did 
not comply with the notice requirements in the Ordinance.155 Such irregularities came 
to light following protest and campaigning from civil society organisations. The court 
ruled that the contract was invalid as it had not been published first for comment by 
members of the public.156 Furthermore, the approval of the local government‘s 
Member of the Executive Council was never obtained as statutorily required.157 
The court explained that the publication requirement was for the benefit of 
ratepayers on whose behalf a local authority intends contracting with other entities for 
the purpose of municipal functions.158 The court further elaborated that the rights and 
interests of affected communities could be affected in a very real sense by such a 
contract entered into by their local authority.159 The court stated that the community‘s 
rights and interests be protected especially where such contract relates to the 
privatisation of an essential service such as provision of water services.160 
The court further ruled that it was in the interests of the affected community in 
ensuring compliance with the provisions of section 173(4) of the Ordinance.161 The 
publication requirement would have enabled the community to assess whether the 
contract entered was indeed for the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipal 
area.162 It would also have helped the community to ascertain whether the party 
contracting to provide water services was competent to do so. Furthermore, 
publication would have helped the community to assess whether the terms of such a 
contract were not financially burdensome to the local authority which would make it 
unable to meet its obligations under the contract.163  
The Indigenous Peoples Convention also enjoins States to establish or 
maintain procedures through which to consult indigenous peoples before undertaking 
or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of their lands.164 The 
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purpose of the consultation process is to ascertain whether, and to what degree, 
indigenous peoples‘ interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting 
any programmes for the exploitation of resources on their lands.165 It is also 
important that indigenous peoples participate in, and benefit from, any activities on 
their land. This includes, receiving appropriate reparations for any damages which 
they may sustain as a result of such activities.166 Consultation with and participation 
of indigenous peoples is particularly important where any water privatisation 
arrangement may result in interference with customary or traditional arrangements 
for water allocation.167 In the Cochabamba privatisation discussed in chapter 3, Law 
2029 allowed the possibility of charging indigenous people who drew water from the 
concession area.168 Law 2029 deemed all water resources, including those from land 
owned by indigenous communities in the country the original property of the State.169 
Law 2029 was passed with little debate and no deliberative process to consult 
indigenous people was carried out.  
Any water privatisation project must give special attention to the relationship 
between indigenous people and their land.170 A local authority or entity should 
consult with, and ensure participation of, indigenous peoples when making significant 
decisions such as water privatisation with respect to land belonging to such 
communities. The local authority and the water services provider must consider ways 
of fostering indigenous community‘s capacity to participate in such decision making. 
The mechanism established under the Niger Basin Water Charter provides 
another form of consultation and participation by all stakeholders on water related 
decision-making.171 The Niger Basin Water Charter provides for the rights of all 
stakeholders to participate in the development and implementation of decisions 
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relating to the exploitation of water resources in the basin.172 The Niger Basin Water 
Charter further provides for parties to be furnished with information on the ―status of 
transboundary waters, water allocation to different sectors and measures taken or 
projected to prevent, manage and reduce the transboundary impact.‖173 According to 
the Niger Basin Water Charter, information must be made available early in the 
decision making process.174 Additionally, reasonable deadlines must be scheduled 
concerning the different stages of public participation. Furthermore, participation 
should start early in the proceedings. The public must be informed promptly in case 
of new projects.175 The public must have the opportunity to submit written comments, 
such as all observations, information, suggestions, propositions, counter-
propositions, analysis or opinions that they find pertinent.176  The Niger Basin Water 
Charter further provides that the authority shall ensure that, at the point of decision-
making, the results of public participation are duly taken into account. Significantly, 
the authorities are enjoined to ensure that the public is promptly informed once the 
decision relating to water services has been made.177 It necessarily follows that any 
water privatisation project earmarked for any area of the Niger Basin should be 
preceded by public consultation and participation as provided by the Niger Basin 
Water Charter. 
Pakistan‘s National Drinking Water Policy of 2009 specifically provides for the 
participation of women in planning, implementation, monitoring, operation and 
maintenance of water services given their role in the provision of domestic waters 
supply.178 This is meant to promote community ownership, empowerment as well as 
sustainability.179 The National Water Drinking Policy further provides for special focus 
to be placed on gender training programs for the staff of water supply related 
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institutions at all levels. This will help to effectively respond in a sensitive manner to 
gender differentiated needs in the water services sector.180 
In Australia, the Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―ICRC‖) is a statutory body set up to regulate prices, 
ensure access to public services, and handle complaints and other matters in relation 
to regulated industries such as water.181 The ICRC has the further responsibility of 
licensing utility services and ensuring compliance with license conditions. Australia‘s 
Utilities Act Chapter 27 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Utilities Act‖) enjoins 
the ICRC to consult with the public on issues relating to public utilities such as water. 
For instance, before the ICRC makes a licensing decision, it is obliged to invite 
submissions about the matter from interested people.182 The Utilities Act also 
provides for public notice to be published in a daily newspaper and on ICRC‘s web 
site, on the internet, and state where copies of relevant documents may be 
inspected.183 The public notice must state where submissions may be lodged and the 
closing date for submissions which must be at least 28 days after the day the notice 
is published.184 Furthermore, the Utilities Act provides that if the ICRC gives public 
notice about a licence decision, it must not make the decision unless the utility has 
considered the matters raised in all public submissions.185  The Utilities Act further 
provides that the ICRC must make copies of each of the documents relevant to its 
licensing decisions available for public inspection.186 The Act entitles any person, 
without charge, to inspect a document made available and make a copy of all or any 
part of the document in the possession of the ICRC.187  
India‘s National Water Policy of 2009 also emphasises the need for a 
participatory approach.188 It states that a water services provider should follow a 
participatory approach in the design and operation of the service. The National Water 
Policy further states that such an approach should involve water users and other 
stakeholders in various aspects of planning, design, development and management 
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of water resources projects.189 The National Water Policy further states that 
necessary legal and institutional changes should be made at various levels to ensure 
an appropriate role for women.190 Kyrgyzstan‘s Water Code also provides that the 
management of water resources should be participatory. This means that all 
interested stakeholders should participate in planning and decision-making 
processes relating to the provision of water services.191 The Water Code provides 
that information on the condition and use of water bodies and water resources should 
be accessible to the public.192 
New Zealand‘s Local Government Act 84 of 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ―Local Government Act‖)193 sets a comprehensive procedure to be followed by 
local authorities when carrying out community consultation processes. A local 
authority is obliged to provide affected individuals or communities with information to 
help them present their views to the local authority in a manner that is appropriate to 
their needs. This might involve providing information in more than one language or in 
more than one format.194 The Local Government Act enjoins local authorities to seek 
out views of people affected by a particular decision.195 Communities should be 
informed in detail regarding the purpose and focus of the consultation process.196 
The legislation further requires a local authority to give a reasonable opportunity to 
affected individuals and communities to present those views to the local authority in a 
way that is appropriate to the needs of the communities in question.197 In most cases 
local authorities may have working plans and strategies in mind before any 
consultation process. Nevertheless, they must be prepared to listen to and consider 
all submissions from the affected communities with an open mind.198 A local authority 
is also obliged to provide information to affected communities on the decision it has 
made, and the reasons thereof which led to the particular decision.199  
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In New Zealand, local authorities are further required to put in place 
mechanisms to specifically consult with the indigenous Maori people.200 The Local 
Government Act sets out principles to facilitate substantive participation by Maori in 
local government decision-making processes. Local authorities should provide Maori 
with opportunities to contribute to decision-making processes including on issues 
relating to land and water.201 The Local Government Act specifically requires local 
authorities to take into account the relationship of Maori and their culture and 
traditions with their ancestral land and water when making a significant decision with 
respect to land and bodies of water.202  
The problematic aspect with the last provision is that it only requires the local 
authority to take account the community‘s views. It does not explicitly require that the 
views of the community be given sufficient weight and be factored into the decision 
as to whether or not to proceed with a particular project.203 It is important that the 
views of minorities must be given serious consideration especially in water 
privatisation initiatives directly or indirectly impacting on the welfare of such a group.  
6 3 4 Disclosure of appropriate information relating to the privatisation agreement 
A credible community consultation and participatory process must be based on the 
prior disclosure and dissemination of relevant, transparent, objective, meaningful and 
easily accessible information to the affected community. It must be emphasised that 
the State and the water services providers have the responsibility to disseminate any 
relevant information in their possession relating to the privatisation arrangement. The 
affected individuals and community should be given equal access to full and 
transparent information concerning water issues held by public authorities or third 
parties. This must be specified in national laws, including provisions on the 
obligations of governments as well as procedures to secure adequate 
participation.204 Factors that influence people‘s ability to access information need to 
be taken into account including illiteracy and poverty.205 People may not understand 
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the language or the information itself. Information may therefore need to be published 
in different languages and through multiple media (written, spoken) to ensure that 
everybody is able to access public information as equitably as possible.206 
6 3 4 1 State obligation to furnish affected community with information 
The normative content of the right to water, as elucidated in chapter 2, enjoins public 
access to information concerning proposed water policies and actions plans to 
enable meaningful consultation and participation.207 The CESCR has elaborated in 
General Comment 15 that individuals and groups should, in the formulation and 
implementation of national water strategies and plans, be given full and equal access 
to information concerning water issues held by public authorities or third parties.208 
The UN Human Rights Council has also explained that genuine participation of 
communities affected by any proposed decisions on water policies requires 
disclosure of adequate and sufficient information. In the case of proposed 
privatisation of water services, the public must have access to draft water 
privatisation contracts.209 Access to information includes the right to receive and 
distribute information concerning water issues.210 
To make participation possible, the first step is always to ensure that there 
exists accessible public information pertaining to current and future government 
policies. As discussed in section 6 3 2 above, the relevant sphere of government, 
depending on the internal organisation or federal structure of the State, must provide 
the affected community with access to relevant information relating to the decision to 
privatise water services and its plans for ensuring universal access to water services. 
Furthermore, the State should furnish affected communities and individuals with 
relevant information at the tendering, bidding and contract stages.211 Disclosure of 
information will help such stakeholders to understand the proposed benefits, risks, 
impacts and opportunities of the proposed project.212 The State should also provide 
relevant information on the content of those policies, actions plans, budgets and 
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planned tariffs. All changes to existing policies need to be announced and made 
public.213  
The State must disseminate information regarding the water privatisation contract 
before it enters into such an agreement.214 The water privatisation documents must 
not be deemed confidential and members of the public must have access to them 
since they relate to the provision of a public service. Significantly, issues such as 
commercial confidentiality must not imperil transparency requirements.215 Key 
information relating to the privatisation proposal which must be available is the 
following: 
a) information on the human rights impact assessments to be carried out 
during the duration of the contract and the duration of such assessments; 
 
b) how the State intends to make water services economically accessible to 
everyone, including information on subsidies, safety nets, and any other 
intervention policies to make water services accessible; 
 
c) information on any laws, policies and regulations relating to water services 
as well as procedures available for disconnection of water services; 
 
d) the regulatory framework in place to regulate water services providers to 
ensure such services are physically accessible, affordable, safe and 
sufficient; 
 
e) information on State-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to hold 
water services providers to account for any breach of the right to water. 
 
In the Cochabamba privatisation, the details of the negotiations between the 
government and the contractor remained unknown to the public.216 Some of the 
details on the content of the negotiations only emerged after the so-called ―water 
war.‖217 The water privatisation agreement specifically required confidentiality 
regarding all information that the parties ―might find out or have direct knowledge in 
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virtue of their participation in [the] [c]ontract and in the negotiations.‖218 This 
obligation extended to all personnel working for either party to the privatisation 
agreement. Significantly, such confidentiality would continue for five years after the 
termination of the contract, regardless of the reason.219 
Legislation should strictly regulate contractual terms which purport to restrict 
the disclosure of information held by the authority relating to the privatisation contract 
beyond the restrictions permitted by relevant constitutional provisions and access to 
information legislation. In other words, public authorities should not be permitted to 
"contract out" of their statutory obligations in terms of any laws enabling public 
access to information held by the State. Public authorities should disclose any 
information in response to a request, regardless of the terms of any contract unless 
there is a valid statutory exemption provided for under any applicable law. Where it is 
necessary to include commercial confidentiality provisions in a water privatisation 
contract (and these provisions are mandated by relevant constitutional provisions 
and legislation) an option could be for this commercial information to be included in a 
separate schedule to the privatisation contract. This schedule must clearly identify 
information which should not be disclosed. It is however important for local 
authorities to take extreme care when drafting such a schedule, and be aware that 
any restrictions on disclosure provided for could potentially be overridden by their 
obligations under applicable legislation.  
The United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as the ―UK‖)‘s Freedom of 
Information Act Chapter 23 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ―Freedom of 
Information Act‖), for instance, recognises that there may be valid reasons for 
withholding information held by a public authority in response to an information 
request.220 The Freedom of Information Act lays out twenty-three situations in which 
such information is considered exempt from public disclosure. It is noteworthy though 
that only information that is in fact confidential in nature, or which could prejudice a 
commercial interest if released, can be withheld from disclosure under the provisions 
of the Act.221 Nevertheless, it is important that any commercial confidentiality clause 
in a water privatisation agreement must be subject to a public interest test to 
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encourage transparency.222 Furthermore, any constraints to accessing public 
information should be drafted as narrowly as possible in order to avoid unnecessary 
secrecy. Significantly, public authorities should only be permitted to withhold 
information regarded as commercially sensitive where the public interest in 
maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information 
in question. Additionally, public authorities should be aware that changing 
circumstances could strengthen the public interest arguments in favour of disclosure 
of information relating to the terms of a water privatisation agreement.223  
The UK‘s Information Tribunal, for instance, has confirmed that information 
contained in a contract between a public authority and a third party represents the 
conclusion of negotiations between the two parties. Such information is therefore 
jointly created rather than being obtained by the public authority from the private 
contractor. It is therefore not confidential information hence should be disclosed to 
the public if need be.224 In a related case, the UK‘s Information Tribunal has stated 
that, in the context of commercial contractual confidentiality, there is no requirement 
for an exceptional case to be made in order for the duty of confidence to be 
overridden on public interest grounds.225  
Finally, it should also be noted that the nature of information will change over 
time. For example, if information that was once considered confidential subsequently 
becomes public knowledge it will lose its quality of confidence. In the Cochabamba 
case, as discussed in chapter 3,226 much of the information was disclosed during the 
subsequent arbitration that took place between the private water provider and Bolivia. 
Similarly, information that was commercially sensitive during the tendering process 
may no longer be sensitive once the privatisation contract has been signed.227 Public 
authorities will, therefore, need to be very careful when negotiating such commercial 
confidentiality clauses. By agreeing to wide definitions of what constitutes 
―confidential information,‖ the public authority may unwittingly place itself in a 
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dilemma when faced with a request for information covered by such a clause - to 
breach its statutory obligation or to ignore a contractual clause.228 
6 3 4 2 The water services provider: Responsibility to furnish information 
The water services provider must give details to all stakeholders including the 
affected community on the estimated duration of proposed project activities. It should 
also provide relevant details on any risks to, and potential impacts on, affected 
communities. This should include details of any mitigating measures it proposes to 
adopt as well as the envisaged community consultation process discussed above. 
The private operator should also provide relevant information on how the 
communities may access the internal corporate grievance mechanism to address any 
community grievances.229 The relevant information should include: 
a) Documents on the financial situation of the bidding corporation, including 
financial statements of overall turnover and profits over the preceding few 
years as well as audited accounts and proof of adequate liability insurance. 
Such information may also be helpful to the State in its selection process and 
the eventual awarding of a water privatisation agreement;  
 
b) Accurate information on its technical and financial competencies during the 
bidding process so as to help ensure that there is no strategic underbidding 
and its resulting negative consequences discussed above; 
 
c) Information on the ownership and, if applicable subsidiary corporation 
relations; 
 
d) Information on the qualifications, skills and expertise of its management;  
 
e) Information on any contracts relating to the provision of water services 
awarded in the last few years as well as on concessions awarded for the 
provision of water services similar to the one applied for230 This will assist the 
State in assessing the technical, financial and social suitability of the 
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corporation to operate and manage water services in a way that is compatible 
with the right to water; 
 
f)  Information on the due diligence, ethics and training of its employees; 
 
g) Detailed information on how the water services provider intends to undertake 
a human rights impact assessment of the privatisation project, the duration 
and frequency of the assessment; and 
 
h) Operational information relating to the sufficiency, water quality, regularity of 
supply, accessibility and information relating to its pricing strategy.231  
 
The following section discusses some good practices in international and 
comparative law relating to access to information. 
6 3 5 Access to information: Good practices in international and comparative law 
Lesotho‘s Water Act 31 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Water Act‖) provides 
for a water management institution, at its own expense, to make information at its 
disposal available to the public in an appropriate manner.232 The Water Act, however, 
contains a problematic provision. The release of such information may be subject to 
―such limitations relating to public security or commercial confidentiality as may be 
appropriate.‖233 Such a clause may be used to deny the public access to relevant 
information pertaining to water issues such as the terms of privatisation contracts, 
water quality issues, the tendering process, as well as bid documents.234 
Section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that 
everyone has the right of access to any information held by the State and any 
information held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection 
of any rights. The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (hereinafter 
referred to as ―PAIA‖) was enacted to give effect to section 32 of the Constitution. 235 
Where any information request is made in terms of PAIA, the private or public body 
to whom the request is made is obliged to release the information, except where 
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PAIA expressly provides that the information must not be released.236 PAIA sets out 
the requisite procedural issues attached to such an information request. Any person, 
who requires information for the exercise or protection of any rights, may request 
information from a private entity, including a water services provider. Section 50 of 
PAIA explicitly states that a person requesting access to information held by a private 
body must be given access if such information is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. Such a provision is applicable where an individual or 
community seeks to access information relating to the provision of water services 
held by a private water services provider. Although commercial information belonging 
to a private entity is a ground of refusal to disclose information,237 PAIA provides for a 
public interest exemption. Section 70 of PAIA provides that the head of a private 
entity must grant a request for access to a record of the private entity where ―the 
public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the harm 
contemplated in the provision in question.‖238 
The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Water 
Services Act‖) provides for the establishment of a national information system on 
water services.239 The Water Services Act elaborates that the purpose of the national 
information system is to record and provide data for the development, 
implementation and monitoring of national policies on water services. The national 
information system also serves as a repository to provide information to water 
services institutions and the public in order to help in monitoring the performance of 
water services providers as well as providing information for research purposes.240 
The public is entitled to reasonable access to the information contained in the 
national information system. The only limitation to access is where disclosure of 
information may infringe an individual‘s rights protected under the Bill of Rights 
enshrined in the South African Constitution.241 The Water Services Act enjoins the 
Minister responsible for water services to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
information relating to water services is in an accessible format.242  
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Honduras‘ Framework Law for Drinking Water and the Sanitation Sector 
Decree No 11 of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Framework Law for Drinking 
Water and the Sanitation Sector‖) provides that users of public water services must 
enjoy, inter alia, the rights to receive information about the provision of the service. 
The Framework Law for Drinking Water and the Sanitation Sector also guarantees 
public access to information on the tariff system and method of payment, as well as 
plans regarding the expansion and improvement of services. The information must 
be provided in sufficient detail to enable individuals and communities to exercise their 
rights as water users.243 The following section discusses fair procedures for 
disconnection of water services in a privatisation context and the relevant practices 
from different jurisdictions. 
6 3 6 Fair procedure for disconnection of water services 
A key concern in any water privatisation scenario is the likely disconnection of water 
services for non-payment as illustrated in the case studies discussed in chapter 3 
above.244 The CESCR has elaborated that arbitrary or unjustified disconnection from 
water services or facilities constitute prima facie violations of the State‘s obligation on 
the realisation of the right to water.245 Laws and policies that permit service providers 
to disconnect water services to users in response to the non-payment of bills must 
allow for due process.246 The disconnection of water services, especially in the case 
of inability (as opposed to a refusal) to pay should be approached with the utmost 
caution and should only occur as a last resort after due consultation and minimum 
water services provision is in place. The water services provider must ensure that an 
individual or community faced with the disconnection of water services is given 
opportunities to be heard and to rectify the situation.247 The water services provider 
must also ensure that basic minimum amounts of water services are made available 
to the defaulting individual or group regardless of ability to pay to protect the 
defaulting user‘s dignity, health and other human rights.248 The defaulting party‘s 
personal circumstances must also be taken into account when making a decision to 
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disconnect water services. Water services providers should pay special attention to 
individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising their right 
to water and should desist from disconnecting such groups from accessing basic 
amounts of water for personal and domestic uses. This includes women, children, the 
elderly, asylum seekers and victims of natural disasters and those who are too poor 
to pay.249 
The water services provider must ascertain the financial means of the person 
or household including any particular vulnerabilities such as illness or other 
conditions requiring special access to water.250 In the case of Mazibuko and Others v 
City of Johannesburg and Others discussed in chapter 4 above,251 (hereinafter 
referred to as ―Mazibuko case‖), expert evidence led during the hearing of the case in 
the High Court showed that the residents of Phiri were mainly poor, uneducated, 
unemployed, elderly, sickly and ravaged by HIV/AIDS.252 A majority of the residents 
survived on State pensions or grants.253 It was further explained that people living 
with HIV/AIDS require more water on a daily basis than non-HIV infected individuals 
to maintain their health, standard of living and dignity.254 This is because such 
persons require water regularly for personal and domestic uses such as washing, 
drinking, bathing and cooking. The court further noted that the caregivers of such 
persons also need water regularly to wash their hands. Although the Mazibuko case 
did not directly deal with water privatisation, it nevertheless addressed issues that are 
fairly common in privatisation scenarios such as the importance of free basic water 
policies to enable poor communities realise their right to water. The Mazibuko case, 
also dealt with the question of the legality of prepayment water meters in light of the 
right to water provided for in the Constitution, and the impact of operationalising such 
gadgets in poor communities. Despite strenuous arguments to the contrary on behalf 
of the Phiri community, the South African Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutionality of prepaid water meters.  
The problem with prepaid meters in such a situation is that, unlike 
conventional credit meters, the poor communities are not provided with procedural 
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safeguards before disconnection of water services.255 The use of prepaid water 
meters does not provide for notice and an opportunity to make representations in the 
event of difficulties in paying for water consumption beyond the free basic supply.256 
Prepaid meters are therefore strongly discouraged particularly when it comes to an 
important human rights issue such as the right of access to safe water. Where it 
becomes inevitable to disconnect water services, those affected must be given 
reasonable notice of the planned disconnection. They should also be given an 
opportunity to have recourse to legal assistance for the purpose of obtaining any 
available remedies.257 Disconnection of water services often disproportionately 
affects minority and low-income groups more than any other segments of the 
population. In her 2011 country mission to the United States of America, the Special 
Rapporteur visited a neighbourhood in Boston, Massachusetts.258 It was reported 
that, for every one per cent increase in the minority population in the neighbourhood, 
the number of disconnections by water service providers in that area rose by four per 
cent.259 One way to avoid any negative impact of disconnections on human right to 
water is to adopt legislation to ban them outright.  
It is important that the judiciary interpret the constitutional and statutory 
provisions in a way that gives full effect to normative purposes and standards 
embodied in the right to water. The South African Water Services Act provides a very 
useful template that can be used to hold water services providers accountable in this 
respect if properly implemented.260 As illustrated in chapter 4 above, the water 
services provider is obliged to ensure that any procedures for the limitation or 
discontinuation of water must be fair and equitable.261 These procedural safeguards 
against arbitrary discontinuation of water services for non-payment are critical in 
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ensuring that disadvantaged and marginalised sections of society have uninterrupted 
access to water services, regardless of whether the service is publicly or privately 
provided, or both.262 The following section discusses some comparative law relating 
to procedural safeguards against arbitrary discontinuation of water services. 
In Belgium, a decree adopted by the Government of Flanders in 1996 provides 
for a presumption against disconnection of the minimum supply of basic services 
such as water, electricity and gas.263 The only exception that permits for the 
disconnection of minimum supply of such basic services is in cases of evident 
unwillingness to pay and fraud.264 However, it is important to note that any 
disconnection of minimum services based on unwillingness to pay or fraud must still 
be approved by a Local Advisory Committee whose composition is determined by the 
Government of Flanders. The provider of water services must lodge a request with a 
local municipality‘s Local Advisory Committee for the disconnection of the prescribed 
minimum supply of water services.265 In Flanders every individual has the right to a 
minimal supply of 15 m³ of free water per person per year.266 Armeni notes that this 
―individual approach,‖ to allocating free water to individuals and not to households as 
units, regardless of the number of inhabitants per household, seeks to increase 
equality in the allocation of free water services among families in the long term.267 
The Local Advisory Committee is obliged to investigate and issue a motivated 
decision within fourteen days of receiving the request.268 The above decree adopted 
by the Government of Flanders and the procedures enunciated thereunder provide 
fair procedures especially in privatisation situations to protect marginalised and poor 
communities against disconnection of minimum supply of water services except in 
cases of fraud or unwillingness to pay. 
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In Indonesia, a policy document adopted by the Minister of Home Affairs in 
2006 on ―Technical Guidance and Procedures for Regulating Tariffs‖269 provides on 
the need for water services tariffs to be affordable to users. In this regard, the 
regulations state that tariffs on water services for personal and domestic use shall not 
exceed four per cent of the water user‘s monthly income.270 The regulations further 
provide that ―[j]ustice in the imposition of tariffs shall be achieved through application 
of differentiation tariffs and cross subsidy among group of subscribers.‖271 The 
Technical Guidance and Procedures for Regulating Tariffs provide an important 
standard especially where water services have been privatised. The need for water 
services to be affordable in spite of the involvement of water services provider is in 
line with the normative content of the right to water enjoining economic accessibility 
of water services discussed in chapter 2.272  
The implication of the above analysis is that an indigent person may not have 
his access to basic water services completely disconnected for non-payment. The 
underlying principle is that water services may not be disconnected where a water 
user is unable to pay for the water service.273 The water services provider, to comply 
with the human right to water, should only limit the water supply of a defaulter to a 
basic water supply. This content varies from one jurisdiction to the other. For 
example, in South Africa it is 25 litres per person per day. As illustrated in chapter 2 
above, the CESCR provided that the quantity of water available for each person 
should correspond to WHO guidelines though it further notes that some individuals 
and groups may also require additional water over and above that stipulated in the 
WHO guidelines due to health, climate and work conditions.274 
In the event that a water services provider has to disconnect water services, 
the following steps must be taken in order for such an actor to comply with the 
standards imposed by the right to water. First, the water services provider must notify 
the water user of its intention to disconnect the water supply as a consequence of the 
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water user‘s non-payment for past water usage.275 The water services provider must 
notify the water user in the same notice of an opportunity to pay the arrears and 
invite the user to make representations as to why his water supply should not be 
disconnected. Such a notice must clearly identify to whom the water user may direct 
such representations and the period within which such representations can be made. 
Significantly, such a process should not be merely illusory but should genuinely 
consider the water user‘s representations with objectivity. In the event that the water 
user fails to settle the arrears or make any representations, or fails to convince the 
water services provider to defer or set aside its decision to disconnect water services, 
the water services provider may proceed to limit or discontinue the water supply.276  
The water services provider must notify the water user of its decision and indicate 
any remedies available, including the possibility of appealing the decision, if the 
applicable legislative framework provides for an appeal process.277 These procedural 
safeguards provide an important standard especially where water services have 
been privatised. Such procedural safeguards will help forestall arbitrary or unjustified 
disconnection from water services or facilities due to non payment, even in 
circumstances where there is clear evidence that the defaulting party does not have 
the financial resources is to pay for water services. Even where there are just 
grounds to disconnect water services, the procedural safeguards are particularly 
important in privatised contexts to ensure that any disconnection to from water 
services does not deprive access to minimum essential amount of water that is 
sufficient and safe for domestic uses to prevent disease particularly for socially 
disadvantaged groups. 
 
6 3 7 Conclusion 
The above section proposed and analysed an accountability model to ensure that 
States and other non-State actors involved in the provision of water services have 
clearly designated roles and responsibilities consistent with the human right to water. 
An important aspect of the model is the State‘s duty to protect the right to water 
against abuse by third parties, including corporations. The State is enjoined to 
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prevent, investigate and punish the abuse of the right to water through adopting 
appropriate policies, regulatory and adjudication mechanisms.  
This section also analysed the procedural elements of the accountability 
model, focusing on the decision whether or not to privatise the provision of water 
services, the terms of a water privatisation contract, and the operation of water 
services during the tenure of the privatisation contract. The procedural components 
of the right to water such as consultation, participation and access to information 
were also identified, and specific examples of how these procedural standards are 
implemented in practice were examined.  
  
6 4 Substantive obligations imposed by the right to water 
6 4 1 Introduction 
The preceding sections examined the procedural components of the right to water, 
and how these have been implemented in practice. However, as analysed in 
chapters 4278 and 5,279 water as a human right also imposes obligations on public 
and private water services providers to ensure that the delivery of water services 
conforms to certain substantive standards. The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―CESCR‖) has elaborated on these 
standards, explaining that water services must be adequate, of sufficient quality, as 
well as physically and economically accessible. The following section examines 
practices from across the world pertaining to how these substantive standards have 
been implemented, and seeks to identify emerging good practices in this context. 
6 4 2 Availability 
The CESCR has explained that the availability component of the right to water to 
mean that water supply for each person should be sufficient and continuous for 
personal and domestic uses.280 The standard of availability requires a definition of 
what constitutes sufficient water. The CESCR elaborated in General Comment 15 
that the quantity of water available for each person should correspond to the World 
Health Organisation Guidelines as discussed in chapter 2.281 The quantity required 
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by each person varies to a certain extent based on circumstances such as sex, age, 
climate and temperature conditions.282 The following section proceeds to consider 
various national benchmarks in relation to the adequacy of water. 
In South Africa, the normative standard is set by the Water Services Act and 
the Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to 
Conserve Water of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the ―Regulations‖)283 as 
highlighted in chapter 4.284 The Water Services Act provides for a prescribed 
minimum standard of water supply service necessary for the reliable supply of a 
sufficient quantity and quality of water to households where as the Regulations 
provide for a minimum standard for basic water supply.285   
In Nepal, the National Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy of 
2009 provides for the State to ensure provision of basic service levels of potable 
water services to all in urban areas.286 It provides for ―a minimum quantity of 25 litres 
per capita throughout the year at an accessible point of no more than 250 meters of 
every urban abode.‖287 Burkina Faso‘s Decree Governing Domestic Water Uses No 
580 of 2004 provides that ―the threshold for domestic use is fixed at one hundred 
litres of water per person per day.‖288 In Sri Lanka, the Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy provides that the minimum requirement of water for direct 
consumption, preparation of food and personnel hygiene is 40 litres per person per 
day. It is further stated in the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy that these 
guidelines are the minimum requirements needed to ensure health and the levels of 
services to ensure a dignified life.289 Belarus‘s Council of Ministers Decision No 724, 
on Measures for the Establishment of a System of State Social Service Standards for 
the Population of the Republic provides for obligatory water provision to citizens who 
live in apartment houses connected to the centralised water supply and canalisation. 
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The water quantity provided should not be less than 180 litres per person per day. 
This includes a supply of not less than 90 litres per day of hot water.290 The Council 
of Ministers Decision also provides for an obligatory water provision for citizens who 
use water from the water posts of 35 litres a day per person.291 
 The right to water requires that everyone must have access to ―sufficient and 
continuous water for personal and domestic use.‖292 Norms for minimum quantities of 
water to be supplied have been adopted as indicated in the above discussion.293 The 
requirement that water be economically accessible to everyone may necessitate the 
provision of free or low cost water for personal or domestic uses.294 Legislation 
should specify what needs the minimum quantity of water should be sufficient to 
meet, for example survival, health and dignity. It is important to avoid a rigid, a-
contextual reliance on the above standards. Access to water services is often 
characterised by great disparities within countries and between different sectors of 
the population.  The water needs of individuals and groups vary according to climatic 
conditions, lifestyle, culture, tradition, diet and technology.295 The decisions about 
defining the minimum quantity will depend on the climatic conditions, social and 
economic status of water users and resources availability. Privatisation of water 
services should not result in vulnerable and poor people communities being denied 
access to a minimum amount of water for personal and domestic uses.  
6 4 3 Quality 
There is no doubt that sufficient water alone is not enough to ensure a human right to 
water. For the right to be satisfied the quality of water must also be safe. This implies 
that water for personal and domestic use ―must be…free from micro-organisms, 
chemical substances and radiological hazards.‖296 This is in recognition of the fact 
that even though many people may receive this basic water requirement or more, in 
some cases the water delivered may not be of adequate quality. Additionally, 
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General Comment 15 stipulates that water for personal and domestic use must be of 
an acceptable colour, odour and taste.297 
The WHO has explained that the highest health risks to water services come 
from pathogenic organisms, such as viruses, bacteria or fungi that can cause severe 
diseases.298 Chemical contamination of water sources from agricultural and industrial 
sources also poses a considerable risk to people‘s health.299 Additionally, water that 
does not create an immediate threat to people‘s health can still be unacceptable 
since many people will interpret water which is of a strange colour, odour or taste as 
being unsafe. The CESCR has explained that water is also essential to enjoying 
certain cultural practices.300 Cultural preferences and practices of relevant 
communities cannot be ignored in water services delivery, particularly indigenous 
communities who may rely on water for religious practices. 
In the United States of America, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 Public 
Law No 93-523 (hereinafter referred to as ―SDWA‖) sets stringent minimum 
standards for water quality in all 50 states.301 While each state may promulgate and 
enforce higher standards for public sources within their borders, none may fall below 
the federal standards. States are required to produce regular water quality 
assessments, which must be made public.302 Water services providers failing to 
maintain the minimum water quality standards may face civil or even criminal actions 
brought by state or federal executive agencies.303 The SDWA requires quality 
monitoring for all public water sources as well as private water services serving more 
than 25 individuals, hence risking the exclusion of individuals who live in remote 
areas.304 
Côte D‘ivoire‘s Water Code Law No 98-755 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ―Water Code‖) obliges any actor involved in the provision of water services to 
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ensure that the water provided is potable and complies with quality standards.305 The 
Water Code further prohibits any ―spills, waste dumps of any kind, or of radioactive 
waste, causing or increasing pollution of water resources.‖306 Paraguay‘s Law 1614 
of 2000 governing tariffs for public drinking water services gives water users the right 
to demand the provision of a quality water service from the water provider.307 
Malaysia‘s Water Services Industry Act 655 of 2006 provides that a water services 
provider shall, when, supplying water to any premises, ensure that at the time of 
supply the quality of water complies with the minimum quality standards prescribed 
by the Minister responsible for water services.308 The water services provider is also 
obliged to ensure that there is no deterioration in the minimum quality standards of 
the source from which water is supplied.309 
In Sri Lanka, the National Policy on Water Supply and Sanitation of 2002 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―National Policy on Water Supply‖) provides for a 
Water Sector Regulatory Commission responsible for the quality of the water 
provided by water services providers to ensure compliance with national water 
standards.310 The National Policy on Water Supply further provides for the 
development and implementation of a certification programme for water quality 
testing laboratories of water service providers.311 Kyrgyzstan‘s Law No 33 on 
Drinking Water provides for the rights of water users to demand, from water service 
providers, adequate information about the quality of water services. Water users 
have the right to demand water services that are in conformity with prescribed 
standards and sanitary rules and regulations.312 Should water users identify any non-
conformity of the water quality with specific parameters, evidencing a threat to public 
health, the water services provider must ensure the immediate notification of water 
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users through the media.313 The notice should include information about 
precautionary measures to curtail any potential health threats to water users.314 
These procedural safeguards are important, especially where water services have 
been privatised as this will ensure that non-State involvement in the provision of 
water services does not compromise the quality of water. Failure to provide access to 
safe water of appropriate quality will constitute infringement of the right to water.315 
The 2009 Drinking Water Law of the Netherlands (hereinafter referred to as 
―Drinking Water Law‖) contains provisions on water quality that may potentially serve 
as standards, especially in privatisation scenarios.316 The water law provides that the 
owner of a water company shall guarantee the quality and sustainability of the 
production and distribution of water services.317 The water services provider is 
obliged to protect the sources of drinking water from pollution in its distribution area. 
The water services provider is also required to conduct research on the quality of 
water sources and areas around these sources to prevent or reduce pollution.318 The 
Drinking Water Law also specifically enjoins a water services provider to ensure that 
drinking water is not contaminated by organisms, parasites or substances in 
quantities or concentrations per unit volume which results in adverse effects on 
public health.319 The water service provider is required to ensure that the design and 
condition of water supply works, equipment and pipe networks do not pose a threat 
of contamination to connecting public water supply networks.320 Finally, the Law 
provides for monitoring the quality of drinking water and the materials and chemicals 
used by water services providers during the extraction, preparation, storage and 
distribution of water.321 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that the 
State has an obligation to prevent third parties, including private water providers from 
―compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and 
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acceptable water.‖322 Although an important component of the right to water, the 
sufficiency of water services is not enough for water to be acceptable and thereby 
comply with the standards imposed by the right to water. The importance of ensuring 
that water services are of appropriate quality cannot be emphasised. The 
privatisation of water services should not have a negative effect on the quality of 
water provided by the non-State actor. National legislation or regulations relating to 
water services should explicitly provide that the non-State actor must ensure that the 
physical, chemical, biological and aesthetic properties of water provided are such 
that it is safe to use. Furthermore, the privatisation contract should also explicitly 
provide that a water services provider is bound by any constitutional and statutory 
provisions or regulations relating to water quality.  
6 4 4 Physical accessibility 
The CESCR has also elaborated on accessibility of water services as a constituent 
element of the normative content of the right to water.323 This means that ―[w]ater and 
water facilities and services have to be accessible to everyone without 
discrimination.‖324 The importance of access to information on water issues was 
discussed in part 6 3 5 above. This section discusses another dimension of 
accessibility as elaborated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―CESCR‖), the need for water to be physically and 
economically accessible.325 The section also discusses how this norm has been 
implemented in practice. 
The CESCR has explained that water services should be within safe physical 
reach for all members of the community.326 This will ensure physical access to water 
facilities that provide sufficient, safe and regular water. Water services facilities 
should have a sufficient number of water outlets to avoid long waiting times and be at 
a reasonable distance from the household.327 In order to ensure accessibility for all 
sectors of society, special attention may need to be given to people with special 
needs.328 As illustrated in chapter 2, one of the obligations imposed by the the right to 
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water is that water services must be accessible to everyone.329 It also means that 
when the State delegates provision of water services to a private water services 
provider, national legislation and regulations relating to water services should impose 
duties on the water services provider to extend water services to previously unserved 
and underserved areas. Such legislation should also enjoin water services providers 
to ensure that: water services are physically accessible to the entire community; 
water services facilities should have a sufficient number of water outlets; and that 
water services are at a reasonable distance from households, schools and other 
public places. 
 Water services providers in privatised situations have often been criticised for 
cherry-picking financially attractive areas within regions, countries, cities and 
neighbourhoods, where a high rate of return can be expected.330 It is important to 
note that normally the coverage of services provided by non-State actors in situations 
of water privatisation is the result of political decisions and a contract proposed by 
the public authorities.  A non-State service is unlikely to extend services to unserved 
or underserved areas unless explicitly mandated to do so in the privatisation 
contract.331 The State should resist the pressure to invest in and prioritise only 
neighbourhoods where interventions are less expensive and complex. The State is 
obliged to realise the rights to water for all, including the marginalised members of 
society.332 The State and the water services provider must develop a comprehensive 
and coherent approach targeting the provision of water services to currently 
unserved and underserved areas.333 During the contract negotiation process, 
relevant public authorities must carefully consider the areas where it delegates 
provision of water services to a private operator, the coverage levels to be achieved, 
and the service levels to be met. National legislation relating to water services should 
enjoin the water services provider to ensure that water services are available within 
or in the immediate vicinity of each household as well as schools, workplaces, health-
care settings and other public places. The water services provider should provide 
timelines on how it aims to fulfill this duty and the regulator must ensure that the 
water services provider fulfils its investment and operational undertakings with regard 
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to the extension of service coverage. It was illustrated in chapter 3 that States are the 
primary duty bearers under the international human rights system.334 The following 
section discusses some national standards on the accessibility of water services. 
Namibia‘s Water Resources Management Act 24 of 2004 provides that access 
to water services must be available to every citizen within a reasonable distance from 
their place of abode.335 Sri Lanka‘s 2004 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 
explicitly provides that ―[t]he maximum haul of water to the dwelling of any user 
should not exceed 200m…[I]n steep terrain this should be reduced with consideration 
to the effort for hauling water.‖336 In Kenya, the 2009 Model Water Services 
Regulations provide that a water services provider shall comply with the basic 
minimum standards of water supply.337 The basic minimum standards are defined as 
the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use, provision of a 
minimum quantity of potable water of 20 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per 
household per month at a minimum rate of not less than 10 litres per minute and  
within 200 metres of a household.338 The Water Services Regulations also provide 
that no water user shall go more than seven consecutive days in a month without 
water supply.339 Kenya‘s 2007-2015 National Water Strategy further provides as one 
of its goals, the reduction in the time taken to the nearest public water outlet and 
back home to an average of 30 minutes in urban areas. The National Water Strategy 
also provides for the reduction to two kilometres of the distance in rural areas to the 
nearest public water outlet.340  
Access to water assumes heightened importance especially where water 
services have been privatised. The mere availability of water services is not enough 
to comply with the right to water. For instance water facilities might be available in a 
jurisdiction, but physically inaccessible to the disabled, women, minorities, or other 
marginalised members of the community. Water facilities must be both available in a 
jurisdiction and also physically accessible to all, in law and fact, without 
discrimination. The water services provider must ensure that there is no 
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discrimination in access to water services. Accessibility of water services is a key 
component of the right to water. Water services providers must ensure that water 
services are easily accessible to all, including children, the elderly and people with 
disabilities, in or near the household, workplace and in all other spheres of their lives. 
This includes ensuring that they do not have to queue or wait excessively to access 
water services.  
6 4 5 Economic accessibility of water services 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained in General 
Comment 15 that water, water facilities and services must be affordable for all.341 It 
further states that the costs associated with securing water must be affordable and 
must not threaten the realisation of other rights protected in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.342 States are thus obliged to 
adopt the necessary measures that may include appropriate pricing policies such as 
free or low-cost water to ensure that water services are affordable.343  
Non-discrimination entails that water must be accessible to everyone, 
including the most vulnerable and marginalised sections of the society.344 It was 
explained that water must be economically accessible.345 The water services provider 
should not unnecessarily hike water tariffs as doing so would impede affordability of 
water services. The charging of exorbitant water tariffs is a pervasive practice, 
especially in instances where water services have been privatised or corporatised as 
shown by discussions on water privatisation in Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and 
South Africa above.346  
6 4 5 1 Pricing structures 
Different approaches can be developed to structure the pricing for the provision of 
water services. It is often a challenge to come up with a pricing approach that does 
not create disincentives for the water services providers. For instance, where the 
State or a regulatory authority establishes tariff standards that bill water users on a 
scale according to incomes, it is possible that the water services provider may focus 
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on providing primarily or exclusively for affluent areas to ensure that they recover the 
costs of their investment and make a profit.347 Similarly, adopting increasing block 
tariff rates, where the rate per unit of water increases as the volume of consumption 
increases, could also create a motive to focus on high volume users, instead of 
household users. Such an approach will most likely disproportionately affect 
marginalised and poor communities.348  
In Tanzania, Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (hereinafter 
referred to as ―EWURA‖) is mandated to regulate water services rates and 
charges.349 The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act 11 of 2001 
provides for factors that EWURA should take into account in making any 
determination on rates and charges for water services. These include the costs of 
making, producing and supplying goods or services. Other factors include the return 
on investment and relevant benchmarks such as international benchmarks for prices, 
costs and return on assets in comparable industries.350 EWURA is further enjoined to 
consider the financial implications of the determination, the desirability of establishing 
maximum rates and charges, the interests of water users, and the desire to promote 
competitive rates.351 The preceding provisions appear to conceptualise water 
primarily as an economic good as explicitly provided in the Dublin Statement 
discussed in chapter 2.352 It is important for the regulatory authority not to be guided 
by full cost recovery for water services. Such an approach will, in all likelihood, price 
the water services out of the reach of poor and marginalised communities. Rather, 
the regulatory authority must ensure that water services are accessible to all in 
compliance with the right to water. Water tariffs should reflect the normative 
dimensions of water as a human right. 
In the South African context, the Water Services Act empowers the Minister of 
Water and Environmental Affairs to prescribe norms and standards in respect of 
tariffs in the provision of water services.353 Significantly, such standards permit for 
differentiation among geographical areas and categories of water users.354 
Importantly, South Africa‘s Municipal Systems Act requires a credit control and a debt 
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collection policy to make provision for indigent debtors‘ access to basic municipal 
services.355 This provides a mechanism for ensuring that privatisation of water 
services does not result in an upsurge in water tariffs making access unaffordable. In 
order for the operations of the water service provider to be consistent with the right to 
water, a water services provider should thus ensure that water services are 
affordable to all including socially disadvantaged groups.356  
A number of statutes from across the world provide for the adoption of 
measures to ameliorate the conditions of the less privileged and poor community 
members to access water services. The 1993 California Public Utilities Code 
provides that access to an ―adequate supply of healthful water is a basic necessity of 
human life, and shall be made available to all residents of California at an affordable 
cost.‖357 The California Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
―CPUC‖) regulates privately owned water companies among other providers of public 
utilities. The California Public Utilities Code enjoins the CPUC to consider and 
implement programmes to provide rate relief for low-income ratepayers.358 The 
CPUC may, in establishing the feasibility of rate relief for the poor and marginalised 
individuals and communities, take into account variations in water needs caused by 
geography and climate.359 
Nicaragua‘s General Law on Drinking Water and Sanitation Services Law 297 
of 1998 obliges the State to ―establish a subsidy system to enable poor communities‘ 
access to potable water.‖360 The subsidy system, limited to water for personal and 
domestic uses, is exclusively intended for low income sectors of the population.361 
The State is obliged to operationalise the system through cross subsidies between 
high income water users and low income water users. Equally, Nicaragua‘s General 
Law on National Water Resources of 2001362 emphasises the State‘s responsibility to 
promote, provide, and adequately regulate the provision of potable water to the 
Nicaraguan people. Such water must be provided in a sufficient quantity and quality 
and at differentiated costs, while also supporting the marginalised sectors of 
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society.363 Additionally, the General Law on National Water Resources stipulates that 
water services cannot be disconnected to hospitals, health centres, schools, 
orphanages, nursing homes, penitentiaries, fire stations and public markets for non 
payment.364 
In the United Kingdom, the Water Industry Act Chapter 56 of 1991 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Water Industry Act‖)365 provides for the outright prohibition of 
disconnection of water services for non-payment in certain circumstances. Section 61 
provides for premises that are exempt from disconnection. This includes water 
services to any dwelling occupied by a person as his or her only or principal home.366 
Accommodation for the elderly, hospitals, premises used for the provision of medical 
services, residential care homes, nursing homes and children‘s homes are all exempt 
from water disconnection for non-payment.367 Premises used by an institution within 
the education sector for the provision of education and premises used for the 
provision of day care for children are also exempt from water disconnection for non 
payment.368 The Water Industry Act also criminalises the use of water-limiting 
devices such as prepaid water meters.369 The above legislative safeguards are 
important to protect vulnerable individuals and communities from being denied 
access to basic water services.  
Madagascar‘s Water Code No 98-029 of 1999 provides that the tariff and cost 
recovery policies for drinking water services must consider investment and 
exploitation costs on the one hand, and water users‘ capacity to pay, on the other.370 
The Water Code also provides that the water tariff system shall include provisions 
ensuring poor communities access to water services for personal and domestic 
uses.371 
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The Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços de Águas e Resíduos (hereinafter 
referred to as ―ERSAR‖), the regulatory authority in Portugal has played a critical role 
in ensuring universal access to water services.372 In Portugal, 93% of households 
have access to water services through house connections. ERSAR has adopted a 
number of rules for service providers, mandating, for instance, that any person living 
within 20 metres of the public system has the right to be served by that system.373 
Additionally, water services providers are required to respond to service requests 
within five days of receipt of a request for connection to the water network.374 ERSAR 
has also implemented policies to control the affordability of water services. It has set 
a benchmark for the charges which may be levied in respect of each service (water 
and sewerage) at 0.5 per cent of average disposable income,375 for an average 
consumption of 120 cubic meters per year. Additionally, ERSAR is working toward 
the elimination of connection charges.376 To reduce the financial barrier that 
connection charges create for those seeking to access services for the first time, 
ERSAR incorporates the cost of connecting a new user into their regular tariff 
charges throughout the contract lifetime.377 The idea is to ensure that beneficiaries 
will include low-income families that are failing to connect to the water network. 
6 4 5 2 Significance of social policies 
It is important that full cost recovery should not constitute an obstacle to providing 
affordable water services especially to poor and marginalised communities.378 An 
exclusive focus on full cost recovery would render water services unaffordable for 
many users often resulting in health concerns or instability as witnessed in the 
Cochabamba water privatisation experience discussed above.379 Special safeguards 
in the form of safety nets such as free or low cost water for indigent families, 
                                                     
372
 De Albuquerque and Roaf On Right Track 55. ERSAR is the Portuguese national water and waste 
services regulation authority established in 1998. ERSAR is the national authority for drinking water 
quality control and regulates wastewater management service. The regulatory agency is directed by a 
three-member Board, whose members are appointed upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
Environment. Provision of water services in Portugal is a shared responsibility between the 308 
municipalities and the national, public holding corporation Águas de Portugal, and its subsidiaries. 
373
 De Albuquerque & Roaf On Right Track 55. 
374
 55. 
375
 55. One of the problems associated with measuring affordability is deciding what measure to use. 
In this case, ―disposable income‖ refers to income after tax. In the UK ―disposable income‖ refers to 
income after housing costs have been eliminated. See De Albuquerque and Roaf On Right Track 70. 
376
 55. 
377
 55. 
378
 Special Rapporteur Report para 55. 
379
 Para 55. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 426 
 
subsidies and other supplementary social policies may be necessary to ensure that 
water services are available to everyone. Regulatory oversight alone may not be 
sufficient to ensure that the right to water is effectively protected.380 Supplementary 
intervention mechanisms are necessary and can take various forms such as 
providing income supplements381 or adjusting tariffs to render water services 
affordable.382 Although water users will often be able to pay recurring charges for 
water services, a high one-off payment for the initial connection is often beyond the 
capacity of many, especially the poor and vulnerable members of society.383 It is 
important that any subsidies should cater for connection costs in order to expand the 
network to low-income areas.384  
Intervention measures adopted must not disproportionately benefit the affluent 
communities. Rather, such measures must be targeted to reach the unserved and 
underserved communities. Furthermore, the regulatory authority should carry out 
affordability studies and the results of such studies will constitute an important tool for 
taking decisions on how to target intervention measures.385 Statutory frameworks are 
also vital for ensuring the affordability of water. Venezuela‘s 2001 Organic Law on 
the Provision of Potable Water and Sanitation Services addresses the affordability of 
water services386 by establishing a variety of subsidies for low-income users. Such 
subsidies are designed to encourage both public and private services providers to 
expand access to low-income and under-serviced communities.387 
Paraguay‘s Law No 1614/2000 on Tariff Regulations for Licensees 
(hereinafter referred to as ―Law No 1614/2000‖) provides for a subsidy system for 
water services and connection fees, targeting the poor.388 Law No 1614/2000 
stipulates conditions for access to the subsidies. It provides that persons would be 
eligible for such subsidies where their socio-economic conditions are such that ―it is 
impossible for the family of users living in the property to pay the full amount of the 
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value of the service.‖389 Paraguay‘s General Department of Statistics, Surveys and 
Censuses are obliged to supply information on the socio-economic level of each 
subsidy applicant. The purpose of such information is to enable objective indicators 
on the socio-economic situation of the applicants to be established.390 The only 
problematic aspect of this provision is the requirement that water users must not be 
in arrears to be eligible for subsidies.391 Such a provision is likely to exclude indigent 
communities as they are the ones likely to be saddled with arrears for water services. 
Chile‘s Law 18778, Establishing a Subsidy for Payment for the Use of Drinking Water 
and Sewerage Services (hereinafter referred to as ―Law 18778‖) also contains the 
problematic provision that requires applicants for subsidies not to be in arrears with 
payments.392 Law 18778 establishes a subsidy scheme for household water supplies 
and sewerage services, in favour of low-income residential users.393 It also 
establishes eligibility criteria for subsidy applicants. Applicants for a water subsidy 
must be unable to pay the full costs of the services.394 Article 3 of Law 18778 further 
provides that the applicants must be up to date with their payments for water services 
to qualify for a water subsidy.395  
Nepal‘s National Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy396 is 
pioneering in the sense that it recognises the importance of adopting social policies 
to enable water access for the poor, including non-citizens and those without land 
tenure rights. The lack of citizenship or tenure rights is normally used as a 
justification for failure to avail water services to poor and marginalised communities. 
Nepal‘s Water Supply and Sanitation Policy acknowledges that: 
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―As the impact of deficient basic services falls most heavily on the poor, policy will 
ensure that such groups have access to sustainable basic services at affordable 
prices and a voice in service-related decision making that will affect them.‖397  
It further states that regardless of whether or not such residents have legal 
citizenship and land tenure rights squatter and slum settlements will be automatically 
included in service areas to be provided with water services.398 
The above comparative practices from across the world are in line with the 
CESCR‘s approach that water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable 
for all. The practices showed that different approaches can be developed to structure 
the pricing for the provision of water services to make them accessible to all without 
discrimination. This provides a mechanism for ensuring that privatisation of water 
services does not result in an upsurge in water tariffs making access unaffordable to 
low-income groups. 
 
6 5 Duty to monitor and regulate as part of the obligation to protect 
States have duties to effectively regulate water services providers and ensure that 
such entities respect and promote the realisation of the right within their 
constitutional, statutory and contractual mandates.399 Effective regulation requires 
independent monitoring of all actors involved in the provision of water services. 
Regulation entails the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by 
some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting 
compliance with such rules.400 Regulation is aimed at protecting water users, 
investors and the environment.401 Regulatory activities should therefore focus on 
protecting water users particularly in cases of disconnections, water quality and 
monitoring of the water sector.402 A State must establish a regulatory system for 
private and public water service providers. Such a regulatory system should require 
that water services providers ensure physical, affordable and equal access to safe, 
acceptable and sufficient water. A regulatory mechanism should also enable genuine 
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public participation, independent monitoring, and compliance with norms imposed by 
the right to water. It is important for regulatory bodies to ensure that water services 
providers comply with delivery standards imposed by water as a human right. The 
State would be in violation of its duty to protect where lack of adequate monitoring 
and regulatory mechanisms results in a non-State actor breaching the right to 
water.403  
National legislation and regulations relating to water services should spell out 
reporting obligations by the water services provider, including periodical reports on 
contract performance to the contracting authorities and this should also be reflected 
in the privatisation contract. Appropriate monitoring and oversight, both internally by 
the corporation and by the contracting authority (and, in some cases, by NGOs) are 
crucial to promoting accountability. National legislation regulating water services 
providers should enjoin water services providers to monitor and sanction breaches of 
the right to water by any of their sub-contractors through an internal compliance 
mechanism.404 In a privatisation context this should also be entrenched in a 
privatisation contract. The State should have trained and experienced contract 
monitors to effectively monitor contract performance as well as compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.405 The water privatisation contract should also 
provide penalties for any continued breaches of the right to water such as fines, 
termination of the contract and exclusion from future bidding processes depending on 
the gravity of the breach.406  
Regulation must be independent and shielded from political interference and 
capture by corporations and other special interests which are the subject of 
regulation. Regulatory and institutional models may differ. Independent regulatory 
agencies should be provided for under national legislation rather than relying on the 
privatisation contract as a tool for regulating the water services provider.407 The 
regulatory authority must therefore be empowered to enforce existing regulations and 
the terms of the privatisation contract.408 The regulator should also be empowered to 
sanction the non-compliant service provider through, for instance, imposition of 
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penalties for non-compliance such as fines and the possibility of revocation of the 
contract.409 
Tanzania‘s Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act 11 of 2001 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―The Energy and Utilities Act‖),410 enacted prior to the 
Dar es Salaam water privatisation discussed above,411 provides for a regulatory 
authority, the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to 
as ―EWURA‖),412 to regulate energy and water utilities. EWURA is responsible for the 
regulation of the electricity, petroleum, natural gas and water sectors in Tanzania. 
EWURA‘s functions include among others, licensing, tariff review, monitoring 
performance and standards with regard to quality, safety, health and environment. 
EWURA is also responsible for protecting the interests of consumers and promoting 
the availability of regulated services to all inhabitants including low income, rural and 
disadvantaged communities.413 EWURA was not operational during the tenure of the 
Dar es Salaam water privatisation scheme.414 This resulted in the over-stretched 
Ministry of Water and Livestock Development assuming responsibility for the 
monitoring and regulation of the privatisation arrangement.415  
Section 6 of the Energy and Utilities Act empowers EWURA to protect the 
interests of water users,416 and to promote the availability of water services to 
everyone including low income, rural and disadvantaged water users.417 EWURA 
also has a promotional role through its mandate to enhance public knowledge, 
awareness and understanding of the water sector.  In this respect EWURA is obliged 
to enhance public knowledge of the rights and obligations of water users and water 
services providers. EWURA is mandated to advise the public on ways in which 
complaints and disputes may be initiated and resolved.418 EWURA is also 
empowered to issue, renew and cancel water operating licences.419 It has the further 
responsibility to establish standards for the terms and conditions of water services 
                                                     
409
 Para 52. 
410
 See Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act No 11 of 2001. 
411
 See section 3 5 1, chapter 3. 
412
 See section 4 of the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act. 
413
 For more information on EWURA, see <http://www.ewura.com/overview.html> (accessed      
23.08.12). 
414
 Section of the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act. 
415
 Section 12. 
416
 See section 6(b) of the Energy and Water Utilities Act. 
417
 Section 6(d). 
418
 Section 6e (i) & (ii). 
419
 Section 7 (b) (i)-(ii). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 431 
 
provision as well as to regulate water tariffs.420 The Energy and Utilities Act 
specifically empowers EWURA to monitor the performance of water services 
providers in relation to levels of investment, availability, quantity and standard of 
services. Finally, EWURA is responsible for regulating the cost of services and the 
efficiency of production and distribution of water services.421 
The Energy and Utilities Act provides that EWURA shall not perform its 
functions ―in contravention of any International Agreements to which the United 
Republic is a party.‖422 This provision could be interpreted as meaning that the 
regulatory authority should be guided by Tanzania‘s human rights obligations under 
international law, including the right to water.423 A potentially problematic provision is 
section 7(4) of the Energy and Utilities Act. It provides that the Minister (responsible 
for water affairs) ―may, from time to time as occasion necessitates it, give to the 
(regulatory) [a]uthority directions of a specific or general character on specific 
issues.‖ Provisions similar to the above should be discouraged in legislation creating 
and empowering regulatory and monitoring entities for water services. It creates a 
propitious environment for political interference in the activities of the regulatory 
authority. It is important that the regulatory and monitoring body should be 
independent to function effectively without arbitrary interference from politicians or 
other special interests. 
One of the key issues raised in the case studies of water privatisation in 
Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines and South Africa discussed in chapter 3 was the 
paucity of effective monitoring and regulatory mechanisms to exercise oversight over 
the private providers.424 In The Philippines there existed a lack of political will to 
create a powerful regulatory agency which contributed to the partial failure of that 
privatisation initiative. In South Africa, the local authority in Nelspruit did not have the 
capacity to effectively regulate the water concession contract hence its failure. In 
some cases, officials mandated to monitor and regulate the privatisation contract 
lacked the requisite expertise to do so.425 In the Dar es Salaam water privatisation 
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scheme, the absence of a regulatory and monitoring body meant there was no 
independent authority to formulate and monitor tariff levels.426  
An independent regulatory body is particularly important in the case of 
discontinuation of water services for non-payment. Independent monitoring 
mechanisms should ensure that the minimum international standards with regard to 
the right to water are maintained. The regulatory and monitoring mechanisms should 
have the mandate to scrutinise privatisation contracts to ensure their provisions and 
implementation do not encroach on the right to water. At the very least, they should 
mandate water services providers to meet the minimum quantitative or qualitative 
levels of water provision as elaborated in General Comment 15.427 Significantly, the 
regulatory and monitoring mechanisms should put in place strict water tariff control 
measures to prevent water services providers from charging exorbitant tariffs thereby 
impeding the economic accessibility of water.428  
 
6 6 Duty to remedy 
The substantive guarantee of the right to water, as pointed above, is incomplete 
unless the beneficiaries of the right are provided with adequate means of reparation 
should the right be infringed.429 Access to remedies is critical because the right to 
water may not mean much in the absence of effective remedies for its 
enforcement.430 Accountability and access to effective remedies will ensure that 
water service providers are held accountable for deteriorating services, unmet 
performance standards, unjustified tariff increases, inadequate social policies or 
other breaches.431 An effective complaints mechanism is crucial to the 
implementation of the human right to water. It is an effective tool to ensure that a 
remedial framework is available against abuse of the right to water by water services 
providers especially in a privatisation scenario.432  
Accountability can be achieved through judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, 
political and social mechanisms. Both States and corporations are responsible for 
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ensuring an adequate remedy when abuses occur.433 Complaint mechanisms should 
be based at both the level of the service provider or of the State.434 State provided 
remedies are important in case of corporate non-compliance with the standards 
imposed by water. Non-State service providers should be under a duty not to 
obstruct access to State-based accountability mechanisms, including court 
proceedings.435 State based mechanisms are essential, since an effective remedy 
might not be provided by the private water services provider to individuals who 
complain that their right to water has been infringed.436  
6 6 1 Complaints mechanisms: State obligations 
The CESCR explained in General Comment 15 that ―victims of violations of the right 
to water should be entitled to adequate reparation, including restitution, 
compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.‖437 States must take 
judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate steps to ensure that victims of 
such violations have access to effective remedies as illustrated in the accountability 
model in Figure 1 below.438 States are obliged to establish effective judicial as well as 
non-judicial mechanisms to address corporate human rights abuses of the right to 
water.439 The remedies must be accessible, predictable, equitable and transparent.440 
In this regard, States should take steps to overcome legal, practical or procedural 
barriers that could impede access to effective remedies. Potential barriers could be in 
the form of such concepts as forum non conveniens, corporations‘ misuse of the 
principle of separate legal personality, lack of legal representation, and non-
availability of class actions in civil suits.441  
State-based complaints mechanisms can be in the form of judicial and non-
judicial complaints mechanisms. In the absence of alternative remedies, States 
should ensure that there are no barriers that prevent aggrieved individuals or 
communities from accessing courts in situations where judicial recourse is an 
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essential part of accessing remedies.442 States should also ensure that access to 
effective judicial remedies is not prevented by corruption of the judicial system, and 
that courts are independent of economic or political pressures from other entities, 
including water services providers.443 Apart from judicial mechanisms, States should 
provide effective and appropriate non-judicial complaints mechanisms as part of a 
comprehensive State-based system for the remedy of breaches to the right to 
water.444 It is important to note that non-judicial mechanisms could play an essential 
role in complementing and supplementing judicial mechanisms in protecting the right 
to water. It is possible that in some cases, judicial remedies may not always be 
required nor the favoured approach for all claimants.445 Ensuring access to remedies 
requires also that States facilitate public awareness and understanding of complaints 
mechanisms, how they can be accessed, and any available legal or financial support 
to access such remedies.446 
Complaints against a water services provider, depending on the domestic 
constitutional and legislative framework as well as the relevant contractual 
provisions, can be submitted to ombudsman offices, human rights commissions or 
the judiciary. Such bodies can ensure adequate redress for those whose right to 
water have been infringed by the water services providers. These bodies serve 
different functions for the purposes of handling complaints. Human rights 
commissions and ombudsman offices are normally able to handle complaints faster 
and cheaper than, for example, the judiciary though much depends on the 
constitutional powers and legislative frameworks in each jurisdiction. The only 
drawback is that decisions by State-based non-judicial bodies are not always binding 
and may not have the necessary powers to grant effective relief. In such cases, the 
judiciary may be the most appropriate entity to handle complaints and award 
remedies where there is systematic discrimination against individuals or groups 
affecting their right to water. The judiciary can also, at the level of the court system, 
demand the State to revise its water programmes and plans of action and create 
substantial change and impose penalties.447  
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6 6 2 Complaints mechanism: responsibilities of water services providers 
The importance of corporate internal complaints mechanisms to provide effective 
remedies was discussed above.448 The water services provider must provide 
operational-level grievance mechanisms to remedy any breach of the right to water. 
The importance of complaints mechanisms located in the corporation is that they 
potentially provide early-stage recourse and resolution of any disputes. Non-State-
based complaints mechanisms may encompass those mechanisms administered by 
a water services provider with other stakeholders, by an industry association or a 
multi-stakeholder group.449  
Internal grievance mechanisms provided by the water services providers are 
an important first step, but may not settle the issue conclusively in some cases. It is 
therefore important that in contentious cases, settlement of any dispute via an 
independent institution such as the judiciary is required.450 A mechanism must be in 
place to facilitate the filing of complaints.451 Individuals and communities must, for 
instance, be able to bring up potential discrimination cases in the targeting of water 
subsidies.452 Individuals and communities whose right to water has been infringed 
should receive adequate reparation, including restitution, compensation, satisfaction 
and/or guarantees of non-repetition.453 While internal remedies will be adequate in 
many cases, a right of judicial appeal as a last resort is often appropriate and 
sometimes indispensable.454 
6 6 3 Complaints mechanisms: Good practices 
Tanzania‘s Energy and Utilities Act provides for a complaints mechanism against 
suppliers of water services.  The Energy and Utilities Act, if effectively implemented, 
would constitute a good practice.455 The Energy and Utilities Act provides for the 
submission of complaints against a water services provider to EWURA. EWURA is 
obliged, after satisfying itself that the complainant has an interest in the complaint 
and that the complaint is not frivolous or vexatious, to investigate the matter.456 
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EWURA has the option of referring the complaint to the water services provider 
should its investigations reveal that the water services provider has not properly 
considered the complainant‘s complaint. The regulatory authority may also make 
representations to the water services provider on behalf of the complainant.457 
The Energy and Utilities Act further provides for procedures in the adjudication 
of a complaint. If a complaint is not resolved to the satisfaction of a complainant 
within sixty days after the complaint was filed with EWURA, the complainant may 
request the regulatory authority to refer the complaint to a Division of the Authority 
(an organ of EWURA) for a decision. 458The regulatory authority is obliged to 
establish a unit whose responsibility it is to receive and follow up on complaints from 
water users.459 The relevant Division of the Authority is required to investigate all 
complaints and attempt to resolve the complaints amicably. In the event that a 
complaint cannot be resolved amicably within thirty to sixty days, the Division of the 
Authority concerned is required to present its findings and recommendations for 
action to EWURA.460 The remedies that may be handed down by EWURA include an 
order requiring a party to pay money or requiring the water services provider to 
supply water services to the complainant. Alternatively, it may dismiss the 
complaint.461 It is also significant to note that orders handed down by the regulatory 
authority are enforceable as orders of the High Court.462  
Namibia‘s Water Resources Management Act No 24 of 2004 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Water Resources Management Act‖) provides for the 
establishment of an administrative mechanism to handle complaints regarding the 
adequacy and reliability of water supply services.463 In Colombia, Law 142 
Establishing the Regime for Public Household Services (hereinafter referred to as 
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―Law 142‖) provides for the rights of users of public services such as water to present 
―company petitions, complaints, or appeals relating to the contract of public 
services.‖464 Furthermore, Law 142 enjoins all the public utility providers to establish 
an ―office for petitions, complaints, and appeals.‖465 Such an office is obliged to 
handle petitions or claims and appeals presented by water users. Law 142 further 
provides that such complaints offices must record and keep a detailed account of all 
petitions and appeals presented as well as of the steps or remedies awarded. The 
law provides that the petitions and appeals must be processed in accordance with 
norms in effect concerning the right to petition.466 Law 142 further provides for the 
award of remedies to the user such as reparations, whichever is suitable in the 
circumstances.467 
In Guyana, the Public Utilities Commission Act Chapter 25:01 of 1999 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―Public Utilities Commission Act‖) provides for a 
complaints mechanism. Section 25 requires every water services provider to 
maintain its property and equipment in such condition as to enable it to provide water 
services.468 A water services provider is further enjoined to make every reasonable 
effort to provide water services in a non-discriminatory manner, and to meet the 
threshold of safety, adequacy and efficiency.469 The Public Utilities Commission Act 
provides for the submission of any complaints against providers of public utilities 
such as water services providers to the Public Utilities Commission.  Where the 
Public Utilities Commission, upon hearing a complaint finds that the service provided 
by a public utility is not in accordance with the provisions of section 25, the Public 
Utilities Commission must prescribe the reasonable service to be provided by the 
public utility. The Public Utilities Commission may direct the public utility to pay to any 
consumer compensation for loss or damage suffered.470 The Public Utilities 
Commission Act also provides that any complaint in terms of this law may be made 
by the Minister responsible for public utilities or any person (including any other 
public utility) having an interest in the subject matter. The filing of a complaint is thus 
not limited to the victim of infringement of any water related rights. The Public Utilities 
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Commission Act also provides the possibility of a class action. It provides the Public 
Utilities Commission with the discretion to permit one or more persons to make a 
complaint against a public utility, on behalf of a class of users of such a service.471 
Furthermore, hearings before the Public Utilities Commission are public. 
Complainants are entitled to be heard in person or represented by a legal 
practitioner.472 The Public Utilities Commission is obliged to hand down an order in 
writing which shall state the time within which the order is to be complied with.473 
In Namibia, the Water Resources Management Act requires the Minister 
responsible for water services to ensure that all Namibians are provided with an 
affordable and a reliable water supply that is adequate for basic human needs.474 
The Water Resources Management Act further enjoins the Minister responsible for 
water resources to ensure the adequacy, affordability and reliability of water supply 
by water services providers.475 The Minister is required to develop reliable standards 
of performance and facilities that are applicable to any entity that supplies water for 
domestic, commercial, industrial or agricultural use.476 The Minister must also 
periodically review the performance of every person who supplies water for domestic, 
commercial, industrial or agricultural use to evaluate compliance with the standards 
of performance.477 The Minister is further required to take corrective action with 
regard to any water services provider that fails to meet standards of performance. 
Such remedial measures may include the secondment of managerial or technical 
personnel, the amendment, suspension or cancellation of any relevant licence to 
abstract and use water.478 Finally, the Water Resources Management Act enjoins the 
Minister to establish an administrative mechanism that will enable water users to be 
heard regarding the adequacy and reliability of their water supply.479 
The importance of grievance and enforcement mechanisms as part of 
realising the right to water cannot be over-emphasised. As illustrated from a 
discussion of practices from different jurisdictions, such mechanisms are important 
whether or not provision of water services have been privatised as both actors are 
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capable of infringing on the right to water. Such complaints mechanisms provide a 
framework for holding water services providers accountable for any deteriorating 
services, unmet performance standards, and unjustified tariff increases. Grievance 
mechanisms are even more important where water services have been privatised to 
ensure the accountability of the private service provider with the norms imposed by 
the right to water.  
Complaints mechanisms, whether State - or corporate-based, must be 
accessible, predictable and provide for transparent procedures. It is therefore 
important that State-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms should complement 
operational-level corporate grievance mechanisms to protect water users against 
infringement of their right to water and provide remedies where the right has been 
infringed. The importance of the State‘s sanctioning power lurking in the background 
to enhance the effectiveness of corporate level mechanisms was explored in chapter 
5.480 The threat of such intervention reinforces the effectiveness of such corporate 
level grievance mechanisms. 
 
6 7 Conclusion 
This chapter proposed an accountability model incorporating good practices from 
different jurisdictions. The accountability model clearly illustrates that States and non-
State actors involved in the provision of water services have clearly designated roles 
and responsibilities consistent with the human right to water as illustrated in Figure 1 
below. 
The chapter thus analysed and discussed good practices from different 
jurisdictions such as legal frameworks, national policy initiatives, strategies, plans of 
action, regulatory systems and institutions employed by States and other actors 
consistent with the norms imposed by the right to water. An important prong of the 
accountability model is the State‘s duty to protect against human rights abuses of the 
right to water by third parties, including corporations, through appropriate policies, 
regulation, and adjudication. According to the accountability model, the State has a 
duty to prevent, investigate, and punish abuse of the right to water and provide 
access to appropriate remedies. The accountability model also emphasises the 
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responsibility of water services providers, including non-State actors, to respect the 
right to water. The duty to respect the right to water has both positive and negative 
dimensions. The duty to respect is broad enough to proscribe the adoption of policies 
that result in denial of access by poor communities to the right, rather than simply 
prohibiting interference with existing access to water services. The accountability 
model discussed and analysed procedural elements of due diligence in relation to 
water privatisation, focusing on the decision to privatise provision of water services, 
the water privatisation contract, the operation of water services and the provision of 
effective complaints mechanisms. The accountability model also emphasised the 
responsibilities of both the State and the water service provider to undertake human 
rights due diligence at every stage of the water privatisation process to become 
aware of the actual and potential impact of their policies and actions on the right to 
water.  
An important element of the privatisation process is the need to consult and 
enable participation of individuals and groups affected by the water privatisation 
process. In terms of the accountability model developed in this chapter, such 
consultation and participation starts during the initial design phase and continues 
right through construction, implementation and compliance monitoring. A credible 
community consultation and participatory process must be based on prior disclosure 
and dissemination of relevant, transparent, objective, meaningful and easily 
accessible information to the affected community. 
 The accountability model demonstrated that both the State and the private 
water provider have an obligation to ensure equal access to full and transparent 
information concerning water issues held by public authorities or third parties.481 
Such information must be published in different languages and through multiple 
media (written, spoken) to ensure that everybody is able to access public information 
as equitably as possible. 
The accountability model emphasised the State‘s duty to prevent, investigate, 
and punish abuse of the right to water through adoption of appropriate policies, 
regulations and adjudication mechanisms.482 Access to remedies is critical because 
the right to water may not mean much in the absence of effective remedies for its 
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enforcement.483 An effective complaints mechanism is key to the implementation of 
the human right to water. The accountability model emphasises the need for victims 
of water rights abuse to access effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial. 
Such effective remedies should be available, both at the State level and at the 
corporate level. Additionally, the accountability model emphasised that the State and 
the water services provider have a responsibility to disseminate any relevant 
information in their possession relating to the privatisation agreement. This would 
ensure that individuals and groups are given full and equal access to information 
concerning water issues held by public authorities or third parties in the formulation 
and implementation of national water strategies and plans. 
This chapter elaborated on how the normative standards imposed by the right 
to water can be implemented in practice by discussing model legislation and good 
practices from across the world. It sought to illustrate how these normative 
commitments in respect of the right to water are ―becoming reality for the excluded, 
the forgotten and the voiceless.‖484 The accountability model is thus an interrelated 
and dynamic system of preventative and remedial measures involving both the 
States and corporations through ―differentiated but complementary 
responsibilities.‖485 The following chapter summarises and concludes this 
dissertation. 
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State 
Obligations 
Duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill 
Develop legislation, policies and regulations 
Duty to monitor and regulate 
Provide judicial and non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms 
Duty to investigate and punish 
Shared Responsibilities 
Ensure water services are safe, physically 
accessible, and affordable 
Conduct human rights impact assessment 
Non-State Actors 
Responsibilities 
Duty to respect 
Duty to provide information 
Duty to consult and ensure participation 
Duty to provide grievance mechanisms 
Duty to remedy 
Affected Communities 
Right to appropriate, relevant and timely information 
Right to be consulted and participate 
Right to safe, affordable, physically accessible quality water services 
Accountable 
Monitor Regulate 
Accountable 
Accountable 
Figure 1 Accountability Model 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 443 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Water is of fundamental importance as a basic need and a human right for living a 
life in dignity. The universal enjoyment of access to safe water is not only a technical, 
social or economic issue, but a human right which must be respected, protected, 
promoted and fulfilled. Yet the current statistics are sobering.1 As noted in chapter 1, 
close to a billion people lack access to safe water for personal and domestic use.2 
This leads to a huge global burden of disease and death from water-related 
diseases. Lack of access to safe water has been tied to sixty per cent of the world‘s 
illnesses. Water related diseases such as cholera, typhoid and diarrhoea are some of 
the leading causes of death in developing countries. This has catastrophic 
implications for health, education, personal security, livelihoods as well as the 
realisation of other human rights. Furthermore, lack of access to safe water has been 
considered as one of the greatest obstacles to development. Access to water is also 
essential for food security, economic development and for securing livelihoods.3 In 
addition to the more apparent consequences that result from lack of access to an 
adequate supply of safe water highlighted above, there are secondary non-obvious 
effects such as reducing school attendance or impact on communities or individuals‘ 
ability to earn a living through subsistence farming or other water-dependent 
livelihoods. 
A noticeable development, promoted by multilateral lending and donor 
institutions, was the conception of water as an economic good susceptible to 
commodification and corporatisation.4 The past two decades have witnessed a trend 
in all the regions of the world to roll back the State and increasingly rely on the 
market as the distributor of basic goods and services. The State is no longer 
considered as the provider, but the regulator of many social services. Water 
privatisation has been promoted as an urgently necessary antidote to ameliorate the 
world‘s water crisis. The provision of water supply services by private corporations 
increased rapidly around the world from the 1990s onwards. Water privatisation was 
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actively supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
development agencies as the panacea to the ills that plague the water sector.5 In the 
water services sector, it was shown that the concept of water as an economic good 
and the principle of full cost recovery have catalysed the privatisation of water 
services provision across the world. Private enterprises are taking control of the 
management, operation and ownership of public water systems. This has resulted in 
water increasingly becoming subject to the rules and powers of markets and prices 
have been set for water services previously provided for free.6  
Chapter 2 illustrated that the ideological, political and philosophical debates 
surrounding the development of the concept of water as an economic good 
emboldened a counter- movement for the explicit recognition of water as a human 
right.7 Opponents of privatisation argue that water is a human right, a public trust and 
a commons hence the privatisation call is merely a mask to conceal the appropriation 
of water from the public domain into the private domain.8 Further, the 
commodification of water would lead to lack of access to water services, especially 
by the poor and vulnerable members of society.9 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that one of the most significant developments in the 
last decade is the rise of a human rights oriented approach to ameliorating the global 
water crisis. The conception of water as either a human right on the one hand or an 
economic good on the other was one of the major impetuses towards the emergence 
of the right to water. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the rise of a human rights 
approach has been substantially aided by watershed normative developments in 
international human rights law.10 The current global water crisis highlighted above 
and the consequent inclusion of water in the United Nations agenda and other 
multilateral fora precipitated the call for the recognition of a human right to water. 
This dissertation traced the recognition of the right to water in international treaties, 
regional human rights treaties in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas, as well as in 
national constitutions and laws of a number of countries.11  
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This dissertation showed that the right to water is explicitly protected in certain 
international human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,12 the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and the International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities.13 It was argued that the right to water is also 
implicitly protected in the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,14 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights15 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―ICESCR‖) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.16 Moreover, the right of access to water is an indispensable component to an 
adequate standard of living.17 There is no doubt that access to basic supplies of safe 
and adequate water is a precondition for the sustenance of human life itself. 
Furthermore, the realisation of the right to health and a healthy environment requires 
access to an adequate supply of safe and potable water, rendering water a core 
component of the right to health. Similarly, safe and clean water is a fundamental 
component of the right to adequate housing. Denial of a safe and clean water supply 
would render a dwelling inhabitable. Water is indispensable for the preparation of 
food, and drinking water, as highlighted in chapter 2, is regarded as liquid food.18 
Chapter 2 further demonstrated how the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ―CESCR‖) took the initiative by 
construing a human right to water from the existing provisions of the ICESCR through 
the ground-breaking General Comment 15.19 This standard-setting instrument 
marked a decisive shift toward an elaboration of the legal basis of the right to water, 
its normative content, and the obligations imposed by this right. General Comment 15 
marked the explicit affirmation by a United Nations (hereinafter referred to as the 
―UN‖) treaty supervisory body of the existence of an independent human right to 
water. It also provided the impetus for the explicit and implicit recognition of the right 
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to water in a substantial number of national constitutions and laws from all over the 
world and across legal cultures.20  
Interdependence of all human rights constitutes a key theoretical underpinning 
for the recognition of a right to water and this is a major theoretical perspective which 
I draw on in chapter 2.21 The right to water should be understood within the realm of 
the interrelatedness and interdependent nature of all human rights, consisting of both 
organic and related interdependence.22 This study applied the organic and related 
interdependent framework in the understanding of the interdependence of human 
rights as elaborated by Craig Scott.23 This dissertation illustrated that the absence of 
an explicit reference to a right to water in the ICESCR or the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ―ICCPR‖) is not a sufficient 
argument to deny access to water the status of an independent human right.24 The 
CESCR derived the right to water from articles 11 and 12 in the ICESCR. The 
CESCR supported this derived right through an analysis of the centrality and 
necessity of water to other rights under the ICESCR as well as other instruments 
under the International Bill of Rights. The CESCR thus emphasised the 
interrelationship between the right to water and a range of other human rights.25  
This dissertation demonstrated the emergence of the right of access to water 
is in the process of emerging as a norm of customary international law. There is 
widespread recognition of the right to water at the national level through national 
constitutions and domestic legislation, regulations and policies. Such developments 
have implications for the emergence of the right to water as a customary international 
law norm. Although it is early to positively assert that the right to water has attained 
the status of customary international law, it can be argued that the right to water is 
now customary law in statu nascendi.26 
                                                     
20
 See section 2 5 2 2, chapter 2. 
21
 See section 2 5 2 1, chapter 2 for further discussion on the interdependent and interrelated nature of 
all human rights. 
22
The significance of the related interdependent framework in the understanding of the 
interdependence of human rights is that protecting one right indirectly results in the protection of 
another right. See CM Scott ―The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: 
Towards a Partial Fusion of the International‖ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769 779-786. 
23
 779-786. See also section 2 5 2 1, chapter 2 
24
 Riedel ―The Human Right to Water and General Comment Number 15‖ in Riedel & Rothen (eds) 
(2004) The Human Right to Water 19 24. For a discussion of the interdependence of all human rights, 
see section 2 5 2 1, chapter 2. 
25
 See section 2 5 2 4, chapter 2. 
26
 See IT Winkler The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications for Water 
Allocation (2012) 277. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 447 
 
As indicated in chapter 2, some scholars have disputed the existence of a 
right to water under international human rights law.27 The main thrust of their 
objection is the derivation of the right to water from related rights. To such scholars, 
such an approach is tantamount to rewriting the provisions of the treaties, and part of 
a larger revisionist programme.28 This dissertation argued that such assertions 
cannot be sustained. A proper interpretation of the International Bill of Human Rights 
means that it is perfectly legitimate and permissible to derive a human right to water 
from related rights.29 Any legal instrument must be interpreted in accordance with its 
object, purpose and context.30 The object of a treaty, purpose and context are 
teleological elements which militate against a narrow literal interpretation of treaty 
texts. In the context of international law the interpretative criteria enjoin a purposive 
approach that takes account of the on-going evolution of international law.31 The 
recognition of water as an international human rights norm is consistent with a 
teleogical approach to treaty interpretation, and the principle of the interdependence, 
interrelatedness and indivisibility of all human rights. It is also in sync with emerging 
State practice and the leading literature in the field.32 
A strong and persuasive case can therefore be made for the status of water as 
a norm of international human rights law. This dissertation has further argued that 
conceiving of water as a human right has political and strategic advantages in 
advancing the goal of providing safe water to everybody, particularly disadvantaged 
communities. A human rights approach contributes to the goal of universal access to 
water by clarifying that water is a legal entitlement rather than a commodity provided 
on the basis of charity or purely market principles.33 Clarifying and further developing 
the theoretical underpinnings of the right to water can help States, non-State actors 
and communities affected by privatisation arrangements to evaluate whether the 
proposed arrangements will advance the progressive realisation of the right.34 
Further elaboration of the right to water with regard to privatisation could help ensure 
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that water privatisation arrangements will be guided by the normative standards 
imposed by the right to water. This would help States and non-State actors use 
human rights standards to ensure that privatisation initiatives do not underpin the 
normative objectives of water as a human right.35  
Privatisation, as demonstrated in chapter 3, can take a variety of forms.36 In 
some instances, privatisation represents State withdrawal from a field of activity or 
from responsibility for providing services. This might be the case, as for example 
where a State sells off a public entity to a private entity. The other, more common 
model of privatisation is when the State engages private entities to provide services 
to the public on the State‘s behalf.37 This form of privatisation is normally 
characterised by government agencies giving private entities significant control over, 
and responsibility for, the provision of basic services ordinarily provided by the State. 
This results in private entities exercising enormous control over the public‘s access to 
basic goods and services ordinarily provided by the State.38 In that sense, 
privatisation often effectively serves to delegate government responsibilities to 
private entities. Proponents of privatisation, as demonstrated in this dissertation, 
often use a relatively constrained definition, reserving the term privatisation for the 
outright sale of State assets to the private sector.39 This dissertation demonstrated 
that privatisation should be understood as a change in the role and responsibilities of 
the State rather than simply a change of ownership.40 This dissertation adopted a 
broad understanding of privatisation rather than limiting the concept to a complete 
transfer of assets from the public to the private sector.41 This dissertation used the 
term privatisation to denote the entire gamut of activities involving the participation of 
private entities in the provision of public goods, either on behalf of, or in cooperation 
with the State or its agencies. This may take the form of concessions, management 
and service contracts, consulting services, and public-private partnerships with State 
agencies.42  
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 Furthermore, this dissertation highlighted the close connection between 
privatisation and corporatisation.43 Corporatisation is the integration of market 
principles such as full cost recovery in the operation and management of public 
entities involved in service provision.44 The main reason for corporatising a public 
service is to infuse market principles in its operations. Corporatisation, together with 
privatisation, is increasingly being employed in the delivery of basic services such as 
water.45 In some cases, corporatisation can be a stepping-stone towards full 
privatisation of the service in question. This dissertation has demonstrated that the 
implications of privatisation of water services are relevant, and have implications for 
corporatised entities.46 Most of the human rights concerns raised by other forms of 
privatisation are similar to those that arise in the context of corporatisation of a 
service such as water provision.47 
 Chapter 3 highlighted the global increase in privatisation of human rights 
sensitive services such as water provision. In the water services sector, it has been 
shown that the concept of water as an economic good and the principle of full cost 
recovery have catalysed the privatisation of water services provision across the 
world. Private enterprises are taking control of the management, operation and 
ownership of public water systems. The result is that water has increasingly become 
subject to the rules and powers of markets and prices have been set for water 
services previously provided for free or at a subsidised cost.  
  In line with the position adopted by various treaty bodies such as the CESCR, 
the dissertation adopted the position that it is permissible within the human rights 
framework for private entities to be involved in the provision of human rights sensitive 
services such as water.48 Privatisation of water service provision does not per se 
constitute a violation of the right to water. However, circumstances in which 
privatisation is carried out might give rise to substantive and procedural breaches of 
the right to water.49 The utilisation of privatisation as a water delivery mechanism 
                                                     
43
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 See section 3 2 3, chapter 3 for further discussion. 
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must, therefore, go hand in hand with developing mechanisms for holding both State 
and non-State actors accountable for the human right to water.50 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that States, and institutions such as the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions as well as private water providers have 
put insufficient effort to assess the risks and limitations of water privatisation. This 
has resulted in a failure to put in place standards and measures imposed by human 
rights norms to govern privatisation processes.51 Four select examples of water 
privatisation from Tanzania, Bolivia, the Philippines and South Africa were discussed 
with a view to illustrating the potential impact of privatisation on the human right to 
water. The four case studies reveal the potentially deleterious effects of privatisation 
of water services if the standards imposed by the right to water, both substantive and 
procedural, are not taken into account.52 In the Cochabamba privatisation for 
instance, no opportunity was afforded to those affected by the water privatisation 
scheme to incorporate the concerns of the affected communities. In Dar es Salaam, 
the privatisation process was conceived and implemented by national and 
international technocrats without any public consultation and participation of local 
communities.53 The lack of public consultation and participation in the privatisation 
process made it impossible for the public to determine whether the privatisation 
process was in the public interest. Another key issue raised in the above cases of 
privatisation is the paucity of effective regulatory and monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure realisation of the right to water notwithstanding the privatisation of water 
delivery services. This dissertation argued that for a State to effectively discharge its 
protective mandate where water services have been privatised, it must put in place a 
regulatory and monitoring mechanism to monitor the performance of water services 
providers.54 
Some of the matters of public interest in any water privatisation project include 
the cost of and quality of water services, physical accessibility of water sources, 
security issues, environmental impacts, and the potential closure of public spaces if 
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the privatisation initiative is not properly designed. A human rights approach to water 
privatisation requires that privatisation of water services have as its key objective the 
realisation of the right to water, especially by those currently unserved or 
underserved.55 Significantly, any water privatisation initiative should be guided by the 
principles of indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, including the right 
to water.56 
 Chapter 4 of this dissertation sought to analyse the nature of the obligations 
imposed on the State by the right to water, focusing particularly in the context of 
privatisation of water services. A key development in international human rights 
theory and practice from the early 1980s was the development of typologies to 
elaborate the nature of obligations imposed by human rights instruments on States 
discussed and analysed in chapter 4.57 This dissertation demonstrated that all human 
rights, including the right to water, impose a spectrum of duties, and that the duty 
applicable in a particular situation depends on a contextual evaluation of the case.58 
Chapter 4 provided a detailed analysis of the obligations imposed by the right to 
water on State actors. Adopting the quartet of obligations framework, this dissertation 
argued that the human right to water imposes four types of obligations on the State, 
the obligations to respect, the obligations to protect, obligations to fulfill and the 
obligations to promote the right to water.  
The use of typologies as an analytical tool has contributed immensely to the 
further clarification of the obligations that the right to water imposes on States.59 This 
dissertation showed that using the typologies of State obligations as an analytical tool 
has helped to dispel the notion that there are significant differences in the nature of 
various human rights.60 It was argued that, the distinction should rather be between 
different levels of duties applicable in a particular case. Such an analytic model 
provides a better understanding of the scope and content of the right to water and 
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helps to safeguard the right, whether water is provided by the State or a private 
operator.61  
The State‘s duty to protect human rights against violations by private actors is 
an integral component of State duties under human rights treaties and customary 
international law. Drawing from General Comment 15 on the right to water and the 
jurisprudence of international, regional and national courts, chapter 4 highlighted the 
duties the right to water imposes on the State in the context of involving non-State 
actors in the provision of water services.62 The dissertation argued that involvement 
of non-State actors in the provision of water services necessarily implies that a shift 
in emphasis takes place.63 It was argued that, in the context of privatisation schemes, 
the State‘s obligation to protect assumes greater significance.64 The State has an 
obligation imposed by the right to water to protect individuals and communities from 
the deleterious acts of non-State actors. States parties must prevent them from 
compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and 
acceptable water.65 Any arbitrary or unjustified disconnection from water services and 
discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of water constitute violations of 
the State‘s obligation to ensure the realisation of the right to water.66 A State may be 
liable for a breach of its obligations should it fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, 
investigate, punish and remedy breach of the right to water by non-State actors.67 To 
fulfill this protective mandate the State must adopt legislative and other measures to 
regulate and monitor the conduct of non-State actors involved in the provision of 
water services.68 Significantly, the State is further obliged to take measures aimed at 
ensuring access by everyone to water for personal and domestic uses. This 
obligation entails the requirement to adopt special measures in favour of 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups such as subsidies, cross-subsidies, and other 
direct measures of assistance to ensure water access.69 Such safeguards are very 
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significant for the protection of the human right to water in the event of involvement of 
private actors in the provision of water services. 
 One of the questions this dissertation attempted to answer is whether 
international human rights law, in particular the human right to water, is directly 
binding on non-State actors involved in the provision of water services.70 Chapter 5 
questions the efficacy of the State-centric focus of human rights approach discussed 
in chapter 4 and the challenges it poses for holding non-State actors accountable for 
human rights in the era of privatisation and liberalisation.71 It analyses the 
significance of imposing direct obligations on non-State actors under international 
human rights law. Chapter 5 discusses and analyses both existing and emerging 
mechanisms to impose human rights responsibilities on non-State actors and their 
potential for holding corporations responsible for the right to water in privatised 
contexts. These include the provisions of various international human rights 
instruments, domestic legislation, global and other UN-sponsored initiatives as well 
as voluntary corporate codes of conduct and other multi-stakeholder mechanisms.72 
 Recent experiences have demonstrated that non-State actors such as 
corporations can (and often do) abuse human rights such as the right to water. This 
is particularly the case where States are unable or unwilling to reign in such entities. 
Chapter 5 attempted to clarify the human rights obligations and responsibilities of 
such non-State actors given their increasing involvement in the provision of human 
rights sensitive services such as water.  
 Newly independent States initiated the impetus towards imposing direct 
human rights obligations on Multinational Corporations (hereinafter referred to as 
―MNCs‖ in the 1970s.73 These States also wanted to reduce incidences of political 
interference in their domestic affairs by powerful MNCs. A notable incident was the 
involvement of a US entity, ITT Corporation in the overthrow by military coup of 
Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973.74 One of the earliest attempts at 
establishing binding obligations on MNCs was the UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations. The UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
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was the first attempt at the UN level to usher in binding norms to regulate the 
activities of MNCs.75 Disagreements on the content and scope of application of the 
draft code between the industrialised countries and the developing countries resulted 
in failure to adopt the envisaged instrument.76  
A range of initiatives have since been developed in an attempt to impose 
human rights responsibilities on non-States actors. The UN has succumbed to 
pressure to adopt binding norms on MNCs by embarking on initiatives aimed at 
identifying, clarifying and elaborating international human rights responsibilities of 
MNCs as reflected in the UN Framework and Guiding Principles discussed in chapter 
5.77  
This dissertation demonstrated that, in addition to the State‘s duty to protect 
against third party infringement with the right, corporations have human rights 
obligations under the human right to water. This dissertation elaborated that non-
State actors have an obligation to respect the right to water.78 The corporate 
responsibility to respect the right to water means that the corporation must refrain 
from acts or omissions whose effect is to interfere or deprive individuals or groups‘ 
enjoyment of their right to water.79 Significantly, this dissertation argued that the 
private water provider is obliged to carry out a human rights due diligence study to 
become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts on the right to 
water. This process should enable the corporation to identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for any impacts on the right to water as a result of its operations. 
Additionally, a non-State service provider has a responsibility to put into place 
mechanisms that allow individuals and groups to bring alleged human rights abuses 
of the right to water to the attention of the service provider.80 Chapter 5 emphasised 
that a private water services provider has a duty to provide adequate remedy 
whenever a breach of the right to water occurs.81 
This dissertation also analysed emerging voluntary soft law initiatives involving 
corporations, States, non-governmental organisations and inter-governmental 
organisations in an attempt to impose human rights responsibilities on corporations in 
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the absence of binding international standards. The relevance of corporate-driven 
and UN-initiated norms within the context of water privatisation for holding water 
corporations to account for the human right to water was also analysed. Chapter 5 
demonstrated that, despite the limitations posed by the voluntary nature of such 
initiatives, these mechanisms show real promise for strengthening regulation by filling 
regulatory gaps against non-State actors.82 Such mechanisms are valuable 
especially for developing States that are either unwilling or lack essential capacities 
to regulate MNCs.83 This dissertation has demonstrated that these emerging 
mechanisms, if properly harnessed alongside strengthening the domestic legislation 
of States, can play an important role in holding private water providers accountable 
for the human right to water.  
A significant contribution of this dissertation is its development of an 
accountability model designed to ensure that States as well as non-State actors 
involved in the provision of water services have clearly designated roles and 
responsibilities to give effect to the obligations imposed by the human right to 
water.84 Chapter 6 analysed and discussed good practices from different jurisdictions 
such as legal frameworks, national policy initiatives, strategies, plans of action, 
regulatory systems and institutions employed by States and other actors consistent 
with the normative standards imposed by the right to water.85  
 An important aspect of the accountability model developed in chapter 6 is to 
specify in greater detail the concrete substantive and procedural obligations that the 
right to water imposes on States and non-State actors in privatisation scenarios.86 An 
important prong of the model is the State‘s duty to protect against human rights 
abuses of the right to water by third parties, including corporations, through 
appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication. The State has an obligation to 
prevent third parties from threatening access to equal, affordable, sufficient, safe and 
acceptable water.87 The accountability model further emphasised the responsibility of 
water services providers, including non-State actors, to respect the right to water.88 
The duty to respect is broad enough to proscribe the adoption of policies that may 
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result in denial of access by poor communities to safe water, rather than simply 
prohibiting interference with existing access to water services.89  
 Another important aspect of any water privatisation process highlighted in the 
accountability model is the need to consult and enable the participation of individuals 
and groups affected by the water privatisation process.90 The right of individuals and 
groups to be consulted and participate in decision-making processes that may affect 
their exercise of the right to water must be an integral part of any policy, programme 
or strategy concerning water.91 The State must consult and ensure participation of 
communities at different stages of the water privatisation process. Such consultation 
and participation should be integral to the adoption of framework legislation 
governing the provision of water services, the decision whether or not to privatise 
water services, as well as the privatisation process. The accountability model has 
shown that such consultation and participation starts during the initial design phase 
and continues right through construction, implementation and compliance 
monitoring.92  
 The accountability model has also emphasised that the private water provider 
must develop and implement a community consultation and participation plan.93 
Issues that must be discussed and agreed upon during the consultation process 
include the sufficiency, quantity, water quality, regularity of supply, the accessibility, 
as well as the affordability of water services. The corporation‘s consultation with and 
participation of communities affected by the water privatisation agreement provides 
important insights into their perspectives and concerns regarding the corporation‘s 
operations and the implications these have for their human right to water and related 
rights.94 The water services provider must ensure that the consultation and 
participation of affected communities is carried out with particular sensitivity to 
cultural differences and any perceived power imbalances. 
 The CESCR has elaborated in General Comment 15 that individuals and 
groups should, in the formulation and implementation of national water strategies and 
plans, be given full and equal access to information concerning water issues held by 
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public authorities or third parties.95 The accountability model demonstrated that both 
the State and the private water provider have an obligation to ensure equal access to 
full and transparent information concerning water issues held by public authorities or 
third parties.96 Such information must be published in different languages and 
through multiple media (written, spoken) to ensure that everybody is able to access 
public information as equitably as possible. 
The accountability model emphasised the State‘s duty to prevent, investigate, 
and punish abuse of the right to water through adoption of appropriate policies, 
regulations and adjudication mechanisms.97 Access to remedies is critical because 
the right to water may not mean much in the absence of effective remedies for its 
enforcement.98 An effective complaints mechanism is key to the implementation of 
the human right to water. It is an effective tool to ensure that a remedial framework is 
available against abuse of the right to water by water services providers, especially in 
a privatisation scenario. The accountability model emphasises the need for victims of 
water rights abuse to access effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial. Such 
effective remedies should be available, both at the State level and at the corporate 
level. This dissertation also advanced the argument that, alongside judicial 
mechanisms, States should provide effective and appropriate non-judicial complaints 
mechanisms as part of a comprehensive State-based system for the remedy of 
breaches to the right to water.99 In addition, water services providers must provide 
operational-level grievance mechanisms to remedy any breach of the right to 
water.100 The importance of complaints mechanisms located in the corporation is that 
they potentially provide early-stage recourse and resolution of any disputes. Non-
State-based complaints mechanisms may encompass those mechanisms 
administered by a water services provider with other stakeholders, by an industry 
association or a multi-stakeholder group. This dissertation emphasised that while 
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internal remedies will be adequate in many cases, a right of judicial appeal as a last 
resort is indispensable.101 
 This dissertation leaves scope for further in-depth research on certain aspects. 
This study is primarily normative and there is considerable scope for future studies 
on the implementation of the practices discussed in chapter 6 in order to ascertain 
their efficacy in providing adequate protection for the normative components of the 
right to water. Furthermore, this dissertation was confined to an analysis of the 
implications of privatisation of water services for the human right to water. This 
dissertation did not focus on sanitation, which often is associated with water. There is 
emerging literature on sanitation signalling a tentative impetus for its recognition as a 
human right though the issue remains unsettled. There is scope for research in this 
regard. Furthermore, this dissertation focused on the human rights responsibilities of 
corporations involved in the provision of water services, but left the question on the 
potential responsibilities for the right to water of institutions such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks that have been the 
main drivers of water privatisation initiatives. There is scope for research on the 
human rights responsibilities of such entities, if any, with regard to the right to water. 
In conclusion, a significant contribution of this dissertation is its development 
of an accountability model for holding States and non-State actors accountable for 
the right to water. If properly implemented, the model has the potential to give greater 
specification to the normative commitments imposed by the right to water in a 
privatisation scenario as developed in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation. This 
study would have succeeded in its objective if it can contribute towards making sure 
that all public and private actors involved in the privatisation of water services have 
clearly designated roles and responsibilities to give effect to the normative standards 
imposed by the human right to water.  
Delineating these roles and responsibilities in greater detail, as this 
dissertation has sought to do, is significant for four primary reasons. First, it can 
provide detailed guidance to State and non-State actors contemplating or involved in 
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privatisation initiatives in respect of water services. Such guidance is indispensable 
for ensuring that all stages of the privatisation process and its implementation are 
consonant with the normative commitments of water as a human right. Second, 
concrete standards are critical to enabling beneficiaries of the right to water, relevant 
NGOs and other stakeholders to hold State and non-State agencies accountable. 
Effective accountability is in turn indispensable to ensuring that the right to water has 
clear, practical implications in the range of contexts in which water delivery is being 
privatised. Third, such specification of roles and responsibilities may provide 
normative guidance to national courts, administrative tribunals and treaty-supervisory 
bodies in developing their jurisprudence relating to the obligations of States and non-
State actors in a privatisation scenario. Fourth, it can further contribute to the 
development of appropriate legislation regulating water privatisation that gives proper 
effect to the right to water. Such jurisprudence and legislation can in turn enhance 
the further development of the accountability model by providing greater specification 
of the norms and standards imposed by the right to water. It is only through giving 
greater specification to the normative commitments of water as a human right in 
particular contexts such as privatisation scenarios that the right will assume real 
relevance for those it was designed to protect and benefit. 
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